G.R. No. L-24102. January 30, 1971
JUANITO SORIA, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, RESPONDENT?APPELLEE.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in
its Civil Case No. 48793 denying
appellant’s petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction. Originally taken to the Court of Appeals,
this case was subsequently certified to us there being no question of fact
involved.
The petitioner, Juan Soria, came to the
Philippines on
December 2, 1960 as a temporary
visitor for the purpose of visiting his relatives. His authorized stay was for one (1) month, but it was repeatedly
extended, the last extension being
until November 1, 1961.
In a letter dated December
7, 1960, the petitioner, through counsel, requested the
Commissioner of Immigration that
he be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. He alleged, among other things, that he was born in Bangued,
Abra, on September 23, 1918; that he was an
illegitimate son of one Maria Soria, a Filipino
citizen, and Chua Chemco, a Chinese; that along with
his mother and sister, he was taken to China by his father sometime in 1931;
that his father died in China while his mother was still living; that in 1949
he escaped to Hongkong from the Chinese mainland;
that while in Hongkong he made representations with
the Philippine consulate there so that he might be allowed to enter the
Philippines as a returning Filipino citizen, but that no action was taken
thereon. The petition was heard on December
16 and 29, 1960 and on February 21,
1961 by an investigator in the Bureau of Immigration. On March 13, 1961 the investigator
submitted his Citizen Evaluation Board Report, giving a summary of the material
allegations of the petition as well as the evidence submitted to substantiate
them, and concluding that “Juan Soria is a
Filipino citizen by illegitimate
birth, entitled to recognition as such.” Upon review of said report, the
Commissioner of Immigration found the evidence presented insufficient to prove
the petitioner’s claim of
illegitimacy. Consequently, he denied
the petition in a letter dated March
22, 1961, which reads as follows:
“March 22, 1961
Mr. Juanito Soria
Vigan, Ilocos Sur
S i r :
Please be advised that your petition for recognition as a Philippine
citizen was denied by the Commissioner of Immigration, for insufficiency of
evidence that you are the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino
mother.
Very truly yours,
For the
Commissioner:
(SGD.) A.R.
ACURRANTES
Chief, Law & Investigation
Division”
Upon receipt of the aforequoted letter
the petitioner went to the Court of First Instance of Manila on a petition for mandamus
with preliminary injunction (Civil Case No. 47781), praying that he be declared
a citizen of the Philippines, and that respondent Commissioner of Immigration be compelled to cause his documentation as
such and restrained from ordering his deportation before final judgment. Before the case could be heard on the
merits, however, the petitioner’s counsel moved to dismiss the petition on the
ground that his client had left the Philippines and had lost interest in the further
prosecution of the case. In its order
dated October 28, 1961, the lower court granted the motion.
It appears that while the mandamus case was pending in the
lower court the petitioner was able to secure from the Department of Foreign
Affairs his documentation as a Filipino citizen. On November
2, 1961 the Philippine Vice-Consul in Bangkok,
Thailand, issued to the
petitioner a Certificate of Registration and Identity certifying “that Juanito Soria has been documented
as Philippine citizen pursuant to SECFORAF’S Cable No. 1676-V dated October 2, 1961.” Armed with
said certificate, the petitioner came back to the Philippines
on November 5, 1961 and
sought admission as a Filipino citizen.
However, the Bureau of Immigration denied him entry on the ground that
he was improperly documented and that he was still an alien as shown by the
records of the said office. The
Commissioner of Immigration thereupon ordered his arrest and exclusion from the
Philippines.
