G.R. No. L-25894. January 30, 1971
QUIRINO BOLANOS, EDILBERTO ALEJANDRINO AND DIOSDADO DE LOS REYES, PETITIONERS?APPELLEES, VS. J. M. TUASON & CO., INC. AND PEOPLE’S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS?AP…
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal by J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
and the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation
from the order dated September 9, 1965
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch X,
issued in LRC Rec. No. 7581, Quirino Bolaños, et als., petitioners,
versus J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., et al.,
respondents, reading in full as follows:
“In their urgent petition dated March 17, 1965, the petitioner
prayed that an order be published at
the expense of the petitioners and addressed to all to whom it may concern
enjoining all and sundry ‘pending the promulgation of the decision of the
Supreme Court on any appeal which may be taken from the decision of this
Honorable Court dated January 12, 1965’ to desist from disturbing the physical
possession of petitioner Quirino Bolaños
of the parcel of land object of this case comprising 13,2619 hectares and
included in the area covered by said TCT Nos. 37677 and 37686 of the Registry
of Deeds of Rizal.
“It appears that in a case filed before the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Quezon City
Branch, entitled ‘J. M. Tuason Co., Inc., represented by its
managing partner, Gregorio Araneta, Inc. versus Quirino Bolaños‘, the plaintiffs
sought to recover possession of the parcel of land object of the present action
from the defendant therein, and who is now one of the petitioners; that
decision having been rendered in favor of the plaintiff in said case and
against the defendant Quirino Bolaños
appealed the case to the Supreme Court (Exhibits ‘B’, ‘B-1’, to ‘B-7’) which
rendered a decision (No. L-4935, May
28, 1954), affirming the decision of the lower court.
“In Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622, and 3623 of this Court,
Branch II, a decision was rendered on January
18, 1965, declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the
Registry of Deeds of Rizal as null and void. The petitioners made this decision as the
basis of their action, alleging that the certificate of title covering the
parcel of land now in litigation
having been derived from Original Certificate of Title No. 735, it follows that
these titles which were issued later should also be declared null and void in
the event the aforementioned decision becomes final and executory,
or the same is affirmed by the Supreme Court.
“The petition merely prays for an Order to be published at the
expense of the herein petitioners to enjoin all and sundry from disturbing the
physical possession of petitioner Quirino Bolaños of the parcel of land object of the petition and
which is included in the property covered by TCT Nos. 37677 and 37686. It is not disputed that the petitioners were
in possession of the parcel of land object of this petition at the time that
the civil action before the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City,
was instituted and up to the present time (Exhibits ‘B-2’ to ‘B-5’). The records show that the petition was published
at the expense of the petitioners in the Daily Mirror in its issues of May 22, 29, and June 5, 1965 (Exhibit ‘A’). The decision of the Supreme Court in the
aforementioned case was promulgated on May
28, 1954. Notwithstanding
the lapse of more than ten years, it appears that said decision has not been
executed and the defendant in said case, Quirino Bolaños, who is one of the petitioners in the present
case, is still in possession of the parcel of land in question. In view of the decisions in Civil Cases Nos.
3621, 3622, and 3623 of this Court, Branch II, as already stated above, it
would appear that the position of the petitioner that their possession should
not be disturbed until said decision is
reversed by the appellate court, is tenable.
“WHEREFORE, finding
the petition to be well-taken, the same is granted, and it is hereby ordered
that the respondents, their agents, and all persons acting for and in their behalf as well as all
others are hereby enjoined from disturbing the physical possession of
petitioner Quirino Bolaños
of the parcel of land comprising 13.2619 hectares and included in the area
covered by said TCT Nos. 37677 and 37686, said notice having
been published in a newspaper of general circulation as already stated above.
“SO ORDERED.”
In their brief, appellants have assigned the following alleged
errors of the lower court:
“I
“THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITION IS ALREADY BARRED BY THE JUDGMENT IN G. R.
NO. L-4935 ENTITLED J. M. TUASON &
CO. INC., ET AL. VS. QUIRINO BOLANOS, PROMULGATED ON
28 MAY 1954 (95 Phil. 106).
II
“THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN PROCEEDING TO HEAR THE PETITION
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PETITION.
III
“THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING THAT THE DECISION IN G. R. No. L-4935 HAS
NOT YET BEEN EXECUTED AND THAT
PETITIONER BOLANOS IS STILL IN POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN QUESTION.
IV
“THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ISSUING THE ORDER DATED 5 AUGUST
1965.”
