THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. ROSENDO RESUELLO, ET AL., DEFENDANTS, ROSENDO RESUELLO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

People versus Resuello

The Case

The People of the Philippines, through the Provincial Fiscal, appeal against Rosendo Resuello and his co-accused, who were charged with estafa before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. The information alleged that Resuello, as President and General Manager of the Security Credit and Acceptance Corporation, and his co-defendants as officers of the same entity, received for deposit from Florentina G. Limpin the amount of eight hundred pesos, with the obligation to return and deliver the amount so deposited upon demand, and that instead of complying they misapplied, misappropriated, and converted the money to their own personal use and benefit, despite repeated and insistent demands. The trial court quashed the information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, holding that the liability of the accused was purely civil in nature. The case matters because it is a procedural ruling on the remedy available to the State after a trial court dismisses a criminal case on a pure question of law, and on how the Supreme Court treats a belated objection to the wrong mode of appeal.

Procedural History

The information for estafa was filed with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. On June 24, 1968, Resuello filed a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. After hearing the parties, the trial court, in its order of October 10, 1968, sustained the motion and dismissed the case, with costs de oficio, upon the ground that the liability of the defendant and his co-accused was purely civil in nature.

In due time the Provincial Fiscal appealed from the order of dismissal by filing the corresponding notice of appeal, and on April 21, 1969 the State filed its brief. On July 5, 1969, instead of filing his brief, the accused appellee filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the order appealed from is not appealable and has become final and executory, invoking Section 17 of the Judiciary Act, as amended by Republic Act Number 5440, which took effect on September 9, 1968, more than one month before the perfection of the appeal. The case reached the Supreme Court by that appeal, and the Court resolved the motion to dismiss.

Facts

Florentina G. Limpin deposited eight hundred pesos with the Security Credit and Acceptance Corporation. The information alleged that Rosendo Resuello, as President and General Manager, and his co-defendants as officers of the same entity, received the deposit with the obligation to return and deliver the amount upon demand.

According to the information, the accused did not comply. Instead, with intent of gain and to defraud, and with grave abuse of confidence and by means of deceit, they wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously misapplied, misappropriated, and converted the money to their own personal use and benefit, and despite repeated and insistent demands failed and refused to return or deliver the amount.

Resuello moved to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case, ruling that the liability was purely civil. The State appealed, and the appellee then moved to dismiss the appeal as the wrong remedy.

Issues

• Whether or not the order of dismissal may be the subject of an appeal, or whether the proper remedy is a petition for review on certiorari.
• Whether or not the appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal should be denied on the ground of laches.

Applicable Provisions

Section 17 of the Judiciary Act, as amended by Republic Act Number 5440, governs the mode of review of decisions of the Court of First Instance, and the appellee invoked it to argue that only a question of law was raised and that the remedy was a petition for review on certiorari:

Section 17. Appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided, in all cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto; in all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue; in all cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved; and in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment.

The provision bears on the case because it determines whether the State should have appealed or instead filed a petition for review on certiorari.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court denied the motion to dismiss. It held that in cases similarly situated, and as long as the steps formerly required for the perfection of an appeal were taken in due time, it has adopted the policy of giving due course to the appeal, without prejudice to requiring the appellant to file the necessary petition for review by certiorari, which is also a form of appeal. The Court thus did not treat the choice of remedy as fatal where the appellant had acted promptly under the former procedure.

On the second issue, the Court found the appellee guilty of laches. The records showed that the appellee, through counsel, appears to have received copies of the brief filed by the State on April 23, 1969. On May 22 of the same year, his attorneys of record filed a motion for first extension of time to file their brief, which the Court granted on May 27, 1969. Again on June 20, 1969, his attorneys filed a motion for second extension for the same purpose, which the Court also granted on June 25 of the same year. It was only on July 5, 1969 that the motion to dismiss was filed. These facts showed that the appellee was guilty of laches.

Doctrine

First, where the steps formerly required for the perfection of an appeal were taken in due time, the Supreme Court will give due course to the appeal, without prejudice to requiring the appellant to file the necessary petition for review by certiorari, which is also a form of appeal. The mode of review under Section 17 of the Judiciary Act, as amended, is not applied with rigid finality against a party who perfected an appeal in good time.

Second, a party who seeks extensions of time to file his brief and then belatedly moves to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the order appealed from is not appealable is guilty of laches. The objection to the remedy comes too late when the movant has already submitted to the Court's processes.

Disposition

The motion to dismiss the State's appeal was denied, but the appellant was required to file within ten days from notice the necessary petition for review, and the appellee was required to file his brief within the reglementary period counted from notice of that petition for review.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that the Supreme Court will give due course to an appeal perfected in due time under the former procedure, without prejudice to requiring a petition for review by certiorari, which is also a form of appeal. Examiners use this case on the proper remedy from a dismissal of a criminal case on a pure question of law, and on laches as a bar to a belated motion to dismiss an appeal.