EVIC HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, INC. ET AL.,/ EVIC HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, LTD.,/ MS. MA. VICTORIA C. NICOLAS, PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND VALERI…
LAZARO-JAVIER, A.C., J.:
assailed issuances, this Court finds and so holds that the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) judiciously acted in awarding private
respondent’s permanent total disability benefit and other monetary
claims.
Petitioners hired private respondent Valerio Paragele as Able
Seaman on board M/T Christina on March 27, 2012. He boarded the vessel
on May 26, 2012. According to Valerio, he was constantly served with
unhealthy food on board the vessel which he was forced to eat because of
his heavy, stressful, and physically demanding work. On January 1,
2013, after rendering straight duty for 12 hours, he experienced
moderate palpitations, chest pain, auditory hallucinations, tremors,
light-headedness, dizziness, upset stomach, and weakness. He also felt
discomfort whenever he was alone. Because of his auditory
hallucinations, he could no longer sleep and became lethargic and
irritable, which consequently affected his work performance. Valerio was
repatriated on January 12, 2013.
Upon arrival in Manila,
Valerio was referred to the company-designated physician at YGEIA
Medical Center to determine and treat his condition. Petitioners later
requested their company-designated physician, Dr. Susannah O. Salvador
of Sachly International Health Partners to extend medical attention and
treatment to Valerio as the latter was repatriated and diagnosed with
Major Depression Disorder.[2] Valerio consulted other independent physicians, namely, Dr. Arleen Grace Rosal[3]
and clinical psychologist Dr. Elias D. Adamos, who both confirmed that
he had Major Depression Disorder. After a series of evaluation and
treatment, Dr. Adamos declared Valerio permanently incapacitated to work
as seafarer because of his serious medical, mental, and psychological
condition equivalent to Grade 1 under the Standard Contract of POEA, and
stated that the latter’s condition was related to his heavy workload on
board the vessel[4].
Petitioners rejected Valerio’s claim for disability benefits on the
strength of the Master’s Report stating that Valerio allegedly requested
to be signed off from the vessel due to family problem[5].
Valerio, thus, filed the complaint below for total and permanent
disability benefits, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees[6]. Both the labor arbiter[7] and the NLRC[8]
ruled in Valerio’s favor granting his money claims, but denying his
claim for damages due to lack of proof of bad faith or malice on
petitioners’ part.
Petitioners now seek affirmative relief
claiming that Valerio is not entitled to permanent total disability
benefit because he was not medically repatriated, but requested for
voluntary repatriation prior to the completion of his contract, and his
illness is not work-related but only brought about by news that his
daughter had been abused.
For a seafarer’s employment to be
deemed effectively pre-terminated by resignation and sign-off, the same
must be done in writing as required under Section 18 (B) 3 of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment
Contract (POEA-SEC), viz:
Section 18. Termination of Employment
B. The employment of the seafarer is also terminated when the
seafarer arrives at the point of hire for any of the following reasons:3. when the seafarer, in writing, voluntarily resigns and
signs off prior to expiration of contract pursuant to Section 19 (G) of
this Contract.
Here, there is no substantial evidence that Valerio actually
pre-terminated his employment. Apart from the Master’s report,
petitioners failed to show any written proof that Valerio, indeed,
requested for early disembarkation because his daughter was abused. The
Master’s report which only narrates accounts of other seafarers
regarding Valerio’s alleged request and reason for early disembarkation
cannot outweigh the concurring findings of the labor arbiter and the
NLRC that Valerio was medically repatriated. This falls short of the
written proof of voluntary pre-termination of the contract required
under the POEA-SEC.
Further, petitioners’ own acts belie their claim that Valerio voluntarily resigned and was not medically repatriated. First. A perusal of petitioners’ Request for Medical Attention[9] would show that they acknowledge the fact that Valerio was indeed repatriated and is suffering with Major Depression Disorder. Second.
The fact that they paid Valerio’s repatriation cost also militates
against their interest since the POEA-SEC requires the seafarer who
requested for pre-termination of his contract to shoulder the
repatriation and transportation cost of his replacement. It expressly
singled out the seafarer’s transportation cost as the only expense the
employer may assume as a form of compassionate gesture.[10] Beyond that, it may already be deemed an admission of liability for the seafarer’s early repatriation.
To escape liability, petitioners further argue that Valerio’s
illness is not work-related. Relying on the Master’s report, they allege
that the news about the abuse of his daughter was the proximate cause
of his depression and his subsequent request for voluntary repatriation.
The Master’s Report with respect to this matter has no probative value
for being hearsay as the Master, Dimitrios Theodorou, only recited
therein what another seafarer, Bosun Flores Danilo, told him, i.e. Valerio’s reason for requesting early disembarkation was the incident regarding his daughter.
Though Major Depression Disorder may not be listed as an
occupational disease under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC, it is presumed
to be work related and compensable pursuant to Section 20 (B), paragraph
(4) of the said POEA-SEC[11].
The employer bears the burden to overcome this statutory presumption.
