MAMERTO T. PACRIS, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE ADRIAN N. PAGALILAUAN, RESPONDENT.

At bar is an administrative complaint of Mamerto T. Pacris
(complainant) against Judge Adrian N. Pagalilauan (respondent) of Branch
12, Regional Trial Court, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, for serious
misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, inefficiency and falsification
of monthly certificate of service.

Complainant charges respondent as follows:

“THE CHARGES

xxx xxx xxx

During the pendency of Election Case No. 1807-S, entitled ‘Federico
Q. Galapia, protestant, versus Mamerto T. Pacris, protestee,’ which was
tried and submitted for decision before respondent judge, and during
the campaign of (sic) the 1995 elections, wherein the protestant and the
protestee were again among the candidates for mayor in Sanchez Mira,
Cagayan, the protestant in his campaign speeches told the public that he
will sit as the Mayor-elect of Sanchez Mira on April 14, 1995. So the
protestee approached the respondent judge in his chambers to inquire
from him if he has (sic) already rendered his decision in the election
protest involving the protestant and the protestee and stated to him
what the protestant had been publicly telling the people, but respondent
judge told protestee not to believe the protestant and to convince
protestee, he showed his unsigned decision dismissing Election Case No.
1807-S.

xxx xxx xxx

In the early morning of April 20, 1995, the undersigned before
going to Tuguegarao, Cagayan, to see the Governor on official matters,
he decided to see first the respondent judge in his chambers, which he
was using it (sic) at that time as his sleeping quarters without the
permission of the Supreme Court because he left his boarding house after
he was caught peeping at the daughter of his landlady while taking a
bath, to ascertain from him if it is (sic) true what protestant had been
telling the public that he will (sic) sit that day, April 20, 1995, as
the mayor-elect of Sanchez Mira and he admitted that he had changed his
unsigned decision dismissing the election protest and invalidated the
ballots with undetached coupons.

When protestee arrived home from Tuguegarao in the afternoon, he
was informed that the respondent judge had promulgated his decision
(Annex ‘A’) in the election protest and the Comelec Officer of Sanchez
Mira had already received his copy of the decision from whom protestee
got an immediate xerox copy as the basis of his perfection of an appeal
with the COMELEC on April 22, 1995.

xxx xxx xxx

That respondent judge, as part of his plan, design or scheme to
make protestant win the election protest, intentionally violated the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure in his desire to favor the protestant, by not
setting a date for the promulgation of the decision wherein due notice
must be given to the parties, but instead he immediately promulgated the
same on the very day it was rendered, in violation of Rule 35, Sec. 19
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and the case of Alejo vs. Tanada, 238
SCRA 60 (1994).

That respondent judge, intentionally and persistent-disregarded
(sic) well-known law, legal rules and jurisprudence or stare decisis to
the prejudice of the protestee and knowing it as the only possible means
to make protestant win his election protest, declared invalid one
hundred twenty one (121) ballots with undetached upper coupons cast in
favor of protestee in violation of Sec. 211 of the Omnibus Election
Code, which provides:

‘27. Failure to remove the detachable coupon from a ballot does not annul such ballot.’

and the settled doctrine that voters shall not be deprived by
(sic) their votes by mere failure of the election officer to comply with
the formal prerequisites of voting (Valenzuela vs. Carlos, 42 Phil.
428).

To justify his illegal, unlawful and fraudulent act in declaring
invalid 121 ballots with undetached upper coupons, respondent judge
opined:

‘xxx the protestee cit(ed) the case of Valenzuela vs. Carlos,
42 Phil. 428. The Court agrees with this, for it is but fair and
reasonable in so far as simple, innocent and honest ommission (sic) of
election officers are concerned. The court however doubts whether the
rules should cover all kinds of ommission (sic) by election officers be
it deliberate or not and irrespective of whether or not the ommission
(sic) defeats the secrecy of the voter’s vote. xxx.’

contrary to the Supreme Court ruling in Albert vs. Court of First Instance of Manila (Br. VI), 23 SCRA 948, which states:

‘So it is, that in Martiniano P. Vivo vs. Hon. Gaudencio
Cloribel, et al., L-23239, November 23, 1966 (18 Supreme Court Reports
Anno. 713,726), this Court stressed the need for trial judges to take cognizance of the rulings of the Supreme Court. xxx’ (Underscoring supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

and Circular No. 13, dated July 1, 1987, of the Supreme Court,
providing general guidelines for all members of the judiciary, that
judges should keep abreast of the rulings and doctrines laid down by the
Supreme Court and apply them to appropriate cases regardless of their
personal opinion.

