LOLITA DE ERIT, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. GEORGE DE ERIT, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR-APPELLANT.
BARRIOS, M. M., J.:
Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
“x x x
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
marriage of Lolita Garcia-De Erit and George De. (sic) Erit as void ab
initio. As a necessary consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner
shall cease using the surname of her husband having lost the right over
the same and so as to avoid a misimpression that she is still the legal
wife of respondent.Furnish a copy of this decision the Office of the
Solicitor-General, the National Statistics Office and the Local Civil
Registrar of Dasmarinas, Cavite so that the appropriate amendment and/or
cancellation of the parties’ marriage can be effected in its registry.
Furnish, likewise, the parties and counsel.SO ORDERED.”
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
Private parties were both nineteen (19) years of age when they
met in 1984. Petitioner-appellee had just graduated high school at the
time, while respondent-appellee was a high school drop-out who was then
serving in church as a “sakristan.” After a short courtship of about
three (3) or four (4) months, respondent-appellee started living with
petitioner-appellee at the home of the latter’s mother.
Petitioner-appellee eventually became pregnant and later gave birth to
Ma. Etchiel de Erit on 01 November 1985. Pressured by
petitioner-appellee’s family and worried about what other people would
say about their arrangement, the couple contracted their marriage on 27
April 1986 when they were just twenty-one (21) years of age. They then
had two (2) more children, George de Erit who was born on 09 September
1987 and Ezekiel de Erit, born on 01 July 1989.
During the early
years of their marriage, both private parties did not have jobs and
depended on petitioner-appellee’s mother and brothers for support.
Petitioner-appellee knew about respondent-appellee’s family background:
they had a bad vice of gambling. She thought, however, that
respondent-appellee was different because he was a sakristan in church.
Unfortunately, respondent-appellee did not want to look for work and
spent time with friends, even when they were already married. When
respondent-appellee did find a job, he would usually gamble away his
earnings. He also had trouble maintaining his job as he usually got
fired for being unable to report for work on time due to his late-night
gambling activities. Even the money petitioner-appellee earned and left
at home for the sustenance of the children was also utilized by
respondent-appellee for gambling.
When petitioner-appellee would
berate respondent-appellee, the latter would slap and hit
petitioner-appellee that caused bruises on her face and body. At one
time, their eldest daughter even witnessed respondent-appellee banging
petitioner-appellee’s head on the wall. Ofterntimes, respondent-appellee
would also hit the children when he was irritated or drunk.
Petitioner-appellee endured the misery she suffered in the hands of her
husband. She grew up without a father; and she did not want her children
to suffer the same fate. But then, after a serious fight in 2002, they
separated. In 2006, petitioner-appellee found out that
respondent-appellee already had a new family.
On 27 September 2010, petitioner-appellee filed a petition before the court a quo
to declare her marriage to respondent-appellee as null and void
grounded on Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Petitioner
presented the Psychological Evaluation Report accomplished by Julian
Montano, Ph.D. which stated that petitioner-appellee was afflicted with a
Dependent Personality Disorder while respondent-appellee had an
Antisocial Personality Disorder. He thus found both of them to be
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of
marriage.
Meanwhile, oppositor-appellant authorized the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor in Imus, Cavite to represent the State. In
this connection, Provincial Prosecutor Rosa Villarin made a report to
the court a quo that she cannot conclusively determine whether collusion
existed because the private parties failed to appear before her during
the scheduled investigation. She was present during the presentation of
petitioner-appellee and Dr. Julian Montano, and was able to
cross-examine both witnesses.
After trial, the court a quo declared the marriage as null and void ab initio in
its assailed Decision dated 02 May 2011. Oppositor-appellant filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the court a quo in an
Order dated 15 August 2011. Oppositor-appellant thus filed the instant
appeal, raising the following as errors:
I.
THIS (sic) COURT A QUO ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE
OF THE PARTIES NULL AND VOID EVEN IF THERE IS NO CONCLUSIVE PROOF OF
NON-COLLUSION BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
II.
THIS (sic) HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE
MARRIAGE OF THE PARTIES NULL AND VOID EVEN IF THE TOTALITY OF THE
EVIDENCE PRESENTED FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE PARTIES’ PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITIES TO PERFORM THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.
The appeal has merit.
