VILLA-REY TRANSIT, INC., PETITIONER VS. HON. ELOY B. BELLO, FLORENTINA ASUNCION, IN HER OWN BEHALF AND AS GUARDIAN AD-LITEM OF HER MINOR CHILDREN, CARMENCITA, DANILO, EVENGELINE…

On August 7, 1961, herein respondents, the Tejadas, presented with the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, a complaint for “Damages with
Preliminary Attachment”, against herein petitioner and the
incorporators thereof, as a result of the death of Felipe Tejada,
(husband and father of respondents), who was one of the passengers of
petitioner’s Bus No. 107, which figured in a vehicular accident on the
morning of July 17, 1961.

Summons was received by petitioner Villa-Rey Transit, Inc. on August
18, 1961, and had until September 2, 1961, within which to Answer. One
day before the expiration of the period to present Answer, a “Motion
for Extension of Time Within which to File Responsive Pleading”, was
mailed by counsel of the defendants, asking fifteen (15) days from
September 2, 1961. They were given 10 days from September 2, 1961.
Counsel claims that he did not receive any resolution before the
expiration of the period of extension. However, on September 12, 1961,
within the period prayed for, counsel for defendants filed a “Motion to
Dismiss”, the principal allegations and arguments of which read as
follows-

“* * * The complaint alleges that the
above-referred defendants ‘are included as such because they are the
original incorporators of the defendant Villa-Rey Transit, Inc.; that
according to the Articles of Incorporators, they have subscribed to
P200,000.00 worth of shares of Stock and have paid only P105,000.02;
and that the balance of P95,000.00 still in the hands of these
defendants form part of the assets of the Villa-Rey Transit, Inc. (Par.
V, of plaintiffs’ complaint). Admitting the same to be true, yet, it is
respectfully submitted that defendants are liable for their unpaid
subscriptions to the corporation, but, not to a third party, It could
not be a cause for including them as party defendants herein. Hence,
the plaintiff has no cause of action against said defendants. To allow
said defendants to be parties herein, would only cause them
embarrassment and expenses.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully
prayed that the complaint of plaintiffs be dismissed, or that
plaintiffs be ordered to amend their complaint by discharging Virgilio
Reyes, Emma P. Reyes, Benigno Cunanan, Felicitas V. Cunanan, Natividad
R. Villarama and Feliciana Reyes as parties-defendants thereof.”

The motion to dismiss was set for hearing on September 20, 1961.
However, on September 14, 1961, herein respondents presented with the
lower court, a Petition Ex-Parte to declare herein petitioner
in Default, it appearing that the period granted, to it, had already
elapsed and the Motion to Dismiss was only for the benefit of the other
defendants, but not of herein petitioner. On September 18, 1961,
respondents filed a Motion Ex-Parte, praying that the
defendants-incorporators in said Civil Case, be dropped from the
complaint, as prayed for in the Motion to Dismiss.

Under date of September 18, 1961, the respondent Court handed down an Order, the pertinent portions of which recite-

“From the records of the case, it appears that the
defendant Villa-Rey Transit, Inc. was served with summons on August 17,
1961; that on September 4, 1961, the said defendant filed a motion for
an extension of time within which to file responsive pleading; and that
this Court acting on said motion gave the defendants ten (10) days from
September 2, 1961, within which to file their answer. In the records of
the case, there is no answer filed by the defendants but a motion to
dismiss for the defendants other than the defendant Villa-Rey Transit,
Inc. From September 2, 1961, until the present time, more than ten (10)
days have already elapsed.

As prayed for, the defendant Villa-Rey Transit is hereby declared in default.

This
Court may even declare the other defendants in default because their
motion of August 29, 1961, asking for an extension of time to file a
responsive pleading, and a motion to dismiss is not a responsive
pleading. However, on September 18, 1961, the plaintiffs thru counsel,
have just filed a motion ex-parte praying that the complaint be dropped
against the defendants Virgilio Reyes, Emma P. Reyes, Benigno Cunanan,
Felicitas V. Cunanan, Natividad R. Villarama, and Feliciano Reyes.

As
prayed for, the complaint as far as the above-named defendants are
concerned are hereby dropped. As prayed for in the motion ex-parte of
plaintiffs dated September 14, 1961, the Special Deputy Clerk of Court,
Branch I, is hereby commissioned to receive the evidence which the
plaintiffs may desire to present in support of their complaint.”

On September 20, 1961, the respondent Court, resolving the Motion to
Dismiss, stated that since the defendants-incorporators had already
been dropped from the complaint, it was superfluous to act thereon.

On September 23, 1961, the respondent Court rendered a default
judgment against the Villa-Rey Transit, Inc., the relevant portions of
which read-

“From the evidence presented it has been established
that the late Felipe R. Tejada is the legitimate husband of the
plaintiff Florentina Asuncion and the legitimate father of the other
plaintiffs; that at around 3:00 o’clock in the morning of July 17,
1961, the said Felipe R. Tejada boarded a Bus No. 107 of the defendant
corporation at Lingayen, Pangasinan, in his way to Manila where he is
employed; that he (Tejada), was a paying passenger in said bus; that
while the bus was on its way on the national highway at San Manuel,
Tarlac, and while visibility was not very clear, the driver of the said
Bus No. 107 drove the said bus at a terrific speed and; while doing so
bumped against a cargo truck that was parked along the side of the road
at said municipality, * * * the right side of the bus was smashed and
all the seven passengers seated on the right side died as a result of
the accident, and among those passengers was the late Felipe R. Tejada;
that the said Tejada; was a permanent employee of the Court of Appeals
with a salary of P3,300.00 a year, * * * and that Felipe R. Tejada was
38 years, old at the time of his death.

