APOLONIO GONZAGA, PROTESTANT AND APPELLANT, VS. CONRADO D. SENO, PROTESTEE AND APPELLEE.

In the election held on November 10, 1959, four candidates for the
office of Mayor of Mandawe, Cebu, were presented, to wit: Apolonio Z.
Gonzaga, Conrado D. Seno, Vicente B. Seno and Sergio Sanchez. After the
canvass of the election, the, rnunicipal board of canvassers proclaimed
Conrado D. Seno as mayor-elect having received 3,786 votes over his
opponent Apolonia Z. Gonzaga who, obtained 3,740 votes, or a majority
of 46 votes. On November 20, 1959, Gonzaga filed an election protest
before the Court of First Instance of Cebu based mainly on vote-buying,
which was answered by Conrado D. Seno with a counter-protest as to
three precincts.

Commissioners were appointed. In the course of the trial, the counterprotest was withdrawn. On February 28, 1961, the court a quo
decided the protest in favor of protestee but declared that his
majority of 46 was reduced to 12 mainly on the ground that the
invalidated ballots were found to be marked.

Considering that the court a quo erred in admitting about 92
ballots wherein the words “D. Seno” appear written on the space for
mayor as valid votes for protestee, protestant Gonzaga appealed the
case to the Court of Appeals. In due course, protestee Seno submitted
his brief refuting the only error assigned by protestant but discussing
not only questions of law but also questions of fact.

After both parties had submitted their briefs and the case was heard
and submitted for decision, protestant moved that the protest be
elevated to this Court upon the plea that the only issue involved in
this appeal is one of law. This motion was granted over the objection
of protestee who, in his brief, raised both questions of law and of
fact, for which reason this Court will limit its discussion to the only
issue raised by protestant relative to the admission in favor of
appellee of the 92, ballots which on the space for mayor the words “D.
Seno” appear written,

The law on which the issue hinges is Rule 16, Section 149 of the Revised Election Code, which reads as follows;

“When there are two or more candidates for an office
with the same name or surname, the voter shall, in order that his vote
may be counted, add the correct name, surname or initial that will
identify the candidate for whom he votes.”

Appellant contends that under the above rule where there are two
candidates for mayor which bear the same surname of “Seno” the voter,
in order that his vote will be counted and the candidate he intends to
vote for will be identified, shall add the correct initial of the
correct Christian name, either of the appellee, which is Conrado, or of
the candidate Vicente Seno, which is Vicente, and since none of the
initials of either Christian name appears written on the 92 ballots in
question because the initial “D” written thereon is not the correct
initial of the Christian name of either candidates, which is “C” or
“V”, it was error for the court a quo to have considered said
ballots as valid votes for protestee. In other words, appellant is of
the opinion that Rule 16 as copied above should be interpreted to
reflect the intention of the legislature as follows:

“When there are two or more candidates for an office
with tlio same name or surname, the voter shall, in order that his vote
may be counted, add the correct name, the correct surname or the
correct initial of the correct name or of the correct surname that will
identify the candidate for whom he votes.

“The correct
initial of the correct name or surname being therefore the initial
definitely, explicitly and expressly required by Rule 16, it follows
that the correct initial, or any other kind of initial, is excluded
under the principle of ‘inclusio unius est exelusio alterius.’ Thus, in
the case at bar, as to the candidates surnamed ‘Seno,’ it is
indispensable that THE CORRECT initial of their respective correct
Christian name should be prefixed to their surname ‘Seno’ (1) in order
that they can claim that they are identified by the voter and (2) in
order that the vote will be counted. Based on protestee-appellee’s
Certificate of Candidacy, Exh. D, is the initial “D.” the correct
initial of his correct Christian name of ‘Conrado’? Is it the correct
initial of Dr. Seno’s correct ‘Christian name of ‘Vicente’ The answkers
are quite obvious.”

Appellee disagrees with the above interpretation, firstly, because
it would run counter to a well-known rule of statutory construction,
secondly, it would render useless the qualifying clause, “that will
identify the candidate for whom he votes”, and thirdly, it would leave
a void in the law. In our opinion, this observation is well-taken.

