G.R. No. L-26718. October 31, 1969
ELITE SHIRT FACTORY, INC., PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. THE HON. W. L. CORNEJO AND/OR THE CITY COURT OF MANILA, COMPANIA MARITIMA AND THE PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO., INC., RES…
FERNANDO, J.:
The question presented by this appeal from a decision of the
lower court, then presided by Judge, now Justice Arsenio
Solidum of the Court of Appeals, dismissing a
petition for certiorari filed by the
Elite Shirt Factory, Inc., now appellant, is one that this Court will pass upon
for the first time. Does the exclusive
jurisdiction conferred on a court of first instance over admiralty and
maritime cases include the suit where the shipper files a claim against the
carrier, the goods having been landed, stored in its bodega but subsequently
burned, no delivery having been made to the consignee as a result?[1]
The lower court answered in the affirmative.
It dismissed the petition for certiorari
filed against respondent Judge W. L. Cornejo of the City
Court of Manila who, after deciding in favor of petitioner which sought to
recover damages in the amount of P2,124.00 resulting from the cargo being
burned, refused to grant the motion for execution and in addition, set aside
its original decision, the ground for such dismissal being the lack of
jurisdiction of respondent Judge, the matter falling within the exclusive
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of a court of first instance. Hence, this appeal. We agree with the conclusion reached by the
lower court, and we affirm.
According to the brief for appellant Elite Shirt Factory, Inc.,
it delivered to respondent Campania Maritima on November
29, 1963 for shipment to designated consignees several cartons of
merchandise. While such cargo was stored
in the bodega of respondent Campania Maritima at Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, and before they could be delivered to
the consignees, a fire broke out, as a result of which appellant allegedly
suffered damages in the amount of P2,124.00. The brief for appellant continues: “On June 13, 1964, therefore, petitioner-appellant filed with
the City Court of Manila a complaint against Campania
Maritima for the reimbursement of said amount of P2,124.00 as actual damages.
A motion to dismiss said complaint was filed by Campania
Maritima on the ground that the city court does not
have jurisdiction over said case, the same being in the nature of maritime and
admiralty, and within the jurisdiction of courts of first instance. Said motion to dismiss was denied by the city
court for lack of merit, after which Campania Maritima filed an answer to the complaint impleading respondent-appellee
Philippine Steam Navigation Co., Inc., as third party defendant on the ground,
among others, that the fire which gutted the warehouse of Campania
Maritima and destroyed the goods stored therein
started from the section occupied by the third-party defendant and caused by
the latter’s negligence. Respondent-appellee Philippine Stem Navigation Co., Inc. filed its
answer to the third-party complaint. At
the scheduled hearing of the complaint and third-party complaint, respondent-appellee Philippine Steam Navigation Co., Inc., failed to
appear by reason of which an ex-parte judgment was
rendered against it and respondent-appellee Campania Maritima agreed to pay
the petitioner-appellant the sum of P2,124.00 plus interest thereon at the
legal rate so a judgment by consent was rendered against it.”[2]
Upon petition of the Philippine Steam Navigation Co., Inc. to set aside such
judgment on the ground that its failure to appear on the date of the hearing
was due to an excusable neglect, respondent Judge set aside the decision
rendered by him. Necessarily, a motion
for execution of such decision filed by appellant was denied.
After an unsuccessful motion for reconsideration, a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction
was filed by appellant with the Court of First Instance of Manila, then presided by now Justice Arsenio
Solidum, against respondent Judge and respondents Compania Maritima and
the Philippine Steam Navigation Co., Inc. In its answer to such petition,
respondent Compania Maritima
invoked the question of jurisdiction alleging that the matter was within the
exclusive admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the court of first instance in
accordance with the Judiciary Act, respondent Judge therefore being without
power in the premises. Such a defense
found favor with the lower court which in the decision, now on appeal, of June 16, 1966 dismissed the petition
as in its view the respondent Judge lacked jurisdiction.
As the appealed decision would put it: “As regards the contention of the
petitioner that the liability of the carrier, Compania
Maritima, from the time the shipment was deposited in
its warehouse in Pulupandan, Negros
Occidental, was no longer as a common carrier but as a depositary, is not well
taken for the reason that the warehouse in which the cargo was deposited at the
time it was burned was owned by the carrier, Compania
Maritima, itself.
