PETPAUL ALDEA BUENO, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIRST DIVISION), BSM CREW SERVICE CENTRE PHILS., INC., BERNHARD SCHULTE SHIP MANAGEMENT (ISLE OF MAN) L…
ABDULWAHID, J.:
The undisputed facts, as culled from the records of the case are, as follows:
On January 27, 2013, petitioner Petpaul Aldea Bueno was hired by private respondent BSM Crew Service Centre Phils., Inc. [BSM Crew], in behalf of its foreign principal, private respondent Bernhard Schulte Ship Management (Isle of Man) Ltd., as Chief Cook on board the vessel, Umm Al Lulu-I, for a period of nine (9) months, with a basic monthly salary of US$698.00.[3] Petitioner underwent pre-employment medical examination and was declared fit to work.[4] Thus, he commenced work on February 29, 2012, until he disembarked on November 30, 2012, upon completion of his employment contract.[5]
On November 11, 2013, petitioner filed with the NLRC a Complaint[6] for permanent disability benefits (for traumatic arthritis on both knees); compensatory, moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P500,000.00 each, and attorney’s fees amounting to 10% of his total monetary claims.
In his Position Paper,[7] petitioner alleged that, as Chief Cook, he was constantly exposed to extreme heat in the galley, and then to extreme cold whenever he had to routinely enter the freezer, even while perspiring. Thus, at around the fifth month, petitioner began to suffer severe cough, which later worsened and caused him shortness of breath, chest and muscle pains, dizziness and recurring high fever. His condition worsened to a point that he could no longer bear the pain and found it difficult to perform his job. He reported his condition to the ship captain and even requested for early termination of his contract and early release so that he could seek medical attention, but the same was not granted. Instead, he was made to stay on board the ship until the end of his employment term, since private respondents had not yet found a replacement for him. In the meantime, he was allowed to rest on board and was given various medications which, however, only worsened, and not alleviated, his condition. On November 20, 2012, he was sent to a clinic in Abu Dhabi, where he was treated by Dr. M. Aravindakshnv and diagnosed with dry cough and traumatic arthritis on both knees.[8] Nevertheless, he stayed on board until he was repatriated/disembarked the vessel on December 1, 2012. At the same time, he was assured by the ship captain that BSM Crew would assist him and provide him with proper care upon arrival in the Philippines. However, petitioner did not receive any assistance despite his request for help, and he went home on a wheelchair, accompanied only by a colleague.
Due to severe health condition, it was only on December 11, 2012, that petitioner was able to consult with Dr. Alma Neny C. Bion of the Doctors Hospital in Bacolod. Dr. Bion advised him to undergo a chest x-ray because his cough had been ongoing for six months already. He was further examined by a rheumatologist and pulmonologoist, and was subjected to various laboratory tests and medication for severe cough and arthritis. On September 26, 2014, Dr. Bion issued a Medical Certificate and Report,[9] diagnosing petitioner with PTB Extensive, TB Bone, old multiple rib fracture or congenital rib deformity. The Medical Certificate also indicated that petitioner’s pulmonary tuberculosis was only partially treated since his anti-tuberculosis medications had to be stopped after two months due to complications to his arthritis. Through all these procedures, private respondents failed/refused to extend assistance to petitioner, despite his oral requests and demands.
Since petitioner’s condition did not improve, and since private respondents continued to refuse to provide medical and financial assistance to petitioner, petitioner was constrained to file his complaint for permanent disability benefits. Further, he sought a second opinion from another independent internist-cardiologist, Dr. Rommel F. Galvez, who issued a medical certificate dated December 4, 2013, declaring petitioner “unfit to work as a seaman”, to wit:[10]
This is to certify that Mr. Petpaul Bueno 40y/o, male previously diagnosed with pulmonary tuberculosis with incomplete treatment base on his medical profile available. At present patient is very weak and was not able to ambulate without support thus makes him unfit to work as seaman.
Further, petitioner maintained that his illness was work-related and compensable under the POEA Standard Employment Contract [POEA-SEC], and that he is entitled to permanent total disability compensation under Section 32 of the POEA-SEC. Finally, petitioner posited that he was entitled to damages and attorney’s fees due to private respondents’ failure to comply with their contractual obligations by refusing to provide him with medical and financial assistance.
