KAISAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA KAHOY SA FILIPINAS, AND THE 118 MOVANTS-INTERVENORS REPRESENTED BY BENITO NAHAG, PETITIONERS, VS. DEE C. CHUAN & SONS, INC., RESPONDENT.

The petitioners in these two cases challenge the validity and seek
the annulment of an order of the Court of Industrial Relations by which
that court gave course to a motion for modifications of a judgment that
had already become final. Though differing in form—one (G. R. No.
L-5983) being an original action for certiorari and the other (G. R.
No. L-6265) an appeal by certiorari—the two cases are but one in
substance and purpose, and should be adjudicated together. This
decision is, therefore, rendered for the adjudication of both.

It appears that, on November 23, 1946, the Court of Industrial
Relations awarded wage increases to the laborers of Dee C. Chuan &
Sons, Inc., a Philippine corporation in the lumber business, the
laborers being then represented by the Kaisahan ng mga Manggagawa sa
Kahoy sa Filipinas and the CLO. On July 23, 1948, following a strike
staged by the laborers, that court again awarded them wage increases
coupled with vacation and sick leave with pay. Taken to the Supreme
Court by a writ of certiorari, this latter award was affirmed in toto
on January 28, 1950. The company, however, filed a motion for
reconsideration, and pending determination of this motion in the
Supreme Court, the company filed another motion, dated March 31, 1950,
in the Court of Industrial Relations asking for a modification of both
the award of November 23, 1946 and that of July 23, 1948, on the
grounds that conditions had changed since those awards were made due to
losses suffered by the company in 1948 and 1949, the down trend in the
cost of living, and the reduction of wages in other lumber companies.
This motion for modification was docketed as case No. 71-V (6), but
consideration thereof was suspended pending the resolution of the
motion for reconsideration in the Supreme Court.

On July 3, 1950, the Supreme Court denied the motion for
reconsideration, and its decision having been declared final and
executory on July 6, the present petitioners filed a motion in the
Court of Industrial Relations asking for the execution of the judgment.
The company agreed to the execution with respect to the wage increases
for 1947 but objected with respect to the wage increases for 1948, 1949
and 1950 for reasons already alleged in its motion for modification.

The motion for execution and the motion for modification were heard
together—each being considered a reply to the other—and thereafter the
Court of Industrial Relations, under date of November 24, 1950,
rendered an order declaring itself without authority to modify an award
for an increase of wages “for the period of the pendency of the appeal
in the Supreme Court” and ordering the corresponding writ of execution
to be issued “in accordance with the decision of July 23, 1948 * * * .”
Reconsideration of this order having been denied, the company
petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari (G. R. No.
V-4680) to have the order annulled. But the petition was dismissed for
lack of merit, and the dismissal became final on May 25, 1951.

That was the status of the case when the Court of Industrial
Relations, at the instance of the company, issued the order of May 29,
1952, by which that court gave course to the motion for a modification
of the award that had already become final by ordering an examination
of the company’s books of account and other pertinent record to
ascertain “its financial condition for the years 1948, 1949 and 1950”
so as “to enable the court to determine the justice, equity and
substantial merits of the case concerning the modification of the award
of July 23, 1948 * * * . It is this order that the laborers brought to
this Court for review after the court below, with two of its judges
dissenting, had refused to reconsider it.

At the time the order was issued, the award was already on its way
to being executed as the amounts due the laborers thereunder had
already been computed by the court examiner and were then being
discussed in court. The laborers, therefore, maintain that the award
could no longer be modified so that the order giving course to the
motion for modification was a nullity.

Brushing aside all technicalities, the broad question presented for
determination is whether the Court of Industrial Relations may modify
an award that has been affirmed by the Supreme Court after an order for
the execution of that award has already become final.

Section 17 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended, reads:

“SEC. 17. Limit of effectiveness of award.—An
award, order or decision of the court shall be valid and effective
during the time therein specified. In the absence of such
specification, any party or both parties to a controversy may terminate
the effectiveness of an award, order or decision after three years have
elapsed from the date of said award, order or decision by giving notice
to that effect to the court: Provided, however, That at any
time during the effectiveness of an award, order or decision, the court
may, on application of an interested party, and after due hearing,
alter, modify in whole or in part, or set aside any such award, order
or decision, or reopen any question involved therein.”

While the above section apparently authorizes the modification of an
award at any time during its effectiveness, there is nothing in its
wording to suggest that such modification may be authorized even after
the order for the execution of the award has already become final—with
respect, of course, to the period that had already elapsed at the time
the order was issued. To read such authority into the law would make of
litigations between capital and labor an endless affair, with the
Industrial Court acting like a modern Penelope, who puts off her
suitors by unraveling every night what she has woven by day. Such a
result could not have been contemplated by the Act creating said court.

Conformably to the above, the order complained of is annulled and
set aside insofar as it affects or retards the execution of the award
of July 23, 1948 for the years 1948, 1949 and 1950. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.