G.R. No. L-13139. May 24, 1961

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF TAN CHU KENG TO BE ADMITTED AS A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. TAN CHU KENG, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR A…

Decisions / Signed Resolutions May 24, 1961 PAREDES, J.:
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PAREDES, J.:


This is an appeal by the Republic of the Philippines from the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, granting Tan Chu Keng Philippine
citizenship.

On September 15, 1955, Tan Chu Keng filed a petition for naturalization,with
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, alleging that he emigrated to the
Philippines from Amoy,China, in or about July 1912, arriving in the islands on
board the boat Susana; that he is married to Lu Lay Tee, also a Chinese, born in
Amoy, China, who came to the Philippines in 1932; that he has three (3) children
with his wife Lu Lay Tee, namely Domingo Tan, Esperanza Tan and Bienvenido Tan,
all born in Cebu, on January 28, 1940, September 30, 1942 and April 22, 1945,
respectively; that his children are now studying in the Cebu Institute, a school
duly recognized by the government where Philippine history, civics and
Philippine government are taught and which school is open to children of all
races; that he is a merchant, having a sari-sari store and deals in lumber,
copra and corn meal business; that he has no tax liabilities; knows the
principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; can Speak and write English,
Spanish and the Cebu-Visayan dialect. Petitioner claimed that he is entitled to
the benefits of Commonwealth Act No. 535, which exempts any person who has
resided in the Philippines for a period of thirty (30) years from filing a
declaration of intention—to become a citizen. The affidavits of two character
witnesses, Dr. Hospicio B. Iballe, City School Dentist of Cebu City, who claimed
to have known petitioner since childhood, and Atty. Antonio T. Paulin, who lived
a stone throw from petitioner’s house, vouching for his good moral character and
irreproachable conduct, were also presented. Both witnesses are compadres
of petitioner.

In the course of the proceedings, the provincial fiscal, on cross examination
was able to elicit facts which were not contained in the petition, such as: that
petitioner before he married his present wife, was married in China sometime in
1923; that his first wife died in 1925, leaving a son Espiritu Tan, who was
living at C. Padilla street, Cebu City, at the time; that Espiritu studied at
the Silliman University and reached the 2nd year high school; that he (Espiritu)
was already 35 years old at the time of the hearing; that he did not include
Espiritu in the enumeration of his children in the petition because he was
already of age. On redirect, petitioner explained that Espiritu did not finish
his studies because of the outbreak of the last war and of his marriage
after.

After the hearing, the provincial fiscal requested for fifteen (15) days
within which to file a memorandum. Before the expiration of the period, however,
counsel for the petitioner filed a motion for the re-opening of the case to
present additional evidence, since he (petitioner) failed to introduce
“important, material and relevant facts, through excusable negligence and
mistake”. At the re-opening, petitioner testified that aside from the three (3)
children he mentioned in his petition, he had two (2) others, namely Espiritu
Tan and Alfonso Tan, who were born in Amoy, China, on February 17, 1924 and
January 8, 1933, respectively; that when Expiritu was under the custody of
petitioner, he attended the Gebu Little Flower School, the Silliman University
and the Balamban Institute; that in 1937 to 1938, Espiritu was classified as a
third grader and a fifth grader in 1939 to 1940; that Alfonso studied in the
Balamban Public School from Grade I to IV. Atty. Narvios, counsel for the
petitioner, testified that at the preparation of the petition, he discovered
that Espiritu and Alfonso were already 31 and 21 years old and both married; in
1953 and 1955, respectively; that he believed there was no necessity to include
their names in the petition, considering that under section 15 of Act 473, only
minor children are affected by the naturalization of the father.

It was also brought out at the said hearing that on February 25, 1942,
petitioner filed a petition for naturalization in the CFI of Cebu, in which
petition he included the names of the two children (Espiritu and Alfonso), who
were then minors; but that said petition was dismissed for his failure to appear
during the hearing, due to illness.

The lower court on June 8, 1957, rendered the following judgment:

“WHEREFORE, the petition to be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines of
petitioner TAN CHU KENG is granted and the Court hereby decrees the
naturalization of the said petitioner as a citizen of the
Philippines.”

