LUZVIMINDA C. COMIA, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE CONRADO R. ANTONA, RESPONDENT.

The administrative matter at bar stems from a sworn
affidavit-complaint dated 22 March 1999, filed by herein complainant
Luzviminda C. Comia, imputing to respondent Judge Conrado R. Antona of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City, Branch 4, a plethora of
charges involving “gross ignorance of the law, by deliberately
committing a mockery of judicial proceedings, (for) knowingly rendering
an unjust judgment in favor of the accused, (for) capriciously allowing
the accused in the custody of their counsel, (for) treating the private
prosecutor in a despotic, tyrannical, oppressive and dictatorial manner
during the January 6, 1999 hearing, (for) allowing accused to post bail
despite the fact that the crime committed is a capital offense and a
heinous crime, at that; (of) depriving the prosecution the procedural
requirement of due process, (for) acting most prejudicial to the best
interest, image, trust, confidence and integrity of the court, and (for)
deliberately violating the existing doctrines and jurisprudence laid
down by the Honorable Supreme Court.”

In a Memorandum dated 12 April 2000, Court of Appeals Justice
Buenaventura J. Guerrero, who was tasked by this Court to conduct an
investigation, and submit a report and recommendation on the instant
administrative matter, classified the charges against respondent judge
into three:^[1]

A) Ignorance of the law;

B) Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the Court; and

C) Deliberately violating existing doctrines and jurisprudence laid down by the Supreme Court.

As borne by the records, this administrative matter arose as a result
of respondent judge‘s handling of Criminal Case No. 9309 for Murder,
particularly the hearing and resolution of the petition for bail
therein.

Based on the Memorandum submitted by Investigating Justice
Buenaventura J. Guerrero, the material antecedents and proceedings in
the instant administrative case are as follows:

“On 19 January 1998, an information for murder for the death of
complainant’s husband, Numeriano Comia, was filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Fourth judicial Region, and raffled to Branch 4, Batangas
City, presided by respondent Judge. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 9309
and entitled ‘People of the Philippines vs. Fajardo, et al.,’ accused
were Dante Fajardo, Sr. and Filipina Fajardo-Arce, as principals, the
latter’s husband Pio Arce as accomplice.

“On 29 January 1998, counsels for accused Fajardo Sr., Filipina
Arce and Pio Arce, filed an ‘Urgent Motion to Defer Issuance of the
Warrants of Arrest with Supplemental Petition to Quash, Lift and or
Dissolve Warrant of Arrest if Already Issued.’ Private Prosecutor Atty.
Isabelita Bathan Manigbas with the conformity of 2nd Assistant City
Prosecutor Leonardo Suyo of Batangas City submitted a
comment/opposition. Taking cognizance that a petition for review against
the resolution of the City Prosecutor had been filed by the accused
with the Department of Justice, respondent judge held that ‘such fact
does not in any way preclude the court from acting on the information
already filed with the Court’ hence denied the urgent motion for lack of
merit. Counsel for the accused filed a motion for reconsideration. On
10 March 1998, respondent Judge granted the motion decreeing ‘that the
efficacy of the said warrants of arrest against all the herein accused
dated January 27, 1998 are hereby suspended until further order of the
court.’

“A motion for reconsideration was filed by the Private Prosecutor
with the conformity of the 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Leonardo Suyo.
On 31 March 1998, respondent Judge denied the motion ruling, inter alia,
that:

‘X X X In any case, a reading of the subsequent orders of the
Secretary of Justice merely gave the justification for the prosecutors
to file informations with the Court even if there were appeals and/or
petitions for review of their resolutions seasonably filed. There is,
however, nothing in these orders and/or circulars which in any way
affects the discretion of the Court on whether or not warrants of arrest
should be issued and although already issued, the Court may order its
recall and as what had been made in this case, suspend the effectivity
of said warrants of arrest.

