MANUEL DIVINAGRACIA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA AND DON BOSCO TECHNICAL INSTITUTE, INC., RESPONDENTS.

Original
action of prohibition and injunction to restrain the Court of First
Instance of Manila from further proceedings in Civil Case No. 43192
thereof, entitled “Don Bosco Technical Institute, Inc. vs. The
Workmen’s Compensation Commission et al.,” and to annul and set aside a
writ of preliminary injunction therein issued.

Respondent Don
Bosco Technical Institute, Inc, hereafter referred to as the Institute
is a duly registered non-stock corporation, organized in accordance
with the laws of the Philippines. As such it operates two shops, in one
of which tables, chairs and other furniture are manufactured. While
working in this shop on February 28, 1957, Manuel Divinagracia, a
carpenter by occupation, had an accident, in consequence of which he
lost the use of one eye, with the danger of affecting the other eye by
sympathetic opthalsia. Divinagracia having filed a claim for
compensation therefor, Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor
rendered, on December 19, 1957, after due hearing, a decision
sentencing the Institute to pay him the aggregate sum of P2,909.27-less
P378.10, already advanced to him as compensation and surgical expenses,
aside from requiring the Institute to pay P30.00 as fees of said
office. This award was, on appeal taken by the Institute, affirmed, on
August 17, 1959, by the Chairman of the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, whose decision was, on motion for reconsideration of said
Institute, affirmed in a resolution of the Commission, sitting en banc,
dated January 6, 1960, Thereupon, the Institute appealed by certiorari
to the Supreme Court, where the case was docketed as G. R. No. L-16500,
entitled “Don Bosco Technical Institute vs. Workmen’s
Compensation Commission and Manuel Divinagracia”, which, by resolution
of January 21, 1960, was dismissed upon the ground “that the questions
involved are factual and there is no merit in the petition”. Twice the
Institute sought a reconsideration of this resolution, but to no avail.
The aforementioned decision of the Commission having thus become final
and executory, the Commission issued; on May 6, 1960, the corresponding
writ of execution.

Soon thereafter, or on May 19, 1960, the
Institute commenced said Civil Case No. 43192 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, against the Commission, the Sheriff of Manila, the
Philippine Trust Company and Manuel Divinagracia, to annul the said
decision and writ of execution of the Commission, upon the ground that
it had neither jurisdiction to entertain Divinagracia’s claim for
compensation nor authority to issue said writ of execution. In its
complaint in said case the Institute prayed, also for a writ of
preliminary injunction, which was issued by the Court of First Instance
of Manila on May 21, 1960. Divinagracia moved to dismiss the case, but,
by an order dated September 19, 1960, said Court deferred the
resolution of the motion until after trial on the merits.

On
November 7, 1960, Divinagracia commenced the present action for
prohibition and injunction, against the Court of First Instance of
Manila and the Instituce for the purpose indicated above upon the
theory that, inasmuch as the decision of the Commission in his favor
bad already become final and executory, respondent Court had exceeded
its jurisdiction in suspending the execution of said decision. Upon the
filing of the petition herein we issued a writ of preliminary
injunction commanding respondent Court to refrain from trying and
deciding said Civil Case No. 43192, until further orders.

The
Institute, maintains that the Commission was without jurisdiction to
hear divinagracia’s claim because said Institute is a non-profit,
religios, charitable, educational corporation to which the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, allegedly, does not apply, and that the Commission’s
decision-thereon and the writ for the execution thereof are
accordingly, null and void.

It appears, however, that, upon
the presentation of said claim for compensation, the Institute filed an
answer contesting the applicability thereto of the Workmens’s
Compensation Act, for the reason that the Institute is a religious,
charitable, educational and non-profit institution; that upon the
rendition of the decision or award of the Regional Office No. 3 of the
Department of Labor, which, in effect, overruled this objection, the
Institute appealed to the Commission and then filed therein, on October
28, 1958, a motion to dismiss based upon the alleged lack of
jurisdiction of said Commission; that this motion was virtually denied
in the decision of the Chairman of the Commission, dated August 17,
1959, which held that students had nothing to do with the shop in which
Divinagracia worked and suffered the injury upon which his claim is
based, and that said shop was established by the Institute for
profit-making purposes; that on motion for reconsideration of said
decision, based upon the theory that the evidence of record did not
support these findings, the same were affirmed by the Commission on and
that in its aforementioned appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court,
the Institute contended “that the Honorable Workmen’s Compensation
Commission erred in finding that jurisdiction can be acquired over the
petitioner and the respondent claimant on the ground that the former is
organized and operated for gain and/or profit”.

