DEMETRIA ESTRADA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. ULDARICO CASEDA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

This case is before this Court for review of a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila reversing the judgment of the municipal court and declaring
that “the plaintiff may not eject the defendant from the premises in
question.”

It appears that on September 5, 1945, plaintiff brought this suit, for
unlawful detainer, alleging that defendant leased from her a part of a dwelling
at a monthly rental of P26; that on August 11, 1945, plaintiff notified
defendant in writing to vacate the premises under lease, because one of her
married daughters was going to occupy them by the first of the following month;
that defendant refused to leave.

On October 13, 1945, Judge Mariano Nable, then of the municipal court, gave
judgment for plaintiff with order for defendant to pay the rent from October 1,
1945, at the rate of P26 a month.

On the case being appealed to the Court of First Instance, defendant filed an
answer alleging as special defense, among others not necessary to the solution
of this appeal, “that the main motive of the plaintiff in bringing the present
action is to oust the defendant and lease the same premises to third parties who
are willing to pay the black market rental.”

In reversing the judgment of the municipal court, the Court of First Instance
of Manila, Judge Rafael Dinglasan presiding, said that “Commonwealth Act No.
689, as amended only provides three grounds for ejecting a lessee or occupant
from a building destined solely for dwelling, namely (1) for willful and
deliberate non-payment of rents, (2) when the lessor has to occupy the building
leased, and (3) when the lessee shall have subleased the building or any part
thereof as dwelling of for dwelling purposes without the written consent of the
proprietor.” None of these contentions, according to the court, was alleged much
less proved. The court correctly held that the fact that the premises under
lease were needed by plaintiff’s married daughter was not comprehended in the
second ground above mentioned.

The above requirements were provided in Commonwealth Act No. 689, which was
approved October 15, 1945. Section 14 of that Act provided that the same “shall
be in force for a period of two years after its approval.” Republic Act No. 66,
approved October 18, 1946, amended section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 689 so as
to read as follows: “Section 14. This Act shall be in force for a period of four
years after its approval.”

When did this four-year period commence to run? Is the present lease still
within this period?

An amended act is ordinarily to be construed as if the original statute had
been repealed, and a new and independent act in the amended form had been
adopted in its stead; or, as frequently stated by the courts, so far as regards
any action after the adoption of the amendment, as if the statute had been
originally enacted in its amended form. The amendment becomes a part of the
original statute as if it had always been contained therein, unless such
amendment involves the abrogation of contractual relations between the state and
others. Where an amendment leaves certain portions of the original act
unchanged, such portions are continued in force, with the same meaning and
effect they had before the amendment. So where an amendatory act provides that
an existing statute shall be amended to read as recited in the amendatory act,
such portions of the existing law as are retained, either literally or
substantially, are regarded as a continuation of the existing law, and not as a
new enactment. (59 C.J., 1096, 1097.)

In accordance with this rule, the provision of Republic Act No. 66 amending
section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 689, related back to, and should be computed
from, the date of the approval of the amended act, that is October 15, 1945. The
period as thus construed expired on October 15, 1949.

The judgment of Judge Dinglasan was correct, but, the period reckoned by the
trial court being now over, our decision is that judgment shall be rendered
ejecting defendant from the house described in the complaint and ordering him to
pay rent at the rate of P26 a month from October 1, 1945. It is so ordered,
without costs.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Montemayor, Reyes, and Torres,
JJ., concur.

MORAN, C. J.:

Mr. Justice Bengzon voted in conformity with this decision.

PADILLA, J.:

I concur in the result. Commonwealth Act No. 689, as amended by Republic Act
No. 66, cannot be given retro-active effect. The cause of action in the case at
bar arose before the passage of the Acts.