On the other hand, private respondents BSM Crew and Narcissus Duran alleged that petitioner performed his duties as chief cook on board the vessel without any issue until he finished his contract on November 30, 2012. In support thereof, private respondents presented the Disembarkation Report[11] dated November 30, 2012, which indicated that the reason for petitioner’s discharge was “EOC” or end of contract. Thus, BSM Crew was surprised when petitioner filed the instant complaint with the NLRC. In its Position Paper,[12] BSM Crew maintained that petitioner had no cause of action against the former since it did not commit any act or omission which violated the rights of petitioner. As previously stated, petitioner disembarked from the vessel after finishing his contract, and not because he was suffering from any illness or injury which would have necessitated his medical repatriation. Moreover, BSM Crew noted that petitioner failed to comply with the mandatory reportorial requirement under the POEA-SEC, which incorporated the 2000 Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean Going Vessels, by not reporting for post-medical examination by a company-designated physician, and not the employee’s chosen physician, within three days after repatriation or disembarkation, pursuant to the POEA SEC. BSM Crew stressed that the rule requiring post-employment medical examination within three days after repatriation is mandatory in nature, and failure to comply with the same would result to forfeiture of the seafarer’s right to claim disability compensation under the POEA SEC.
In his Reply,[13] petitioner countered that, while it was true that he disembarked the vessel due to completion of his employment contract, his illness had begun long before, a fact which he had reported to his ship captain. However, he was made to stay on the vessel and was merely allowed to rest and given medicine during that time. On the other hand, upon his return to Manila, his illness and physical incapacity to freely move on his own rendered it impossible for him to comply with the three-day notice rule. Moreover, private respondents failed to give him medical assistance upon his arrival in Manila, as promised, thus leaving him with no choice but to proceed home to Bacolod, where he sought immediate medical treatment and care.
On February 20, 2014, Labor Arbiter Jose Antonio C. Ferrer rendered its Decision,[14] dismissing the complaint on the ground that petitioner failed to comply with the mandatory post-employment reportorial and medical examination requirement under the POEA-SEC , viz:[15]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner immediately raised the same on appeal before the NLRC via a Memorandum of Appeal.[16] However, on June 4, 2014, the NLRC rendered its assailed Decision, dismissing the appeal, to wit:[17]
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated February 20, 2014 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration[18] of the foregoing Decision, but the same was again denied in the NLRC’s assailed Resolution[19] dated August 22, 2014.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition, praying for the annulment and/or reversal of the above-assailed Decision and Resolution of the NLRC and raising the following issues:[20]
- Whether or not the NLRC erred in dismissing the Complaint on the ground of plain denial of private respondents that petitioner failed to report for post-employment medical examination upon his return in Manila on 01 December 2012?;
- Whether or not the NLRC erred in applying the exceptions of equivalent post-employment examination and violation of the reciprocal obligation to the general rule mentioned in Section 20(A)(3) of the POEA SEC?;
- Whether or not the NLRC erred in dismissing the claim for permanent and total disability benefits despite petitioner failed to gainfully employ for a period of more than 240 days since July 2012 or even after arrival in Manila on 01 December 2012?;
- Whether or not the NLRC erred in dismissing the claim for sickness allowance even if petitioner was medically repatriated due to medical reason needing further treatment?; and
- Whether or not the NLRC erred in dismissing the claims for damages and attorney’s fees even if private respondents committed gross negligence in their failure to accord petitioner an immediate medical attention in July and 20 November 2012, which negligence led to his permanent and total disability?
The instant petition is bereft of merit.
A careful examination of the issues raised by petitioner will reveal that most, if not all of said issues involve questions of fact, law and evidentiary matters. It is an oft-repeated rule in jurisprudence that the remedy of certiorari may be resorted to only in cases involving errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In INC Shipmanagement, Inc. v. Moradas, the Supreme Court held, as follows:[21]
When a labor case decided by quasi-judicial tribunals—the Labor Arbiter (LA) and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)—finds its way into the judicial sphere, the court must proceed and act on the petition on the basic premise that the assailed ruling is a final and executory ruling. This premise, in turn, is based on two facts: first, labor cases that reach the CA (and eventually the Supreme Court) are already rulings on the merits that finally dispose of the case; and, second, after the labor tribunals have rendered judgment, substantive law no longer provides any remedy of appeal to the losing party.