That respondent judge, to buttress his decision making protestant
win in the election protest, which exposes his complete ignorance of
the law, not only invalidated the 121 ballots with undetached upper
coupons but also considered said ballots as marked contrary to the
settled doctrines in elections (sic) contest that the mark which shall
invalidate the ballot are those which the voter himself deliberately
placed on his ballot for the purpose of identifying it thereafter. In
other words, a markplaced (sic) on the ballot by a person other than the
voter himself does not invalidate [the ballot] as marked (Tajanlangit
vs. Cazenas, G.R. No. L-18894, June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 567). Hence, the
ballots which (sic) upper coupons were not detached by the Chairman of
the Board of Inspectors are not marked ballots.

That respondent judge, either as a part of his plan, design or
scheme to make protestee lose in the election protest or in evident bad
faith and/or partiality, also declared invalid six (6) ballots cast in
favor of the protestee which were not signed by the Chairman of the
Board of Inspectors. However, he did not declare invalid the twenty
five (25) ballots cast in favor of the respondent. In the case of
Lucero vs. De Guzman, 45 Phil. 852, 875, the Court held that ‘xxx It is
a well settled rule that a voter shall not be deprived of the franchise
by mere failure of the election officials to comply with some
provisions or another statute relative to the acts to be done
exclusively by the officer’.

The respondent judge, not supported by evidence or with conscious
and deliberate act to do an injustice against the protestee, stated in
his decision that, ‘after a careful scrutiny of the Book of Voters and
List of Voters, the Court finds’, among others, the following three (3)
of the eight voters to be invalid:

‘Precinct No. 23

‘1. Acdal, Orlino P voted, but at the back of his voters affidavit it is marked ‘deceased’;

‘2. Cabulisan, Pacito (policeman) voted but according to information he had been dead before the election.’

xxx xxx xxx

‘Precinct No. 22-B

‘1. Alegado Nancita – voted but no name in Book of Voters.’

Orlino P. Acdal died on December 12, 1992 (Annexes B-B1, while
Pacito Cabulisan died on June 2, 1992 (Annex C) after the elections on
May 11, 1992. The annotations ‘deceased’ at the back of their voters
affidavit were entered by the Comelec Officer when he requested the
court during the trial of the election protest for the return to his
Office the Book of Voters of the aforesaid precincts preparatory to the
May 8, 1995 elections.

Nancita Alegado is a classroom teacher in Barangay Tokitoc,
Sanchez Mira, Cagayan and is a registered voter of Precinct 35 therein
(Annex D). She was assigned and served as a member of the Board of
Inspectors of Precinct 22-B of Barangay Masisit and she voted in said
precinct pursuant to Sec. 169 of the Omnibus Election Code allowing
members of the board of election inspectors to vote in the polling place
where they are assigned on election day.

That respondent judge, to further fortify his plan, design or
scheme to make protestee lose the election protest and with deliberate
intent to cause injustice on the part of the protestee and a clear
violation of Sec. 14, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution, dismissed for lack
of merit protestee’s counter-protest without taking into account the
facts and evidence alleged in his counter-protest and without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which the dismissal
was based.

Considering the facts that protestant had been publicly telling
the people that he has plenty of money; that he will do everything
within his resources to win his election protest; that he will sit as
the mayor-elect of Sanchez Mira on April 20, 1995, the date of the
questioned decision of respondent judge; that respondent judge had
prepared an unsigned decision dismissing the election protest; that he
was enticed to prepare another decision dated April 20, 1995, which he
promulgated on the same day, declaring protestant as the winner in the
May 11, 1992 elections for mayor of Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, in complete
disregard to (sic) the decisions and rules and regulation of the Supreme
Court, the principle of res ipsa liquitor (sic) be applied to him.
(People vs. Valenzuela, 135 SCRA 712).

