G.R. No. L-29396. August 29, 1969
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ERNESTO P. VALENCIA (JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF AURORA SUB-PROVINCE), FLORENCIO DAGUMAN, AND HON. ARTEMIO N. VILLANU…
CASTRO, J.:
In this present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with preliminary injunction, the People of the Philippines, represented by the
acting assistant provincial fiscal of Quezon
province, seeks a reversal of the order of the respondent Judge Ernesto P.
Valencia of the Court of First Instance of Aurora sub-province dismissing the
appeal lodged with the said court by the accused Florencio
Daguman (co-respondent herein), upon motion of the
latter.
Daguman was charged in the municipal
court of San Luis in three separate cases with illegal possession of firearms,
assault against an agent of a person in authority, and slander, respectively. After a joint trial of these cases, the
municipal court rendered judgment on July
7, 1964 convicting him of illegal possession of firearms, and
sentencing him to suffer imprisonment for a period of two years and one day to
five years and to pay the costs. The
charges of assault and slander were dismissed.
On July 15, 1964 he
filed his notice of appeal wherein he manifested his intention to appeal to the
Court of First Instance.
An information was thereafter filed a new in the CFI of Aurora
sub-province on October 20, 1964, charging Daguman
with the crime of illegal possession of firearms. Before arraignment, however, he moved for the
dismissal of his appeal on the ground that it is the Court of Appeals and not
the Court of First Instance which has appellate jurisdiction, invoking Esperat v. Avila, G.R. No. L-25922, June 30, 1967.
On February 12, 1968
the Hon. Judge Ernesto Valencia issued an order dismissing the appeal for lack
of jurisdiction, thus:
“WHEREFORE, as prayed for by the accused thru counsel, for
lack of jurisdiction, the appeal in this case is dismissed and the Deputy Clerk
of Court is directed to return the record of this case to the court of
origin.”
Upon receipt of the record of the case from the CFI of Aurora
sub-province, the municipal court of San Luis set the case for “hearing.”
On August 22, 1968 the
present petition was lodged in this Court for review of respondent Judge Valencia’s
order dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, as well as the order of
respondent municipal court of San Luis setting the case for “hearing.”
The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was prayed for to restrain
respondent municipal court from proceeding, which writ we issued on August 23, 1968.
The sole’ issue posed by this petition is: which court has
appellate jurisdiction over a decision rendered by an ordinary municipal
court (i.e., municipal court of a municipality which is neither a provincial
nor a sub-provincial capital) in a criminal case which is within the confluence
of jurisdiction of ordinary municipal courts and courts of first instance?
The petitioner argues that in this case appellate jurisdiction
properly pertains to the court of first instance, primarily because the
proceedings are not recorded, and should appeal be taken to the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court directly, there is no recorded evidence to
consider on appeal. The petitioner further
cites sec. 5 of Rule 123 of the New Rules of Court which provides:
“Appeal from judgment of the justice of the peace or municipal
court. The convicted party may appeal
either orally or in writing from any final judgment of the justice of the
peace or municipal court in a criminal
cause to the Court of First Instance within fifteen (15) days from the
promulgation of the judgment.”
The respondent CFI Judge,
on the other hand, invokes sec. 14, Rule 122 of the New Rules of Court which
recites:
“Appeal. – From all final judgments of the Court of First
Instance or courts of similar jurisdiction, and in all cases in which the law
now provides for appeals from said courts, an appeal may be taken to the Court
of Appeals or to the Supreme Court as hereinafter prescribed,”
and
reasons that since “the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace [now
municipal judges] and judges of municipal courts [now city judges] over criminal
cases enumerated in paragraph (c) [now paragraph (b)] of Section 87 of
Republic Act No. 296 is not exclusive but concurrent with the Court of First
Instance (People v. Palmon, supra[1]) the jurisdiction of Courts of First
Instance and Municipal Courts, therefore, are similar, so that cases
falling under said paragraph are appealable directly
to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court as the case may be, hence, the
ruling of the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Esperat
v. Avila, supra.[2]“
We uphold the
petitioner’s position.
Under par. 9 of section
87(b) of the Judiciary Act, as amended, municipal judges and judges of city
courts of chartered cities are vested with original jurisdiction over the crime
of illegal possession of firearms, explosives and ammunition. This offense is punishable by imprisonment of
not less than one year and one day nor more than five years, or both such
imprisonment and a fine of not less than P1, 000 nor more than P5, 000, in the
discretion of the court.[3] It is true that Rep. Act 3828 limits the
criminal jurisdiction of municipal courts to crimes punishable by the maximum
penalty of imprisonment of not more than three years or a fine of not more
than three thousand pesos or both such fine and imprisonment,[4] but this jurisdiction has been broadened,
first, by section 87(b) of the Judiciary Act which gives municipal judges and
judges of city courts of chartered cities original jurisdiction over the crimes
therein enumerated regardless of penalty,[5] and second, by the penultimate
paragraph of section 87(c) of the Judiciary Act which vests municipal judges in
the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and judges of city courts with like
jurisdiction as the courts of first instance to try parties charged with
offenses committed within their respective jurisdictions for which the penalty
provided by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment of not more than six years
or a fine not exceeding six thousand pesos, or both.
