G.R. No. L-1411. September 29, 1953
DIONISIO RELLOSA, PETITIONER, VS. GAW CHEE HUN, RESPONDENT.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
holding that the sale in question is valid and, even if it were
invalid, plaintiff cannot maintain the action under the principle of pari delicto.
On February 2, 1944, Dionisio Rellosa sold to Gaw Chee Hun a parcel of
land, together with the house erected thereon, situated in the City of
Manila, Philippines, for the sum of P25,000. The vendor remained in
possession of the property under a contract of lease entered into on
the same date between the same parties. Alleging that the sale was
executed subject to the condition that the vendee, being a Chinese
citizen, would obtain the approval of the Japanese Military
Administration in accordance with (seirei) No. 6 issued on April 2,
1943, by the Japanese authorities, and said approval has not been
obtained, and that, even if said requirement were met, the sale would
at all events be void under article XIII, Section 5, of our
Constitution, the vendor instituted the present action in the Court of
First Instance of Manila seeking the annulment of the sale as well as
the lease covering the land and the house above mentioned, and praying
that, once the sale and the lease are declared null and void, the
vendee be ordered to return to vendor the duplicate of the title
covering the property, and be restrained from in any way dispossessing
the latter of said property.
Defendant answered the
complaint setting up as special defense that the sale referred to in
the complaint was absolute and unconditional and was in every respect
valid and binding between the parties, it being not contrary to law,
morals and public order, and that plaintiff is guilty of estoppel in
that, by having executed a deed of lease over the property, he thereby
recognized the title of defendant to that property.
Issues
having been joined, and the requisite evidence presented by both
parties, the court declared both the sale and the lease valid and
binding and dismissed the complaint. The court likewise ordered
plaintiff to turn over the property to defendant and to pay a rental of
P50 a month from August 1, 1945 until the property has been actually
delivered. As this decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, plaintiff sued out the present petition for review.
One of the issues raised by petitioner refers to the validity of Seirei
No. 6 issued on April 2, 1943 by the Japanese authorities which
prohibits an alien from acquiring any private land not agricultural in
nature during the occupation unless the necessary approval is obtained
from the Director General of the Japanese Military Administration.
Petitioner contends that the sale in question cannot have any validity
under the above military directive in view of the failure of respondent
to obtain the requisite approval and it was error for the Court of
Appeals to declare said directive without any binding effect because
the occupation government could not have issued it under article 43 of
the Hague Regulations which command that laws that are municipal in
character of an occupied territory should be respected and cannot be
ignored unless prevented by military necessity.
We do not
believe it necessary to consider now the question relative to the
validity of Seirei No. 6 of the Japanese Military Administration for
the simple reason that in our opinion the law that should govern the
particular transaction is not the above directive but the Constitution
adopted by the then Republic of the Philippines, on September 4, 1943,
it appearing that the aforesaid transaction was executed on February 2,
1944. Said Constitution, in its article VIII, section 5, provides that
“no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except
to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines”, which provisions
are similar to those contained in our present Constitution. As to
whether the phrase “private agricultural land” employed in said
Constitution includes residential lands, as the one involved herein,
there can be no doubt because said phrase has already been interpreted
in the affirmative sense by this court in the recent case of Krivenko vs.
Register of Deeds, 79 Phil., 41, wherein this court held that “under
the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural
lands, including residential lands.” This ruling fully disposes of the
question touching on the validity of the sale of the property herein
involved.
