ALLIED FREE WORKER’S UNION (PLUM) ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. JUDGE MANUEL ESTIPONA, ETC. ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

On
November 5, 1960, a decision was rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Lanao del Norte in Civil Case No. 577 declaring the
arrastre contract entered into between plaintiff Compañia Maritima and
defendant Allied Free Workers’ Union terminated and of no force and
effect as of August 31, 1954, ordering defendants therein to pay
jointly and severally to plaintiff damages in the amount of
P520,000.00, and enjoining perpetually said union, its members, agents
or representatives from enforcing said contracts as well as molesting
or harassing the aforesaid plaintiff. It was likewise ordered that in
case defendant union should appeal it should put up a supersedeas bond in
the aforesaid amount of P520,000.00 to stay the execution of the
judgment.

Upon receipt of said decision, defendants filed a
motion for reconsideration contending that the same is contrary to law
and the evidence, and that in any event the case was beyond the
jurisdiction of the court because at the time said decision was
rendered there were already pending two labor disputes involving the
same parties and issues before the Court of Industrial Relations.

On
December 21, 1960, while said motion was pending consideration, or
before any action could be taken there on by the court, plaintiff
Compañia Maritima filed an urgent motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution alleging that should the decision be not immediately executed
plaintiff would continue suffering damages that might be irreparable to
its business and vessels aside from the fact that the appeal that
defendants were taking was frivolous and manifestly intended only for
delay, invoking to that effect Sections 2 and 4, Rule 39, and Section
10, Rule 60, of the Rules of Court. This motion was vigorously objected
to by defendants on the ground that the same is premature, their motion
for reconsideration not having been acted upon yet by the court, and
that the execution of the decision at that time would prejudice the
fundamental rights of the members of the union that are involved in two
labor disputes then pending in the Court of Industrial Relations which
under the Magna Carta of Labor has exclusive jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case in question.

On the same date,
December 21, 1960, because of the absence of the judge then presiding
over the court of first Instance that rendered the decision, counsel
for plaintiffs Compañia Maritima submitted his motion for execution
to the Municipal Court of Iligan City, which at the same time was the
municipal court of the capital of the province, with the request that
the same be acted upon by it pursuant to the provisions of the
Judiciary Act, as amended, in view of the absence of the district
judge. Notwithstanding, the opposition interposed by defendants, the
municipal judge entered an order on January 6, 1961 granting the motion
insofar as the portion of the decision which enjoins defendants from
enforcing the arrastre contract is concerned, invoking in support of
its action Section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in connection
with pertinent provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by
Republic Act No. 2613.

Within one hour from receipt of this
order as well as the writ issued in connection there with, defendants
filed a motion for reconsideration alleging lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the municipal court, and said motion having been denied,
defendants interposed the present petition for certiorari.

There
is no question that in certain cases that call for an urgent action
when the district judge who presides the court that has jurisdiction
over a case is absent the justice of the peace or municipal judge of
the capital of the province may exercise within the province an
interlocutory jurisdiction in the same manner as the court of first
instance, “which shall be held to include the hearing of all motions
for the appointment of a receiver, for temporary injunctions, and for
all other orders of the court which are not final in their character
and do not involve a decision of the case of its merits, and the
hearing of petitions for a writ of habeas corpus” (Section 88,
Judiciary Act of 1948). But, as may be noted, this jurisdiction is
merely interlocutory, as it merely includes orders which are not final
in character, or do not involve a decision on the merits. If the order
is not interlocutory, then it is beyond the jurisdiction of the
municipal judge acting as a judge of first instance.

In our
opinion, the order of execution issued by the municipal judge of Iligan
City is not merely interlocutory but final in character because its
purpose is to enforce a decision on the merits rendered in the main
case. It is true that the order only covers a portion of the decision
which refers to the permanent injunction directed against defendant
labor union, nevertheless, it is final just the same for its effect is
to put an end to that portion of the decision. An order or a judgment
is deemed final when it finally disposes of the pending action so that
nothing more can be done with it in the trial court (Mejia vs. Alimorong, 4 Phil., 572; Insular Government vs. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Segovia, 17 Phil., 487; People vs.
Makaraig, 54 Phil., 904). In other words, a final order or judgment is
that which gives an end to the litigation (Olsen and Company vs.
Olsen, 48 Phil., 238). Consequently, when the order or judgment does
not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be done upon
the merits, it is merely interlocutory. In the instant case, the order
issued by the municipal judge is final because it puts an end to the
case by the enforcement of the decision of the trial court.

Another
reason that renders the order of execution legally ineffective is that,
according to the very order, the same is predicated upon Section 2 of
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides that, while the court may
issue, in the exercise of its discretion, an order of execution before
the expiration of the time to appeal, it must however state therein the
special reasons which may justify its issuance. These reasons do not
appear in the order herein disputed.

Wherefore, petition, is
granted. The orders issued by respondent municipal judge dated January
6 and 9, 1961, as well as the writ of execution issued on January 6,
1961 are hereby set aside, with costs against respondent Compañia
Maritima.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs in the result.