That respondent judge, since appointment to the judiciary, as
presiding judge of the Regional Trial [Court], Second Judicial Region,
Branch 12, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, up to the present, has not been
reporting for duty and hearing cases every Mondays, Thursday afternoons
and Fridays of the week. He arrives in his station from Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, where he resides, in the morning of Tuesday and leaves his
station after lunch of Thursday, thereby affecting his integrity and
efficiency.

That respondent judge, despite the fact that he does not report
for duty and hold session on Mondays, Thursday afternoons and Fridays,
he certified in his Monthly Certificate of Service that he rendered
complete service for the month, which is a clear case of falsification
of monthly certificate of service since he became a judge up to the
present.”^[1]

In compliance with the First Indorsement^[2] dated July 9, 1997 of Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo, respondent submitted his Comment^[3] stating, among others:

“3. That from the time I assumed office as the presiding judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan I became
aware, for the first time, of the existence and pendency of Election
Case No. 1807-S before the said Court when it was included in the July
29, 1993, calendar of the Court, at which time the committee on revision
of ballots and recounting of votes had not yet submitted its report of
the result of the revision and recounting of votes in the precincts
covered by the protest and counter-protest xxx.

xxx xxx xxx

10. That thereafter several incidents were submitted by the
parties for resolution by the Court and after hearing, resolving all the
incidents, the Court issued an order dated February 21, 1995, a copy of
which is hereto attached as ANNEX ‘15’ giving the parties twenty (20)
days within which to submit their respective memorandum and on March 13,
1995, the protestee submitted his memorandum personally signed by him;

11. That on April 20, 1995, the undersigned, as presiding judge of
the court, rendered a decision on the merits. All the foregoing facts
and incidents aptly demonstrate that I was not really inefficient in
disposing of Election Case No. 1807-S wherein retired Judge Mariano T.
Pacris is the protestee and counter-protestant. Much of the delay is
attributable to the protestee and counter-protestant himself and his
counsel.

12. That as regards the alleged delay in the elevation of the
record of the case as pointed in the Comelec resolution cited in the
letter-complaint, such delay, if there was any, was entirely called for
and fully justified by the events and incidents which took place in
connection with the case after the promulgation and filing of the notice
of appeal by the protestee, such as:

xxx xxx xxx

Consequently, it is most respectfully submitted that the delay if
there is any, in the elevation of the record of the case to the Comelec
called for and fully justified by the incidents and events that took
place after the promulgation of the decision and the filing of a notice
of appeal by the protestee;

13. That in so far as the alleged campaign speeches of the
protestant, Federico Q. Galapia, during the campaign period immediately
preceding the May 12, 1995 local elections, stating, among others, that
he would sit as Mayor elect of Sanchez Mira on April 14, 1995 and/or on
April 20, 1995 I have absolutely nothing to do with the same, the truth
of the matter being that I never had any occasion to talk to him or any
of his two counsels, Attys. Victoriano G. Pascua and Abuan regarding the
case; hence the reason why I told the protestee, Mamerto T. Pacris,
when he approached me for the first time asking me if I had already
rendered my decision in the case and on the occasion of which I told him
I have not yet finished making the decision in the case, which was then
absolutely true, the truth of the matter being that I was still in the
process of writing the draft of the decision. Hence, contrary to the
imputation contained in the letter-complaint, I never showed him any
decision, unsigned or otherwise, in the case, much less dismissing the
election case;

xxx xxx xxx

15. That it is true that in the morning of April 20, 1995, the day I
signed the decision in the case, the protestee approached me for the
second time, again inquiring if I had already finished the decision in
the case and I told him the decision was already finished which prompted
me to release the decision that very same day by handing the same to
the Clerk of Court who then, right away, mailed copies of the same to
the parties concerned, but I never told or admitted to the protestee
that I changed the decision dismissing the election protest the truth of
the matter being that I never made or prepared a decision, unsigned or
otherwise, dismissing the election protest;