The sale in question having been entered into in
violation of the. Constitution, the next question to be determined is,
can petitioner have the sale declared null and void and recover the
property considering the effect of the law governing rescission of
contracts? Our answer must of necessity be in the negative following
the doctrine laid down in the case of Trinidad Gonzaga de Cabauatan, et
al. vs. Uy Hoo, et al., 88 Phil., 103, wherein we made the
following pronouncement: “We can, therefore, say that even if the
plaintiffs can still invoke the Constitution, or the doctrine in the
Krivenko Case, to set aside the sale in question, they are now
prevented from doing so if their purpose is to recover the lands that
they have voluntarily parted with, because of their guilty knowledge
that what they were doing was in violation of the Constitution. They
cannot escape this conclusion because they are presumed to know the
law. As this court well said: ‘A party to an illegal contract cannot
come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objects carried
out. The law will not aid either party to an illegal agreement; it
leaves the parties where it finds them.’ The rule is expressed in the
maxims: ‘Ex dolo malo non oritur actio,’ and ‘In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis.’ (Bough and Bough vs. Cantiveros and Hanopol, 40 Phil.210, 216.)”
The doctrine above adverted to is the one known as In Pari Delicto.
This is well known not only in this jurisdiction but also in the United
States where common law prevails. In the latter jurisdiction, the
doctrine is stated thus: “The proposition is universal that no action
arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal contract; no suit can be
maintained for its specific performance, or to recover the property
agreed to be sold or delivered, or the money agreed to be paid, or
damages for its violation. The rule has sometime been laid down as
though it were equally universal, that where the parties are in pari
delicto, no affirmative relief of any kind will be given to one against
the other.” (Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. 3, 5th ed., p. 728.)
It is true that this doctrine is subject to one important limitation,
namely, “whenever public policy is considered as advanced by allowing
either party to sue for relief against the transaction” (idem,
p. 733). But not all contracts which are illegal because opposed to
public policy come under this limitation. The cases in which this
limitation may apply only “include the class of contracts which are intrinsically
contrary to public policy,—contracts in which the illegality itself
consists in their opposition to public policy, and any other species of
illegal contracts in which, from their particular circumstances,
incidental and collateral motives of public policy require relief.”
Examples of this class of contracts are usurious contracts,
marriage-brokerage contracts and gambling contracts. (Idem. pp. 735-737.)
In our opinion, the contract in question does not come under this
exception because it is not intrinsically contrary to public policy,
nor one where the illegality itself consists in its opposition to
public policy. It is illegal not because it is against public policy
but because it is against the Constitution. Nor may it be contended
that to apply the doctrine of pari delicto would be tantamount
to contravening the fundamental policy embodied in the constitutional
prohibition in that it would allow an alien to remain in the illegal
possession of the land, because in this case the remedy is lodged
elsewhere. To adopt the contrary view would be merely to benefit
petitioner and not to enhance public interest.
The danger
foreseen by counsel in the application of the doctrine above adverted
to is more apparent than real. If we go deeper in the analysis of our
situation we would not fail to see that the best policy would be for
Congress to approve a law laying down the policy and the procedure to
be followed in connection with transactions affected by our doctrine in
the Krivenko case. We hope that this should be done without much delay.
And even if this legislation be not forthcoming in the near future, we
do not believe that public interest would suffer thereby if only our
executive department would follow a more militant policy in the
conservation of our natural resources as ordained by our Constitution.
And we say so because there are at present two ways by which this
situation may be remedied, to wit, (1) action for reversion, and (2)
escheat to the state. An action for reversion is slightly different
from escheat proceeding, but in its effects they are the same. They
only differ in procedure. Escheat proceedings may be instituted as a
consequence of a violation of article XIII, section 5 of our
Constitution, which prohibits transfers of private agricultural lands
to aliens, whereas an action for reversion is expressly authorized by
the Public Land Act (sections 122, 123 and 124 of Commonwealth Act No.
141).
In the United States, as almost everywhere else, the
doctrine which imputes to the sovereign or to the government the
ownership of all lands and makes such sovereign or government the
original source of private titles, is well recognized (42 Am. Jur.,
785). This doctrine, which was expressly affirmed in Lawrence vs.
Garduño, G. R. No. 16542, and which underlies all titles in the
Philippines, (See Ventura, Land Registration and Mortgages, 2nd ed.,
pp.2-3) has been enshrined in our Constitution (article XIII). The
doctrine regarding the course of all titles being the same here as in
the United States, it would seem that if escheat lies against aliens
holding lands in those states of the Union where common law prevails or
where similar constitutional or statutory prohibitions exist, no cogent
reason is perceived why similar proceedings may not be instituted in
this jurisdiction.
