JENNIFER S. REYES, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

This petition, which WE
treated as a special civil action, seeks to set aside respondent Court’s [a]
August 1, 1975 minute resolution denying petitioner’s motion for last extension
of time of twenty (20) days to file appellant’s brief; [b] August 26, 1975 minute resolution motu proprio
dismissing petitioner’s appeal and [c] October
1, 1975 minute resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of
the August 26, 1975 resolution, all issued in CA-G.R. No. L-17712-Cr., entitled
“People of the Philippines
vs. Jennifer S. Reyes”, petitioner herein.

Aforesaid
CA-G.R. No. L-17712 was
petitioner’s appeal, as defendant-appellant therein, to respondent Court from
the November 21, 1974 decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
VI, convicting her of the crime of estafa which was initiated upon
complaint of her aunt, Adela Gerona, involving the amount of Ten Thousand Six Hundred Ninety-Five (P10,695.00) Pesos representing the value of the jewelries
subject matter of the transaction between them that gave rise to the said criminal
complaint.  Appellant was sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from four (4) months and twenty-seven (27) days
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, eleven (11)
months and ten (10) days of prision correccional; and to
indemnify the offended party in the amount of Ten Thousand Six Hundred
Ninety-Five (P10,695.00) Pesos.

On May 5, 1975,
respondent Court granted petitioner an extension of ninety (90) days from even
date with warning of no further extension for filing her brief.

Nevertheless, on July 29, 1975, or six days before the expiration
of the aforesaid ninety-day period, petitioner’s counsel, fearing that he might
not be able to submit the appellant’s brief on time, filed a second and last
extension of twenty (20) days from August 3, 1975 within which to file the
appellant’s brief, invoking as grounds thereof, pressure of work and his
appointment as vice-chairman of the Comite de Festejos of
the municipality of Pandan, Catanduanes, as per Resolution No. 258 of the
Pandan Municipal Council, copy of which was attached to the motion as Annex
“A” thereof (p. 32, C.A. rec.).

On August 1,
1975, respondent
Court denied the motion.  Copy of the
resolution of denial was received by petitioner’s counsel on August 9,
1975.

On August
21, 1975, or two (2)
days before the expiration of the twenty-day extension sought by counsel in the
denied motion, petitioner filed her printed appellant’s brief with the
respondent Court.

On August 26, 1975 or five days after the filing of the aforesaid
appellant’s brief, respondent Court issued a resolution dismissing the appeal
of petitioner, thus:  “Docket’s
report:  No appellant’s brief filed
within the extension period granted.  RESOLVED:  APPEAL
DISMISSED.” A copy thereof was received by petitioner’s counsel on August 30, 1975.

On September
1, 1975,
petitioner’s counsel moved to reconsider the aforesaid August
26, 1975 resolution
of dismissal and prayed therein for the admission of appellant’s brief already
filed as of August 21, 1975. 
Vigorously, petitioner’s counsel explained that:

“1.  x x x the extended period given by this
Honorable Court for the submission of appellant’s brief expired on August 3,
1975, a Sunday;

“2.  For fear that the undersigned counsel might
not be able to finish the brief on time, as he will be out of town, to proceed
to Catanduanes, to fulfill a PERSONAL VOW to our Patron Saint, St. Ignatius de
Loyola, undersigned counsel prepared on July 26, 1975 a motion for extension of
twenty (20) days’ time from August 3, 1975, within which to submit appellant’s
brief;

“3.  Before undersigned counsel however left for
the Province of Catanduanes, he, in the afternoon of July 28, 1975, entrusted
to the accused-appellant the prepared draft of the brief for printing, with the
instructions that the accused-appellant be the one to submit it for printing
with the printer concerned, after which, the printed copies should be submitted
to this Honorable Court, furnishing copies thereof to the Solicitor General;

“4.  Said instructions were given by undersigned to
the accused-appellant in view of the fact that undersigned counsel would not be
around in Manila from July 29, 1975 to the first week of August, 1975, to
supervise, proof-read the manuscript and submit the printed copies to this
Honorable Court;

“5.  Even if the prepared draft of the brief was
finished by the undersigned counsel on July 28, 1975, and entrusting the same
to the appellant for printing, undersigned counsel still caused the filing of
the motion for extension of time to file brief with this Honorable Court, for fear that the printing of the same
might be delayed by the printing press concerned, for one reason or another,
and hence, the brief might not be submitted one time, that is, on or before
August 3, 1975;

“6.  That even if the prepared draft of the brief
was given by undersigned counsel to the accused on July 28, 1975, the same was not immediately
brought by the accused to a printing
press BECAUSE OF FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES.

