THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, PETITIONERS, VS. JUDGE MARIANO CASTAÑEDA, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH III, CFI-PAMPANGA…

A recital of the allegations in this certiorari proceeding
to review an order suffices to demonstrate its merit.  The order of respondent Judge dated February
28, 1973, assailed by the Republic of the Philippines, directed the Local Civil
Registrar of San Fernando, Pampanga to correct the corres­ponding entries in
his registry, the effect of which would be to classify as Filipinos Rolando
Koh, Alicia Koh, Jesusa C. Koh, Wilna C. Koh, Gina C. Koh, Jannete C. Koh and
Rommel C. Koh.^[1]
It was so explicitly decreed in the dispositive portion of such order with
respect to each of such person.  Private
respondent Gerarda Canlas, the mother of the above individuals, on November 16,
1972, “filed with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a petition for
correction of entries in the, birth certificates of Rolando, Alicia, Jesusa, Wilna,
Gina, Jannete and Rommel, all surnamed Koh, in the Civil Registry of San
Fernando, Pampanga.”^[2]
It was alleged therein that petitioner, now private respondent, was the mother,
and that the natural father, one Koh Chi, was a Chinese subject who had left
for China, and that as they were born out of wedlock they should have been
registered as Filipinos and not as Chinese nationals, the mistake being due to
the erroneous belief that the parents were married.^[3]
On December 21, 1972, the Solicitor General filed an opposition “on the
ground, among others, that the petition for correction of entry in the Civil
Registry pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court contemplates a summary proceeding and correction of mere
clerical errors; those harmless and innocuous changes such as the correction of
a name that is clearly misspelled, occupation of parents, * * * and not changes
or corrections involving civil status, nationality; or citizenship which are
substantial or controversial.”^[4]
Thereafter came the order of February 28, 1973.^[5]
Hence this petition.

It is to be noted that the well-settled doctrine, as above set
forth, was called to the attention of the respondent Judge in the opposition
filed by the Solicitor General.^[6]
As a matter of fact,, in the challenged order, there was reference to it.  Thus: 
“There is no doubt that the opposition filed by the Honorable
Solicitor General for the Republic of the Philip­pines is very well
grounded.  Incidentally however, this
Court believes that our basic laws are not supposed to be applied, nor
prescribed rules of procedure to be followed with absolute strictness and in
all instances irrespective of the nature of the facts and circumstances of a
given case.”^[7]
Based on what he considered to be the spirit of the present Constitution, he
granted the correction as prayed for.

Thus there was an explanation but not a justification for the
failure to abide by the deeply-embedded principle that the allowable correction
in the entries in a civil registry cannot go as far as to afford a basis for a
change of nationality.  The
constitutional mandate concerning citizenship must be adhered to strictly.  This Court has always been alert to the
possibility that through a motion for the correction of entries in the civil
registry an alien may become a Filipino and has guarded against it.  So it has been from Ty Kong Tin v. Republic,^[8] a
1954 decision:  “It is our opinion
that the petition under consideration does not merely call for a correction of
a clerical error.  It involves a matter
which concerns the citizenship not only of petitioner but of his children.  It is therefore an important controversial
matter which can and should only be threshed out in an appropriate action.  The philosophy behind this requirement lies
in the fact that ‘the books making up the civil register and all documents
relating thereto shall, be considered public documents and shall be prima facie
evidence of the facts thereon contained’ (Article 410, new Civil Code), and if
the entries in the civil
register could be corrected or changed through a mere summary proceeding, and
not through an appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by
the entries are notified or represented, we would set wide open the door to fraud
or other mischief, the consequence of which might be detrimental and
far-reaching.  It is for these reasons
that the law has placed the necessary safeguards to forestall such eventuality
that even on matters which call for a correction of clerical mistakes the
intervention of the courts was found necessary. 
This is an innovation not originally found in the law which placed this
matter exclusively upon the sound judgment and discretion of the civil
registrars.  This was found by Congress
unwise and risky in view of the far-reaching importance of the subjects covered
by the civil register.”^[9]

