BARTOLOME DY POCO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, AND THE IMMIGRATION OFFICER OF CEBU, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

Appeal in a proceeding for habeas corpus.

Stating in its Judgment rendered on April 11, 1964 that it sustained
the argument of the Solicitor General in opposing the issuance of the
writ, the court a quo nonetheless therein ordered that petitioner be
released upon posting of bond, “to avoid the commission of injustice
and for the sake of humanitarian consideration, because she had been
detained too long.”

In this appeal the Solicitor General contends that petitioner’s
detention by the Bureau of Immigration is legal. This Court has issued
preliminary injunction to enjoin, for the meantime, the enforcement of
the court a quo’s release orders.

According to stipulation by the parties the facts are as follows:

Petitioner, of legal age, Chinese, is detained by the Bureau of
Immigration at Engineer Island but temporarily confined at the
Philippine Chinese General Hospital, for a serious illness, under
security guards of the aforesaid Bureau of Immigration.^[1]

She was admitted into the Philippines on May 3, 1953 as a transient
from Sandakan, Borneo and bound for Hongkong. She stayed beyond the
period allowed her. For overstaying in the Philippines she was—after
proper deportation proceedings—ordered deported by the Commissioner
of Immigration on August 6, 1955. She was however allowed temporary
release upon posting of surety and cash bonds.

After August 16, 1963 petitioner was arrested and detained by the
Commissioner of Immigration until December 27, 1963. At the latter
date, she was again released under bond, subject to the condition that
she will leave the country on or before January 28, 1964.

For not leaving the country within the time above-stated, petitioner
was rearrested on January 29, 1964 and thereafter detained. She then
filed the petition in this case for habeas corpus in the Court of First
Instance of Manila on March 11, 1964.

It is also stipulated that other than the fact that her permission
to stay in the Philippines has expired, petitioner is not and has never
been charged of any offense against the Philippine Government or any
citizen; that nine (9) years have elapsed since the order of her
deportation was issued and the Government has not yet deported her;
that she has asked the Commissioner of Immigration to release her from
detention, but the same was not granted; and that negotiations are
being conducted between the Philippine Government and the Nationalist
Government of China for the return of the so-called overstaying Chinese
to which the petitioner belongs.

From the stipulated facts abovementioned it follows that
petitioner’s further stay in the Philippines is illegal and that the
Government has the right to deport her. As an incident of the right to
deport, the Government, through the Commissioner of Immigration, has
the right to detain the alien to be deported pending the deportation.
Said right to detain, per se, is not questioned herein. Petitioner
however contends that her detention has been unreasonably too long so
that she is entitled to be discharged by writ of habeas corpus.

It is true that too long a detention of an alien pending the
carrying out of a deportation order may justify the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus under particular circumstances (Borovsky vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, 84 Phil. 161). The question of what is a
reasonable time in this regard, also varies with the circumstances of
every case (Ross vs. Wallis, 279 F. 401, 402).

In the present case, the detention complained of started on January 29, 1964. At the time the petition was filed in the court a quo on March 11, 1964, less than two months
of said detention had taken place. Said length of time does not strike
this Court as unreasonably too long a detention preparatory to
deportation.

Now, even taking into account the fact that the detention has continued up to the present, that is, for about two years,
the same is not illegal considering the reason for the delay. As the
parties stipulated, petitioner is a Chinese national and negotiations
are being conducted between the Philippine Government and the
Nationalist Government of China for the return of the so-called
overstaying Chinese to which petitioner belongs.

Accordingly, it is in point to state here what this Court said thru
Mr. Justice Barrera in Tan Seng Pao v. Commissioner of Immigration,
L-14246, April 27, 1960 :

“Respondent finally contends that the lower court
erred in granting petitioner the writ of habeas corpus, on the main
ground that he had been under detention by the immigration authorities
for 8 years since he was ordered deported, without said order having
been carried out. The lower court considered said long continued
detention of petitioner as unreasonable, citing the cases of Mejoff vs.
Director of Prisons (G.R. No. L-4252, prom. September 26, 1951 );
Borovsky vs. Commissioner of Immigration, et al. (G.R. No. L-4352, prom.
September 28, 1951 ); Chirskoff vs. Commissioner of Immigration, et al.
(G.R. No. L-3802, prom. October 26, 1951 ); and Andreau vs. Commissioner
of Immigration, et al. (G.R. No. L-4253, prom. October 31, 1951),
wherein this Court granted the writ of habeas corpus to petitioners in
said cases, as they had been under detention by the Immigration
authorities from 2 to 4 years, while awaiting deportation.

“It
is to be noted, however, that this Court was constrained to grant the
release of petitioners in said cases, because ‘there was no ship or
country which would take them.’ Petitioners therein were stateless
Russians who have no country to which they may be deported or which
would be willing to accept them. In the instant case, petitioner is a
Chinese citizen and not a stateless alien, and has a known country,
Formosa (from whence he came), to which he may be removed. If there is
any delay in the shipment of petitioner from this country, it is not
due to the fault or negligence of the Government or of its officers. If
diplomatic negotiations which have been pursued relentlessly by our
Government have not yielded tangible results leading to the immediate
or early removal of petitioner and other aliens similarly situated, the
delay should not be considered a ground for declaring the order of
deportation functus oficio. Otherwise, it would be within the
power of the countries of undesirable aliens ordered deported from this
country to render ineffective or unenforceable warrants of deportation,
by simply frustrating all diplomatic efforts aimed at their removal
from this country.

“In conclusion, we hold and declare
that, as long as the continued detention of a deportee is not
attributable to the fault or negligence of the Government or of its
officers, and his deportation is not rendered impossible by his
citizenship status by reason of which no country or ship will accept
him, warrant for his deportation should stand in all its force and
vigor, rather than be declared functus oficio.”

If not being the fault of the Philippine Government or its officers
that petitioner is not as yet deported to her own country, her
continued detention preparatory to deportation is legal. It follows
that the writ prayed for cannot be granted “for the sake of
humanitarian considerations.” And besides petitioner had sufficiently
been accorded “humanitarian considerations.” For two times, the records
show, she was released on the strength of assurances that she was going
to leave the country. It is true the deportation order had been issued
nine years before she filed her petition for habeas corpus. It is
however equally true that for eight years of those nine years, from
1955 to 1963, she was released under surety and cash bonds, during
which time she had all the chance to live up to her original commitment
of proceeding to Hongkong, which was why she was allowed to enter the
Philippines as a transient in the first place. As it happened, she
succeeded in staying in the Philippines, undetained, for
eight years. For this Court now to sanction her release to resume such
illegal stay would be to open the door to the entry and indefinite stay
of aliens to this country under the pretext of being transient
entrants, and thereby leaving the country permanently exposed to
undesirable elements from abroad to the detriment of its peace,
security and order. Such a situation is far from what this Court can
sanction under the law.

Wherefore, petitioner’s motion for release on bail
pending the decision of this case is denied and the judgment appealed
from is reversed. Petition for habeas corpus is denied. Costs against
petitioner.So ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

^[1] Said confinement was from
28 January 1964 to 12 August 1964; she is now back at Engineer Island.
See Petition for Temporary Release dated October 4, 1965, p. 67 of
Rollo and Certificate, p. 70 of Rollo.