“7.  The printers which appellant approached were
demanding for a down payment just to print the aforesaid brief, which down
payment accused-appellant could not give, in view of her financial
difficulties, appellant being only a mere employee,
and THE SOLE BREADWINNER OF THE FAMILY, having her younger brothers and
sisters, and even her parents, to support;

“8.  It was only on the second week of August,
1975, that is, on August 7, 1975, that the accused-appellant, thru the kind
help of the friends of her father, was able to get in touch with a printer, and
who was willing to print the same on credit basis;

“9.  The said brief was finally printed and the
same was accordingly filed with this Honorable Court on August 21, 1975;

“x x x x x x x x x x.”

The aforesaid motion for
reconsideration was verified by counsel and petitioner.

Respondent Court
forthwith required on September 9, 1975 the Solicitor General to comment within ten
(10) days on the aforesaid motion.  On September
25, 1975, the
Solicitor General filed his comment curtly submitting that “x x x simply
because counsel for appellant had an out-of-town engagement is not sufficient
reason for him to entrust the printing of his brief to his client who may not
be aware of the importance and urgency thereof” (p. 32, rec.).  Finding that opposition well-founded,
respondent Court accordingly denied the aforesaid motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this instant petition, petitioner labelling the questioned
resolutions of respondent Court as constitutive of grave abuse of discretion.

On December
12, 1975, WE
resolved to require respondents to comment on the petition.

On January 22, 1976,
the Solicitor General filed the required comment; and on February 9, 1976, the Court resolved to give due
course to the petition, at the same time treated it as a special civil action
and on even date declared the same submitted for decision.

WE view the circumstances narrated above as justifying the
setting aside of the questioned resolutions of the respondent Court.  Accordingly, WE find merit in the petition
and grant the relief prayed for by the petitioner.

1.  The New Rules of Court
allows extension of time within which to file brief upon a showing of a “x x x x good and sufficient cause, and only if the
motion for extension is filed before the expiration of the time sought to be
extended” (Section 15, Rule 46). 
Indicative of this rule is the authority of the courts to grant as many
motions for extension as may be asked if good reasons are shown (Gregorio vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., 72 SCRA 120, 123-124 [1976]).  The allowance or denial of such motions (as
well as the setting aside of orders previously issued) rests principally upon
the sound discretion of the court to which it is addressed, which discretion,
however, must be exercised wisely and prudently, never capriciously, with a
view to substantial justice (Cucio vs. Court of Appeals, 57 SCRA, 64, 68
[1974], citing Piedad vs. Batuyong, 55 SCRA 763 [1974]).  Furthermore, “x x such discretion should
always be predicated on the consideration that more than the mere convenience
of the courts or of the parties in the case the ends of justice and fairness
would be served thereby” and that “it is sound judicial
discretion” to allow a reasonable transfer of hearing or request for
extension timely filed “when no substantial rights are affected and the
intention to delay is not manifest” (ibid., quoting Limon vs.
Candido, 27 SCRA, 1166, 1169 [1969]). 
Section 1 of Rule 50 under which respondent Court motu proprio
dismissed petitioner’s appeal merely confers a power and does not impose a
duty; and the same is not mandatory but merely directory which thus requires a
great deal of circumspection, considering all the attendant circumstances
(Lopez, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 75 SCRA 402, 406 [1977], citing
cases).