To forestall the execution of the said order the petitioner, on
November 18, 1961, went to the Court of First Instance of Manila on a petition
for certiorari with preliminary injunction, praying that “judgment
be rendered declaring the petitioner a citizen of the Philippines at birth;
annulling the order in question and directing the respondent Commissioner of
Immigration and all persons acting under him to desist from arresting the
petitioner and excluding him from the Philippines and otherwise molesting him
and treating him as an alien.” In support of his allegation that the
respondent Commissioner of Immigration had acted without or in excess of his
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order complained
of, the petitioner contended, among other things, that: (1) said respondent arbitrarily set aside the
findings of the Department of Foreign Affairs that he was a Filipino citizen
without considering the evidence submitted to the Philippine Vice-Consul in
Bangkok, Thailand and without knowing the basis for the official act of said
Department; and (2) the questioned order was based on an incomplete and irregular investigation of his
request for admission as a Filipino citizen where no final or formal decision
was rendered. In effect, the petitioner was seeking a review not only of
the order of exclusion but also of the denial of his petition for admission as
a Filipino citizen, which was the subject of his petition for mandamus
previously dismissed by the lower court
upon motion of his own counsel. Finding that the respondent had neither
abused his discretion nor acted without jurisdiction in both instances, the
trial court dismissed the petition on July 1, 1963. The
petitioner moved to reconsider but was turned down; hence, this appeal.
Several errors are alleged to have been committed by the lower
court, namely: (1) in denying the
petition for certiorari; (2) in holding that the respondent did not
abuse his authority; (3) in applying the memorandum circular of the Department
of Justice dated August 28, 1958;
and (4) in not declaring that he is a
Filipino citizen.
Under the first and second assigned errors the petitioner
contends that he was not given a full, fair and free hearing by the
respondent Commissioner of Immigration, and was denied the right to present all
his evidence in support of his claim of illegitimacy, as shown by the
following portion of the transcript of his testimony:
“Q. Do you have anything else to say or
submit in support of your allegations that you are the illegitimate son of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother?
“A. No
more for the present.
MANIFESTATION BY COUNSEL: We wish to reserve the right to present the
relatives of petitioner and such other documents as we may later on deem fit to
submit in support of his claim of illegitimacy.
In the meantime we are submitting Exhibits A to J to form part of his
evidence.
“Q. That is all.”
In disposing of the contention of the petitioner, the lower court
made the following observation:
“After going over the records of this case, particularly the evidence presented by
the petitioner during the said investigation to prove that he was the illegitimate son of a Chinese
father and a Filipino mother, the Court believes that no better evidence than
that already presented during the investigation could be presented by the
petitioner. It appearing that his birth
certificate or a
certified copy thereof cannot be presented in evidence by the petitioner
in support of his petition, and secondary evidence having been introduced during the
investigation, it is believed that the other evidence that the petitioner might
have presented would only be cummulative. As a matter of fact, the investigator, Atty.
Leon M. de Villa, considered the evidence presented by the petitioner as
sufficient to establish his claim that he was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino
mother. However, the respondent Commissioner
of Immigration has the right and authority to disregard the conclusion and
disapprove the recommendation of the investigator.”
We do not see that the lower court committed the first two errors
assigned. In the first place the
hearings wherein the petitioner submitted evidence, as well as the respondent’s
decision based thereon, preceded the petition for mandamus which was
dismissed upon the petitioner’s own motion.
Obviously, in filing that petition he considered the evidence already
complete and was willing to stand thereon.
Secondly, the petitioner merely says that the additional evidence he
intended to present is material, but he fails to state what it consists of and
how it would bear on his claim. Instead,
he has merely reproduced in his brief the complete report of the investigator
and prays that reference be made to the findings therein.
It is also to be
noted that the manifestation of the petitioner’s counsel reserving the right to
present additional evidence was made during the hearing on December 16, 1960;
that before the investigator submitted his report two more hearings were held
– one on December 29, 1960 and the other on February 21, 1961; and that during
those two hearings the petitioner presented various documents as well as two
witnesses who testified in his favor.
Evidently there is no
basis for the petitioner’s contention that he was not given a full, fair and
free hearing by the respondent.
The petitioner also contends that the respondent committed a
grave abuse of discretion by not writing a decision discussing the issues
involved instead of merely noting
“Denied for insufficiency of evidence” across the last page of the
report of the investigator. The
petitioner overlooks the fact that the Chief of the Law and Investigation
Division of the Bureau of Immigration, in behalf of the Commissioner, sent him
a letter dated March 22, 1961, advising him his “petition for recognition
as a Philippine citizen was denied by the Commissioner of Immigration, for
insufficiency of evidence that you are the illegitimate son of a Chinese father
and a Filipino mother.” It is clear that the said letter is itself the decision, and that
although it does not contain an extended opinion, it nevertheless discloses the
only issue involved and reason for the ruling.