In other
words, said alleged lack of jurisdiction of the Commission was invoked
at all stages of the original proceedings and had been overruled upon
the ground among others, that the shop in which Divinagracia worked and
suffered the injury in question was operated for profit, not for
religious,charitable or educational purposes. Regardless of the
accuracy of this finding, the same is now conclusive insofar as
Divinagracia and the Institute are concerned. The inevitability of this
conclusion becomes more apparent when we consider that said finding was
explicitly assailed in the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. L-16500
of this Court and in the motions for reconsideration therein filed by
the Institute, and that said petition was dismissed for lack of merit
and the aforementioned motions for reconsideration were denied by this
Court. The character of the Institute, insofar as Divinagracia’s claim
is concerned, and the jurisdiction of the Commission to pass upon the
same, as well as the legality of its aforementioned decision thereon
are, therefore, res adjudicata and no longer subject to review by any court.

However,
the disputed writ of execution is null and void, for the power to issue
such writ is judicial in nature, and cannot be vested in administrative
bodies, like the Commission. Indeed, the procedure for the enforcement
of an award is set forth in section 51 of the Workmen’s Compensation
Act, reading:

“Any party in interest may
file in any court of record in the jurisdiction of which the accident
occurred a certified copy of a decision of any referee or the
Commissioner, from which no petition for review or appeal has been
taken within the time allowed therefor, as the case may be, or a
certified copy of a memorandum of agreement duly approved by the
Commissioner, whereupon the court shall render a decree or judgment in
accordance therewith and notify the parties thereof.

“The
decree or judgment shall have the same effect, and all proceedings in
relation thereto shall thereafter be the same, as though, the decree or
judgment had been rendered in a suit duly heard and tried by the court,
except that there shall be no appeal therefrom.

“The
Commissioner shall, upon application by the proper party or the Court
before which such action is instituted, issue a certification that no
petition for review or appeal within the time prescribed by section
forty-nine hereof has been taken by the respondent.”

Hence, in Pastoral vs.
The Commissioners of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, L-12903
(July 31, 1961), we expressed the following view, which has been
reiterated in Community Sawmill Co. vs. The Workmen’s Compensation Commission, et al., infra, p. 753):

“It would appear evident, therefore, that the powers given to the
W.C.C. by the Reorganization Acts, cannot validly include the power to
amend Sec. 51 of the Workmen’s Compensation Law, heretofore quoted, for
to do so would be to diminish the jurisdiction and the judicial power
and functions vested by law on the courts of record, by virtue of said
section, to issue or order a writ of execution by the promulgation of a
judgment, which power or authority the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission never had, before the Reorganization Acts had been passed.
Where the inquiry to be made involves questions of law as well as
facts, where it affects a legal right, and where the decision may
result in the terminating or destroying that right, the powers to be
exercised and the duties to be discharged are essentially judicial (11
Am. Jur. 904); and being judicial, such powers are granted to or vested
upon a court or judicial tribunal (Rhode Island vs. Mass, 37
U.S. [12 Peters] 657, 738 L. ed, [U.S.] 1233, 1266), And there is no
gain saying the fact, that under this concept, an order for the
execution of a decision or award of the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission is essentially a judicial power or function of the court.”

For
this reason, respondent court did not err in taking cognizance of Civil
Case No. 43192 thereof and in issuing therein the writ of preliminary
injunction complained of.

Wherefore, the petition in this
case is dismissed, and the writ of preliminary injunction therein
issued hereby dissolved, without costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.