BARTOLOME DY POCO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, AND THE IMMIGRATION OFFICER OF CEBU, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

Bartolome Dy Poco versus the Commissioner of Immigration

The Case

This is an appeal in a proceeding for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Dy Poco, a Chinese national detained by the Bureau of Immigration, against the Commissioner of Immigration and the Immigration Officer of Cebu. The petitioner does not question the power to deport her; she questions only the length of her detention while awaiting deportation, and asks the Court to release her on that ground. The case matters because it fixes the test for when prolonged detention of a deportee becomes unlawful: the detention is lawful so long as the delay is not attributable to the fault or negligence of the Government and deportation is not rendered impossible by the alien's citizenship status.

Procedural History

The petitioner filed her petition for habeas corpus before the Court of First Instance of Manila. In its judgment rendered on April 11, 1964, that court sustained the argument of the Solicitor General opposing the issuance of the writ, yet nonetheless ordered that the petitioner be released upon posting of bond, to avoid the commission of injustice and for the sake of humanitarian consideration, because she had been detained too long. The case then went to the Supreme Court on appeal. The Supreme Court issued a preliminary injunction to enjoin, for the meantime, the enforcement of the trial court's release orders, and thereafter reversed the judgment appealed from.

Facts

The petitioner, of legal age and a Chinese national, was admitted into the Philippines on May 3, 1953 as a transient from Sandakan, Borneo, bound for Hongkong. She stayed beyond the period allowed her. After proper deportation proceedings, the Commissioner of Immigration ordered her deported on August 6, 1955. She was, however, allowed temporary release upon posting of surety and cash bonds.

After August 16, 1963 the petitioner was arrested and detained by the Commissioner of Immigration until December 27, 1963. On that date she was again released under bond, subject to the condition that she leave the country on or before January 28, 1964. For not leaving within that time, she was rearrested on January 29, 1964 and thereafter detained. She then filed her petition for habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance of Manila on March 11, 1964.

The parties stipulated that, apart from the expiration of her permission to stay, the petitioner is not and has never been charged of any offense against the Philippine Government or any citizen; that nine years had elapsed since the order of deportation was issued and the Government had not yet deported her; that she had asked the Commissioner of Immigration to release her, but the request was not granted; and that negotiations were being conducted between the Philippine Government and the Nationalist Government of China for the return of the so-called overstaying Chinese, to which the petitioner belongs.

Issues

• Whether or not the petitioner's continued detention by the Bureau of Immigration pending the carrying out of the deportation order is illegal because it has been unreasonably too long.
• Whether or not the writ of habeas corpus may be granted on humanitarian considerations notwithstanding the legality of the detention.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote a statute; it construes the settled rule on detention pending deportation as announced in its own jurisprudence. The governing formulation, quoted by the Court from Tan Seng Pao versus the Commissioner of Immigration, provides:

In conclusion, we hold and declare that, as long as the continued detention of a deportee is not attributable to the fault or negligence of the Government or of its officers, and his deportation is not rendered impossible by his citizenship status by reason of which no country or ship will accept him, warrant for his deportation should stand in all its force and vigor, rather than be declared functus oficio.

This rule bears on the case because it supplies the very test by which the lawfulness of the petitioner's prolonged detention is measured.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the detention is legal. The petitioner's further stay in the Philippines is illegal and the Government has the right to deport her; as an incident of that right, the Government, through the Commissioner of Immigration, has the right to detain the alien to be deported pending the deportation. That right to detain is not itself questioned. The Court acknowledged that too long a detention of an alien pending the carrying out of a deportation order may justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under particular circumstances, and that what is a reasonable time varies with the circumstances of every case. Here, the detention complained of started on January 29, 1964, and at the time the petition was filed on March 11, 1964, less than two months of detention had taken place, which does not strike the Court as unreasonably too long. Even counting the detention up to the time of decision, about two years, the detention is not illegal considering the reason for the delay: the petitioner is a Chinese national and negotiations are being conducted between the Philippine Government and the Nationalist Government of China for the return of the overstaying Chinese to which she belongs. The Court distinguished the earlier cases granting release, because there the petitioners were stateless Russians who had no country to which they might be deported or which would accept them, whereas the petitioner has a known country to which she may be removed, and any delay in her shipment is not due to the fault or negligence of the Government or its officers.

On the second issue, the Court held that the writ cannot be granted for the sake of humanitarian considerations, and that the petitioner had in fact been sufficiently accorded humanitarian considerations. Twice she was released on the strength of assurances that she was going to leave the country. Although the deportation order had been issued nine years before she filed her petition, for eight of those nine years, from 1955 to 1963, she was released under surety and cash bonds, during which time she had every chance to live up to her original commitment of proceeding to Hongkong, which was why she was allowed to enter as a transient in the first place. To sanction her release to resume such illegal stay would open the door to the entry and indefinite stay of aliens under the pretext of being transient entrants, leaving the country exposed to undesirable elements from abroad.

Doctrine

A deportee may be detained pending deportation, and such detention is lawful so long as it is not attributable to the fault or negligence of the Government or its officers and deportation is not rendered impossible by the alien's citizenship status, as where no country or ship will accept him. Length of detention alone does not make it unlawful; what is a reasonable time varies with the circumstances of every case. Where the alien has a known country to which he may be removed and the delay arises from diplomatic negotiations pursued by the Government, the warrant of deportation stands in all its force and vigor rather than being declared functus oficio, meaning spent or exhausted. Habeas corpus will not lie on mere humanitarian considerations where the detention is legal.

Disposition

The Court denied the petitioner's motion for release on bail, reversed the judgment appealed from, and denied the petition for habeas corpus, with costs against the petitioner.

Remember This

Memorize the rule: detention pending deportation is lawful unless the delay is due to the fault or negligence of the Government or deportation is impossible because no country will accept the alien. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between the stateless Russian deportees released in the earlier cases and a national with a known country awaiting diplomatic negotiations.