G. R. No. L-18589. October 31, 1962
BALDOMERO BAUTISTA, ANDRES BAUTISTA, ANGELO BAUTISTA, EUFEMIA BAUTISTA, VALERIANO BAUTISTA, AND JOSE BAUTISTA, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. ALEJANDRA CABLAY, JUANA TUASON, FEL…
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan dismissing this case with costs against the plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs Baldomero, Andres, Angelo, Eufemia, Valeriano and Jose,
all surnamed Bautista, as well as the deceased Paula Bautista—who was
survived by her children Margarita and Teofilo, both surnamed De Veyra,
who should be joined as parties plaintiffs, but are named as
defendants, because plaintiffs do not know their whereabouts, and have
been unable, therefore, to contact them— allege, in their amended
complaint, that they are the legitimate children of Alberto Bautista,
deceased, from whom they inherited two (2) parcels of riceland, with an
aggregate area of about 204,954 square meters, situated in the Barrio
of Nantangalan, Municipality of Pozorubio, Province of Pangasinan, and
more particularly described in said pleading; that the aforementioned
riceland was mortgaged by said Alberto Bautista, during his lifetime,
to secure the payment of a debt in the sum of P1,500, to Anastacio
Tuason, who had held the aforementioned property and received the
products thereof, netting about P2,000 a year, with the obligation to
apply the same to the payment of said debt, which has thus been more
than fully settled; that, upon the death of Anastacio Tuason, his
widow, defendant, Alejandra Cablay, their children, defendants, Juana,
Felisa, Magdalena, Filomena, Jose and Alberto, all surnamed Tuason, as
well as defendants Daniel Frianeza and Graciano Barroso, succeeded the
deceased in the aforesaid possession; and that, despite repeated
demands, the defendants have refused and still refuse, without just
cause, to surrender said possession to plaintiff herein, who,
accordingly, prayed that judgment be rendered declaring that the said
debt of Alberto Bautista in favor of Anastacio Tuason has been fully
paid; that the entry of the aforementioned mortgage in the office of
the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan be ordered cancelled; and that the
defendants be ordered to render accounts of the fruits of the property
above referred to respectively received by them, and to turn over to
plaintiffsthe value of the said fruits, after deducting the sum of
P1,500, representing the original debt of Alberto Bautista, as Well as
the possession of said property and to pay damages.
In due course, defendants filed an answer to the amended complaint
admitting some of its allegations, denying other allegations thereof
and alleging by way of affirmative and special defenses that plaintiffs
have no cause of action and that their cause of action, if any, is
barred by the statute of limitations. In view of these special
defenses, the lower court set the case for preliminary hearing and the
reception of evidence in connection with the said special defenses.
Plaintiffs objected thereto, but the lower court overruled the
objection and, after the reception of the aforementioned evidence,
issued the order complained of upon the ground of prescription of
action.
Hence, this appeal by the plaintiffs, who maintain that a dismissal
upon said ground is proper only when it is borne out by the allegations
of the complaint; that such is not the situation obtaining in the case
at bar, and the lower court labored under the impression that the
contract between Alberto Bautista and Anastacio Tuason was an ordinary
mortgage, which is erroneous, because it is alleged in the amended
complaint that the land was held by Anastacio Tuason with the
obligation to apply its products to the payment of his credit against
Alberto Bautista, and, hence, under a contract of antichresis; and that
an action to recover a land held under such contract does not prescribe.
There is no merit in this appeal. It is not true that the special
defense of prescription of action may be upheld only when borne, out by
the allegations of the complaint. Appellants’ pretense would have some
color of validity had the order appealed from been issued upon a motion
to dismiss, without taking any evidence on the plea of prescription. In
the case at bar, the plea has been made in the answer and evidence has
been introduced in support thereof.
Upon the other hand, and regardless of whether or not the
allegations of the complaint amount to an averment of antichresis, it
appears from the evidence on record that, in Civil Case No. 6410 of the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, entitled Rufino Toralba and
Anastacio Tuason vs. Alberto Bautista”, decision (Exhibit 7)
was rendered on January 12, 1933, sentencing Alberto Bautista to pay to
Ruitno Toralba and Anastacio Tuason the sum of P1,500, with interest
and costs; that, in compliance with a writ of execution (Exhibit 8) of
said decision, issued on May 31, 1933, three (3) parcels of land of
Alberto Bautista, including the property involved in this case, were,
on July 26, 1933, sold at public auction to Anastacio Tuason and Rufino
Toralba (see Exhibit 10) in whose favor the corresponding final deed of
said (Exhibit 13) was executed by the Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan,
on April 3, 1935; that no redemption having been effected within the
reglementary period, Anastacio Tuason and Rufino Toralba were placed in
possession of said land in pursuance of a writ of possession (Exhibit
12) dated May 7, 1935; and that Anastacio Tuason and Rufino Toralba
remained in possession of said land since then up to December 5, 1941,
when they sold the land to defendant Daniel Frianeza (Exhibit 14), who,
in turn, conveyed the same, on January 12, 1950, to defendant Graciano
Barroso (Exhibit 15).
Inasmuch as the latter and his predecessors in interest have been in
possession of said land, continuously, peacefully and adversely to the
whole world, from May 7, 1935 to November 5, 1958, when the original
complaint herein was filed, or for over 33 years, it is clear that,
independently of the title transmitted to them by virtue of the final
deed of sale executed by the Provincial Sheriff on April 3, 1935,
plaintiffs’ cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against plaintiffs-appellants. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.