“Escheat is an
incident or attribute of sovereignty, and rests on the principle of the
ultimate ownership by the state of all property within its
jurisdiction.” (30 C.J.S., 1164)“* * * In America escheats
belong universally to the state or some corporation thereof as the
ultimate proprietor of land within its Jurisdiction,” (19 Am. Jur.,
382.)“An escheat is nothing more or less than the
reversion of property to the stae, which takes place when the title
fails.” (Delany vs. State, 42 N. D., 630, 174 N. W., 290, quoted in footnote 6, 19 Am. Jr., 381.)
“As
applied to the right of the state to lands purchased by an alien, it
would more properly be termed a ‘forfeiture’ at common law.” (19 Am.
Jur., 381.)“In modern law escheat denotes a falling of the
estate into the general property of the state because the tenant is an
alien or because he has died intestate without lawful heirs to take his
estate by succession, or because of some other disability to take or
hold property imposed by law.” (19 Am. Jur., 381.)
With regard to an action for reversion, the following sections of Commonwealth Act No. 141 are pertinent:
“SEC.
122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of
this Act, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be
encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to persons, corporations,
associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public
domain under this Act or to corporations organized in the Philippines
authorized therefor by their charters.”“SEC. 123. No land
originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous
Act, ordinance, royal decree, royal order, or any other provision of
law formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y realengos,
or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively
of the public domain or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any
permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated,
or conveyed, except to persons, corporations or associations who may
acquire land of the public domain under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the Philippines whose charters authorize them to do so: Provided, however,
That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or
acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and
legalized by competent courts; Provide, further, That in the event of
the ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this section
and in the last preceding section being transferred by judicial decree
to persons, corporations or associations not legally capacitated to
acquire the same under the provisions of this Act, such persons,
corporations, or associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands
or improvements to others so capacitated within the precise period of
five years; otherwise, such property shall revert to the Government.”“SEC.
124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other
contract made or executed in violation of any of the provisions of
sections one hundred and eighteen, one hundred and twenty, one hundred
and twenty-one, one hundred and twenty-two, and one hundred and
twenty-three of this Act shall be unlawful and null and void from its execution and shall produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent, or permit originally issued, recognized or confirmed, actually or presumptively, and cause the reversion of the property and its improvements to the State.“
Note that the last quoted provision declared any prohibited conveyance not only unlawful but null and void ab initio.
More important yet, it expressly provides that such conveyances will
produce “the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title,
patent, or permit, originally issued, recognized of confirmed, actually
or presumptively”, and of causing “the reversion of the property and its improvements to the State.”
The reversion would seem to be but a consequence of the annulment and
cancellation of the original grant or title, and this is so for in the
event of such annulment or cancellation no one else could legitimately
claim the property except its original owner or grantor—the state.
We repeat. There are two ways now open to our government whereby it
could implement the doctrine of this Court in the Krivenko case thereby
putting in force and carrying to its logical conclusion the mandate of
our Constitution. By following either of these remedies, or by
approving an implementary law as above suggested, we can enforce the
fundamental policy of our Constitution regarding our natural resources
without doing violence to the principle of pari delicto. With
these remedies open to us, we see no justifiable reason for pursuing
the extreme unusual remedy now vehemently urged by the amici curiae.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the sale in question is null and
void, but plaintiff is barred from taking the present action under the
principle of pari delicto.
The decision appealed from is hereby affirmed without pronouncement as to costs.
Labrador, J., concurs.
Paras, C. J., Tuason and Montemayor, JJ., concur in the result.
CONCURRING
BENGZON, J.:
I wish to say that I regard the precedents of Bough vs. Cantiveros and Perez vs. Herranz inapplicable because the parties therein were not equally at fault.
However I do not believe that the two ways suggested to solve the
problem of alien-acquired lands are exclusive. Perhaps the innocent
spouse of the seller and his creditors are not barred from raising the
issue of invalidity.
