THE PEOPLE OF THE PHIL­IPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ERNESTO P. VALENCIA (JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF AURORA SUB-PROVINCE), FLOR­ENCIO DAGUMAN, AND HON. ARTEMIO N. VILLANU…

People versus Valencia

The Case

This is a special civil action brought by the People of the Philippines, through the acting assistant provincial fiscal of Quezon province, against Judge Ernesto Valencia of the Court of First Instance of the Aurora sub-province, together with Florencio Daguman and the municipal court of San Luis. The People ask the Supreme Court to reverse the trial judge's order dismissing Daguman's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and to restrain the municipal court from proceeding with the case after the record was returned to it. The case matters because it fixes, once and for all, which court hears an appeal from an ordinary municipal court in a criminal case that falls within the concurrent jurisdiction of municipal courts and courts of first instance. The answer is the Court of First Instance, not the Court of Appeals and not the Supreme Court.

Procedural History

Daguman was charged in the municipal court of San Luis in three separate cases: illegal possession of firearms, assault against an agent of a person in authority, and slander. After a joint trial, the municipal court convicted him of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced him to imprisonment of two years and one day to five years, plus costs. The charges of assault and slander were dismissed. Daguman filed his notice of appeal, manifesting his intention to appeal to the Court of First Instance.

An information was then filed anew in the Court of First Instance of the Aurora sub-province. Before arraignment, Daguman moved to dismiss his own appeal, arguing that it is the Court of Appeals, not the Court of First Instance, that has appellate jurisdiction, relying on the Esperat versus Avila ruling. Judge Valencia granted the motion and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, ordering the record returned to the court of origin. Upon receiving the record, the municipal court of San Luis set the case for hearing. The People then came to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction, and the Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction on August 23, 1968.

Facts

Florencio Daguman was prosecuted in the municipal court of San Luis, an ordinary municipal court, meaning the municipal court of a municipality that is neither a provincial nor a sub-provincial capital. He was convicted of illegal possession of firearms, a crime punishable by imprisonment of not less than one year and one day nor more than five years, or both such imprisonment and a fine, in the discretion of the court. That crime is one of those enumerated in the Judiciary Act as within the original jurisdiction of municipal judges, and it also falls within the jurisdiction of courts of first instance because of the penalty imposed. There is therefore a zone of concurrent jurisdiction.

Daguman appealed to the Court of First Instance, then changed his mind and moved to dismiss his appeal, invoking Esperat versus Avila. The trial judge agreed with him, ruling that because the jurisdiction of municipal courts and courts of first instance is concurrent and therefore similar, the appeal should go directly to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. The People challenged that order before the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of First Instance has appellate jurisdiction over a decision rendered by an ordinary municipal court in a criminal case falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of ordinary municipal courts and courts of first instance.
• Whether or not the concurrence of jurisdiction between ordinary municipal courts and courts of first instance authorizes a direct appeal to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.

Applicable Provisions

Section 5 of Rule 123 of the New Rules of Court provides:

Appeal from judgment of the justice of the peace or municipal court. The convicted party may appeal either orally or in writing from any final judgment of the justice of the peace or municipal court in a criminal cause to the Court of First Instance within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation of the judgment.

This is the general rule on appeals from municipal courts, and it points the appeal to the Court of First Instance.

Section 14 of Rule 122 of the New Rules of Court, invoked by the respondent judge, provides:

Appeal. From all final judgments of the Court of First Instance or courts of similar jurisdiction, and in all cases in which the law now provides for appeals from said courts, an appeal may be taken to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court as hereinafter prescribed.

This provision governs appeals from courts of similar jurisdiction, and the question is whether an ordinary municipal court is such a court.

Section 45 of the Judiciary Act, as originally enacted, provided:

Appellate jurisdiction. Courts of First Instance shall have appellate jurisdiction over all cases arising in municipal and justice of the peace courts in their respective provinces.

This is the statutory grant of appellate jurisdiction to courts of first instance, and it is the law that must be strictly complied with.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court upheld the position of the People. The Court held that the Court of First Instance has appellate jurisdiction over the decision of the ordinary municipal court of San Luis. The Court explained that illegal possession of firearms falls within the original jurisdiction of municipal judges under the Judiciary Act, and also within the jurisdiction of courts of first instance because of the penalty imposed, creating a zone of concurrent jurisdiction. But the Court stressed that appeal is a purely statutory right. Section 45 of the Judiciary Act, as amended, explicitly excepts judgments rendered by municipal courts of capitals and city courts exercising like jurisdiction as courts of first instance from the general rule that courts of first instance have appellate jurisdiction over all cases arising in their respective provinces. That exception does not reach ordinary municipal courts.

On the second issue, the Court rejected the trial judge's reasoning. The fallacy, said the Court, is the conclusion that decisions of ordinary municipal courts are appealable directly to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court because their jurisdiction and that of the courts of first instance are concurrent and therefore similar. The Court held that mere concurrence of jurisdiction does not authorize a direct appeal in the absence of express legislative authority. The right of direct appeal was granted only with respect to judgments of municipal courts of capitals and of city courts, and being an exception to section 45, it must be strictly construed and cannot be extended by implication. The Court also noted the practical reason: ordinary municipal courts are not required to record their proceedings, so the appellate courts would have no record of evidence to consider on appeal. The Court distinguished Esperat versus Avila and Aquino versus Estenzo, which dealt with city courts whose proceedings were required by law to be recorded and whose appeals were expressly directed to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.

Doctrine

Appeal is a purely statutory right, and the law granting it must be strictly complied with; the grant cannot be extended by implication. Mere concurrence of jurisdiction between an ordinary municipal court and a court of first instance does not authorize a direct appeal to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. Absent express legislative authority, the appeal from a decision of an ordinary municipal court in a criminal case within the concurrent jurisdiction lies with the Court of First Instance, under section 5 of Rule 123 and the general rule in section 45 of the Judiciary Act. The direct appeal to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court is an exception limited to municipal courts of capitals and city courts exercising like jurisdiction as courts of first instance, whose proceedings are required to be recorded. That exception is strictly construed and cannot be extended to ordinary municipal courts.

Disposition

The Supreme Court set aside the order of the Court of First Instance dismissing the appeal, ordered that court to give due course to Daguman's appeal and to hear the case de novo, and made the writ of preliminary injunction permanent, with no pronouncement as to costs.

Remember This

Memorize this line: appeal is a purely statutory right, and mere concurrence of jurisdiction does not authorize a direct appeal to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. Examiners use this case to test the hierarchy of courts and appellate jurisdiction, especially the distinction between ordinary municipal courts and municipal courts of capitals or city courts of chartered cities.