Regarding the third assignment of error, the petitioner, who did
not present his birth certificate before the respondent, now avers that the
lower court should not have applied the second sentence of the last paragraph
of the Memorandum Circular of the Secretary of Justice dated August 28, 1958,
which provides that “where the petition for cancellation of such alien
certificate of registration is based on the alleged illegitimacy of the
petitioner, no such cancellation shall be effected unless his birth certificate
or a certified copy thereof is presented
in evidence in support of the petition.” He argues that this provision of
the circular is contrary to both
the law and the constitution.
The averment of petitioner is premised on a wrong
assumption. In his memorandum submitted
to the lower court the petitioner proceeded on the theory that the denial of
his petition for admission as a Filipino citizen was not final because the respondent’s
findings were not submitted to the Department of Justice, as required by the
communication of the Secretary of Justice dated November 15, 1950.
In rejecting the petitioners contention, the lower court held that the
communication relied upon had been superseded by the Memorandum Circular of the
Secretary of Justice dated August 28, 1958, quoting the last paragraph thereof
as follows:
“Petitions for the cancellation of alien certificates of
registration should, in the first instance, be decided on the merits by the
Commissioner of Immigration, and his decision thereon shall be final, unless
the interested party desires to appeal to the Secretary of Justice or to the proper court of justice if
he believes that the decision of the Commissioner of Immigration is palpably
contrary to law or has committed a clear abuse of discretion. Provided, however, where the petition for
cancellation is based on the
alleged illegitimacy of the petitioner no such cancellation shall be effected
unless his birth certificate or a certified copy thereof is presented in evidence in support of
the petition.”
It is obvious that although the second sentence was included in
the foregoing quotation, it was neither applied nor relied upon by the lower
court, since it was irrelevant to the petitioner’s contention therein. What the Court did was to rule adversely upon
the petitioner’s argument that
since the respondent’s decision was not submitted to the Department of Justice
it never acquired the character of finality.
The last assigned error,
namely, that the lower court erred in
not declaring the petitioner a Filipino citizen, is without merit. His petition was for certiorari and
this remedy is available against
action taken without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The order of respondent Commissioner of
Immigration for the exclusion of
petitioner falls under neither category; and the facts on which
the said order was based were not properly in issue. It is true that one of the prayers in the
petition is that judgment be rendered declaring petitioner a citizen of the Philippines. But
it is now well-settled that there is no
proceeding established by law, or the rules, for the judicial declaration of
the citizenship of an individual.[1] In the case of Tan vs. Republic, G. R. No.
L-16108, October 31, 1961, this Court said:
“If the petition be considered as one for declaratory
judgment, the facts do not warrant the filing of the said special civil
action. If the petition seeks to compel the Commissioner of Immigration to
cancel her and her children’s alien certificate of registration, this petition
would not lie because such a remedy of cancellation of alien certificate of
registration can only be had by virtue of a judgment of a competent court, in
an action where the citizenship of parties is a material matter in issue, declaring
the Filipino citizenship of the petitioner and her children, and such
declaration cannot be obtained directly because there is no proceeding at present provided
by law or the rules for such purpose.”
Wherefore,
the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner-appellant.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon,
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
[1]
Danilo Channie Tan v.
Republic, L-14159, April 18, 1960; Palaran v.
Republic, L-15047, Jan. 30, 1962; Tan Yu Chin v. Republic, L-15775,
April 29, 1961; Tan v. Republic L-16108, October 31, 1961; Santiago v.
Commissioner, L-14653, Jan. 31, 1963; Commissioner v. Domingo, L-21274,
July 31, 1963; Lao Yap Diok, et al. v.
Republic, L-19107-09, Sept. 30, 1964; In re Mallari
Adm. Case No. 533, April 29, 1968.