PORFIRIO P. CINCO, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. HON. MATEO CANONOY, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE THIRD BRANCH OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, HON. LORENZO B. BARRIA, CITY JUDGE O…

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu rendered on November 5, 1970.

The background facts to the controversy may be set forth as
follows:

Petitioner herein filed, on February 25, 1970, a Complaint in the
City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu,
Branch II, for the recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident
involving his automobile and a jeepney driven by
Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana
Pepito and Carlos Pepito,
the last three being the private respondents in this suit.  Subsequent thereto, a criminal case was filed
against the driver, Romeo Hilot, arising from the
same accident.  At the pre-trial in the
civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil action
pending the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111,
section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, which provides:

“(b) After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil
action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be
suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the
criminal proceeding has been rendered;”

The City Court
of Mandaue
City in an Order dated August 11, 1970, ordered the
suspension of the civil case. 
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration thereof, having been denied on August 25, 1970,^[1]
petitioner elevated the matter on Certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Cebu, respondent Judge presiding, on September 11, 1970, alleging that the City Judge
had acted with grave abuse of discretion in suspending the civil action for
being contrary to law and jurisprudence.^[2]

On November 5, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the Petition for Certiorari
on the ground that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
City Court in suspending the civil action inasmuch as damage to property is not
one of the instances when an independent civil action is proper; that
petitioner has another plain, speedy, and adequate remedy under the law, which
is to submit his claim for damages in the criminal case; that the resolution of
the City Court is interlocutory and, therefore, Certiorari is improper; and
that the Petition is defective inasmuch as what petitioner actually desires is
a Writ of Mandamus (Annex “R”). 
Petitioner’s Motion for Recon­sideration was denied by respondent Judge
in an Order dated November 14, 1970
(Annex “S” and Annex “U”).

Hence, this Petition for Review before this Tribunal, to which we
gave due course on February 25, 1971.^[3]

Petitioner makes these:

“ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

“1.  THE TRIAL COURT, RESPONDENT JUDGE MATEO CANONOY, ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL OF THE CIVIL CASE
NO. 189 FILED IN THE CITY COURT OF MANDAUE SHOULD BE
SUSPENDED UNTIL AFTER A FINAL JUDGMENT IS RENDERED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.

“2.  THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IN ORDER
TO AVOID DELAY THE OFFENDED PARTY MAY SUBMIT HIS CLAIM FOR DAMAGES IN THE
CRIMINAL CASE.

“3.  THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS NOT PROPER, BECAUSE THE RESOLUTION IN QUESTION IS
INTERLOCUTORY.

“4.  THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
PETITION IS DEFECTIVE.”^[4]

all of which can be synthesized into one
decisive issue:  whether or not there can
be an independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal action.

From the Complaint filed by petitioner before the City
Court of Mandaue City,
Cebu, it is evident that the
nature and character of his action was quasi–delictual,
predicated principally on articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, which
provide:

“Art. 2176.  Whoever by
act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence is
obliged to pay for the damage done.  Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter. 
(1902a)”.

“Art. 2180.  The
obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

” xxx              xxx                   xxx

“Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

” xxx              xxx                   xxx

“The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent damage. 
(1903a)”

Thus, plaintiff made the essential
averments that it was the fault or negligence of the driver, Romeo Hilot, in the operation of the jeepney
owned by the Pepitos which caused the collision
between his automobile and said jeepney; that damages
were sustained by petitioner because of the collision; that there was a direct
causal connection between the damages he suffered and the fault and negligence
of private respondents.

Similarly, in the Answer, private respondents contended, among
others, that defendant, Valeriana Pepito,
observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees,
particularly of her co-defendant Romeo Hilot, a
defense peculiar to actions based on quasi–delict.^[5]

Liability being predicated on quasi–delict,
the civil case may proceed as a separate and independent civil action, as
specifically provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code.

“Art. 2177. 
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code.  But the plaintiff
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
(n)”

The crucial distinction between criminal negli­gence and quasi–delict, which is readily discernible from the foregoing
codal provision, has been expounded in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al., 73 Phil. 607, 620-621,^[6]
thus:

“Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not
only reckless but also simple imprudence. 
If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer
only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to the literal
import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa
aquiliana would have very little scope and
application in actual life.  Death or
injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence
– even the slightest would have to be indemnified only through the principle of
civil liability arising from crime.  In
such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for quasi-delito
or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker
any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous.  Nor are we, in the interpretation of the
laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth
rather than the spirit that giveth life.  We will not use the literal meaning of the
law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin
and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana
or quasi–delito, which is conserved and
made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.

“Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case,
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case,
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in
damages.  There are numerous cases of
criminal negligence which cannot be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be
proved by a preponderance of evidence. 
In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a
civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, otherwise, there
would be many instances of unvindicated civil
wrongs.  Ubi
jus ibi remedium.

“Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make
defendants liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his
(the latter’s) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff
to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining a relief.  True, there is such a remedy under our laws,
but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the primary and
direct responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil
Code.  Our view of the law is more likely
to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs because the procedure indicated by the
defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of common
knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyances
usually do not have sufficient means with which to pay damages.  Why, then, should the plaintiff be required
in all cases to go through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure?
In contruing the laws, courts have endeavored to
shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice.

“At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and
direct responsibility of employers and their presumed negligence are principles
calculated to protect society.  Workmen
and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid
injury to the public.  It is the masters
or employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of
these servants and employees.  It is but
right that they should guarantee the latter’s careful conduct for the personnel
and partimonial safety of others.  As Theilhard has
said, ‘they should reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness,
others for their poor selection and all for their negligence.’ And according to
Manresa,
‘It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility should fail upon
the principal or director who could have chosen a careful and prudent employee,
and not upon the such employee because of his confidence in the principal or
director’.  (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.)
Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of the employer on the
principle of representation of the principal by the agent.  Thus, Oyuelos says
in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons the
employer and employee ‘vienen a ser como una sola
personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente
en la de quien la emplea y utiliza‘ (become as one personality by the merging of the
person of the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him.) All these
observations acquire a peculiar force and significance when it comes to motor
accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility
of owners of motor vehicles.

“Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of
both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to
overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of
understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa-aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek
damages only by virtue of the Civil responsibility arising from crime,
forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910
of the Civil Code.  Although this habitual
method is allowed by our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless
and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual.  In the present case, we are asked to help
perpetuate this usual course.  But we
believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm done by such practice and to
restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles
1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor.  It is high time we cause the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow
on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into
that of a crime under the Penal Code. 
This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding of private
rights because it reestablishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the
further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues,
limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the
party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious
redress.” (Garcia vs. Florido, 52 SCRA 420, 424-425, Aug. 31, 1973).  (Emphasis supplied)

The separate and independent civil action for a quasi–delict is also clearly recognized in section 2, Rule
111 of the Rules of Court, reading:

“Sec. 2.  Independent
civil action. – In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33,
34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency
of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the
preceding section.  Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only
a preponderance of evidence.”

Significant to note is the fact that the
foregoing section categorically lists cases provided for in Article 2177
of the Civil Code, supra, as allowing of an “independent civil
action”.

Tested by the hereinabove-quoted legal tenets, it has to be held
that the City Court, in suspending the civil action, erred in placing reliance
on section 3 (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, supra, which refers
to “other civil actions arising from cases not included in the section
just cited” (i.e., Section 2, Rule 111 above quoted), in which case
“once the criminal action has being commenced, no civil action arising
from the same offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in
whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding
has been rendered”.  Stated
otherwise, the civil action referred to in Secs. 3(a)
and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be suspended after the
criminal action has been instituted is that arising from the criminal offense and
not the civil action based on quasi–delict.

Article 31 of the Civil Code then clearly assumes relevance when
it provides:

“Art. 31.  When the
civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.”

For obviously, the jural
concept of a quasi–delict is that of an
independent source of obligation “not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony”.  Article
1157 of the Civil Code bolsters this conclusion when it specifically recognizes
that:

“Art. 1157.  Obligations
arise from:

(1)  
Law;

(2)  
Contracts;

(3)  
Quasi-contracts;

(4)  
Acts or omissions punished by law; and

(5)  
Quasi–delicts.
(1089a)” (Underscoring supplied)

It bears emphasizing that petitioner’s cause of action is based
on quasi–delict.  The concept of quasi–­delict, as enunciated in Article 2176 of the Civil Code
(supra), is so broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but
also damage to property.^[7]
It makes no distinction between “damage to persons” on the one hand
and “damage to property” on the other.  Indeed, the word “damage” is used
in two concepts:  the “harm”
done and “reparation” for the harm done.  And with respect to “harm” it is
plain that it includes both injuries to person and property since
“harm” is not limited to personal but also to property injuries.  In fact, examples of quasi–delict in the law itself in­clude damage to
property.  An instance is Article 2191(2)
of the Civil Code which holds proprietors responsible for damages caused by
excessive smoke which may be harmful “to persons or property“.

In the light of the foregoing disquisition, we are constrained to
hold that respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in upholding the
Decision of the City Court
of Mandaue
City, Cebu, suspending the civil action based on quasi–delict until after the criminal case is finally
terminated.  Having arrived at this
conclusion, a discussion of the other errors assigned becomes unnecessary.

WHEREFORE, granting the Writ of Certiorari prayed for, the
Decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside, and the City
Court of Mandaue City,
Cebu, Branch II, is hereby
ordered to proceed with the hearing of Civil Case No. 189 of that Court.

Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and De Castro, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Annexes “N” and “O”, Petition.

^[2]
Annex “P”, Petition.

^[3] p.
84, Rollo.

^[4]
p. 17, ibid.

^[5]
Article 2180, Civil Code.

^[6]
Cited in Garcia vs. Florido 52 SCRA 420, 424-425 (1973).

^[7]
See Barredo vs. Garcia 73 Phil. 607, at 620, supra.