DISIDENTE
PABLO, M.:
No estoy conforme con la teoria de la mayoria de que el demandante no
puede pedir la declaracion de nulidad de la venta de un terreno a un
extranjero.
El articulo 1306, regal 1.ª, del Codigo Civil
Español, en que se funda la defensa del demandado, dice asi: “Cuando la
culpa este de parte de ambos contratantes, ninguno de ellos podra
repetir lo que hubiera dado a virtud del contrato.”
“Culpa es falta mas o menos grave, cometida a sabiendas y voluntariamente.” (Diccionario de la Real Academia Española).
No existe ley que castiga la venta de un inmueble a un extranjero. ¿Han
cometido culpa el comprador, el vendedor, o ambos a la vez? Creemos que
no, porque la venta de un terreno es la cosa mas ordinaria del mundo.
No hubo causa torpe en el contrato. No se probo que alguno de ellos o
ambos, sabiendo que estaba prohibida la venta, la realizaron. No habian
cometido falta alguna. Ambas partes realizaron el convenio de venta con
la mejor buena fe. Bueno es hacer constar que no se ha probado que
alguna de las partes o ambas hayan obrado de mala fe, ni existe pruebas
de que, sabiendo las partes que estaba prohibida la venta, la
efectuaron sin embargo. La mala fe no se presume: debe probarse. A
falta de prueba, la presuncion es que las partes obraron de buena fe.
No es aplicable al caso presente el articulo 1306 del Codigo Civil.
En el asunto de Bough contra
Cantiveros (40 Jur. Fil., 221), estos son los hechos probados: Matilde
Cantiveros era la mas rica residente de Carigara, Leyte; ella y su
esposo Jose Vasquez firmaron un contrato de separacion conyugal.
Basilia Hanopol, prima y protegida de Matilde, y su esposo Gustavos
Bough marearon a Matilde con la cantinela de “que Jose Vasquez estaba
en el pueblo y podria impugnar el contrato de separacion de bienes
conyugales.” Los esposos Bough la indujeron a que les vendiese
simuladamente por P10,000 sus bienes inmuebles que valian mas de
P30,000; ella firmo ante notario la escritura de venta ficticia
(Exhibit A). Para convencer a Matilde de que no tenian el proposito de
engañarla y privarla de sus bienes, los esposos Bough suscribieron otro
documento (Exhihit 1), en virtud del cual donaban a ella todos los
bienes que aparecian en el Exhibit A, “donacion que tendria efecto en
el caso de que tanto ellos como sus hijos fallecieran antes que Matilde
Cantiveros.” Matilde, a pesar de la escritura de venta ficticia,
continuo poseyendo sus bienes. Despues de algun tiempo, los esposos
Bough presentaron demanda contra Matilde, pidiendo que se les
restituyera en la posesion de dichos bienes, fundandose la accion en la
venta simulada. Porque el Exhibit A es un documento ficticio y ha sido
obtenido por medios fraudulentos, este Tribunal confirmo el
sobreseimiento de la demanda.
En el asunto de Perez contra
Herranz y otros (7 Jur. Fil., 715), el demandante pedia la posesion del
vapor “Alfred”, fundada la accion en un documento en que la propiedad
del buque se hizo constar “a nombre tan solo del demandante, por razon
de que el, como natural de Filipinas, podia, segun nuestras leyes,
aparecer como dueño de las 10/58 partes del buque y el demandado, de
las 48/58 partes del mismo.
En los dos asuntos citados, los
demandantes pedian el cumplimiento de unos contratos con causa torpe,
unos contratos falsos, simulados, que no existen ante los ojos de la
ley. Por eso este tribunal aplico en ambos el principio bien
establecido de “Ex dolo malo non oritur actio.” e “In pari delicto
potior est conditio dependentis.” “La ley no amparara a ninguna de las
partes en un contrato ilicito; les deja en la situacion en que se han
colocado.” (Bough y otro contra Cantiveros y otro, 40 Jur.