In the instant case, petitioner’s motion for extension of time to
file her brief was seasonably filed as the same was undisputedly filed six (6)
days before the expiration of the existing period.  With respect to the grounds invoked by
petitioner in her said motion as amplified in her motion for reconsideration
with prayer for the admission of her printed brief earlier filed, their
sufficiency and validity have not been seriously questioned or disputed.  The comment of the Solicitor General failed
to grasp the full import of the grounds therein invoked when it casually stated that “x x x simply because
counsel for appellant had an out-of-town engagement is not sufficient reason
for him to entrust the printing of the brief to his client who may not be aware
of the importance and urgency thereof.” For as stated in the July 28 and
September 1, 1977 motions of herein petitioner, what impelled her counsel to
prepare the said motion for extension of time was counsel’s fear that he might
not be able to finish the brief on time because of pressure of work and
furthermore because he was to be out of town the succeeding days to fulfill a
personal vow to his town’s patron saint, the feast days of which were to be
celebrated on July 30-31, 1975
that necessitated his presence thereat during said days, for the further reason
that he was earlier appointed as Vice-Chairman of the Comite de Festejos
which was in charge of the fiesta
celebration in honor of said patron saint. 
And that although counsel was able to finish his draft of appellant’s
brief on July 28, 1975, counsel, before leaving for his hometown, still caused
the filing on said date of the aforesaid motion for extension prepared on and
dated July 26, 1975, in order to obtain and insure additional and sufficient
time within which to timely file the appellant’s brief as he feared then that
the printing thereof might be delayed for one reason or another like the fact
that as aforestated, he will be out of town and therefore will be unable to
supervise and proofread the manuscript of the brief.  But as it turned out, not only the foregoing
factors contributed to the delay in the filing of the said brief but also (and mainly) the financial
difficulties of petitioner herself, by reason of which the printing of the
brief could not be commenced as the printer demanded a down payment which the
petitioner could not then produce.

It would thus appear that the main cause of the delay in the
filing of the appellant’s brief was petitioner’s inability, by reason of
financial difficulties, to obtain the necessary amount for the printing of the
said brief.  In this connection, WE have
recognized as sufficient ground for extending the existing period within which
to file brief the appellant’s inability, because of poverty, to obtain the
money necessary to pay the expenses of the appeal (Gregorio vs. C.A., et al, 72
SCRA 121, 126 [1976], citing 5 CJS 387 and case cited therein).  Because the right to appeal in this case is
granted by the statute, it is part of due process of law, denial of which
violates the due process clause of the Consti­tution.  Moreover, the Constitution likewise
guarantees the individual access to all courts, including appellate tribunals,
which right cannot be denied him by reason of poverty.

2.  There are likewise
circumstances in the records indicative of respondent People’s lack of serious
objection to the motions of petitioner and to the admission of her brief.  Thus, respondent People did not file an
opposition to petitioner’s motion for extension; it did not file a motion to
dismiss the appeal even after respondent Court denied the aforesaid motion for
extension of time; and finally, upon receipt of petitioner’s brief, respondent
people filed on September 18, 1975 a motion for extension of time of ninety
(90) days within which to file appellee’s brief (p. 41, C.A. rec.).

In fine, WE are convinced that the ends of justice would be
better served by allowing petitioner’s appeal to take its due course and thus
afford her an untrammelled review of her criminal conviction.

WE previously emphasized
in Gregorio vs. Court of Appeals (id., p. 125) that “xx That
is commanded by the ‘higher interest of justice dictated by a sense of fairness
with which procedural due process is identified.’ Nothing would be lost and the
right to a hearing on appeal would be accorded full respect if under the
circumstances the motion were granted. 
More so, when it is considered that the failure of the appellant to file
his brief within the allotted time does not ipso facto result in
the dismissal of the appeal.  The
appellate Court has still that inherent power and discretion to amend whatever
order it had made before in order to render substantial justice.” And that
furthermore “[t]he expiration of the time to file brief, unlike lateness
in filing the notice on appeal is not a jurisdictional matter and may be waived
by the parties.  Even after the
expiration of the time fixed for the filing of the brief, the reviewing court
may grant an extension of time, at least where no motion to dismiss has been
made.  Late filing or service of briefs may be excused
where no material injury has been suffered by the appellee by reason of the
delay or where there is no contention that the appellee’s cause was prejudiced
x x ” (ibid.).

WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS’ RESOLUTIONS
HEREINABOVE ENUMERATED ARE HEREBY ALL SET ASIDE AND THE SAID APPELLATE COURT IS
HEREBY DIRECTED TO ADMIT PETITIONER’S BRIEF AS ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND DECIDE THE
SAME ON THE MERITS.  NO COSTS.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Muñoz Palma, Martin, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.