To begin with, we find that the language of Rule 16 is clear. It
provides that if there are two or more candidates bearing the same name
or surname, the voter shall add the correct name, surname, or initial
that will identify the candidate for whom he votes. This only means
that the voter, to identify his vote, should add either the initial of
the correct name, the initial of the correct surname, or any initial
that might identify the candidate for whom he votes. The word initial
does not necessarily refer either to the name or surname of the
candidate, it being sufficient that it identifies the candidate chosen
by the voter. To hold otherwise would be to add to the rule something
not intended therein, as the one intimated by appellant.

There is another reason that justifies the observation of appellee
that the interpretation which appellant gives to the rule would run
counter to some provisions of Section 149 which contains the different
rules relative to the appreciation of ballots. We have, for example,
the content of Rule 6 which refers to three kinds of initials: the
initial of the name which accompanies the correct surname of a”
candidate, the initial of the surname which accompanies the correct
name of a candidate, and the intermediate initial between the correct
name and surname of a candidate. The use of these three initials in the
preparation of a ballot which according to this rule does not have the
effect of annulling the vote even if erroneous provided the candidate
is identified, gives an idea of how Rule 16 should be interpreted, for
it contains a clear in sinuation that the voter may write on the ballot
not only the initial letter of a correct name or surname, but also the
initial letter of any intermediate name the candidate may have. And it
is well-known that the use of an intermediate initial by persons who
bear, the same name and surname is a common occurrence, for they can
only to identified by using that intermediate initial.

It is probably for this reason that the court a quo was
persuaded to consider the 92 ballots in question as valid votes for
protestee it appearing undisputed that the name and surname of the
latter bears the intermediate initial “D”. In other words, his correct
name as it appears in his certificate of candidacy is Conrado D. Seno.
Certainly, a ballot bearing the words “D. Seno” cannot be confused with
the other candidate bearing the same surname for his real complete name
is Vicente B, Seno,

Another reason that may be advanced for the admission of said
ballots in favor of appellee is the undisputed facts that appellee was
well-known in the place where he was a candidate as “Dado Seno”, the
first word being his nickname. As a matter of fact, many of the votes
cast for him and which were admitted without dispute bear the same
nickname before his surname. And since he was admittedly well-known by
that nickname in the municipality where he was a candidate, a part from
the fact that, that nickname appears in his sample ballots, it is no
wonder if many have voted or him writing only the initial “D”of his
nickname as the only identifying mark. In this connection, we do not
agree to the contention that the word initial can only apply to a name
or surname and not to a nickname. Even Webster’s dictionary defines
that word as “a first part, a beginning, an initial, letter, note or
the like.”

We believe that the case of Moya vs. Del Fierro, 69 Phil., 199, was
properly invoked by the court a quo in support of its view that the
words “D. Seno” which appear in the ballots in question may stand for
Dado Seno by which appelle was well-known in the municipality. In that
case Moya objected to 72 ballots counted for Agrifino del Fierro
contend that the words “P. del Fierro” could not be considered for del
Fierro because the letter “P” was merely the initial letter of his
nickname “Pino”, but this Court, brushing aside this objection, counted
said ballots as valid votes for Del Fierro in the following language:

“The fourth assignment of error deals with the 72
ballots where ‘P. del Fierro’ was voted for the office of mayor, and it
is the contention, of the petitioner that said ballots should not have
‘been counted by the Court of Appeals in favor of the respondent. For
the identical reason indicated under the discussion of petitioner’s
second assignment of error, namely, that ‘P’ stands, for ‘PINO’ in
“PINO DEL FIERRO’ which is a name mentioned in the certificate of
candidacy of the respondent, we hold that there was no error in the
action of the Court of Appeals in awarding the said ballots to the
respondent.

“Counsel for both parties have called, our
attention to the different and divergent rules laid down by this Court
on the appreciation of ballots. It will serve no good and useful
purpose for us to engage in the task of reconciliation or harmonization
of these rules, although this may perhaps be undertaken, as no two
cases will be found to be exactly the same in factual or legal
environment. It is sufficient to observe, however, in this
connection, that whatever might have been said in cases heretofore
decided, no technical rule or rules should be permitted to defeat the
intention of the voter, if that intention is discoverable from the
ballot itself, and not from evidence aliunde. This rule of,
interpretation goes to the very root of the system. Rationally, also,
this must be the justification for the suggested liberalization of the
rules on appreciation of ballots which, are now incorporated in section
144 of the Election Code, Commonwealth Act No. 357).” (Italics
supplied).

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed. Costs against appellant,

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.