Fil., 221), o en otras palabras, “los tribunales no ayudaran ni a una
ni a otra parte para hacer cumplir un contrato ilegal, sino que dejan a
ambas alli donde las encuentran.” (Perez contra Herranz y otros, 7 Jur. Fil., 715.)
Pero en el caso presente, el demandante no pide el cumplimiento de la
venta anticonstitutinal, todo lo contrario, pide que sea declarada nula
y que se ordene la devolucion de la cosa que cada parte habia recibido
en virtud del contrato. En la venta no medio engaño, causa torpe,
delito o falta.
Los tratadistas clasifican los contratos en nulos y anulables: los primeros son nulos per se, nulos ab initio,
no tienen existencia legal; los segundos son anulables por haber sido
obtenidos mediante violencia, engaño, dolo, delito o falta, etc.
Un contrato simulado, un contrato en que no concurren los requisitos
que expresa el articulo 1261, son considerados no existentes ante el
Derecho. Los contratos celebrados en contravencion de una prohibicion
legal se consideran tambien contratos inexistentes.
Castan,
hablando del origen de la distincion entre actos nulos y anulables,
dice que “La distincion entre dos grandes categorias de invalidez: la
del acto nulo de pleno derecho o inexistente, de una parte, y la del
acto anulable o rescindible, de otra, procede ya del Derecho romano. El
acto inexistente no engendraba ningun efecto juridico; era nulo de
pleno derecho ab initio. * * *. Asi sucedia cuando el acto no
reunia las condiciones necesarias para su formacion (por ejemplo, venta
sin objeto) o cuando estaba prohibido por la ley (como la donacion
entre esposos.)” (2 Casta, 640.)
El derecho frances, segun el mismo autor, distingue dos categorias de actos nulos con nulidad absoluta: (a) el acto inexistente (al que falta uno de los elementos esenciales para su formacion) y (b) el acto nulo de pleno derecho (que viola una prescipcion legal). (2 Castan, 641).
Sanchez Roman dice que “La causa que no es licita es como si no
existiera para el Derecho y degenera, por tanto, en inexistente y no
verdadera o falsa para el mismo, produciendo el consiguiente resultado
de viciar el consentimiento y anular el contrato.” (4 Sanchez Roman,
207).
“El contrato supuesto o falso,—dice
Manresa—en cuanto lo es y se demuestra destruyendo la apariencia del
mismo, es el caso mas claro de inexistencia, a tal extremo, que en el
se identifican el sentido usual y el juridico de esa palabra.” (8
Manresa, 699).
En sentencia de 26 de junio de 1903, el Tribunal Supremo de España declaro:
“Que
el articulo 1306 del Codigo Civil es inaplicable cuando no se trata de
un contrato real y efectivo, aunque celebrado con causa torpe, sino
simulado:“Que dada tal simulacion, es perfectamente
indiferente que el tenor que indujo a los otorgantes a figurar el
contrato fuese mas o menos fundado y mas o menos licito, puesto que su
nulidad e ineficacia no depende de vicio en el consentimiento, sino de
su real y efectiva inexistencia.” (95 Jurisprudencia Civil, 1028).
y en 30 de noviembre de 1909 el mismo Tribunal dijo:
“Que
no es dable confundir un contrato simulado con un contrato nulo o
rescindible, toda vez que la simulacion significa indudablemente, por
su propia naturaleza, la inexistencia del contrato, al contrato de lo
que acontece respecto de los segundos, en los que, supuesta su realidad
y certeza, es obligado examinar las condiciones de su celebracion para
resolver acerca de la precedencia de la nulidad o rescision, examen
absolutamente improcedente por contradictorio cuando el contrato no ha
existido, ya que de la inexistencia no se pueden deducir mas
consecuencias juridicas que las que necesariamente se derivan de esta
misma inexistencia, o sean las precedentes cual si no se hubiese
intentado siquiera la celebracion de tales supuestos contratos.” (116
Jurisprudencia Civil, 501.)“Los contratos con causa u
objeto ilicitos dice Manresa, se deben reputar ante el derecho
inexistentes. Para afirmarlo asi, nos fundamos en que si otros defectos
de menor gravedad juridica tal vez son irremediables, no ha de tener
mayor eficacia lo ilicito que puede suponer la oposicion mas abierta al
derecho, del que no puede exigir amparo lo ilicito. Ademas el interes
publico que determina la nulidad, principalmente en estos casos, no ha
de quedar a la voluntad, abandono o confimacion de las partes que lo
olvidaron infringiendo la ley.” (8 Manresa, 4.ª ed., 715.)