Hence, the ruling in the cases of Macondray
& Co., Inc. vs. Delgado
Bros., G. R. No. L-13116, April 28, 1960, and Delgado Bros. vs. Home Insurance Company, G. R. No.
L-15567, March, 1961, cited by the petitioner, to the effect that from
the moment the goods are discharged in the port of destination, the liability
of the same receiving the goods and keeping them until they are delivered to
their designated consignees is that merely of a depositary, is not applicable
to the present case for the simple reason that in those two cases, the
shipments were delivered by the carrier to the Customs Arrastre Service, the arrastre operator of the Port of Manila. While the ruling in said cases insofar as it
states that the liability of the carrier ceases upon the discharge of the goods
in the port of destination is correct, the same cannot be correctly applied to
the present case inasmuch as the goods in question were delivered not to
another party but to the warehouse in Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, owned by the carrier, Compania Maritima, which
undertook the delivery of said goods to the corresponding consignees by virtue
of a maritime contract. Unfortunately,
the said cargo was burned before the Compania Maritima, could comply with its maritime obligation to
deliver the same to the consignees.”[3]
Petitioner is of a different mind. It would, in this appeal, maintain the view
which did not find favor with the lower court that respondent Judge had
jurisdiction, the goods having been discharged in the port of destination, the
liability of the one in which they were kept being merely that of a
depositary. This is how it would develop
such a contention in its brief:
“That is why if the goods were lost, burned or damaged after they
were discharged at the port of destination and while they were at the warehouse
of the defendant and the latter is sued for the loss damage of the goods, then
he is sued in his capacity as a [depositary] and not that of a ship owner or as
a common carrier. If that is so, then the
one keeping the goods is not engaged in maritime proper and therefore subject
to the jurisdiction of the city court.
The act of keeping the goods for safekeeping until they are delivered to
the consignee is merely incidental to the business or trade of navigation. So where the defendant is primarily sued for
its liability as a [depositary] of the goods and not as shipowner
or as a common carrier, as in the instant case, whatever issue relative to
maritime is merely incidental to the main issue. It is well-settled that in cases where the
goods were burned, lost or damaged while in store before they are delivered to
the consignees, then ordinary courts have jurisdiction.”[4]
It is thus evident that the question presented, as set forth at
the opening of this decision, is novel in character. The argument advanced by petitioner is not
utterly devoid of plausibility but is not sufficiently persuasive to call for
a reversal of the judgment. The decisive
consideration is that the admiralty jurisdiction as decided by us in a leading
case, International Harvester Co. v. Aragon,[5]
extends over all maritime contracts in whatever form entered into, whether
executed or still to be performed. As
long as the subject matter thereof is maritime service or a maritime transaction, then it is embraced within such a
concept. When, as in this case, the
proceeding in effect is one for a breach of a contract of shipment, the jurisdiction
of the court of first instance under the specific provision of the Judiciary
Act is undeniable. The view cannot be
accepted, as petitioner would insist both here and in the lower court, that the
obligation of respondent Campania Maritima
from the contract entered into by it with the petitioner had ceased the moment
the goods were discharged in the port of destination. It was still under duty to deliver the same
to the consignees. Until there be compliance therewith, it cannot be said that the contract
of affreightment was at an end. That remained the basis of whatever
liability, a point not passed upon in this proceeding, would attach to
respondent Compania Maritima. That is why it would not be in consonance
with the settled law if under the above specific facts the matter would not be
considered as falling with in the admiralty jurisdiction of a court of first
instance.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of June 16,
1966 is affirmed. With
costs against petitioner-appellant.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Teehankee,
and Barredo, JJ., concur.
[1]
Sec. 44. Courts
of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction: *** (d) In all
actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, irrespective of the value of
the property in controversy or the amount of the demand; * * *. (The Judiciary Act of
1948).
[2]
Brief for the Petitioner-Appellant, pp. 2-3.
[3]
Ibid, Appendix, pp. 17-18.
[4]
Ibid, p. 9.
[5]
84 Phil. 363 (1949).
Cf. Negre v. Cabahug Shipping & Co., 16 SCRA 655 (1966).