The Solicitor General alleged in his appeal brief that the lower court erred
in holding that: (1) the omission in the petition of the names of two of
petitioners children who were 31 and 22 years old, respectively, at the time of
the filing of the petition, is not a sufficient ground for dismissing the
petition; (2) the omission of the names of Espiritu Tan and Alfonso Tan in the
petition was not made in bad faith or due to some ulterior motive; (3)
petitioner is exempt from filing his declaration of intention to become a
filipino citizen; and (4) petitioner has all the qualifications to become a
Filipino citizen.

1. Section 7 of the Naturalisation Law (Comm. Act No. 473) specifically
provides that the petitioner will set forth, among others, whether he is single
or married and the father of children, “the name, age, birthplace and residence
of the wife and each of the children11. Petitioner gave the flimsy explanation
and his counsel tried to corroborate it, that the failure to state the names of
the two (2) children (Espiritu and Alfonso) was due to the belief that there was
no necessity for it. It will be recalled that it was only during the
cross-examination that the existence of these children was elicited; that
petitioner did not voluntarily tell the court, during the hearings, that he had
another son besides Espiritu and that it was only when the Fiscal asked for time
to file a memorandum that petitioner moved for a re-opening of the case,
alleging that he had to introduce material and relevant facts, which
turned out to be the existence of another son.

The law requires the petitioner, if he is the father of children, to state
the name, age, birthplace and residence of each of the children, without
making a distinction whether the petitioner’s children are minors or of age.
Inhere the law does not distinguish we should not distinguish.. If it were the
intention of the law to require only minor children of the petitioner to be
mentioned in the petition, it would have so stated. An applicant for
naturalization must comply with all the requirements and conditions specified by
law (Halo Lian Chu vs. Republic, 87 Phil., 668; 48 Off. Gaz., 1780). To
dispense with some requirements of the law on the shallow excuse that
petitioner’s counsel was responsible for the omission,would blaze the trial for
dangerous precedents.

2 & 3. It would seem that the omission was tinged with the color of bad
faith and done for ulterior motives, considering the fact that petitioner claims
exemption to file his declaration of intention. Commonwealth Act No. 535,
amending section 6 of the Naturalization Law, provides that, “Persons born in
the Philippines and have received their primary and secondary education in
public schools or those recognized by the Government and not limited to any race
or nationality, and those who have resided continuously in the Philippines for a
period of thirty years or more before filing their application, may be
naturalized without having to make a declaration of intention upon complying
with the other requirements of this Act. To such requirements shall be added
that which establishes that the applicant has given primary and secondary
education to all his children in the public schools or in private schools
recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality. * * *”.
While petitioner might have satisfied the condition of the thirty years
continuous residence, he has, however, failed to comply with the further
requisite of having given all his children of school age, primary and secondary
education. Awareness of this requisite has undoubtedly motivated the petitioner
to exclude the names of Espiritu and Alfonso in the petition, contrariwise, he
would have been compelled to show that he had given said children primary and
secondary education in the proper schools, which he had admittedly failed to do.
Under these facts, petitioner is not entitled to the exemption of making a
declaration of intention. The failure to file a declaration of intention within
the prescribed time, in accordance with the requirements of Section 5 of the
Naturalization Law, is fatal to his application (Ng Peng Sia vs.
Republic, G. R. No. L-8378, March 23, 1956).

The requirements of the law regarding the qualifications of a petitioner for
citizenship are stringent. In view of the above findings, it is seriously
doubted whether the petitioner herein possesses the qualifications to become a
Filipino citizen. Doubts concerning grant of citizenship should be resolved in
favor of the government and against the claimant (U.S. vs. Macintosh,
N.Y., 1931, 51 S. Ct. 570, 283 U.S. 605, 75 L. Ed. 1302, cited in Velayo’s
Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization, p. 115).

The decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another entered denying the
petition for citizenship of petitioner-appellee Tan Chu Keng. Costs against the
petitioner-appellee.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, De Leon,
and Natividad,
JJ.,
concur.