THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. POLICARPIO TIONGSON Y GARCIA AND MAURICIO NAVARRO Y ORDILLO, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

Compulsory review of the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Manila finding Policarpo Tiongson y Garcia (in Criminal Case No. 46085)
and Mauricio Navarro y Ordillo (in Criminal Case No. 46242), guilty of
the crime of robbery with homicide, committed with the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery and abuse of
confidence, and sentencing each of them to death, to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased William Co Chi Chay, jointly and severally, in
the sum of P6,000 and to pay the costs.

The facts found by the trial court are the following:

In the morning of Sunday, October 19, 1958, the lifeless body of
William Co Chi Chay was discovered by his brother, Jacinto Velasco Co,
lying on an army cot inside the Champion Watch and Jewelry Store at
657-659 Rizal Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila. The cot and the floor of the
store were covered with blood, and empty watchboxes were found
scattered all around. As the incident was immediately reported to the
police authorities, three policemen arrived at the scene of the crime
about twenty minutes later.

A postmortem examination of the cadaver showed that the victim died
of extensive traumatic comminuted fractures of the skull, with
contusions and hemorrhages in the brain caused by a blow from a hard,
blunt object with an elevated edge like a monkey wrench.

Two days after the discovery of the crime, the Cavite police
authorities arrested Policarpo Tiongson and Rufino Galang while trying,
through the latter’s sister, to sell men’s and ladies’ wrist watches to
one Amado Rustia. After being questioned at police headquarters, they
were taken for further investigation to Manila where Tiongson, in the
evening of October 22, 1958, executed a sworn statement admitting his
participation in the commission of the robbery in question and pointing
to his co-defendant Navarro as the one who killed the deceased (Exh. A,
p. 288, rec.). Galang also executed a sworn statement admitting that he
was in the house of Tiongson in the morning of October 19, 1958 and
that in the morning of the 21st of the same month, they agreed to sell
the stolen watches in Cavite thru his sister. (Exh. Op. 314, rec.). He
also implicated Navarro and Salvador Villaveles as having participated
in the commission of the crime (Exh. N, p. 309, rec.). On November 3,
1958, Navarro was apprehended in Cabanatuan City. Brought to, and
questioned in Manila he executed a written statement confessing his
participation in the commission of the crime but pointing to Tiongson
as the slayer of William Co Chi Chay (Exh. M, p. 300, rec.).

The trial court further found that defendants, being badly in need
of money, planned to rob the Champion Watch and Jewelry Store on the
morning of Sunday, October 19, 1958; that to facilitate their getaway
after the robbery and to carry their loot to the provinces, Navarro
hired a car driven by Salvador Villaveles whom he took to Tiongson’s
house in the early morning of October 19; that Navarro and Villaveles
then proceeded to Avenida Rizal, followed by Tiongson; that to gain
entrance into the store, Tiongson, who was acquainted with the
deceased, brought along a watchclock which the latter had sent him for
repairs days before; that once inside, Tiongson hit the deceased on the
head with a monkey wrench while the latter was sitting on an army cot,
causing a fracture in the cranium and other mortal wounds which led to
his death; that meanwhile, Navarro ransacked the showcase, taking 67
watches therefrom and scattering the empty boxes on the floor; that
thereafter, defendants left the store and were joined by Galang and
Villaveles who were on guard outside.

Tiongson claims that his extrajudicial confession, and those of
Navarro and Galang were obtained through force and intimidation; that
the lower court erred in giving credit to the uncorroborated testimony
of accomplice Salvador Villaveles, and in not giving credit to his
defense of alibi.

Navarro, for his part, alleges that the lower court erred in holding
(1) that there was conspiracy to commit the crime, without requiring
the prosecution to establish by independent evidence the existence of
such conspiracy, and (2) that he was arrested in Cabanatuan City when
the truth was that he surrendered peacefully to the authorities.

The claim that the confessions mentioned above were obtained through force and intimidation is unfounded.

Navarro signed his statement before Fiscal Cabrera who, according to
the evidence, explained its contents to him before he signed it. While
Navarro, on the witness stand, pointed out the portions of his
confession that, according to him, were his true answers and those that
were supplied by his investigators, he did not tell Fiscal Cabrera
anything about this before he signed his confession. He was also
physically examined by the NBI after signing his statement, but he told
the examining physician nothing about the alleged duress he was
previously subjected to. Indeed, that no such unlawful means was
employed is demonstrated by his own admission that he was allowed to
make deletions and corrections in the confession.

As far as the confession of Galang is concerned, the record shows
that the contents thereof were translated and explained to him before
he affixed his signature thereto. Similarly, he was subjected to a
physical examination after making the statement, but no evidence of
maltreatment was found in his person.

Tiongson’s claim of maltreatment, on the other hand, is supported
only by his testimony, and there is sufficient evidence showing that
whatever injuries he had sustained during his confinement were not
inflicted by the police authorities but by a brother of the deceased.

Lastly, it should be observed first, that the confession contain
details that the police could not have possibly supplied or invented,
and second, that the declarants tried to blame one another for the
killing. These circumstances lead us to believe that the confessions
were freely made.

Tiongson’s claim that the lower court should not have relied on the
uncorroborated testimony of Salvador Villaveles is likewise untenable.
Villaveles’ testimony in open court was merely confirmatory of the
statements contained in his confession (Exhibit P) in which he
described how Tiongson and Navarro conspired to commit the crime and
how the crime was actually committed. While testimony coming from the
mouth of a co-conspirator must be accepted with caution, we believe
that, in this case, the trial court was justified in giving credit to
that of Villaveles, no part of said testimony having been shown by
appellants to be false.