Notwithstanding the absence of appeal, the aggrieved party is not without any legal remedy. As the legal battle is transferred from the quasi-judicial sphere to the strictly judicial sphere, the aggrieved party must contend with the fact that the new avenue for legal advocacy becomes narrower. The review allowed is limited to jurisdictional grounds under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rule 65).
x x x x x x x x x
A certiorari proceeding is limited in scope and narrow in character. The special civil action for certiorari lies only to correct acts rendered without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not mere errors of judgment, particularly in the findings or conclusions of the quasi-judicial tribunals or lower courts. For errors of judgment, appeal, if provided for by law, is the proper remedy and not certiorari. Accordingly, when a petition for certiorari is filed, the judicial inquiry should be limited to the issue of whether the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment. Even if the findings of the lower court or tribunal are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correctness is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Certiorari xxx xxx xxx (in the guise of correcting errors of jurisdiction even if they are plainly errors of judgment) plainly amounts to unwarranted judicial legislation, by indirectly creating a non-existing right of appeal.
Nevertheless, while a certiorari proceeding does not strictly include an inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence (that was the basis of the labor tribunals in determining their conclusion), the incorrectness of its evidentiary evaluation should not result in negating the requirement of substantial evidence. Indeed, when there is a showing that the findings or conclusions, drawn from the same pieces of evidence, were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record, they may be reviewed by the courts. In particular, the CA can grant the petition for certiorari if it finds that the NLRC, in its assailed decision or resolution, made a factual finding not supported by substantial evidence. A decision that is not supported by substantial evidence is definitely a decision tainted with grave abuse of discretion. (Emphasis, italics and underscoring in the original.)
In the present case, petitioner failed to prove grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in rendering its assailed Decision and Resolution. On the contrary, we find that the NLRC’s findings were substantially supported by the evidence on record and prevailing law and jurisprudence.
Section 20(A)(3) of the 2010 POEA Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Ships[22] provides, as follows:
- In addition to the above obligation of the employer to provide medical attention, the seafarer shall also receive sickness allowance from his employer in an amount equivalent to his basic wage computed from the time he signed off until he is declared fit to work or the degree of disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician. The period within which the seafarer shall be entitled to his sickness allowance shall not exceed 120 days. Payment of the sickness allowance shall be made on a regular basis, but not less than once a month.
The seafarer shall be entitled to reimbursement of the cost of medicines prescribed by the company-designated physician. In case treatment of the seafarer is on an out-patient basis as determined by the company-designated physician, the company shall approve the appropriate mode of transportation and accommodation. The reasonable cost of actual traveling expenses and/or accommodation shall be paid subject to liquidation and submission of official receipts and/or proof of expenses.
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. In the course of the treatment, the seafarer shall also report regularly to the company-designated physician specifically on the dates prescribed by the company-designated physician and agreed to by the seafarer. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.
If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties.
In this regard, the Supreme Court, in Status Maritime Corporation vs. Spouses Delalamon, explained the mandatory nature of the 3-day reporting and post-medical employment requirement under the POEA-SEC, viz:[23]
The purpose of the rule is to allow the employer’s doctors a reasonable opportunity to assess the seafarer’s medical condition in order to determine whether his illness is work-related or not. As explained in Jebsens Maritime, Inc. v. Undag:
The rationale behind the rule can easily be divined. Within three days from repatriation, it would be fairly easier for a physician to determine if the illness was work-related or not. After that period, there would be difficulty in ascertaining the real cause of the illness.
To ignore the rule would set a precedent with negative repercussions because it would open the floodgates to a limitless number of seafarers claiming disability benefits. It would certainly be unfair to the employer who would have difficulty determining the cause of a claimant’s illness considering the passage of time. In such a case, the employers would have no protection against unrelated disability claims.
Equally outlined in the provision is the single instance which exempts a medically repatriated seafarer from complying with the 3-day mandatory reporting rule that is—when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case a written notice of such fact to the employer within the same period shall be deemed as sufficient compliance.
We applied the exemption in Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. NLRC and excused the failure of the seafarer to report within the three-day period for the reason that when he disembarked from the vessel, he was terminally ill and in need of urgent medical attention. His employer manning agency was also found sufficiently notified when his wife went to the office a month later to inquire about his (sic) husband’s sickness benefits.
