CRISPINO FLORES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. G. JESUS B. RUIZ, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAGAYAN, PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF CAGAYAN, AND LEONARDO MANDAC, REPRE­SENTED BY H…

This is a Petition for Certiorari and/or Habeas Corpus filed by
petitioner Crispin Flores on October
24, 1972 after he has been allegedly arrested and detained illegally by Order of the respondent Judge, dated June 20, 1972, finding him guilty of
indirect contempt.  (Annex
A, Peti­tion, p. 11, Rollo).

From the records of this case, it appears that peti­tioner was
actually arrested on August 28, 1972 and has since been detained in the
Provincial Jail of Cagayan until his release by
virtue of a bond of P500.00 which he was allowed to file by this Court in its
Resolution dated October 31, 1972 (p. 33, Rollo),
which he must have filed as he had precisely asked to be bailed, pending his
appeal from the Order of the respondent judge dated August 10, 1972.  (Annex E to Petition, p.
24, Rollo). 
The reason for the delayed arrest is that petitioner was given a period
up to August 1, 1972
“to inform the court whether or not he relinquishes his possession over
the land in question.”

The land in question was levied upon and sold on execution on November 28, 1978 to satisfy the
award of damages in favor of Leonardo Mandac,
plaintiff in Civil Case No. 1616 of the Court of First Instance of Cagayan against petitioner and his father, Doroteo Flores, as defendants and the losing parties in
said case.  They failed to redeem the
property sold to the heirs of Leonardo Mandac in the
auction sale.  Hence, the respond­ent
court ordered petitioner to place in possession the heirs of Leonardo Mandac who had in the meantime died.  For his refusal to vacate the land in favor
of the heirs of Mandac, contempt proceedings were
instituted against petitioner on motion of Atty. Antonio N. Laggui,
as counsel of the aforementioned heirs. 
As previously stated, these contempt proceedings led to his arrest and
detention.

Petitioner, however, questions the legality of the proceedings
for not having been assisted by counsel during the hearing of the motion for
contempt, and for not having been duly informed of the contempt charge by being
fur­nished a copy of the motion, or properly “arraigned” before
trial.  Thus, petitioner claims to have
been deprived due process of law which voided the proceedings against him as
for lack of jurisdiction of the court to inflict the penalty imposed on him,
citing Santiago vs. Alikpala, L-25133, September 28,
1968, 25 SCRA 356.

Further, petitioner contends that his act of not surrendering
possession of his levied property does not constitute contempt, citing the case
of Faustino Lagrimas vs. JP of Camiling,
et al., L-14345, July 20, 1961, 2 SCRA 793, and
Chinese Commercial Property Co. vs. Martinez, et al., L-18565, November 30, 1962,
6 SCRA 851.

1. On the issue of whether petitioner was denied due process as
he claims, both respondent judge and private respondents deny the claim of
petitioner, of having been so denied, private respondents even quoting from the
transcript of the stenographic notes the following:

“COURT:  Is the defendant Crispin Flores in Court?

(Interpreter calls out
the name of Crispin Flores, and answered that he is present.)

(The Court addresses
Crispin Flores).

Q.   Who
is going to represent you in this case?

A.    I
have a lawyer but he was not able to come.

Q.   Did
you notify him?

A.    Yes,
sir, but he was not able to come today.

Q.   Are
you willing to go into trial in this case even in the absence of your lawyer?

A.    Yes,
sir.

Q.   Do
you need the assistance of any lawyer?

A.    No
more, anyway I can answer.”

(pp. 1 and 2, tsn Barias, June 19, 1972).

The veracity of the alleged proceedings as indicated above is
denied by petitioner, alleging that no such proceedings took place, and that,
in any event, the transcript was not signed by the stenographer.  What happened according to him,
is that “when respondent judge had learned that he was without counsel, he
told him (petitioner) to deliver possession of the premises to the private
respondents, and for this purpose gave him ten (10) days to carry out that
mandate.  In spite of the plan of
petitioner that the hearing on that date be postponed so that his counsel of
record could appear for him or that a new counsel would be hired to appear in
his behalf, the respondent judge, however, demurred, and with the assistance of
a certain Atty. Joshua Pastores, peti­tioner was made
to sign an understanding to deliver up the premises within the period indicated
by the judge on pain of being imprisoned.” (Petitioner’s
Memorandum, pp. 79-80, Rollo.)

