MILAGROS T. ONO, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. SABURO ONO, RESPONDENT,
DICDICAN, J.:
The material and relevant facts of the case, as culled from the record, are as follows:
The petitioner-appellee met the respondent at the residence of her former employer in Quezon City sometime in 1988. After around one week of courtship, the petitioner-appellee and respondent became sweethearts and then eventually got married. On March 30, 1998, they got married in Caloocan City before Reverend Remigio G. Cabading.
After the marriage, the petitioner-appellee and respondent went to Japan where they lived with the latter’s family. Their married life was, however, not a blissful one because the respondent allegedly failed to perform his essential marital obligations. Petitioner-appellee lamented that, upon arrival in Japan, respondent treated her indifferently and became a controlling husband. The respondent had allegedly required the petitioner-appellee to work in the former’s construction business, where the latter would be required to lift heavy things and climb the roof. Petitioner-appellee also stated that the respondent would beat her every time she would fail to complete her task at the construction site and if the latter was in a bad mood.
The petitioner-appellee tried to endure her situation for a period of two years until sometime in 1990. The petitioner-appellee came back to the Philippines through the help of a fellow Filipino in Japan. Petitioner-appellee lost communication with the respondent ever since.
On December 6, 2012, the petitioner-appellee then filed with the court a quo a Petition[2] for the nullification of her marriage to the respondent citing, as a ground thereof, their psychological incapacity to perform their essential marital obligations. In her petition, she averred as follows:
“xxx
“4. Petitioner and respondent are presently separated and have been so since the year 1990. The reason for their separation was the breakdown of their marriage due to psychological incapacity to fulfill and discharge of their respective marital obligations to each other, which psychological incapacity existed
prior to their marriage and manifested itself well during the marriage.
“5. That petitioner and respondent psychological incapacity appears to be incurable. Before the filing of this petition, there was a period of harmonious relationship in their marriage.
“6. That petitioner submitted herself to a psychological and clinical assessment by a trained professional, clinical psychologist Ms. Gemma Marie Alhama.
“7. That respondent’s psychological incapacity was explained in details in the Psychological Evaluation Report hereto attached, marked as annex “B” and made an integral part of this petition.”
Thereupon, the court a quo ordered summons to be published in a newspaper of general circulation, considering that the respondent is a resident of Iwata, Japan. The respondent, however, did not file an answer to the petition.
On January 25, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General entered its appearance as counsel for the Republic of the Philippines and deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of Bangui, Ilocos Norte to attend and/or appear in the proceedings of the case.
Thereafter, the court a quo ordered the Provincial Prosecutor assigned to the case to investigate whether there was collusion between the parties. On July 22, 2013, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor submitted a Manifestation[3] stating therein that, after careful investigation conducted, he honestly believed that no collusion exists between the parties in the case.
Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a Motion for Advance Testimony[4] which the court a quo granted on July 4, 2013. On the same day, the petitioner was presented to the witness stand for direct examination. The testimony of the petitioner was likewise completed and terminated on the same day.
To support her claim that the respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential marital obligations, the petitioner-appellee adduced in evidence the Psychological Evaluation Report[5] as well as the testimony of Gemma Marie Alhama (Alhama), the psychologist who conducted the test.
Alhama executed a Judicial Affidavit[6] wherein she stated that the petitioner-appellee is not suffering from any personality dysfunction based on the clinical in-depth interview and battery of psychological tests that she conducted on the petitioner-appellee[7].
On the other hand, Alhama considered the respondent to be psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations based on the data that she gathered from the petitioner-appellee and collateral informants. Alhama stated that the respondent appeared to be suffering from psychological conditions known as Antisocial Personality Traits and Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
Alhama explained in her judicial affidavit that the Antisocial Personality Trait is a specific kind of personality disorder that is characterized by a pervasive pattern of violating others and breaking social norms and regulations. This particular disorder was shown by the respondent’s arrogance, lack of empathy and by being righteous. Allegedly, respondent’s failure to create a safe and sound environment for his wife (petitioner-appellee) showed this particular disorder. Respondent also failed to make amends for his shortcomings and remained to be evasive, as if everything he did was right. The narcissistic personality of the respondent was shown by the respondent’s lack of interest in fulfilling his duties as a married man. Respondent was also insensitive to the needs of other people, especially of the petitioner-appellee. Respondent deprived the petitioner not only of economic freedom but of her freedom to express herself[8].
On September 10, 2013, the court a quo rendered the appealed decision granting petitioner-appellee’s petition, as follows:
“xxx
“In this case, the Court is convinced, that the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence and witnesses presented considered in their entirety, sufficiently established that the defendant’s acts amount to enumerate (sic) and reckon a severe psychological incapacity which debilitate him to perform his essential marital obligations to his wife.