In his Position Paper, petitioner himself admitted that “[d]ue to his severe health condition, complainant was not able to immediately go to the doctor to consult and be treated.”[24] He consulted with Dr. Bion at the Doctors Hospital in Bacolod only on December 11, 2012, or ten days after his arrival in Manila. It is also significant that it was only in the present Petition that he first alleged the fact that he had reported for post-employment medical examination by BSM Crew’s physician, but was denied such medical examination. In his Position Paper, he only averred that he did not receive any medical and/or financial assistance from private respondents despite the ship captain’s promise. Similarly, in his Memorandum of Appeal, petitioner only claimed that, upon his arrival in Manila, private respondents were nowhere to help him, contrary to the ship captain’s promise, thus forcing him to proceed directly to his home in Bacolod.[25] In both pleadings, petitioner never alleged that he had in fact tried to report for post-employment medical examination and the circumstances thereof. It would thus appear that petitioner’s allegation that he reported for post-employment medical examination was a mere afterthought and a belated response to the identical findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.
Even assuming that petitioner was, in fact, too ill or physically incapacitated to personally report to private respondents for post-employment medical examination within the reglementary 3-day period, he cannot exempt himself from the reportorial requirement under POEA-SEC. Section 20(A)(3), paragraph 3, explicitly provides for this situation and states that “the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance.” However, nowhere in the records of the case does it show that petitioner ever bothered to send a written notice to private respondents concerning his physical incapacity to report personally for post-employment medical examination. Instead, he waited ten days, then consulted with a doctor of his own choosing.
In further attempt to exempt himself from the 3-day notice rule, petitioner pointed out that he duly reported his condition to his ship captain, thus, private respondents were well aware of his illness even prior to his disembarkation. Nevertheless, private respondents insisted that he remain in his post and merely allowed him to rest on board and take medications. Significantly, however, petitioner did not present any proof of such knowledge of his employers that he already had a debilitating disease. In fact, we find it difficult to believe that private respondents would insist that he stay on board if they knew that he was too ill to perform his duties as effectively and that he would have to constantly rest on board, instead of working according to schedule.
Petitioner cannot also rely on the medical consultation with Dr. Aravindakshnv in Abu Dhabi to prove knowledge by private respondents of his illness. Significantly, said medical consultation was conducted on November 30, 2012 (and not November 20, as alleged by petitioner), the same day that petitioner disembarked the vessel, as indicated in the Disembarkation Report[26] which petitioner signed. Petitioner never even presented any evidence that private respondents were the ones who actually sent him to the Abu Dhabi clinic for medical check up and that they received a copy of the Medical Report.[27] Moreover, a close review of the said Medical Report reveals that Dr. Aravindakshnv himself did not recommend that petitioner see another doctor, thus negating petitioner’s claim that he was suffering from debilitating illness, such that would need further and immediate medical attention. Neither did Dr. Aravindakshnv state whether or not petitioner was fit for normal work or whether petitioner should be repatriated or go to the hospital.
In this light, it cannot be gainsaid that the one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and that the proof should be clear, positive and convincing.[28] This rule applies even in labor cases, where the employer is burdened with proving payment of claims due to the employee. This is so because, before the burden to prove payment of due claims arises, the employee must first establish and prove actual entitlement to said claims. In this case, since it is petitioner who is alleging that he is entitled to disability benefits under the law, which private respondents vehemently denied, petitioner must first establish and prove his claims and his compliance with the pre-requisites under the law. This, however, petitioner failed to do.
Considering the foregoing disquisition, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent NLRC in ruling that petitioner is barred from claiming permanent and total disability benefits for failure of complying with the three-day reportorial and post-employment medical examination requirement.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Baltazar-Padilla, P.J., and Inting, S.B., JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 202-214.
[2] Id. at 233.
[3] Id. at 67.
[4] Id. at 64-66.
[5] Id. at 138.
[6] Id. at 41-42.
[7] Id. at 45-63.
[8] Id. at 68.
[9] Id. at 69-71.
[10] Id. at 72.
[11] See Note 5.
[12] Rollo, pp. 115-132.
[13] Id. at 139-149.
[14] Id. at 150-155.
[15] Id. at 155.
[16] Rollo, pp. 156-178.
[17] See Note 1 at 213.
[18] Rollo, pp. 215-227.
[19] See Note 2.
[20] Rollo, pp. 18-19.
[21] G.R. No. 178564, January 15, 2014.
[22] POEA Memorandum Circular No. 10, Series of 2010, dated October 26, 2010.
[23] G.R. No. 198097, July 30, 2014.
[24] See Note 7 at 48.
[25] See Note 16 at 171.
[26] See Note 5.
[27] See Note 9.
[28] Noblejas v. Italian Maritime Academy Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 207888, June 9, 2014.