16. That the release and consequent promulgation of the decision on
April 20, 1995 without the date of the promulgation having been set and
the parties notified thereof caused no damage or prejudice to any of
the rights of the parties in the case, the evident purpose of the
provisions of Sec. 20, Rule 35, Part VI of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure, providing for the setting of the promulgation of decisions
rendered by the Regional Trial Courts in elections cases being only to
avoid any squable (sic) between the parties litigants, in case of an
appeal, as to whether or not the appeal was perfected within the period
of appeal, a question which sometimes arises on account of the
difficulty of establishing or knowing at what time or on what date the
party litigants received their respective copy of the decision or order
appealed from, as well as to achieve auniform (sic) time or date from
which to perfect the period of appeal for both the protestant and the
protestee in such cases;

xxx xxx xxx

18. That in so far as the 122 ballots in Precinct No. 23 Masisit,
which were declared invalid in the decision rendered, I was fully aware
of the provisions of Sec. 211, par. No. 27 of the Omnibus Election Code
and of the doctrines or ruling made by the Honorable Supreme Court to
the effect that the voter should not be deprived of his or her vote by
the mere failure of the election officers to comply with the formal
pre-requisites of voting. It was, and still is, my honest and
considered view, however, that Sec. 211, par. 27 and the above-mentioned
doctrines or ruling of the Honorable Supreme Court are not applicable
xxx.

19. That as regards to the six (6) ballots wherein the protestee
was voted for but which were declared invalid in the decision for the
reason that the same were not signed by the Chairman of the Board of
Election Inspectors, and my failure to declare invalid the twenty/five
(25) ballots wherein the protestant was voted for and which are
likewise, unsigned by the Chairman, I candidly admit I committed a
mistake or ommission (sic). My ommission (sic) or mistake however, is
an honest one and was the result of pure inadvertense (sic); not a
deliberate act. xxx

20. That as regards to the three (3) votes for the protestee
mentioned in the letter-complaint and which are declared invalid in the
decision, the invalidation of said votes or ballots were based on what
appeared in the Book of Voters and in the List of Voters used during the
May 11, 1992 elections. Thus, in the Book of Voters for precinct No.
23, Masisit Orlino Acdal who appears in the list of voters used during
the May 11, 1992 elections to have voted, is therein indicated as
deceased; while Mancita Alegado who appears in the list of voters to
have cast her vote in Precinct No. 22-B Masisit, is not a registered
voter in the precinct per the Book of Voters because her name does not
appear therein;

21. Relative to the allegations of the letter-complaint averring
that I peeped at the daughter of my former landlady and that I have been
using the court’s chamber as my sleeping quarters, there is absolutely
no truth to the same. As a matter of fact the incidents referred to is
the subject of a previous anonymous letter-complaint in relation to
which I have submitted my comments and which had been docketed as
Administrative Matter No. RTJ 96-1363 and in connection with the
supposed complaint, complainant had never appeared nor located inspite
of efforts exerted by the Justice of the Court of Appeals to where it
was assigned for investigation;

22. That it is not true that I have not been reporting for duty on
Mondays, Fridays and Thursday afternoons, the truth of the matter being
that I do work from Monday to Friday and on many instances I even
worked at home on Saturdays and Sundays when resolving cases involving
difficult questions of law, although I seldom conduct trials or hearing
of cases on Mondays and Fridays because said days are devoted by me to
make my decisions and study cases pending trial before the Court;”

On March 16, 1998, the Court resolved^[4]
to refer the case to Associate Justice Hilarion L. Aquino of the Court
of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation. However,
Justice Aquino begged leave to be relieved of the case because the
respondent is a townmate of his and for a number of years, a former
colleague when he (Justice Aquino) was Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court in Tuguegarao, Cagayan.^[5]

On July 8, 1998, the Court assigned the case to Associate Justice
Bernardo P. Abesamis of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report
and recommendation.^[6]

During the hearing on October 15, 1998 before Justice Abesamis, the parties stipulated on the following facts:

