THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. ROSENDO RESUELLO, ET AL., DEFENDANTS, ROSENDO RESUELLO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

The information (for estafa)
filed with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in Criminal Case No. 5232
against Rosendo Resuello and others alleged that Rosendo Resuello, as President
and General Manager of the Security Credit and Acceptance Corporation,
and his co-defendants, as
officers of the same entity, had
“received for deposit from FLORENTINA G. LIMPIN the amount of EIGHT HUNDRED (P800.00) PESOS, with the
obligation, on the part of the accused to return and deliver the amount so deposited
upon demand the said accused far from complying
with the said obligation, conspiring together and mutually helping and aiding
one another, with intent of gain and to defraud and with grave abuse of
confidence and by means of deceit, once in possession of the said money, did
then and there wilful­ly, unlawfully and feloniously misapply, misappropriate
and convert to their own personal use and
benefit the said amount of EIGHT HUNDRED
(P800.00) PESOS, end in spite of repeated
and insistent demands made on the said accused to return and deliver the money,
said accused failed and refused and still fail and refuse to return or deliver
the said amount of P800.00, to the damage and prejudice of the said FLORENTINA
G. LIMPIN in the aforesaid amount, Philip­pine currency”.

On June 24, 1968 Resuello filed a motion to quash the information
on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.  After hearing the parties, the court, in its
order of October 10, 1968, sustained the motion aforesaid and, as a result,
dismissed the case, with costs de oficio, upon the ground that the liability of
the defendant and his co-accused was purely civil in nature.

In due time the Provincial Fiscal appealed from the order of
dismissal by filing the corresponding notice of appeal, and on April 21, 1969
the State filed its brief claiming therein that the trial court committed the
follow­ing errors:

“I.    The lower court erred in considering the
transaction involved as a simple loan;

“II.   The lower court erred in concluding that the
relationship between the accused-defendant and the complaining witness is one
of creditor and debtor;

“III.  The lower court likewise erred in resolving
that defendant’s liability is only civil, not criminal; and

“IV. The lower court finally erred in quashing the
information on the ground that the facts alleged do not charge an
offense.”

On July 5, 1969, instead of filing his brief, the accused
appellee filed a motion to dismiss the appeal “on the ground that the
order appealed from is not appealable and has become final and executory”,
claiming in this con­nection that under Section 17 of the Judiciary Act, as
amended by Republic Act No. 5440 – which took effect on September 9, 1968, or
more than one month before the perfection of the appeal – the remedy of appeal
does not lie from the trial court’s order of dismissal since only a question of
law is sought to be reviewed, the proper remedy
being, therefore, a petition for review on certiorari.

The motion to dismiss must be denied.  In cases similarly situated, and as long as
the steps formerly required for the perfection of an appeal were taken in due
time, we have adopted the policy of giving due course to the appeal, without
prejudice to requiring the appel­lant to file the necessary petition for review
by certiorari – which is also a form of appeal.

Moreover, appellee, through counsel, appears to have received
copies of the brief filed by the State on April 23, 1969.  On May 22 of the same year, his attor­neys of
record filed a motion for first extension of time to file their brief, which this
Court granted on May 27, 1969.  Again on
June 20, 1969, his attorneys filed a motion for second extension for the same
purpose which We also granted on
June 25 of the same year.  It was only on
July 5, 1969 that the motion under consideration was filed.  These facts show, in our opinion, that appellee is guilty of laches.

WHEREFORE, the motion to dismiss the State’s appeal is
denied, but appellant is hereby required to file within ten (10) days from
notice hereof the necessary petition for review.  Appellee, on the other hand, is required to
file his brief within the reglementary period to be counted from notice of said
petition for review.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando,
Capistrano, and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., took no part.

Reyes, J.B.L., and
Zaldivar, JJ., are on leave.