“Evidently, defendant performs an unimaginable act as a husband when he finally unclothed or bared his true identity of being self-centered, insensitive and neglectful in fulfilling the demands of his marriage or marital obligations which he unequivocally show or demonstrate to his wife by performing an act which is unbearable to the plaintiff especially that she dreamed, wants or desired to have a happy family life. Her desire to raise an ecstatic family indeed disappeared like a smoke in the air because of the incongruous and excruciating deed and character of herein defendant. Defendant’s unmindful, heedless and selfish characteristics robbed her of her essence of becoming a wife by making or considering her as his hostage and slave wherein he could do whatever he wants without her permission or against her will. All expectations and reveries vanished because of a psychotic husband.
” x x x
“Applying the case of Azcueta vs. Republic of the Philippines and Court of Appeals, in the instant case, the Court is inclined to grant the petition It is wisely stated therein, to wit:
‘In dissolving bonds on account of either party’s psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of families but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociophatic personality anomaly. Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.’
“Thus, the Court finds the complaint to be impressed with merit. The defendant failed in his personal obligations to the petitioner to whom he owes love respect, and fidelity. The plaintiff should not be bound to continue a marriage that has not worked and will not work because of the psychological incapacity of her husband brought by his wicked orientation, his lack of manhood by enslaving his wife for unreasonable basis or explanation and his being.
“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the complaint is hereby GRANTED as judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage contracted by plaintiff MILAGROS T. ONO to defendant SABURO ONO solemnized on March 30, 1988 in Caloocan City, Manila, Philippines NULL and VOID pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
” x x x
“SO ORDERED.”
On October 8, 2013, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Motion for Reconsideration[9] of the foregoing decision. The said motion was, however, denied by the court a quo in its November 26, 2013 Order[10].
Hence, on January 2, 2014, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Notice of Appeal[11] which was given due course by the court a quo on January 20, 2014.
In its Brief for Oppositor-Appellant[12], the Office of the Solicitor General raised these errors purportedly committed by the court a quo:
I.
VENUE WAS IMPROPERLY LAID.II.
THERE WAS NO COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE 48 OF THE FAMILY CODE ON THE ZEALOUS AND ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF THE STATE THROUGH THE OSG.III.
PETITIONER FAILED TO ESTABLISH EXISTENCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.
Apparently, the core issue to be resolved by us in this appealed case is whether the petitioner-appellee was able to prove by sufficient evidence that the respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential marital obligations.
The appeal is meritorious.
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration thereof, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage shall be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will[13]. This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility and duty as a married person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness[14].
A more definitive set of guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code was laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals[15] (the Molina case), as follows:
“(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it ‘as the foundation of the nation.’ It decrees marriage as legally ‘inviolable,’ thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be ‘protected’ by the state.
“The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
“(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
“(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
“(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
“(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
“(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
“(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
“(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.”
Guided by the aforementioned principles, we scrutinized the totality of evidence adduced by petitioner-appellee and found that the same was not enough to sustain a finding that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of his marriage.
In essence, the petitioner-appellee wanted to equate the controlling behavior of her husband as akin to psychological incapacity. The petitioner-appellee, however, failed to establish the root cause of the purported behavior of her husband.
In ruling for the petitioner-appellee, the trial court gave credence to the psychological report prepared by a clinical psychologist, Alhama, to wit:
” x x x
“On the other hand, based on the accounts of petitioner, her psychological protocol, and collateral information, it can be inferred that the subject spouses did not have a meaningful marital relationship. Respondent exhibited maladaptive behaviors that constitute a Narcissistic Personality Disorder and Antisocial Personality Traits.
‘The essential feature of a personality disorder is an enduring pattern of inner experience, and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual’s culture and is manifested in at least two or more of the following areas:
a) Cognition – a deficit in recognizing the essential obligations;
b) Affectivity – deficit in appreciating these obligations;
c) Interpersonal functioning – the inability to relate positively well;
d) Impulse control – chronic and pervasive inability to control one’s destructive behavior’
“This enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a broad range of personal and social situations and leads to duration, and its onset can be traced at least back in early childhood and adolescence and early adulthood.
” x x x
“Respondent is a self-centered individual. He manifested lack of interest in fulfilling his duties. He is insensitive to the needs of other people especially that of his wife. It is also evident that during their marriage, it was only the petitioner who is involved in making their welfare in order. In spite the controlling nature of the respondent, she became submissive even to the point off foregoing her own happiness. She was not only deprived of economic freedom but also deprive of expressing herself. She was abused by the respondent as he took advantage of her ignorance and her lack of education.
“The respondent also took advantage of her helplessness being a stranger in his homeland. Accompanied by his antisocial personality (sic). He repeatedly violated the right of his wife by making her a slave. She was forced to do construction work, a gender defined occupation. Worse, she did not receive any compensation. Respondent did not only violate sound labor practice but it was a form of maltreatment. Her situation almost caused (sic) her sanity and she even thought of ending her life due to her misery.