“1. Complainant lacks sufficient evidence to prove that respondent
judge used his chambers as sleeping quarters; the said allegation is
considered withdrawn;

2. Complainant’s allegation that respondent judge committed an act
of voyeurism is subject matter of another pending administrative matter
against respondent, hence, considered withdrawn from this case;

3. Complainant’s allegation that delay visited the disposition of
Election Case No. 1807-S is not a charge but merely mentioned in passing
in connection with the said case; and

4. Respondent judge admitted the factual footholds of the following allegations in the complaint:

a) he promulgated the decision without setting the date therefor and notifying the parties;

b) he did not observe stare decisis in ruling against the validity of 121 ballots with undetached upper stubs;

c) he erred in invalidating six (6) ballots not signed by the Chairman of the Board of Canvassers;

d) he invalidated the votes of Acdal, Cabulisan and Alegado;

e) he dismissed the protestee’s counter-protest without discussing the merits thereof; and

f) he resolved Election Case No. 1807-S without hearing on the stipulation of the parties.”^[7]

After conducting the required investigation, Justice Abesamis culled his findings as follows:^[8]

RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GROSS MISCONDUCT FOR SHOWING COMPLAINANT
A COPY OF HIS UNPROMULGATED DECISION IN ELECTION CASE NO. 1807-S, BUT
NOT FOR PREPARING TWO DRAFTS OF DECISION AS CHARGED.

RESPONDENT IS LIABLE FOR GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW.

RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN PROMULGATING THE DECISION IN ELECTION
CASE NO. 1807-S WITHOUT FIRST SETTING THE DATE THEREFOR WITH NOTICE TO
THE PARTIES.

RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN INVALIDATING ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-ONE (121) BALLOTS WITH UNDETACHED UPPER STUBS.

RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN INVALIDATING SIX (6) BALLOTS FOR BEING UNSIGNED BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF CANVASSERS.

RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN INVALIDATING THE VOTE OF NANCITA
ALEGADO, A TEACHER AND VOTER OF PRECINCT 35 OF SANCHEZ MIRA, CAGAYAN,
WHO SERVED AS MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF INSPECTORS OF PRECINCT 22-B OF THE
SAME MUNICIPALITY.

RESPONDENT JUDGE DISMISSED PROTESTEE’S COUNTER-PROTEST WITHOUT STATING THE FACTS AND LAW ON WHICH THE DISMISSAL WAS BASED.

RESPONDENT JUDGE IS LIABLE FOR VIOLATION OF CIRCULAR NO. 13 ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 1.

RESPONDENT JUDGE’S ALLEGED VOYEURISM IS DISMISSED AS A COMPLAINT ON
SIMILAR GROUND WAS ALREADY FILED AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE
COMPLAINT IN THIS CASE.

RESPONDENT JUDGE’S ALLEGED PRACTICE OF USING HIS CHAMBERS AS SLEEPING QUARTERS IS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT.

RESPONDENT’S ALLEGED DELAY IN RESOLVING ELECTION CASE NO. 1807-S IS DISMISSED.

RESPONDENT JUDGE’S ALLEGED ERROR IN INVALIDATING THE VOTES OF CABULISAN AND ACDAL IS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT.

RESPONDENT JUDGE’S ALLEGED FAILURE TO SET ELECTION CASE NO. 1807-S FOR HEARING SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT.

RESPONDENT JUDGE’S ALLEGED FALSIFICATION OF CERTIFICATES OF SERVICE IS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT.

RESPONDENT JUDGE’S ALLEGED PARTIALITY TOWARDS COUNSEL FOR THE
PROTESTANT IN ELECTION CASE NO. 1807-S IS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT.

and recommended thus:

“WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, it is respectfully
recommended that: (a) respondent judge be fined in the amount equivalent
to his one (1) month salary for gross ignorance of the law and serious
misconduct; (b) the charge of falsification of certificates of service
be dismissed for lack of merit; and (c) the charge of inefficiency be
likewise dismissed, however, respondent judge be enjoined to observe
proper trial hours subscribed Circular No. 13.”