Courts of First Instance, on the other hand, are vested with
original jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is
imprisonment of more than six months or a fine of more than two hundred pesos,
or both. In a number of cases,[6]
this Court has harmonized section 87(b) with section 44 of the Judiciary Act, as
amended, in the sense that insofar as the criminal cases enumerated in section
87(b) are concerned, there is concurrence of jurisdiction between courts of
first instance and municipal courts.
Illegal possession of firearms being one of the crimes falling by virtue
of section 44 of the Judiciary Act (because of the penalty imposed) within the
jurisdiction of courts of first instance, and likewise falling, under the
authority of section 87(b) (as one of the crimes therein enumerated), within
the jurisdiction of municipal courts, there is thus a zone of concurrent
jurisdiction.
The fallacy in the respondent judge’s position is his conclusion
that decisions of ordinary municipal courts are appealable
directly to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court because their
jurisdiction and that of the courts of first instance are concurrent and
therefore similar. Mere concurrence of
jurisdiction does not authorize an appeal direct to the Court of Appeals or
the Supreme Court from decisions of ordinary municipal courts in the absence
of express legislative authority. Appeal
is a purely statutory right. Section 45
of the Judiciary Act, as amended, explicitly excepts judgments rendered by
municipal courts of capitals and city courts exercising like jurisdiction as
courts of first instance pursuant to the penultimate paragraph of section
87(c), as amended, from the scope of the general rule that courts of first
instance have appellate jurisdiction over all cases arising in their respective
provinces.
Tracing the history of section 45, we note that the original
provision of Rep. Act 296 reposed appellate jurisdiction in the courts of first
instance over all cases arising in their respective provinces and tried by municipal
courts (now city courts) and justice of the peace courts (now municipal courts)
regardless of whether these courts exercised exclusive jurisdiction or concurrent
jurisdiction with courts of first instance.
Thus section 45 of the Judiciary Act originally read:
“Appellate jurisdiction. – Courts of First Instance shall have
appellate jurisdiction over all cases arising in municipal and justice of the
peace courts in their respective provinces.”
Simultaneously with the expansion of the
jurisdiction of municipal courts of capitals and of city courts, and the
requirement of recording their proceedings prescribed by the amending act,
Rep. Act 2613, as further amended by Rep. Act 3828, a distinction was drawn in
the matter of appeals from decisions rendered by municipal courts of capitals
and of city courts by the last paragraph of section 87(c) taken together with
section 45 of the Judiciary Act, as amended – this distinction being that their
decisions in cases tried pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred upon them by
the penultimate paragraph of section 87(c) shall be appealable
directly to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may be. The right of direct appeal to the two
appellate courts was granted with respect only to judgments of municipal courts
of capitals and of city courts but not to those of ordinary municipal courts;
this right of direct appeal, being in the nature of an exception to section 45
of the Judiciary Act, as amended, must be strictly construed and its purview
cannot be extended to embrace decisions of ordinary municipal courts in
concurrent jurisdiction cases but must perforce be limited to what has been
explicitly excepted.
Our view is buttressed by
section 5 of Rule 123 of the New Rules of Court which provides:
“Appeal from judgment of the justice of the peace or municipal
court. – The convicted party may appeal either orally or in writing from any final
judgment of the justice of the peace or municipal court in a criminal cause to
the Court of First Instance within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation of
the judgment.”
Absent
the exception provided in section 45 and the last paragraph of section 87(c) of
the Judiciary Act, as amended, the above-cited provision of the New Rules of
Court governs the manner of appeals from decisions of ordinary municipal
courts. The statute granting the
right of appeal is the Judiciary Act, as amended, particularly section 45
thereof. Appeal being a purely statutory right, the law granting the
right must be strictly complied with, and the grant cannot be extended by
implication. Thus, since the law does
not grant direct appeal to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court from
decisions of ordinary municipal courts in concurrent criminal jurisdiction
cases, we cannot authorize such mode of appeal.
