BACOLOD-MURCIA MILLING CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. HON. JOSE R. QUERUBIN, AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, JULIO & JULIANA DE LA RAMA AND NAPOLEON GO…

On December 29, 1967 the respondents Julio and Julian dela Rama Gonzaga
and Napoleon Gonzaga (hereinafter to as the
Landowners) a complaint for injunction with petitioner Bacolod-Murcia
Milling Co., Inc., (hereinafter referred to Central) with the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental (civil case 8410),
alleging that they are the owners of parcels of land over the railway tracks of
the Central pass for the purpose of hauling sugar cane from sugar plantations
to the Central; that said railway tracks were constructed by the Central by
virtue of 1920 and 1936 milling contracts executed between the Landowners and
the Central, which contracts granted a right of way to the Central for the
period of the milling contracts, this period to expire on September 30, 1965;
and that the Central continues to used the said railway tracks, and unless an
injunction grave and irreparable injury will result to the Landowners.  Prayer is made for the issuance o a preliminary
injunction restraining the use of the said railway lines passing thru the
property of the Landowners, and, after hearing for judgment making the
injunction permanent.         

On the same date, December 29, 1967, the respondent court, thru
Judge Jose F. Fernandez; issued an injunction ex parte
as prayed for, upon the filing of a bond of P1,000.

On January 2, 1968
the Central filed an urgent motion to lift the preliminary injunction, alleging
that there are about 8,000 hectares affected by the closure of the railway
lines, involving about 500,000 picuIs, or a loss of
more than $2,000,00 in foreign exchange badly needed
by the country.

The President of the Philippines
intervened in G.R. No. L­-27084, entitled “Angela Estate, et al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., et al.,” and
succeeded in persuading the Angela Estate and the Gonzaga
Estate to allow the use by the Central of the railway tracks on the land of the
petitioners in that case.

On January 4, 1968 the respondent judge issued an order which
states in essence that while public interest maybe jeopardized by the closing
of the railways by virtue of the injunction nevertheless, because the contracts
have expired and the court cannot extend the contract for the parties, and
because the President was going to call the parties to a round table conference,
the motion to lift the preliminary injunction should in the meantime be denied.

As result of the said conference, it was agreed to allow the
Central’s cane cars and locomotives to pass thru the Landowners’ property up to
April 1, 1968 only.

The Central filed its answer on January 29, 1968 which was amended on April 18, 1968, which amended answer admits some
of the factual allegations in the complaint and denies others, and raises legal
defenses.

On April 24, 1968 the Central was informed that the Landowners
were constructing a cement barricade over the railway tracks passing their
property, and that they were ready to bull­doze the land on which the railway
tracks are laid.

On May 10, 1968
the Central came to this Court on certiorari with preliminary injunction
for review of the orders of the respondent court of December 29, 1967 and January 4, 1968, which was docketed as
G. R. No. L-29001.

On May 15, 1968
the Supreme Court issued the following resolution:

“Acting upon the petition for certiorari in
case G. R. No. L-29001 (Bacolod-Murcia Milling
Co., Inc. vs. Hon. Jose R. Querubin, et al.) and
there being no showing that all the grounds alleged in said petition were
brought to the attention of the respondent Judge in due time, for which reason
it can not be properly held that the order a January 4, 1968, now complained
of, was issued in abused of discretion, the Court resolved to DISMISS the
petition.”

 As a consequence on June 4, 1968 the Central filed a
motion to lift injunction with the respondent court, interposing said grounds,
and on June 25, 1968 the
Central filed a second amended answer. 
The motion to lift injunction was denied in the respondent court’s order
of July 1, 1968 which reads:

“Considering the motion of the defendant to lift injunction
dated June 4, 1968 and the
oppo­sition thereto and finding the said motion without merit, same is hereby
denied.”

Hence, the present recourse.

