PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. NOEL SABATER MALANA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
REYES, JR., J.C., J.:
The facts:
The records show that accused-appellant Noel Sabater Malana was charged with the said offense in an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads as follows:
“That on or about the 1st day of April 2010, which is within the election period and within the ban on carrying of firearms and other deadly weapon in connection with (the) May 10, 2010 national elections and local elections, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously carry and have in his control and possession one (1) knife, a deadly weapon, outside his residence or place of business without prior written authority from the Commission on Elections.
CONTRARY TO LAW” (Records, p. 1)
During arraignment on May 6, 2010, accused-appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charge against him. Trial on the merits ensued where the prosecution presented PO3 Efren de los Santos (PO3 delos Santos) together with PO2 Efren Pascua Mimis and PO2 Bernard Merdegia as winesses. Meanwhile, the defense presented accused-appellant as one of the witnesses together with Antonio Navarro (Navarro), Arvin Mercado (Mercado) and Gilbert Tolentino (Tolentino).
On April 1, 2010 around 1:00 o’clock in the morning, PO3 Efren delos Santos together with PO2 Efren Mimis and PO2 Bernard Merdegia were patrolling along Marcos Alvarez Avenue when a concerned citizen reported a stabbing incident along said street. On their way to where the reported incident took place, they saw accused-appellant running towards Sta. Rita Street with a knife in his left hand which caused them to arrest him. PO3 delos Santos alighted from the patrol to arrest accused-appellant who did not resist so they went to the precinct after his constitutional rights were reiterated to him.
While they were heading towards the precinct, a witness informed them that accused-appellant’s victim, Angelito Blanca was brought to Las Piñas Medical Center for medical treatment. However, the victim later passed away. After the incident was recorded in the police blotter, accused-appellant was brought to the Las Piñas District Hospital for medical examination. Accused-appellant was then turned over to the police station for further investigation and the apprehending officers executed a Complaint and Joint Affidavit of Arrest.
On the other hand, accused-appellant testified that on April 1, 2010 he had a drinking spree with his friends Navarro, Mercado and Tolentino. As they were leaving the beerhouse at around 1:00 o’clock in the morning, they came across two (2) dispatchers asking for money to buy alcohol. Accused-appellant declared that he answered back saying that they spent their money during the drinking session. Consequently, one of the two men punched accused-appellant then Navarro and Mercado ran away. Tolentino was able to catch accused-appellant before he could fall on the ground. Accused-appellant grappled for the knife which one of the men was holding and he ran farther as four (4) more men arrived throwing stones at him. As soon as the men caught up with accused-appellant, the latter accidentally stabbed Angelito Blanca. Accused-appellant also claims that it was done out of self-defense.
The RTC was not persuaded with the testimonies of the defense as they had inconsistencies in their narrations as to how the incident really happened. Hence, on May 11, 2012, the RTC rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds the accused NOEL SABATER MALANA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of the Omnibus Election Code and he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one (1) year of imprisonment as minimum to two (2) years of imprisonment as maximum, not subject to probation; and he shall suffer DISQUALIFICATION to hold public office and DEPRIVATION of the right of suffrage.
SO ORDERED.” (Records, p. 360)
Dissatisfied, accused-appellant filed an appeal in this Court with the following assigned errors:
I.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING SABATER DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING SABATER DESPITE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE DEFENSE WITNESSES.III.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING SABATER DESPITE HIM BEING ABLE TO JUSTIFY HIS POSSESSION OF THE BLADED WEAPON.
Accused-appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He avers that the RTC was mistaken in not giving credence to the testimonies of the defense witnesses. He argues that he should not be held liable for the possession of the knife as he only acted in self-defense from the unlawful aggression exerted by the victim.
The appeal is without merit.
After a thorough review of the records, this Court is of the view that the RTC is correct in its findings of fact. Indeed, the testimonies of the defense witnesses, as found by the RTC, are in conflict with each other. Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. In addition, the question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to determine. For this reason, its observations and conclusions are accorded great respect on appeal. (Abenes v. Court of Appeals, 515 SCRA 690 [2007])
The trial court’s assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight. It is conclusive and binding unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has not been considered. (People v. Barde, 631 SCRA 187[2010]). Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, or that the judge acted arbitrarily, his assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves high respect by appellate courts. (People v. Corpuz, 482 SCRA 435 [2006]) Thus, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the lower court that accused-appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 261 (q) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 32 of R.A. 7166 for possession of a dangerous weapon.
The different version of the defense witnesses on the surrounding circumstances of the incident negates his claim of innocence. The testimonies of the defense witnesses on how the incident happened differs on material points such as: a) the number of dispatchers who extorted money; b) on whether there were other persons who arrived to help the dispatchers; c) the number of the persons who pursued the group of accused-appellant and the weapons they were holding; and more importantly d) whether or not accused appellant immediately stabbed the victim or the victim was stabbed after the group of accused-appellant were pursued.
Antonio Navarro testified that he saw the incident 5 to 7 meters away while accused-appellant was accompanied by Arvin Mercado. Three (3) men were trying to extort money from accused-appellant and punched the latter. One of the men pulled out a knife, but, accused-appellant was able to get hold of the knife and immediately stabbed the person attacking him.