‘Moreover, the right of an accused to appeal and/or petition for
review resolutions of Prosecutors to the Secretary of Justice had not
been removed but only qualified. It is unfortunate that what impressed
the Private prosecutor was the apparently no longer effective Circular
No. 17 of the Department of Justice. But as can be gleaned from the
order of March 10, 1998, the suspension of the efficacy of warrants of
arrest was primarily premised on the sense of fair play of the Court to
give full meaning to the due process that should be accorded every
person accused of a criminal offense and in the interest of substantial
justice in the face of the existence of warrants of arrest which
undoubtedly would affect the rights of the accused to ventillate (sic)
their arguments and evidence before the Secretary of Justice.’

“On 04 November 1998, defense’s appeal to the Department of Justice was dismissed.

“On 04 December 1998, respondent Judge issued the second warrants of arrest against accused Fajardo Sr., Filipina and Pio. While still at large,
Atty. Reynaldo P. Dimayacyac, Sr. filed an Urgent Petition for the
Grant of Bail to Accused Dante Fajardo, Sr. and Filipina Arce with
Supplemental Motion for Reduction of Bail Recommended for Accused Pio
Arce, Jr. dated 14 December 1998.

On 16 December 1998, respondent Judge merely directed that
the urgent petition be filed with the records it appearing the court has
not yet acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all accused who are still at large.

“On 04 January 1999, acting on the manifestation/motion of counsel for the accused, respondent Judge issued an order setting tentatively the hearing of the petition for bail
of Fajardo, Sr. and Filipina Arce and reduction of bail of Pio Arce,
Jr. on 06 January 1999 at 9:30 a.m. In the same order, respondent judge
directed that a copy thereof be furnished the City Prosecutor, and upon
request of the defense counsel, subpoena ad testificandum be issued to
three witnesses named in the request.

“On 06 January 1999, the scheduled hearing of the petition for bail was held.
First to speak was the private prosecutor who manifested they only
learned ‘today’ of the return of the warrant dated January 6, 1999
showing that the warrant was served by the PNP Criminal Investigation
and Detection Group, Camp Crame, Quezon City in the evening on January
5, 1999. Inasmuch as the accused were present, she continued that a
commitment order be issued for their confinement at the City Jail of
Batangas, adding that a representative of the PNP Batangas is present
for the purpose.

“Defense’s counsel retorted the proceedings was for petition for
bail and since the court had ruled that the petition could not be heard
without the accused-movants submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of
the court, they surrendered themselves to the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group of the PNP, Camp Crame and were
pressing (sic) for a speedy trial.

“Respondent Judge then remarked that the matter to be heard as shown in the order setting the hearing, was subject to the condition that the accused voluntarily surrender themselves which they did.
Regarding the plea of the private counsel that a commitment order for
the confinement of the accused in Batangas City Jail be issued, he said
it ‘will be resolved later on but first things first.’ Continuing, he
observed that ‘the motion here set for hearing is the one for the
movants to show their cause why this motion should be granted and in the
matter of granting bail and with respect to the other accused in the
matter of reduction of bail, so first things first.’

“Private prosecutor then asserted that under the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, in application for bail particularly for capital offense
(the burden of) ‘showing (that the evidence of) the guilt of the accused
is strong, lies in the prosecution. It is the prosecution who should
present evidence to prove (that the evidence of) the guilt of accused is
strong.’ Citing Section 8 of Rule 114, she argues that ‘all of the
evidence presented by the prosecution shall [be] automatically form part
(of) the trial on the merits of the case. So, it would be unprocedural
(sic) Your Honor, with due respect to the Honorable Court and to defense
counsel that this application for bail be conducted without first
submitting the accused to the proper agency; that they be properly
arraigned and the Prosecution then will be given the proper opportunity
to file an opposition to the petition for bail and to give proper
opportunity for the prosecution to present its evidence to prove that
the evidence of guilt is strong; the accused here has not yet
been arraigned; they had not been committed to the proper agency where
they should had been properly detained, Your Honor.’” (Emphasis Ours)

During the course of the bail hearing, the defense further moved – to
the objection of the prosecution – that the accused be held in custody
at the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, Camp Crame, claiming
that accused, Fajardo, Sr., was then scheduled for medical operation
“as early as December 14th.”^[2] Respondent judge granted the motion of defense counsel.