To support his alibi, Tiongson testified that on the morning of
October 19, 1958 he had several visitors in his house located at 2316
Misericordia, Manila, one of whom was a certain Rufino Galang who asked
him to sell an outboard motor; that another visitor named Adelaida
Viray arrived between 9:30 and 10:00 o’clock and still another named
Esperanza Guhit arrived at about 10 o’clock, both having left the house
only before lunch time; that his co-accused Navarro and Villaveles were
among his visitors at about 11 o’clock that morning, and they offered
to sell him 65 brand new watches for P2,000 which, according to them,
were smuggled goods; that he was able to pay them only P750 and agreed
to pay the balance in two or three days; that Viray and Guhit saw him
pay for the watches and even offered some to them but they refused to
buy.

Tiongson’s alibi was correctly disregarded by the trial court. While
his testimony is somewhat incoherent, it sufficiently establishes the
fact that among his alleged visitors about 11 o’clock in the morning of
October 19, 1958 were Navarro and Villaveles, who brought with them a
bag full of watches. As the crime was committed at an earlier hour that
same morning, it would seem reasonable to assume that Tiongson and his
confederates had repaired to his house with their loot after committing
the crime.

Appellant Navarro, for his part, testified that in the morning of
October 17, 1958, he went to Novaliches to visit his friend, Simeon de
Jesus; that he and the latter went to witness a basketball game in
Novaliches at about 8 o’clock a.m., having left the game only at 12
o’clock noon when they went to de Jesus’ house in Barrio Gulod; that at
2 o’clock that afternoon he witnessed another basketball game at the
public plaza of Novaliches, and spent the night in the house of de
Jesus; that on the following day he went to the Forest Hills with some
friends; that it was only on November 1, 1958 that he learned from his
sister in the house of de Jesus that he was being charged with murder.

It is obvious that Navarro’s testimony is hard to believe. In the
first place, why he stayed for so many days in the house of de Jesus in
Novaliches has not been satisfactorily explained. In the second place,
while he claims that his purpose in going to Novaliches was to witness
basketball games, he admitted that, in reality, he did not know that
such games were to be played until he arrived in said municipality. On
the other hand, Navarro’s witnesses do not seem to be reliable ones.
His intimate friend, Simeon de Jesus, could not even tell how many
players there are in a basketball team; while he and Navarro testified
that they were present at the start of the games at 8 o’clock in the
morning, Navarro’s other witness and friend, Manuel Austria, said that
Navarro invited him to the games only at 8:30 a.m. and that they
arrived at the place where the basketball games were being played at
8:40 a.m. To this we must add the circumstance that, according to
appellant Tiongson, Navarro went to his house at Misericordia st.,
Manila at 11 o’clock in the morning of October 19. This precludes the
possibility of Navarro being in Novaliches that same morning. Indeed,
that Navarro was in Manila that morning is admitted in his sworn
statement given to the police after his arrest in Cabanatuan City
(Exhibit M).

Lastly, Navarro’s contention that the alleged conspiracy to commit
the crime had not been established by evidence other than the
confessions mentioned heretofore is without merit. After going over the
testimony of Salvador Villaveles, we are satisfied that the same is
quite sufficient to establish the conspiracy.

Appellant Tiongson filed in this court a motion for new trial based
on newly discovered evidence consisting of the affidavit of Villaveles
in which latter recants his previous testimony implicating Tiongson.
Petitions of this nature have heretofore been denied by us because of
the untrustworthiness of similar evidence coming from the mouth of
convicts or ex-convicts who have nothing or not much to lose by
recanting previous testimony given under oath. For this same reason
Tiongson’s motion should be, as it is hereby, denied.

Wherefore, the decisions appealed from being in accordance with law and the evidence, the same are affirmed, with costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

RESOLUTION

May 31, 1963

PER CURIAM:

The decision of this court in the above entitled cases promulgated
on October 31, 1962 having become final and executory, the records were
remanded below for execution.

It appears, however, that before said decision could be executed,
counsel for defendant Tiongson filed on January 11, 1963 an urgnt
petition alleging therein that notice of the decision was received by
said party only on that date, and praying, as a consequence, that the
entry of judgment be set aside; that said defendant be allowed to file
a motion for reconsideration within fifteen (15) days from January 11,
1963, and that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining
the Director, New Bilibid Prisons at Muntinglupa, Rizal from, carrying
out the execution of the judgment already set for January 19, 1963.

Considering the peculiar circumstances obtaining in the cases, this
court issued the preliminary writ of injunction prayed for, and granted
counsel for defendant Tiongson fifteen (15) days from January 11, 1963
within which to file a motion for reconsideration. Said motion was
filed on January 31, 1963, within the extension granted to the
aforesaid defendant in the resolution of this court of January 29,
1963, but the same was denied on February 7 of the same year. Notice of
the order of denial was received by counsel on February 27 the same
year.

With leave of court, defendant Tiongson filed on February 28, 1963 a
second motion for reconsideration, but again the same was denied on
March 4 of the same year. Notice of the denial was received by counsel
on the 25th of the same month and year.

The cases are again before us now upon request of the Honorable
Judge Morfe of the Court of First Instance of Manila so that we may
clarify the status of the preliminary writ of injunction mentioned
heretofore. In connection therewith, it is the sense of this court
that, with the denial of the motions for reconsideration already
referred to above, the preliminary writ of injunction is deemed set
aside.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.