The charge of gross misconduct against respondent judge for allegedly
showing to complainant a copy of his unpromulgated decision in Election
Case No. 1807-S, lacks sufficient evidentiary support. In his
Memorandum of December 9, 1998, the Investigator stated:

“Proceeding from the premises that respondent judge drafted two
decisions and that Court Stenographer Malvar is of unprejudiced
disposition, it is within rhyme and reason to conclude that respondent
judge likewise gave complainant-protestee a ‘sneak preview’ of his first
draft decision. xxx”^[9]

There is nothing on record to prove that the respondent showed a copy of his subject decision to the complainant.

That respondent prepared two drafts of his subject decision is of
no moment. It may be that he changed his mind after preparing one
draft or intentionally prepared two drafts for his evaluation and
consideration. Besides, the decision became effective only upon its
promulgation.

But the acts of respondent constitute gross ignorance of the law, as charged:

1. Respondent admitted that he promulgated the decision in
Election Case No. 1807-S without first setting the date therefor and
with no notice to the parties.

Section 19, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, reads:

“Sec. 19. Promulgation and Finality of Decision. – The decision of
the Court shall be promulgated on a date set by it of which due notice
must be given the parties. It shall become final five (5) days after
its promulgation. No motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.”

2. Respondent invalidated one hundred twenty-one (121) ballots with
undetached upper stubs contrary to jurisprudence and the provisions of
the Omnibus Election Code.

As admitted by respondent, he did not observe stare decisis in
invalidating one-hundred twenty one (121) ballots with undetached upper
stubs. What the respondent did does not accord with applicable rules and
jurisprudence:

“Sec. 211. Rules for the appreciation of ballots. – In the
reading and appreciation of ballots, every ballot shall be presumed to
be valid unless there is clear and good reason to justify its rejection.
The board of election inspectors shall observe the following rules,
bearing in mind that the object of the election is to obtain the
expression of the voters’ will:

xxx xxx xxx

27. Failure to remove the detachable coupon from a ballot does not annul such ballot.”^[10]

And in De los Angeles vs. Rodriguez,^[11] citing Lucero vs. De Guzman,^[12] the Court held:

‘“The circumstance that the coupon bearing the number of a ballot
is not detached at the time the ballot is voted does not justify the
court in rejecting the ballot. The duty of detaching the coupon is
placed by law upon the election officials, and the voter must not be
deprived of the franchise by reason of their failure to perform this
duty.”’

Respondent, in his 2nd Indorsement,^[13]
manifested awareness of the foregoing rules and jurisprudence but
contended that paragraph 27 of Section 211 of the Omnibus Election Code
“refers to the lower stab (sic) of the ballot”^[14] and not the upper stubs involved in the present case.

Respondent erred in making distinctions where the law is clear
and no distinction is necessary. He erred in not adhering to the
precedents set by this Court no matter what his opinion on the matter
may be. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws shall form
part of the legal system of the Philippines.^[15]

Indeed, respondent appears unmindful of his duty as a member of the judiciary:

“18. Influence of decisions upon the development of the law

A judge should be mindful that his duty is the application of
general law to particular instance, that ours is a government of laws
and not of men, and that he violates his duty as a minister of justice
under such a system if he seeks to do what he may personally consider
substantial justice in a particular case and disregards the general law
as he knows it to be binding on him. Such action may have detrimental
consequences beyond the immediate controversy. He should administer his
office with a due regard to the integrity of the system of the law
itself, remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a
judge under the sanction of law.” (Canons of Judicial Ethics)

3. Then too, he invalidated six (6) ballots for complainant for
being unsigned by the Chairman of the Board of Canvassers but did not
invalidate the ballots cast in favor of protestant which were also
unsigned by the Chairman.