There is no
question that the defendant, Villa-Rey Transit, Inc.” had committed a
breach of contract in failing to comply, with its common carrier
obligation of bringing safely the passenger Felipe R. Tejada to his
place of destination, in this particular case, to Manila. There is no
question that had not the late Felipe R. Tejada met a fatal, accident
on July 17, 1961, he would have continued to serve in the Government
until he would retire at the age of 65, years, so that he would still
have to render service for some 27 years. Just for the death of Felipe
R. Tejada, the heirs are entitled to compensation of P6,000.00 (Art.
2206, CC). As consequential damages, the heirs have been deprived of
the earning capacity of their husband and father, respectively, at the
rate of P3,300.00 a year. The average life of a Filipino is between 50
to 60 years; so, the plaintiffs are entitled to, at least seventeen
(17) years, or the sum of P56,100.00 (Art 2206, Par. 1,. C.C.). For
failure of the defendant to exercise due diligence in employing a
careful and prudent driver, as an example for the public good, the
amount’ of P2,000,00 as exemplary damage is hereby awarded. For the
agony, mental anguish and sorrow suffered by the plaintiffs because of
the sudden death of said father and husband, and the mutilated and gory
condition of the body, the amount of P5,000.00 is awarded as moral
damages.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, decision is hereby
rendered, ordering the defendant, Villa-Rey Transit, Inc., to pay the
sum of P70,100,00 as damages, with costs against the defendant.”

On September 26, 1961, private-parties: respondents presented an Ex-Parte
Petition for the execution of the decision. The same was granted and
personal properties of petitioner company were levied upon. On
September 27, 1961, petitioner herein, filed a Motion to Lift Order of
Default alleging that the order was entered against the defendant thru
accident, mistake or excusable negligence; that the Motion to Dismiss,
presented within the period granted, included petitioner herein; that
the same was a responsive pleading; and that petitioner had valid
defenses. The motion with the opposition ef the respondents, was set
for hearing on October 5, 1961. A motion to lift the Order of Execution
dated’ September 30, 1961 was also presented by petitioner, alleging
that the motion to lift order of default, should first be resolved
before the decision could be executed. The motion to lift the Order of
Execution was denied in open court on October 2, 1961, in the following
manner:

“* * * considering that, the issuance for the
execution of judgment is a matter of right ori the part of the
plaintiffs, the defendant having been declared an default and as such
it has no right to appeal, and considering that, not until this court
sets aside its decision and lifts the order of default will the writ of
execution be affected, the said motion is denied.”

On the same date (Oct. 2,), petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial
or to Set Aside Judgment, and requested the same to be heard also on
October 5, 1961. An opposition to the above motion was registered on
October 4, 1961, by respondents. When the motion Was heaid on October
5, 1961, the respondent judge suggested to counsel for petitioner to
file his petition under Rule 38 of the Rules, and to file a bond of
P30,000.00 in order to stop the projected sale of the properties levied
upon. The suggestion, however, was a voice in the wilderness, be cause
on October 4, 1961, petitioner had filed the present action.

In the petition, it was alleged that respondent Court (1) acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or with grave abuse of
discretion in declaring petitioner in default and (2) in not lifting or
suspending the writ of execution, pending the resolution of the motion
to lift order of default and the motion for New Trial and/or to set
aside the judgment. Petitioner prayed:

(a) that judgment bs entered annuling the decision rendered on September 23, 1961 and the orders issued, thereafter;

(b)
that pending hearing and determination of the petition, an order of
preliminary injunction issue directing the respondent Judge to desist
and refrain from enforcing the Writ of Execution dated September 27,
1961 and restraining the Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan to desist and
refrain from selling at auction, on October 7, 1961, the properties
levied upon.

On October 6, 1961, this Court gave due course to the petition and
issued a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents, answering,
maintain that petitioner was correctly declared in default and that the respondent Court did not commit the abuse alluded to.

The issues raised by petitioner boil down to the proposition of
“whether or not respondent Court acted without, or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion in declaring petitioner
in default and in rendering the default judgment.

Admittedly, respondent Court had jurisdiction over the ease. The
impugned orders were issued in the exercise of such jurisdiction. If
the court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the person,
orders or decisions upon all questions pertaining to the cause are
orders or decisions within its jurisdiction and, however irregular or
erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari (Gala vs. Cui and Rodriguez, 25 Phil., 522). Judicial errors or mistakes of law, are proper subjects of appeal (Macasieb Sison vs. CFI of Pangasinan, 34 Phil., 404; Galang vs.
Endencia, 73 Phil., 399). The respondent, in declaring petitioner in
default, found that it did not file a responsive pleading within the
period granted to it, and that the Motion to Dismiss, (which, by the
way, is not a responsive pleading, Paeste & Carpio vs.
Jaurique, 94 Phil., 179; 50 Off. Gaz. 112), did not pertain to
petitioner, but to the defendants-incorporators. Granting, for the
purposes of argument, that these findings are erroneous, still it is a
legal truism that not every error in the proceeding, or every erroneous
conclusion of law or of fact, is abuse of discretion (Gov’t. vs.
Judge of First Instance, 34 Phil., 157). True, that petitioner had
filed a motion to lift order of default, and a motion for new trial and
to set aside the default judgment, but before they could be resolved,
petitioner had already brought the matter to this Court, on a petition
for Certiorari and Injunction, without giving the respondent court an
opportunity to pass upon said motions, which act renders the filing of
the present petition premature. Moreover, the trial court did not act
with abuse of discretion, in issuing the orders complained of, for it
is clear that they are in accordance with the facts and circumstances
of record and the law on the subject.

Wherefore, the petition should be, as it is hereby DENIED, for lack
of merits. The injunction issued is DISSOLVED, find costs taxed against
herein petitioner VILLA-REY TRANSIT, INC.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.