“The respondent is arrogant, he lacks empathy, and righteous (sic). For the longest time, he did not exert any effort in making amends with his wronged wife. He remained evasive as if everything that he has done was alright. Instead of creating a sound and safe environment for his family, he did the other way around. His wife is no longer comfortable with the situation and environment created.
“He perceives his marriage as a blockage (sic) of his personal objectives and aspirations in life. Thus, he is dismissive and rejecting towards the respondent. He does not give in whenever there is a perceived threat regarding his personal goals. He also promises things that he cannot fulfill at the end. He is a fault finder making her (sic) unappreciative towards the efforts of his wife[16].”
In effect, the psychological report of Alhama recommended that the marriage between the petitioner-appellee and the respondent be dissolved on the account of the psychological incapacity of the latter due to his personality disorders.
Time and again, we have pronounced that the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, with its incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial[17]. While it is true that courts rely heavily on psychological experts for their understanding of the human personality, still the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained, and said incapacity established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial[18]. Likewise, although there is no requirement that a party to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician or a psychologist (as a condition sine qua non), there is nevertheless still a need to prove the psychological incapacity through independent evidence adduced by the person alleging said disorder[19].
In the instant case, the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity, its incapacitating nature and the incapacity itself were not sufficiently explained. The report of Alhama did not present facts or circumstances that could have led to such disorder of the respondent. The report made no mention as to the respondent’s personal circumstances or even a brief description of his family background. The conclusions of Alhama were all based on the information provided by the petitioner-appellee who had all the intention to nullify her marriage with the respondent. The fact that Alhama also interviewed collateral informants is of no moment, as her report did not provide for intrinsic details on how these informants are related to the respondent or even to the petitioner-appellee. Hence, as far as evidence is concerned, the collateral informants should be considered as incompetent witnesses and their alleged statements should be considered as mere hearsay.
Additionally, although there was an indication from the report that the disorders of the respondent could be traced back in his childhood and early adulthood, we however could not find the basis of Alhama in arriving at such conclusion. As previously discussed, neither the report nor the judicial affidavit of Alhama gave a glimpse of respondent’s early life so as to justify her findings. In the same case of Alcazar v. Alcazar[20], the Supreme Court held that:
“Tayag’s psychological report leaves much to be desired and hardly helps petitioner’s cause. It must be noted that Tayag was not able to personally examine respondent. Respondent did not appear for examination despite Tayag’s invitation. Tayag, in evaluating respondent’s psychological state, had to rely on information provided by petitioner. Hence, we expect Tayag to have been more prudent and thorough in her evaluation of respondent’s psychological condition, since her source of information, namely, petitioner, was hardly impartial.
“Tayag concluded in her report that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, traceable to the latter’s experiences during his childhood. Yet, the report is totally bereft of the basis for the said conclusion. Tayag did not particularly describe the ‘pattern of behavior’ that showed that respondent indeed had a Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Tayag likewise failed to explain how such a personality disorder made respondent psychologically incapacitated to perform his obligations as a husband. We emphasize that the burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove that respondent suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that such psychological disorder renders him ‘truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.’ Psychological incapacity must be more than just a ‘difficulty’, a ‘refusal,’ or a ‘neglect’ in the performance of some marital obligations.”
Clearly, the petitioner-appellee failed to adduce the required evidence to declare the respondent psychologically incapacitated to justify the nullification of their marriage.
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. Presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio[21].
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision dated September 10, 2013 and the Order dated November 26, 2013 of Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of the First Judicial Region in Bangui, Ilocos Norte, in Civil Case No. 1674-19 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between herein parties is hereby declared as still subsisting and valid.
SO ORDERED.
[*]Lazaro-Javier, and Paredes, JJ.
[*] Acting Senior Member vice J. Elbinias per Raffle dated November 26, 2014.
[1] Rollo, Annex “2”, pages 37 – 50
[2] Record, pages 1-3.
[3] Record, page 102.
[4] Record, pages 92 – 93.
[5] Record, pages 5 – 16.
[6] Record, pages 103 – 110.
[7] Record, page 105.
[8] Records, page 106.
[9] Record, pages 142 – 150.
[10] Record, pages 160 – 166.
[11] Record, pages 167 – 169.
[12] Rollo, pages 18 – 36
[13] Republic v. The Honorable Court of Appeals & De Quintos, G.R. 159594, November 12, 2012.
[14] Yambao v. Republic, G.R. No. 184063, January 11, 2011.
[15] 335 Phil. 664
[16] Record, pages 12 – 15.
[17] Ligeralde v. Patalinhug, G.R. No. 168796, April 15, 2010.
[18] Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005.
[19] Bier v. Bier, G.R. No. 173294, February 27, 2008.
[20] G.R. No. 174451, October 13, 2009.
[21] Ibid.