Respondent admitted having done the same fact but explained that
it was through mistake or omission. His defense is unsustainable. He
is liable for violating the rule that failure of the Chairman of the
Board of Election Inspectors to comply with his mandated administrative
responsibility, i.e., signing, authenticating and thumbmarking of
ballots, should not penalize the voter with disenfranchisement:

“Similarly, Section 211 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise
known as the ‘Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines’ provides that in
the reading and appreciation of ballots, every ballot shall be presumed
to be valid unless there is a clear and good reason to justify its
rejection. Certainly, the inefficiency of an election officer in failing
to affix his signature at the back of the ballot does not constitute as
a good and clear reason to justify the rejection of a ballot.”^[16]

4. So also, he invalidated the vote of Nancita Alegado, a member of
the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct 22 of Sanchez Mira,
Cagayan, on the ground that her name did not appear in the Book of
Voters.

Respondent likewise violated Section 169 of the Omnibus Election Code, which reads:

“Sec. 169. Voting privilege of members of the board of election
inspectors. – Members of the board of election inspectors and their
substitutes may vote in the polling place where they are assigned on
election day; Provided, That they are registered voters within the
province, city or municipality where they are assigned: and Provided,
finally, That their voting in the polling places where they are not
registered voters be noted in the minutes of the board of election
inspectors.”

Ms. Alegado is a registered voter of Precinct 35 of Sanchez Mira,
Cagayan, but she was serving as an election inspector in Precinct 22-B
so that she was entitled to vote in the latter precinct. Despite the
categorical declaration in the law that she had voting rights,
respondent improperly excluded her vote just because Ms. Alegado’s name
did not appear in the Book of Voters.

5. Respondent dismissed complainant’s counter-protest without
stating the facts and law on which such dismissal was based. In
dismissing complainant’s counter-protest, respondent disposed:

“WHEREFORE, the protestant Federico Q. Galapia in the
above-entitled case should be, as he is hereby declared to be the winner
in the May 11, 1992 election (sic) for mayor of Sanchez Mira, Cagayan.

The counter-protest filed by the protestee is hereby dismissed for lack of merit, with costs de oficio.

IT IS SO ORDERED.”^[17]

Therefrom, it can be gleaned unerringly that respondent never
discussed in the body of his decision the basis for the dismissal of the
counter-protest. In so doing, he violated a basic legal principle, a
constitutional one at that,^[18] that in making a decision, the facts and the law upon which the decision is based must be expressed clearly and distinctly.

All the foregoing studiedly considered, the Court is of the
irresistible conclusion that respondent Judge is guilty of gross
ignorance of the law. He should be reminded of paragraph 2 of Circular
No. 13 (SUBJECT: GUIDELINES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE) in
relation to which circular the Court enunciated the rule that “[j]udges
should keep abreast of the rulings and doctrines laid down by the
Supreme Court and apply them to appropriate cases regardless of their
personal opinion.”^[19]

The laws that respondent violated or failed to apply are not
complicated, and do not involve difficult questions of law. His failure
to apply basic legal principles constitutes utter disregard of
well-settled doctrines.

6. Respondent also failed to observe office hours as required by Circular No. 13.^[20]

“GUIDELINES FOR TRIAL COURTS

The following guidelines are hereby issued for all trial courts:

1. Punctuality and strict observance of office hours. – Punctuality
in the holding of scheduled hearings is an imperative. Trial judges
should strictly observe the requirement of at least eight hours of service a day,
five hours of which should be devoted to trial, specifically from 8:30
a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 2:00 to 4:30 p.m. as required by par. 5 of
the Interim Rules issued by the Supreme Court on January 11, 1983,
pursuant to Sec. 16 of BP 129.”

and Administrative Circular No. 1:^[21]

“xxx xxx xxx

2. Maximum Use of Judge Time and Effective Court Management:

2.1 All Presiding Judges are directed to comply strictly with the
guidelines established in Circular No. 13, July 1, 1987, on punctuality
and observance of office hours, effective use of pre-trial and discovery
procedure, effective management of trials, the availment of annual
conferences.”

Respondent, in his 2nd Indorsement^[22]dated August 27, 1997, stated:

“22. That it is not true that I have not been reporting for duty
on Mondays, Fridays and Thursday afternoons, the truth of the matter
being that I do work from Monday to Friday (sic) and on (sic) many
instances I even worked at home on Saturdays and Sundays when resolving
cases involving difficult questions of law, although I seldom conduct
trials or hearing of cases on Mondays and Fridays because said days are
devoted by me to make my decisions and study cases pending trial before
the Court;”

Respondent admitted not holding trials on Mondays and Fridays,
contrary to the instruction of the Court. Respondent has to be reminded
that proper and efficient utilization of office hours for hearings and
trials is to ensure a speedy administration of justice.