The right of the accused to counsel in criminal proceed­ings has
never been considered subject to waiver. 
The practice has always been for the trial court to provide the accused
with a counsel de oficio, if he has no
counsel of his own choice, or cannot afford one.  This is because –

“The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not
include the right to be heard by counsel. 
Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the
science of the law, parti­cularly in the rules of procedure, and, without
counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not
know how to establish his innocence and this can happen more easily to persons
who are ignorant or uneducated.  It is
for this reason that his right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important
that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under
our rules of procedure it is not enough for the court to apprise an accused of
his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires
the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de
oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or
grant him a rea­sonable time to procure an attorney of his own.” (People vs. Holgado, 85 Phil. 752; See
also Aguador vs. Enerio, 37
SCRA 140.)

On the basis of the aforequoted ruling,
it cannot be disputed that the respondent court failed in its duty designed to
satisfy the constitutional right of an accused to counsel.  Petitioner, as the respondent in the contempt
charge, a pro­ceedings that partake of the nature of a
criminal prosecution, was thus denied due process.  This is more so as petitioner does not appear
to have been duly notified of the contempt charge, nor was properly
“arraigned,” since he was not assisted by counsel during the hearing
(Santiago vs. Alikpala, supra).  Admittedly with a counsel of record,
petitioner could not have willingly submitted to go to trial when his counsel
failed to appear.  It is certainly much
easier to believe, that, as petitioner alleges, he asked for postponement,
because of the absence of his counsel, but that the respondent judge denied the
plea, a fact not expressly traversed in the respondent judge’s comment.  (p. 56, Rollo).  Neither has he denied the allegation in the
petition that there was a denial of peti­tioner’s right to due process for not
having been duly informed of the contempt-charge, nor was his counsel furnished
a copy thereof, as he is entitled to one as a matter of right and as a matter
of duty of the court.  All
that respondent judge said in his comment is that “defendant Flores
has been granted his day in court to defend himself from the charges presented
by reason of his contumacious acts.” (p. 56, Rollo.)

We are, therefore, constrained to hold that the pro­ceedings on
the contempt charge has been vitiated by lack of due process, entitling
petitioner to the writ of habeas corpus he seeks.

“Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ.  It is traditionally considered as an
exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained
such as when the accused’s constitutional rights are
disregarded.  Such defects results in the
absence or loss of juris­diction and therefore invalidates the trial and the
consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated.  That void judgment of conviction may be
challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the func­tion of habeas
corpus.  This writ may issue even if
another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant.  In Harden vs. The Director of Prisons (81:741
/1948/), Justice Tuason, speaking for the Court,
expli­citly announced that’ deprivation of any fundamen­tal or constitutional
rights’ justify a pro­ceeding for habeas corpus, on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.  Abriol
vs. Homeres (84 Phil. 525) is even more
categorical.  In that case, the action of
a lower court, denying the accused the opportunity to present proof for his
defense, his motion for dismissal fail­ing, was held by this Court as a
deprivation of his right to due process. 
As was made clear by the opinion of Justice Ozaeta: ‘No court of justice under our system of government
has the power to deprive him of that right.  If the accused does not waive his right to be
heard but on the contrary invokes the right, and the court denies it to him,
that court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed; it has no power to sentence
the accused without hearing him in his defense; and the sentence thus pronounced
is void and may be collaterally attacked in a habeas corpus proceeding.” (Santiago vs. Alikpala, supra.)