An analysis of section 87(c) and section 45 of the Judiciary Act,
as amended, reveals that while the legislature had endowed municipal courts of
capitals and city courts with “like jurisdiction” as a court of first instance and a status as such, it withheld the same
from ordinary municipal courts trying concurrent criminal jurisdiction
cases. This Court cannot ordain ordinary
municipal courts with the status of courts of first instance, nor classify them
as courts of record by requiring them to record their proceedings, for such
actuation on our part would transcend the periphery of legitimate judicial
function and constitute an encroachment upon legislative prerogative. Neither can we authorize a direct appeal to
the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, in the absence of express statutory
authority, for the practical reason that because ordinary municipal courts are
not required to record their proceedings the appellate courts would have no
record of evidence to consider on appeal.
In concurrent criminal jurisdiction cases tried by municipal
courts of provincial and sub-provincial capitals and by city courts, the
judgments are appealable directly to the Court of Appeals
or the Supreme Court, as the case may be, provided their proceedings have been
recorded[7]
and a valid exercise of jurisdiction has been effected.[8]
Verily, such cases would be appropriate cases within the context of the
doctrine we laid down in Esperat, supra. The following words used in Esperat are clear enough to require further
interpretation: “The pronouncement is made on the assumption that the
proceedings in the Cotabato City Court in which the
petitioner was convicted have been regularly conducted and recorded and the
stenographic notes have been taken of the testimony submitted to the trial
court, for there is nothing in the records before us to show otherwise. But, should the evidence not have been
recorded (or transcribed) as required by the last part of section 87(c) of the
Judiciary law, then the trial of the criminal case would be an entire nullity,
as held in Aquino v. Estenzo,
et al., G.R. No. L-20971, May 19, 1965,
for the reason that the Court of Appeals cannot review the findings of
fact of the trial court if there is no record of the evidence taken during the
trial of the case.” The rationale is obviously based on section 87(c) of
Rep. Act 3828 which requires municipal courts of capitals and city courts to
record their proceedings when trying cases where the penalty does not exceed
imprisonment of more than six years or a fine of not more than six thousand
pesos, or both, and which directs appeals in such cases to be brought to the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.
Thus:
“When it was provided in Sec. 87(c) of Rep. Act 296 as amended
by Rep. Act 2613, that the city courts of chartered cities have like
jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an
offense in which the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correccional
or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding P3000.00 or
both (now P6000.00 or both) the city court thereby acts as a Court of First Instance
and its decisions are appealable directly to the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may be. When the city court tries cases of this
nature and it acts as a Court of First Instance, it must perforce act as a
court of record. The very law itself
provides that in the exercise of this jurisdiction by the municipal courts of
provincial capitals and city courts, the proceedings must be recorded. Certainly, the decisions of the city court or
of the municipal court of provincial capitals in the exercise of this
jurisdiction are similar to decisions of the Court of First Instance, and
their decisions cannot be appealed to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme
Court, as the case may be, if there are no records of their proceedings.”
It thus becomes inescapable that Esperat
and Aquino do not apply to this case before
us, for the following reasons: first, Esperat
and Aquino dealt with criminal cases tried and
decided by city courts, whereas the present case deals with a criminal case
tried and decided by an ordinary municipal court which is not a municipal
court of a provincial or a sub-provincial capital; second, in Esperat and Aquino
there was concurrence of jurisdiction by reason of the penalty imposed on
the crime, whereas in the case at bar, the basis of concurrence in jurisdiction
is the crime itself; third, in Esperat and Aquino, proceedings were required by law to be
recorded, whereas here no such requirement exists; fourth, in Esperat and Aquino
the law expressly directs appeal to be brought to the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court, whereas in this case, the general provision (1st clause of sec.
45 of the Judiciary Act) applies with respect to appeals from decisions of
ordinary municipal courts.
ACCORDINGLY, the order of the respondent CFI of February
28, 1968 is set aside, and the said court is hereby ordered to give due course
to the appeal of Florencio Daguman
and to hear the case de novo.
The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court on August 23, 1968 is hereby made
permanent. No pronouncenment
as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Sanchez, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Reyes and Zaldivar, JJ., are on
official leave.
[1]
86 Phil. 350.
[2]
G.R. No. L-25922, June 30, 1967,
20 SCRA 596.
[3]
Rep. Act 4.
[4]
Section 87(c), first paragraph.
[5]
Paringit v. Masakayan,
G.R. No. L-16578, July 31, 1961,
2 SCRA 962; People v. Dose, G.R. No. L-23540, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1345.
[6]
Natividad v. Robles, 87 Phil. 836; Paringit v. Masakayan, G.R.
No. L-16578, July 31, 1961,
2 SCRA 962; People v. Palmon,
86 Phil. 350; People v. Colicio, 88 Phil. 196;
People v. Dose, supra.
[7]
Aquino v. Estenzo,
L-20791, May 19, 1965.
[8]
Ibid.