Hence, unless the employer presents a contrary evidence, this disputable
presumption stands.[12]
Here, there was no sufficient evidence presented to overcome the
presumption of work-relation. Other than the Master’s Report and the
alleged declaration of the company-designated physician that Valerio’s
illness was not work-related,[13]
petitioners failed to discharge their burden. In fact, they even
acknowledged and informed their company-doctors that Valerio was
repatriated and has Major Depression Disorder.[14]
Too, Valerio underwent Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME), was
declared fit to work before joining petitioner’s vessel, and later
manifested symptoms of his illness while on board the vessel which show
that his working conditions either caused or aggravated his illness.
Further, petitioners’ unsubstantiated assertions cannot stand against
Dr. Adamos’ detailed medical opinion and the labor arbiter and NLRC’s
concurring findings that that Valerio is suffering from a work-related
disorder.
Under our labor laws, a disability is total and
permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness, the employee is
unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period
exceeding 120 days[15] or the
disability to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar
nature that he was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of
work which a person of his mentality and attainment could do.[16]
The notion of disability is intimately related to the worker’s capacity
to earn. It should be understood less on its medical significance but
more on the loss of earning capacity inasmuch as what is being
compensated is not the worker’s injury or illness but his inability to
work resulting in the impairment of his earning capacity.[17]
An employee’s disability becomes permanent and total when so declared
by the company-designated physician, or, in case of absence of such a
declaration either of fitness or permanent total disability, upon the
lapse of the 120 or 240-day treatment period, while the employee’s
disability continues and he is unable to engage in gainful employment
during such period, and the company-designated physician fails to arrive
at a definite assessment of the employee’s fitness or disability.[18]
Here, Valerio was repatriated on January 12, 2013 and was referred to a
company designated physician who was not shown to have issued any
medical report or certificate to prove that the latter has already made a
definite assessment of Valerio’s fitness or disability. On the other
hand, Dr. Adamos categorically declared Valerio permanently unfit for
sea duties because of the disability caused by his work-related
illnesses. Valerio was not able to perform his customary duty or any
gainful occupation for an uninterrupted period of more than 120 days due
to said illness. There is no showing that he has been re-employed by
petitioners for the same position or any similar capacity since he got
repatriated. All these give rise to the conclusive presumption that
Valerio is totally and permanently disabled. The labor arbiter and NLRC
are, therefore, correct in declaring that Valerio suffered permanent
total disability considering that his mental and psychological condition
or illness affects his mental faculties, is recurrent, and effectively
prevents him from regaining full use of his mental faculties and
returning to his usual work as seafarer.
Valerio, too, is
entitled to the balance of his sickness allowance benefits because he
has never become fit again to resume his duties nor cured of his illness
from the time he disembarked for medical treatment.
Further,
the NLRC correctly awarded attorney’s fees considering that petitioners’
failure to satisfy Valerio’s valid claim compelled him to litigate and
incur expenses to protect his rights.[19]
Absent any arbitrary or despotic exercise of judicial power as to
amount to abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC, therefore, the
petition cannot prosper.[20]
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Castillo, (Chairperson) and Barrios,[1] JJ., concur.
[1] Per Office Order No. 243-14-ABR dated May 23, 2014.
[2] Manning Agents Request for Medical Attention dated February 21, 2013, Rollo, p. 94.
[3] Medical Certificate dated February 7, 2013, Rollo, p. 93.
[4] Medical Certificate dated April 16, 2013, Rollo, pp. 95-98.
[5] Master’s Report dated January 23, 2013, Rollo, p. 63.
[6] Rollo, pp. 64-66.
[7] Decision dated September 27, 2013, Rollo, pp. 126-136.
[8] Decision dated January 13, 2014, Rollo, pp. 36-45; Resolution dated February 20, 2014, Rollo, 31-33.
[9] Manning Agents Request for Medical Attention, Rollo, p. 94.
[10] SECTION 19. REPATRIATION
G. A seafarer who requests for early termination of his contract
shall be liable for his repatriation cost as well as the transportation
cost of his replacement. The employer may, in case of compassionate
grounds, assume the transportation cost of the seafarer’s replacement.
[11] SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers
work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as
follows:xxx xxx xxx
4. Those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work related.
[12] Jebsens Maritime,
Inc., vs. Eleno A. Babol, G.R. No. 204076, December 4, 2013.; Magsaysay
Maritime Services and Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., vs. Earwin Meinrad
Antero F. Laurel, G.R. No. 195518, March 20, 2013.
[13] Rollo, p. 18.
[14] Manning Agents Request for Medical Attention, Rollo, p. 94. [15]Section
2(b), Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of Title II, Book IV of the
Labor Code, as amended, or the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation
Commission (ECC Rules).
[16] Carmelito N. Valenzona vs. Fair Shipping Corporation and/or Sejin Lines Company Limited, G.R. No. 176884, October 19, 2011.
[17] Joelson O. Iloreta
vs. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. and Norbulk Shipping U.K.,
Ltd., G.R. NO. 183908, December 4, 2009.
[18] Alpha Ship Management Corporation vs. Eleosis V. Calo, G.R. No. 192034, January 13, 2014.
[19] Carmelito N.
Valenzona vs. Fair Shipping Corporation and/or Sejin Lines Company
Limited, G.R. No. 176884, October 19, 2011; MCC Industrial Sales
corporation vs. Ssangyong Corporation vs. Kamalig resources, Inc., 540
SCRA 139.
[20] Santiago Land Development Company v. Court of Appeals, et.al., G.R. No. 103922, July 9, 1996.