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted order, the relief sought
by appellees in their petition filed with the court a
quo was virtually a general preliminary injunction against the whole
world not to disturb their alleged possession of the two parcels of land
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 37677 and 37686 of the office of
the Register of Deeds of Rizal issued to appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. upon the ground that in the three
other civil cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 of the same Court of First Instance
of Rizal, the said court has rendered a decision,
still pending appeal, declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 735 from
which the two above-mentioned titles have been derived null and void,
principally for want of jurisdiction of the court that issued said original
title on account of defects in the publication of the notices of the
proceedings for their registration, the injunction to last, per their prayer,
until the decision of this Court in the
said three civil cases, albeit the impugned order itself does not specify the
period of its duration. Petitioners
sought such relief notwithstanding the admitted fact that in a previous case
filed by appellant Tuason against appellees
for the recovery of the possession of said land, that of Tuason
vs. Bolaños, 93 Phil. 106, wherein appellees had alleged among their defenses that appellant Tuason’s titles were obtained “thru fraud or error and
without knowledge (of) or notice, either personal or thru publication to”
said appellees, this Court upheld the validity of the
questioned titles and affirmed the decision of the trial court “declaring
defendant (now appellee Bolaños)
to be without any right to the land in question and ordering him to restore
possession thereof to plaintiff (now appellant Tuason).”
In the said decision of this Court, it was held:
“As the land in dispute is covered by plaintiff’s Torrens
certificate of title and was registered in
1914, the decree of registration can no longer be impugned on the ground
of fraud, error or lack of notice to defendant, as more than one year has
already elapsed from the issuance and entry of the decree. Neither could
the decree be collaterally attacked by any person claiming title to, or interest in, the land prior to the registration
proceedings. (Soroñgon vs. Makalintal, [90 Phil. 259] 45 Off. Gaz. 3819.)
Nor could title to that land in derogation of that of plaintiff, the registered owner, be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession. (Section 46, Act No.
496.) Adverse, notorious and continuous possession under claim of ownership
for the period fixed by law is ineffective against a Torrens title. (Valiente
vs. Judge of CFI of Tarlac, [80 Phil. 415.] etc., 45 Off. Gaz., Supp. 9, p. 43.) And it is likewise settled that the
right to secure possession under a decree of registration does not prescribe. (Francisco vs. Cruz, 43 Off.
Gaz., 5105, 5109-5110). A recent decision of this Court on this point
is that rendered in the case of Jose Alcantara et al.,
vs. Mariano et al., 92 Phil., 796. This
disposes of the alleged errors V
and VI.”
In these circumstances, the appealed order is entirely propless. Leaving
aside all the other issues raised in appellants’ brief about res adjudicata,
conclusiveness of judgment and conclusiveness of the respondents-appellants’
Torrens Titles, it is obvious that the subject matter of appellee’s
petition was clearly beyond the competence and jurisdiction of the trial court
sitting as it did in this case as a land registration court, this, even on the
assumption, which is most doubtful, that such a general against-the-whole world
preliminary injunction could be sought in any court, it being axiomatic that an
auxiliary remedy cannot be secured unless there is a principal remedy to which it pertains. Once a land registration proceeding is terminated
and a corresponding decree has been issued, the only matter of possession of
the land involved that remains within the jurisdiction of the Land
Registration Court is in regard to the issuance of the writ of possession, if
one should be needed. No provision of
the Land Registration Act (Act 496) or any other law has been cited by appellees and We know of none
which authorizes the land registration court to resolve issues of possession, in any of its aspects, after the original
registration proceedings have come to an end and a writ of possession has
already been issued and implemented.
Section 112 of Act 496 which is the only provision in the said law empowering
the land registration court to issue post or after-registration orders refers
exclusively to amendments and alterations of the title issued and has nothing to do
with possession of the land at all.
The theory of appellees is not clear in
their brief. Seemingly, they are of the
belief that since the above-mentioned Original Certificate of Title No. 735
which was annulled was issued in the same LRC No. 7581 in which the present
petition was filed, it should follow that the court a quo may act on their petition. Appellees‘ position
is not correct. The mere fact that
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 has been voided in so far as the titles
involved in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, derived from said original
certificate of title, are concerned, does not mean that such declaration of
nullity affects also the other titles, also derived from it but issued in the
names of other persons who have neither been heard nor notified. This is elementary under the due process
principle. Although incidents regarding
any title derived from an original one are supposed to be filed in the same expediente or record of the original proceeding, the
incidents regarding each title so derived constitute separate and distinct
proceedings from those affecting the other titles derived from the same
original title, and are, accordingly, always treated as such. Indeed, the very
fact that ordinary civil actions had to be filed by the plaintiffs in those
three civil cases relied upon by appellees proves that the relief sought by them in their
petition in the court below may not be obtained in the form of a mere incident
in the original registration proceedings or expediente. Besides, as already noted earlier, there is
no showing that there is now pending in
the lower court either an action or any kind of proceeding in which appellees
are asking that Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 37677 and 37686 of
appellant Tuason should be annulled, assuming without
deciding that such a relief could still be available to appellees
inspite of Tuason vs. Bolaños, supra.
Such being the case, the trial court placed the cart before the horse in
issuing its questioned order, for how could anyone be enjoined from disturbing
the possession of somebody whose right to such possession has not even been
alleged, much less established in an appropriate proceeding?
Having come to this conclusion, We
consider it unnecessary to resolve the other
issues raised by appellants.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order is declared to have been issued beyond the jurisdiction of the
court a quo and it is hereby declared null and void and set
aside, with costs against appellees.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee, Villamor,
and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., no part.