On 12 January 1999, the prosecution filed an “Omnibus Motion to
(a) reconsider the order of custody of the accused; (b) declare the
proceedings on the bail null and void; (c) inhibit; and, (d) defer
further proceedings.”

On 28 January 1999, the prosecution likewise filed a “Supplement
to the Omnibus Motion dated December 14, 1998 with Additional Arguments
to Support its Motion for Reconsideration Anent the order of January 6,
1999.”

In an order^[3] dated 01
February 1999, respondent judge denied the Omnibus Motion to which the
prosecution moved to reconsider said order. On 03 February 1999,
respondent judge denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the
prosecution and declared the bail hearings terminated.

Upon arraignment, accused Fajardo Sr. and Filipina Fajardo- Arce pleaded not guilty to the charge against them.

In an order dated 15 February 1999,^[4]
respondent judge granted the petition for bail and fixed the amount
thereof at P200,000.00 each for accused Fajardo Sr. and Filipina
Fajardo-Arce, and reduced the amount of bail to P100,000.00 for accused
Pio Arce, Jr.

On 25 February 1999, respondent judge inhibited himself from the hearing and trial of Criminal Case No. 9309.^[5]

ADMINISTRATIVE CASE

Acting on the sworn affidavit-complaint filed by herein
complainant Luzviminda Comia and considering the gravity of the charges
imputed therein, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended
to the High Court that the instant administrative matter be referred to
the Court of Appeals for immediate raffle, investigation, report and
recommendation.

In a Resolution dated 06 December 1999, this Court referred the
case to the Court of Appeals and, upon subsequent raffle, was assigned
to Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero for investigation, report and
recommendation.

On 23 February 2000, herein complainant, through counsel, filed a memorandum.^[6] For his part, respondent judge submitted a Manifestation^[7] on 06 March 2000, and a Memorandum^[8] on 17 March 2000, to which complainant filed a Compliance with Reply-Memorandum^[9] dated 28 March 2000.

In a Memorandum dated 12 April 2000, Investigating Justice
Buenaventura J. Guerrero submitted to the High Court his findings and
recommendations on the administrative matter, to wit:

“1. Ignorance of the law: On the basis of the foregoing, respondent Judge may be held administratively liable and ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 ;

“2. Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the Court:
No Fraud, dishonesty or corruption has been charged much less proven
against respondent Judge. Hence, he may be exonerated; and,

“3. Deliberately violating existing doctrines and jurisprudence laid down by the Supreme Court:
There is no evidence that respondent Judge was aware of herein
aforecited jurisprudential doctrines on application for admission to
bail in a capital offense. Not one of these cases—or any case for that
matter involving petition for bail in a charge for a capital offense—was
brought to the attention of respondent Judge by the prosecution to show
that his order was in violation of existing jurisprudence. Hence,
respondent Judge may be exonerated.”(Emphasis Ours)

THE COURT’S RULING

The findings and recommendations of the investigating justice are
well-taken. A thorough perusal of the records and evidence adduced by
the complainant lend credible substantiation to the charge of gross
ignorance of the law on the part of respondent judge. Verily, the
actuation of respondent judge specifically in the handling, hearing and
resolution of the petition for bail constitutes not only ignorance of
fundamental rules relating to bail applications, but demands stern
rebuke from this Court as well.

Without doubt, the rules and principles relating to bail
transgressed by respondent judge are – to say the least – basic that
unfamiliarity therewith entails a finding of administrative liability
and necessitates the imposition of the proper penalty.

Section 8 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court is explicit:

“Sec. 8. Burden of Proof in Bail Application. – At the hearing of an application for admission to bail filed by any person who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong.
The evidence presented during the bail hearings shall be considered
automatically reproduced at the trial, but upon motion of either party,
the court may recall any witness for additional examination unless the
witness is dead, outside of the Philippines or otherwise unable to
testify.” (Emphasis Ours)

Likewise, jurisprudence on the matter is crystalline. Bereft of any ambiguity of language, this Court, as early as Feliciano vs. Pasicolan,^[10]
articulated the principle in this jurisdiction that since bail is
intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, the same
cannot be authorized or posted before custody of said accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities by his arrest or voluntary surrender.

