THE PHOENIX ASSURANCE COMPANY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

To state the basis of the order of July 16, 1966 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, Branch XXII, the Honorable Federico C. Alikpala presiding, dismissing an action filed by
plaintiff-appellant Phoenix Assurance Company against the Republic of the Philippines
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the state not being susceptible to a
suit without its consent, is to make manifest the appropriate disposition of
this appeal.  Its fate is foreordained.  A reversal of the lower court decision is
unthinkable.

An action was filed against defendants, now appellees,
Republic of the Philippines and the Customs Arrastre
Service, on June 11, 1966, in view of the claims for losses and damages for
failure of the latter, as arrastre operator, to
deliver on two occasions five cartons of cigarettes, with the rest of the
merchandise delivered but in a damaged condition.  Such goods were insured with
plaintiff-appellant.  It had to pay the
claims thereon, thereby subrogating itself to whatever
rights of recovery the consignee
had.  It made demands on now appellee Customs Arrastre Service
for the amounts involved, but there was a failure and refusal to satisfy such
claims.  Hence the action filed on
June 11, 1966.  There was a motion to dismiss on the part of
defendants, now appellees, Republic of the Philippines and Customs Arrastre
Service on June 25, 1966, the principal ground being the lack of
jurisdiction under the doctrine of non-suability.  As noted, the order of July 16, 1966 sustained
the above motion, the complaint being dismissed.

The appeal was taken direct to
this Court on a pure question of
law.  As above made clear, the futility
thereof is undeniable.

Only last September of
this year, in Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines,^[1]
we had occasion to dismiss an appeal in
view of the 1966 authoritative Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc.
decision,^[2]
wherein such, immunity from suit, absent its consent, was given affirmation in
the most categorical language.  It was
noted by us that there were thirty-six subsequent
cases upholding such a view.  We
could then categorically assert: 
“The doctrine of non-suability thus holds undisputed sway.  Its primacy appears to be undeniable.  For a suit of this character to prosper, there must be a showing of
consent either in express terms or by implication through the use of statutory
language too plain to be misinterpreted. 
Its absence being obvious, the
lower court acted correctly.”

So it is in this case.  The
lower court did right and must be upheld. 
Nor is the reason advanced in the brief of appellant Phoenix Assurance
Company as to the desirability of a doctrine permitting such a suit, in view of
the government engaging in business, commend itself for approval.  In the same Providence Washington Insurance
Co. decision, we had occasion to explain why there should be no departure from
the doctrine of non-suability. 
Thus:  “This is not to deny
that while indeed logical and far from impractical the doctrine does give rise
to problems considering how widely immersed in matters hitherto deemed out­side
its sphere the government is at present. 
Nor is it likely considering its expanding role, demanded by the times
and warranted by the Constitution, that a halt would be called to many of its
acti­vities, at times unavoidably adversely affecting private rights.  None­theless, a continued adherence to the
doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties,
the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its
multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were
abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus
restricted.  With the well known propensity
on the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of
time and energy required to defend against law suits, in the absence of such a
basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well be
imagined.”

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of July 16, 1966 by the Honorable Federico C. Alikpala is affirmed. 
Costs against the Phoenix Assurance Company.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez,
Castro, and Teehankee,
JJ., concur.

Zaldivar and Barredo, JJ.,
took no part.

^[1]
L-26386.

^[2]
Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service, 18 SCRA 1120 (1966).