The petitioner imputes excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse a discretion to the respondent court in issuing the said
injunction and in refusing to lift the same, for the following reasons, in the
language of the petition:

 “1. Under Section 7, Act 2479, the milling
contracts that should be executed between the planters and the Central should
convey to the Central such right of way as the Central may deem necessary for
reads and railroad connecting the mill with the fields’ which provision of law
must be read into the said contract, and since a conveyance of a railroad right
of way is not only an easement, but is a conveyance in fee simple of the strip
of land covered thereby, then the provision of milling contracts limiting the
existence of the said right of way to 45 crop years or harvests, is null and
void, as being in conflict with the law, and public policy and since the Central
is the owner of the said railroad right of way, then, it may not be prevented
from using the same.

“2. In the earlier portion of the contract of rights of way it
provides for a donation by landowners of the strip of land traversed by the
railroads, while in the latter portion, it provides a mere easement thereof,
and in the case of conflict, the earlier prevails over the later, hence, since
there is a donation, Central is again the owner thereof.

“3. Assuming arguendo that there is no
conveyance in fee simple or donation of the strip of land constituting the
right of way, since the period of the 45 crop years or harvest during the six
years, from 1940-41 to 1946-47, then, the sale 45 crop-years will expire only
in 1971-72, hence, landowners’ acts of closing the railway tracks is premature.

“4. Assuming arguendo
that the 45-year period has already expired, nevertheless, since according to
Sec. 1(a), sub­par. 4(c) of Act 4166, ‘A plantation
is adherent to a sugar by virtue of the sugar cane delivered to the mill
regardless of the contract relations,’ and that according to Astorias Sugar Co. vs. Montinola  (69 Phil. 725) that the contractual relations
of planter and miller continues by operation of law even after the expiration
of the contract, then, the obligation of the landowners to give such right of
way to Central continues up to the present, hence, removing of the railway
tracks or closing said right of way is an impairment of that obligation.

“5. Moreover, the contract for rights of way between the Central
and the adhered planters, and the adhered planters themselves, is one entire
and indivisible contract, considering bet­ween that the performance of the
planters in granting the rights of way is the consideration in the performance
of the Central in putting up the railways, without which collective promises or
commitments the Central could not have built said railways, and since the
contract is entire, it may not be terminated piecemeal, for an entire contract
stands or falls together, hence, since the contracts of rights of way of most
adhered planters have not ex­pired (even if that of the landowners have
expired), the entire contract is not deemed to have expired.

“6. Assuming arguendo
that the Landowners can now repossess the land constituting the right of way,
nevertheless, under Art. 448 of the new Civil Code, the Central being a
possessor in good faith of the right of way and have built construction thereon
in the form of railway tracks, the same may not be closed or removed without
payment of the value of the said railway tracks as well as the locomotive and
cane cars using the same amounting to not less than P7 million, while on the
other hand, the Central is willing to buy the land covered by the railway
tracks in question at the price that may be fixed by the court, being smaller
in value than the cost of improvements attached to the land, hence, closing the
railway tracks therefrom, which will amount to appro­priating
said improvements, without compensation, and without a hearing, hence, denial
of due process of law (Sec. 1[1 & 2], Art. III, Constitution).”

The present petition must be denied.

These six issues were substantially, albeit in different
language, raised in Angela Estate et al. vs. CFI of Negros
Occidental et al., G.R. No. L-27084, July 31, 1968, where the factual set­ting is similar to that in the case at bar.  In its decision this Court discussed and
analyzed the said issues, and resolved all of them against the Bacolod Marcia Milling Co., to deny the latter passage of
its locomotives and cane cars through the lands of the petitioners therein,
meantime that the existence of the sta­tutory requisites for a right to a legal
easement over the said lands has not been established.

In the present case, as in that case, there is no showing by the
Central that the pre-conditions required by articles 649 and 650 of the new
Civil Code for the grant of a legal easement actually exist.  The respondent court therefore acted
correctly in issuing the injunction against the Central and in refusing to lift
the same.

ACCORDINGLY, the present petition is hereby dismissed.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.