Gilbert Tolentino testified that he was with accused-appellant and Arvin Mercado when two (2) men asked them for liquor. When they refused, one of the men suddenly punched accused-appellant. The other men suddenly pulled out a knife which however, accused-appellant was able to get possession of. Suddenly six (6) more men arrived, and he recalled that he warned accused-appellant to run away as the men approaching him were armed with broken bottles. The armed men pursued them and Tolentino revealed that he witnessed accused-appellant stab the victim who was about to hit him with a broken bottle.
Arvin Mercado testified that after they were going out of the place where they had a drinking session they were met by three (3) men asking for money. When they replied that they have no money, the men punched them. Suddenly, a bladed weapon was pulled out by one of their enemies and accused-appellant grappled for the possession of the knife. In the course of which, accused-appellant stabbed the man. Immediately thereafter, the policemen arrived. However, on cross-examination, Mercado changed his testimony and stated that he and accused-appellant ran away after the latter stabbed the victim.
Although, the witnesses for the defense were one in saying that accused-appellant Noel grappled with the victim Blanca to get hold of the knife then accidentally stabbed the latter. However, their testimonies as to how the circumstances surrounding the incident differs on material points. According to accused-appellant and Tolentino only two (2) dispatchers extorted money from them and a fight ensued between them where accused-appellant got hold of the knife of one of the dispatchers. Accused-appellant testified that Four (4) more men arrived throwing stones at them while Tolentino testified that Six (6) more men armed with broken bottles arrived causing them to run away. The armed men pursued them. When the men pursuing them caught up and came near accused-appellant, the latter accidentally stabbed the victim. It is also to be noted that accused-appellant testified that it was Tolentino who held him after he was punched, but Navarro claimed that only Mercado was with accused-appellant.
The other defense witnesses Mercado and Navarro, testified that there were three (3) men extorting money from accused-appellant. A fight ensued and someone drew a knife. Accused-appellant struggled for the possession of the knife, in the course of which the former immediately stabbed the victim Blanca.
Furthermore, the version of the defense on how accused-appellant came to possession of the knife is questionable. There was no evidence, other than the self serving testimonies of the defense witnesses, that the knife belonged to victim Blanca. As aptly ruled by the RTC in its decision, thus:
“However, according to the accused, the prosecution failed to controvert the evidence presented by the defense that the accused did not own or possess the knife in question. The accused insists that it was during the fight which ensued between his group and the dispatchers that he was able to wrest it from the owner. He feared for his life so he grappled with the owner for possession thereof. He points to the fact that he presented witnesses who testified that the knife was owned by the victim.
The court is not persuaded. The evidence on record does not support the accused’s claim that the knife belonged to the deceased BLANCA. There is no clear proof that the accused struggled with the victim to obtain possession of the knife. The court, in fact finds nothing on record which would show that NOEL sustained any injuries or defense wounds resulting from the struggle he had with the victim for possession of the knife.” (Records, p. 357)
Hence, it cannot be disputed that accused-appellant had animus possidendi. Animus possidendi is a state of mind, and is thus to be determined on a case-to-case basis by taking into consideration the prior and contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances. It may and must be inferred usually from the attendant events in each particular case. (People v. Lagata, 404 SCRA 671[2003]) Upon the prosecution presenting to the trial court of the facts and circumstances from which to infer the existence of animus possidendi, it becomes incumbent upon the defense to rebut the inference with evidence that the accused did not exercise power and control of the illicit thing in question, and did not intend to possess the same. For that purpose, a mere allegation of the accused-appellant that he was able to wrest for the possession of the knife and acted in self defense is insufficient, and animus possidendi is then presumed to exist on his part because he was thereby shown to have performed an act (possession of a dangerous weapon) that the law prohibited and punished.
The charge of violating Section 261 (q) of B.P. Blg. 881, as amended, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code provides:
“Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
(q) Carrying firearms outside residence or place of business. — Any person who, although possessing a permit to carry firearms, carries any firearms outside his residence or place of business during the election period, unless authorized in writing by the Commission: Provided, That a motor vehicle, water or air craft shall not be considered a residence or place of business or extension hereof.
xxx xxx xxx”
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166 (R.A. No. 7166), amending Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, provides:
‘SEC. 32. Who May Bear Firearms. — During the election period, no person shall bear, carry or transport firearms or other deadly weapons in public places, including any building, street, park, private vehicle or public conveyance, even if licensed to possess or carry the same, unless authorized in writing by the Commission. The issuance of firearm licenses shall be suspended during the election period.”
Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166 is clear and unequivocal that the prohibited act to which this provision refers is made up of the following elements: 1) the person is bearing, carrying, or transporting firearms or other deadly weapons; 2) such possession occurs during the election period; and, 3) the weapon is carried in a public place. Under said provision, it is explicit that even if the accused can prove that he is holding a valid license to possess such firearm, this circumstance by itself cannot exculpate him from criminal liability.
In the case at bench, the aforementioned elements were present. First, accused-appellant was apprehended while in possession of a bladed weapon. In fact, accused-appellant admitted that he was in possession of the dangerous weapon at the time the police arrested him. Second, the incident happened on April 1, 2010, when the Comelec ban on firearms and deadly weapon was in force because of the local and national election held on May 10, 2010. Third, in view of the afore-stated provisions, the burden to adduce evidence that accused is exempt from the Comelec ban on firearms and deadly weapon lies with the accused. However, accused-appellant did not present any exemption issued by the Comelec.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The May 11, 2012 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 198 convicting herein accused-appellant Noel Sabater Malana guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 261 (q) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 32 of R.A 7166 in Criminal Case No. 10-0357 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Lopez, M.V., and Inting, S.B., JJ., concur.