Such a doctrine has subsequently been followed.^[10]
Chua Wee v. Republic^[11]
reiterated the principle, first announced by Chief Justice Bengzon in Reyes v.
Republic^[12]
that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court merely implemented the Ty Kong Tin
doctrine, by setting forth the procedure to be followed in the correction of
mistakes in the entries in the civil registry, mistakes which are innocuous in
character.  This point was stressed by
Justice Makasiar as ponente in Chua Wee thus:  “From the time the New Civil Code took
effect on August 30, 1950 until the promulgation of the Revised Rules of Court
on January 1, 1964, there was no law nor rule of court prescribing the procedure
to secure judicial authorization to effect the desired innocuous rectifications
or alterations in the civil register pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil
Code.  Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court now provides for such a procedure which should be limited solely to the
implementation of Article 412, the substantive law on the matter of correcting
entries in the civil register.  Rule 108,
like all the- other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the
Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under Sec. 13 of Art. VIII
of the Constitution, which directs that such rules of court ‘shall not diminish
or increase or modify substantive rights.’ If Rule 108 were to be extended
beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible
to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and
controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule 108 would thereby become
unconstitutional for it would be increasing or modifying substantive rights,
which changes are not authorized under Article 412 of the New Civil Code.”^[13]

The latest case in point is Republic v. Amores.^[14]
There is this relevant excerpt from the opinion of Justice Antonio in that
case, promulgated less than a month before the assailed order, to be precise on
January 31, 1973:  “From Ty Kong Tin
v. Republic (1954) to Uy v. Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City (1972) it has
been the uniform juris­prudence of this Court before and after the adoption of
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the changes and corrections
authorized under the summary procedure sanctioned by Article 412 of the New
Civil Code, refers only to correction of innocuous or clerical
errors, such as misspellings or errors that are visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding, and that ‘changes in the citizenship of a person
or in his status from legitimate to illegitimate or from married to not married
are substantial as well as controversial, which can only be established in an
appropriate adversary proceeding as a remedy for the adjudication of real and
justiciable controversies involving actual conflict of rights the final
determination of which depends upon the resolution of the issues of nationality,
paternity, filiation or legitimacy of the marital status for which existing
substantive and procedural laws * * * amply provide.'”^[15]

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and
the order of respondent Judge of February 28, 1973 is nullified, set aside and
declared to be without force and effect as having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion.

Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and
Santos, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., did not take part.

^[1]
Petition, II, par. 4; Annex C.

^[2]
Petition, III, par. 5.

^[3] Ibid,
Annex A.

^[4]
Petition, III, par. 6.

^[5] Ibid,
par. 7 and Annex C of Petition.

^[6] Ibid,
Annex B.

^[7] Ibid,
Annex C, 4-5.

^[8]
94 Phil. 321.

^[9] Ibid,
324.

^[10]
Cf. Ansaldo v. Republic, 102 Phil. 1046 (1958); Coo Ak v.
Republic, 111 Phil. 1067 (1961); Balete v. Republic, 113 Phil. 559
(1961); Barillo v. Republic, 113 Phil. 695 (1961); De Castro v.
Republic, L-17431, April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 967; Liu Lin v. Nuño, L-18213,
Dec. 24, 1963, 9 SCRA 707; Dy Kim Liong v. Republic, L-18608, Dec. 26,
1963, 9 SCRA 773; Beduya v. Republic, L-17693, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA
109, Reyes v. Republic, L-17642, Nov. 27, 1964, 12 SCRA 376; David v.
Republic, L-21316, Nov. 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 438; Chug Siu v. Local Civil
Registrar of Manila, L-20649, July 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 877; Dy Oliva v. Republic,
L-21806, Aug. 17, 1967, 20 SCRA 1070; Lim v. Local Civil Registrar of
Manila, L-24284, Feb. 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 876; Lee v. Lee Hian Tiu,
L-24540, April 25, 1968, 23 SCRA 211; Dy En Siu Co v. Local Civil
Registrar of Manila, L-20794, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 309; Chua Tan. Chuan v.
Republic, L-25439, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 447; Chan Chin v. Local Civil
Registrar of Manila, L-27159, Sept. 17, 1969, 29 SCRA 448; Viray v.
Republic, L-26588, Sept. 30, 1970, 35 SCRA 133.

^[11]
L-27731, April 21, 1971, 38 SCRA 409.

^[12]
L-17642, November 27, 1964, 12 SCRA 376.

^[13]
38 SCRA 409, 415.

^[14]
L-35232, January 31, 1973, 49 SCRA 361.

^[15] Ibid,
352-363. Two other opinions may be mentioned: 
Go v. Civil Registrar, L-29544, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 350 and Uy v.
Local Civil Registrar, L-24442, July 27, 1972, 46 SCRA 1.