2.  We also find as not
clearly established by the pleadings and annexes, the legal basis for the
pronouncement of guilt for contempt against petitioner.  What would consti­tute contempt is the
re-entry of the defeated party into the premises after possession thereof has
been delivered to the prevailing party by the sheriff in enforcement of the
writ of execution (Rom vs. Cobadora, L-24764, July
17, 1969, 28 SCRA 758, 763; Chinese Commercial
Property Co. vs. Martinez, et. al., L-18565, November 30, 1962, 6 SCRA 848; Faustino Lagrimas vs.
JP of Camiling, et. al., L-14345, July 20, 1961, 2 SCRA 793).  Thus, in
the order of the respondent judge, dated September 28, 1972, (Annex G to Peti­tion, pp. 30-31, Rollo), it was stated that:

“By virtue of the writ of execution of the decision in this
case the plaintiffs were placed in possession over the parcel described in
paragraph 3 of the complaint.  Sometime in March, 1969, defendants invaded
the land and since then, they refused to vacate same.  Plaintiffs, on July 2, 1969, filed the first motion for contempt against
the defendants.

The other properties of defendants were levied, foreclosed and sold
to defendants on November 28, 1968
in a public auction to satisfy the damages awarded in the same judgment.  The defendants failed to redeem the bidded properties within the one year from the registration
of the certificate of sale of the land, and yet defendants refused to vacate
same land for which plaintiffs filed the second motion for contempt on December 17, 1971.

The Court did not pass upon the first motion for contempt but gave
due course to the second motion for contempt.”

It is altogether clear that with respect to the parcel described
in paragraph 3 of the complaint, the Mandacs were
placed in possession thereof but subsequently, the petitioner herein invaded
the land and had since refused to leave it. 
With respect, however, to the land in question, petitioner never vacated
the same; there was, therefore, no re-entry to speak of.  According to petitioner, the sheriff who
tried to enforce the writ of possession never succeeded in locating the
specific land to be delivered to the Mandacs to be
able to claim having placed the latter in possession of the land.  (pp. 77-78, Rollo).  Where
the defeated party asked to vacate the premises by the judgment of the court,
refuses to vacate the same on being ordered by the sheriff enforcing a writ of
execution or possession, no contempt is committed, as held in Goyena de Quizon vs. Philippine
National Bank, et al., G. R. No. L-2851, January 31, 1950, cited in Chinese Commercial Property Co. vs. Martinez, et al.,
supra.  In the case of Rom
vs. Cobadora, L-24764, July 17, 1969, 28 SCRA 758,
Justice Teehankee, speaking for the court said:

“The order of execution issued by the lower Court is addressed
solely and exclusively to the sheriff, who under the above-cited rules is
called upon to oust the defeated party from the property and make the delivery
or restitution by placing the prevailing party in possession of the property,
and mere refusal or unwillingness on the part of the defeated party to
relinquish the property, would not constitute contempt.”

3.  There is, likewise, an
allegation in the petition that the Motion for Contempt was filed by the
counsel of Leonardo Mandac after the latter’s death,
and therefore, the motion was unauthorized and without legal standing.  From what has been said above that petitioner
is not guilty of contempt, the challenge against the legality of the motion for
contempt need not be inquired into.  In
fairness, however, to private respondent from his allegation in his Answer that –

“7. Atty. Pedro
N. Laggui had authority to file the motion for contempt
against the Petitioner on June 30,
1969; at that time, Leonardo Mandac was
still alive.  Atty. Antonio N. Laggui likewise had authority to file the motion for
contempt against the Petitioner on December 17, 1971 no longer as counsel for
the deceased Leonardo Mandac – for at that time he
was already dead – but as counsel for his wife and children in whose favor the
corresponding deed of sale of the parcels of land sold at auction on November
28, 1968, was executed by the Sheriff on February 12, 1970, pursuant to the
Order dated January 21, 1970.” (Answer, p. 69, Rollo).

We have no hesitation to say that the
Motion for Contempt has been filed with proper authority.

For all the foregoing, the present petition should be, as
it is, hereby granted, thereby setting aside the order of the respondent judge
finding petitioner guilty of indirect contempt. 
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.