It is self evident that a court cannot authorize provisional
liberty to one who is then actually in the enjoyment of his liberty, or
as the Court quoted in Feliciano, “it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free.”^[11]
Stated differently, the right to bail can only be availed of by a
person who is in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty
and it would be premature, not to say incongruous, to file a petition for bail for someone whose freedom has yet to be curtailed.^[12]

Thus in Borinaga vs. Tamin,^[13] the High Court in categorical terms enunciated:

“X X X Where admission to bail is a matter of discretion, the prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong.
X X X Admission to bail as a matter of discretion presupposes the
exercise thereof in accordance with law and guided by the applicable
legal principles. The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on
the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed against
in determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due process, that is, after evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. X X X

“X X X

“In the first place, respondent judge did not have the authority to set the petition for bail for hearing in view of the fact that he had not even acquired jurisdiction over the criminal case X X X.” (Emphasis ours)

Under the present circumstances, respondent Judge Antona– fully
cognizant that the court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the
persons of the accused considering that the latter were “at large”–
still entertained the application for bail by setting a date of hearing
therefor, albeit tentatively, and conditioned upon the voluntary
surrender of the accused. In doing so, respondent judge indubitably
violated settled jurisprudential doctrines regarding the purpose of bail
which is to secure the temporary liberty of persons under the custody
of the law, or otherwise deprived of freedom.

It is of no moment that the accused eventually surrendered to the
police authorities on the same date “tentatively” scheduled for the
hearing of the application for bail. To our mind, such supervening event
is of no bearing and immaterial; it does not absolve respondent judge
from administrative liability considering that he should not have
accorded recognition to the application for bail filed on behalf of
persons, who at that point, were devoid of personality to ask such
specific affirmative relief from the court.

The records reveal that at the time the application for bail was
filed, the accused were, in fact, in the enjoyment of their liberty,
having evaded the long arm of the law despite the existence of standing
warrants for their arrest issued by no less than respondent Judge Antona
himself.

Similarly, respondent judge is guilty of a procedural lapse in
the hearing of the petition for bail inasmuch as the order and manner of
presentation of evidence in the bail hearings were flawed and highly
irregular. In the case before us, the defense adduced and presented its
evidence even ahead of the prosecution despite the unequivocal provision
of the Rules to the effect that in bail petitions, the burden of
proving that the evidence of guilt is strong lies within the fence of
the prosecution. The clear import of the foregoing pronouncements is
that the prosecution should be accorded all the opportunity to adduce,
submit and present proof to bolster its stand that the evidence of guilt
is indeed strong so as to warrant the denial of the petition for bail
addressed to the court. Moreover, as gleaned from the order^[14]
dated 04 January 1999, only the defense witnesses were issued subpoenas
Ad Testificandum to the exclusion of prosecution witnesses.

Likewise, respondent judge transgressed the Rules in view of the
fact that his order dated 15 February 1999, granting the petition for
bail in favor of the accused Dante Fajardo, Sr. and Filipina
Fajardo-Arce, and reducing the bail in favor of Pio Arce, Jr., failed to
recite a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. The records show
that said order merely made mention and invoked as its basis the
evidence presented by the defense. Notably, respondent judge’s actuation
is dissident to settled doctrine on this matter that the court’s order
granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution,
otherwise the order may be invalidated because the summary of the
evidence for the prosecution, which contains the judge’s evaluation of
the evidence, may be considered as an aspect of procedural due process
for both prosecution and the defense.^[15]

To appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt,
the prosecution must be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled, as
the accused, to due process.^[16]
The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a
filament. We are to keep the balance true. This norm is of the very
essence of due process, as the embodiment of justice requires that the
prosecution be given the opportunity to prove that there is strong
evidence of guilt.^[17]

In the instant administrative matter, proof is extant that in the
bail hearings the prosecution was not afforded adequate opportunity
within a reasonable time to present evidence within its grasp to
substantiate the degree and gravity of guilt of the accused, for
purposes of resolving the bail petition. As gleaned from the order dated
15 February 1999, respondent judge relied solely on, and made strict
mention of the evidence adduced by the defense without incorporating in
said order a recital of the evidence for the prosecution. Respondent
judge ruled and concluded, albeit erroneously, that the prosecution
waived its right to adduce evidence; in effect, the prosecution was
denied the opportunity to submit all the evidence it desired to present.