1. Respondent’s voyeurism was the subject of Administrative
Matter No. 96-1363 which had been resolved by the Court in a Decision
dated October 12, 1998, disposing thus:

‘“WHEREFORE, for his disgraceful acts of voyeurism committed
against Marilyn C. Dumayas, respondent Judge Adrian N. Pagalilauan,
RTC-Br. 12, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, is fined P10,000.00 with warning that
a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.’”^[23]

2. The charge that respondent has been using his chambers as sleeping
quarters is anemic of evidentiary support and is therefore dismissed.

3. The alleged delay in the disposition of Election Case No.
1807-S is also dismissed because complainant stipulated that the same is
not a charge but merely mentioned in connection with the election case.
Besides, Justice Abesamis found no evidence of delay in the
disposition of subject election case.

4. Respondent’s alleged error in nullifying the votes of
Cabulisan and Acdal is likewise dismissed for lack of corroborating
evidence to substantiate the same.

5. Respondent’s alleged failure to set Election Case No. 1807-S for hearing should also be dismissed because:

“First, as the record of the case bears him out, complainant was
amenable to the submission of the case for decision without hearing. In
an Order, dated February 21, 1995, respondent judge explicit[ly]
instructed with caveat that ‘the parties hereby given twenty (20) days
from today to submit their respective memorandum. With or without their
memoranda, the case will be submitted for decision.’ The parties,
including complainant, did not manifest their objection in open court or
move for the reconsideration of said order in writing. Instead, they
submitted their respective compliance thereto.

Second, it is duly noted that when complainant saw the first draft
of decision, which he alleged was in his favor, there was no fuss over
the lack of hearing. xxx”

6. The charge of falsification of Certificates of Service is also dismissed in view of the absence of proof.

7. The charge that respondent has been partial in favor of the
counsel for the protestant in Election Case No. 1807-S is also dismissed
for lack of merit. The Clerk of Court of Branch 12, Regional Trial
Court, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, has certified that since the respondent
became the Presiding Judge, there was only one criminal case which was
reconsidered, from conviction to acquittal, and that it was counsel for
protestant, Atty. Victoriano Pascua, who appeared as the private
prosecutor in the said case. Furthermore, Atty. Pascua has a lot of
cases pending in the sala of the respondent that somehow explains the
long hours he spends in the courtroom.

Justice Abesamis recommended that the respondent be fined in an
amount equivalent to one (1) month salary, for gross ignorance of the
law. Respondent was once administratively fined P10,000.00 in
Administrative Matter No. 96-1363. The current salary of a regional
trial court judge is P24,127.00 a month.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Adrian N.
Pagalilauan is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and is hereby
FINED in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS.

The charges of serious misconduct, falsification of certificates of service and inefficiency are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

---

^[1] Rollo, pp. 4-11.

^[2] Rollo, p. 25.

^[3] Ibid., pp. 27-39.

^[4] Rollo, p. 85.

^[5] Rollo, pp. 86-87.

^[6] Ibid., p. 88.

^[7] Memorandum dated December 9, 1998, p. 19.

^[8] Ibid.

^[9] Ibid., pp. 24-25.

^[10] Section 211 (27), Omnibus Election Code.

^[11] 46 Phil. 595.

^[12] 45 Phil. 852.

^[13] Rollo, pp. 26-39.

^[14] Rollo, p. 36.

^[15] Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines.

^[16] Punzalan vs. Commission on Elections, 289 SCRA 702, 715.

^[17] Rollo, p. 20.

^[18] Section 14,
Article VIII, 1987 Constitution: “No decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which it is based.”

^[19] Dated July 1, 1987.

^[20] Ibid.

^[21] Dated January 28, 1988.

^[22] Rollo, pp. 26-39.

^[23] Memorandum, supra, p. 36.