At the onset, We immediately note
that the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite has not properly performed the
mandate provided in Article 48 of the Family Code. It directs the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the court “to appear on
behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the
parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.”
To underscore its importance, a simple statement as to whether or not
there is collusion, a pro forma opposition to the petition and a
brief cross-examination of the petitioner’s witnesses, without doing
anything more, is not considered as active participation adequate to
protect the State’s policy to preserve a marriage and prevent its
dissolution at the whim of the parties.[1]
In this instance, the trial prosecutor merely reported that she is not
in a position to determine whether or not collusion exists because both
parties did not report to her. Undoubtedly, the law requires more than
just a superficial effort to perform a legal obligation, especially
since the petitioning spouse and the respondent spouse did not appear,
and furthermore, as there is no opposition nor controverting evidence
that was presented on behalf of the State.
More importantly, the
pieces of evidence presented to support the complaint for annulment are
not sufficient to prove that either spouse is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital covenants. Under Article
36 of the Family Code, the ground for declaration of nullity of marriage
speaks of the downright incapacity or inability of a spouse to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations due to a
serious psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from
understanding and discharging the essential marital obligations. At the
same time, the psychological disorder must be grave, must have existed
at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.[2]
It need be stressed that the law intended to confine the ground of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorders which renders a person utterly incapable of performing or
understanding the significance of marriage. It is not a mere difficulty,
refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations.[3]
In this connection, the Supreme Court has already ruled that a spouse’s
“immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy, maltreatment,
constitutional laziness and abandonment of his family (are)
circumstances (which) cannot be equated with psychological incapacity
within the contemplation of the Family Code.”[4]
These circumstances fall within the ambit of Article 55 of the Family
Code which deals with physical violence, moral pressure, moral
corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like, which are grounds for legal
separation.[5]
We take
note that in the Psychological Evaluation Report submitted by
petitioner-appellee, it is stated that the source of marital
dissatisfaction was primarily rooted in the unsuccessful communication
of intimacy and mutual disclosure. They were “unable to resolve in
mutually satisfying ways their extensive conflicts about their sexual
relationship and financial priorities.”[6]
In the end, the report concluded that petitioner-appellee had a
dependent personality disorder, and that respondent-appellee had an
antisocial personality disorder.
Regrettably, the report did not
explain what these personality disorders ultimately meant in relation to
the ability of private parties to perform the essential marital
obligations. It was only shown that petitioner-appellee had a tendency
to be depressive and pessimistic, that she had a low self-esteem, and
that she had a tendency to be critical, thoughtless and inconsiderate.[7]
As with respondent-appellee, he was described as compulsive, irritable,
irresponsible, non-conformist, and with a reckless disgregard of the
safety of others.[8] Moreover,
the evaluation of respondent-appellee came from interviews conducted on
petitioner-appellee and their children who live with
petitioner-appellee.[9]
Without further corroboration from other sources who may have better
knowledge of respondent-appellee’s character prior to the marriage, it
is not nonsensical to consider that the information Dr. Montano gathered
may have been tainted with bias, and hence, fail to pass the rigid and
stringent level of evidentiary scrutiny required in cases such as the
present action.[10]
To
be sure, this Court does not condone the irrational behavior of
respondent-appellee towards his wife and family. However, the law
defines what psychological incapacity actually means, that such
psychological illness must be present at the inception of the marriage,
and that it must be grave, continuing, and permanent. If the evidence
presented is less than this standard, the presumption must lean in favor
of the validity of marriage.[11]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed Decision dated 02 May 2011 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition dated 27 September 2010 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Reyes, Jr., (Chairperson) and Pizarro, JJ., concur.
[1] Nilda V. Navales v. Reynaldo Navales, G.R. No. 167523, 27 June 2008.
[2] Valerio E. Kalaw v. Ma. Elena Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, 19 September 2011.
[3] Navales, supra note 1.
[4] Republic of the Philippines v. Norma Cuison-Melgar and Eulogio A. Melgar, G.R. No. 139676, 31 March 2006.
[5] Navales, supra note 1.
[6] Records, p.29.
[7] Id., pp.29-32.
[8] Id., pp.32-34.
[9]Id., p.28.
[10] Jose Reynaldo Ochosa v. Bona J. Alano and Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 167459, 26 January 2011.
[11] Benjamin Ting v. Carmen Velez-Ting, G.R. No. 166562, 31 March 2009.