Evidently, respondent judge was remiss in performing the specific
duty of reciting – in the subject order – the summary of evidence for
the prosecution. For where the grant of bail is discretionary, as in the
instant case, the issue of whether or not an accused should be admitted
to bail lies on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence as to their
guilt,^[18] without prejudice, however, to the right of the defense to cross-examine witnesses and introduce evidence in its own rebuttal.^[19]

Worth stressing too, is that no reasonable notice
was given to the prosecution regarding the hearing of the petition for
bail. As shown by the records, the order setting the 06 January 1999
bail hearing was received by the City Prosecutor and private prosecutor
on 04 January 1999 and 05 January 1999, respectively. In this
jurisdiction, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion,
reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor
or fiscal, or at least, he must be asked for his recommendation.^[20]

Thus, in Depamaylo vs. Brotarlo,^[21]
the disregard by respondent judge of the mandatory three-day notice
rule under Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court was deemed by the
High Court to constitute “undue haste”:

“ The undue haste with which respondent judge granted bail also
accounts for her disregard of the mandatory requirement in Rule 15,
Section 4 that notice of a motion must be served on all parties at least
three days in advance of the hearing.”

In the same vein, despite lack of proper substantiation and
presentation of documentary evidence by the defense and over the
vigorous objection of the prosecution, respondent judge allowed that
custody of the accused be transferred from the Batangas City Jail to the
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, specifically under Senior
Inspector Eduardo S. Villena, Chief of Prosecution Department, on the
ground of “health and security reasons.”

As to the charge, however, of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the court, we adopt the findings of the Investigating
Justice that no fraud, dishonesty or corruption was imputed, nor proved
by complainant; hence, respondent judge is not liable therefor.

On the same score, this Court finds no compelling evidence on record to substantiate the charge that respondent judge deliberately
violated existing doctrines and jurisprudence enunciated by the High
Court. To our mind, the procedural lapses and irregularities in the bail
hearings were not consciously, purposely, and intentionally perpetrated
by respondent judge so as to render him liable for said charge. At the
most, respondent judge’s actuation were borne by an ignorance of the
pertinent rules and applicable jurisprudence and were not, in our
considered view, products of a grand design to deliberately perpetrate
injustice.

All told, this Court once again seizes the moment to remind
judges to keep abreast of the rules and recent pronouncements of this
Court, so they may evolve into more effective dispensers of justice —
magistrates of the law in the truest sense of the word.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing
disquisitions, the Court finds respondent Judge Conrado R. Antona
liable for gross ignorance of the law. ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby
resolves to impose upon him a fine of P20,000.000 and sternly warns
respondent judge that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be
dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Mendoza, (Acting Chairman), Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J. (Chairman), on official leave.

^[1] Memorandum dated 12 April 2000, p.35.

^[2] Rollo, p. 216.

^[3] Rollo, pp. 35-38.

^[4] Ibid, pp. 41-43.

^[5] Ibid, pp. 44-45.

^[6] Rollo, pp. 225-241.

^[7] Ibid, pp. 245-246.

^[8] Ibid, pp. 282-288.

^[9] Ibid, pp. 336-342.

^[10] 2 SCRA 888, cited in Aguirre vs. Belmonte, 237 SCRA 778.

^[11] Aguirre vs. Belmonte, 237 SCRA 778.

^[12] Cortes vs. Catral, 279 SCRA 1.

^[13] 226 SCRA 206.

^[14] Rollo, p. 12; ANNEX “E”.

^[15] Cortes vs. Catral, 279 SCRA 1.

^[16] People vs. Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489.

^[17] People vs. Sola, 103 SCRA 393.

^[18] Aguirre vs. Belmonte, 237 SCRA 778.

^[19] Cortes vs. Catral, 279 SCRA 1; Ocampo vs. Bernabe, 77 Phil. 55 [1946].

^[20] Ibid.

^[21] 265 SCRA 151.