VICENTE TAN, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. MARCELINO SARMIENTO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CITY TREASURER OF MANILA, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.

On December 29, 1955 appellant Vicente Tan filed in the lower court a
petition for mandamus against appellee Marcelino Sarmiento, in his capacity as
City Treasurer of Manila, to compel the latter to issue to him a license under
which he could continue engaging in the retail business. Appellee’s answer
alleged, in synthesis, that appellant was not entitled to the license applied
for by him because he was not qualified to engage in the retail trade due to the
provisions of Republic Act No. 1180. When the case was called for hearing both
parties submitted it for decision on the pleadings and the following stipulation
of facts:

“1. That Vicente Tan, petitioner herein, is of legal age, single, a citizen
of the Nationalist Republic of China, and a resident of 1125 O’Donnell Street,
Manila.

“2. That Mr. Marcelino Sarmiento, respondent herein, is the City Treasurer of
the City of Manila and that his duties as such official include among many
others, that of issuing or renewing business licenses to persons desiring to
engage in retail trade, upon payment of the corresponding fees therefor, and,
after the issuance of the corresponding Mayor’s permit.

“3. That on or about May 22, 1954, the petitioner, then being a Chinese
citizen procured and did obtain, in his own name, from the respondent, a license
to operate a retail store at 480 Quezon Boulevard, Manila, and which said
business license was continuously renewed by respondent, upon due application by
petitioner, every quarter thereafter until the last quarter of 1955.

“4. That on or about December 15, 1955, petitioner requested respondent for a
renewal of his license to engage in retail business, corresponding to the first
quarter of 1956, and simultaneously tendering actually upon respondent the full
amount of the license fee.

“5. That respondent refused to renew said license on the ground that
petitioner is not a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines, and further, he
was not actually then engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 in
accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 1180; however, by virtue of
the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction herein, the respondent was
constrained to renew the petitioner’s license on January 13, 1956, corresponding
to the first quarter of 1956.

“6. That said Republic Act No. 1180 took effect, upon its approval by the
President, on June 19, 1954.

“7. That the petitioner has invested a capital of about P6,000.00 in his
retail business situated at Quezon Boulevard #480, Manila.

“8. That petitioner and respondent hereby waive the presentation of further
evidence, both oral and documentary.

“9. That petitioner and respondent reserve the right to file simultaneously
their respective memoranda within twenty (20) days reckoned from March 27,
1956.”

On November 11, 1957 the lower court rendered the appealed decision,
dismissing the case, with costs.

The issue before us, therefore, is whether upon the facts stipulated by the
parties and the provisions of Republic Act 1180, appellant is entitled to
continue engaging in the retail trade in the City of Manila.

While section 1 of the Act already referred to provides that only citizens of
the Philippines may engage in the retail business, it makes an exception in
favor of “persons who are not citizens of the Philippines, or association,
partnership or corporation not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines but
actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954” (Italics
supplied). Persons and entities, in order to be covered by the exception, must
have been actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954.

It is not denied that appellant is a Chinese citizen. On the other hand, the
lower court found—construing paragraph 5 of the stipulation of facts—that he was
not actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954. It is, therefore,
clear that he does not fall under the exception provided in the law.

But appellant argues that on or about May 22, 1954 he obtained from appellee
a license to operate a retail store at 480 Quezon Boulevard., Manila; that said
license was renewed by appellee every quarter thereafter until the last of 1955,
and that it was only on December 15, 1955 when appellee refused to allow its
renewal for the first quarter of the year 1956. He further claims that as the
first license in his name was issued on May 22, 1954, the case of Kwan Kwai
vs. Perdices becomes applicable to the present. In said case (G. R. No.
L-8918, May 21, 1957) this Court said:

“* * * Even while the building was unfinished, the appellant paid his
municipal tax which was accepted by the City Treasurer without requiring him to
secure a permit from the respondent Mayor, and it is important to note
that, according to the City Treasurer, the tax paid on May 21, 1954 was
for April, May and June, thereby embracing the deadline specified in
Republic Act No. 1180, namely, May 15, 1954. We cannot believe that R. A.
ll80, passed on June 19, 1954 or much later than December 23, 1953, when
appellant’s store was burned, could have contemplated to apply the deadline to
the situation forced upon the appellant, * * *” (Italics
supplied)

Appellant’s contention is untenable. In the case relied upon, Kwan Kwai was
actually engaged in the retail business on and prior to May 15, 1954; in fact,
he paid the corresponding taxes for April to June, 1954, although his store was
burned in December, 1953. On the other hand, appellant,—so the lower court
found—was not, actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954, and must
have started his retail business only after the issuance of a license to him on
May 22, 1954—which was a mistake. This mistake the respondent refused to
perpetuate when he did not allow the renewal of appellant’s license for the year
1956.

In view of the conclusion we have reached on this matter, we deem it
unnecessary to decide appellant’s other contention that Republic Act No. ll80
can not be given retroactive effect.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with
costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, and Paredes, JJ., concur.