Y en tratando de contratos celebrados en contravencion de la ley, el
Tribunal Supremo de España dijo en su sentencia de 11 de abril de 1894:
“Que
todo contrato otorgado contra precepto expreso de una ley prohibitiva,
engendra la accion necesaria para restablecer la vitualidad de la
prohibicion, infringida accion que, teniendo este origen y alcance, no
puede menos de ser eficaz desde el momento mismo de la celebracion del
referido contrato.” (75 Jurisprudencia Civil, 503).
El articulo 1334 del Codigo Civil español declara nulas las donaciones
entre conyuges durante el matrimonio. Geronima Uy Coque dono a su
esposo Juan Navas L. Sioca todos sus bienes consistentes en la mitad de
los bienes gananciales. Fallecida ella, sus hijos reclamaron la
anulacion de la donacion, y este Tribunal, confirmando la decision del
juzgado inferior, declaro nulas las escrituras de donacion “A” a “F”.
(Uy Coque contra Navas L. Sioca, 45 Jur. Fil., 452). En dicha
donacion no medio fraude, engaño o causa torpe, violencia, delito o
falta. Marido y mujer por simple ignorancia de la ley efectuaron la
donacion con la mejor buena fe (del modo como obraron el demandante y
el demandado en al presente causa), creyendo que no estaba prohibida la
donacion entre ellos. Se declaro nula la donacion porque esa prohibida
por la ley, porque es contrato considerato inexistente ante el Derecho.
Los herederos de la finada consiguieron la declaracion judicial de
invalidez de la donacion y recobraron los bienes donados por su madre.
¿Que
diremos de la venta de un inmueble a un extrangero, cosa que esta
expresamente prohibida por la Constitucion? Es sencillamente un
contrato inexistente bajo la ley y la Constitucion. No debe depender de
la voluntad de las partes contratantes o de su abandono o ignorancia o
buena fe la existencia de ese contrato anticonstitucional. El interes
publico debe prevalecer sobre el acuerdo de las partes.
Es
absurda la teoria de que el vendedor no puede pedir la rescision del
contrato hecho en contravencion de la Constitucion para “restablecer la
virtualidad de la prohibicion” constitucional o procurar que las cosas
vuelvan a su estado normal anterior. Si los herederos de Uy Coque
consiguieron la anulacion de las donaciones hechas por su madre—porque
la donacion entre conyuges es nula—¿por que el vendedor (demandante en
la presente causa) no puede pedir la rescision de la venta realizada
contra la prohibicion constitucional? ¿Por que es rescindible una
donacion hecha en contravencion del Codigo Civil y no es rescindible la
venta hecha contra la expresa prohibicion de la Constitucion?
La nulidad absoluta, segun Castan, “puede ser reclamada mediante accion
o excepcion, por toda persona que tenga interes en ella, porque no
afecta la nulidad de los contratos al interes publico, la accion no es
en nuestro Derecho publica o cuasipublica, como lo es en otras
legislaciones.” (El articulo 1047 del Codigo Civil agentino dispone que
la nulidad absoluta puede y debe ser declarada por el Juez, aun sin
peticion de parte, cuando aparece manifiesta en el acto, y puede
pedirse su declaracion por el Ministerio publico, en el interes de la
moral o de la ley.) La inexistencia del contrato, segun Castan, “es
perpetua e insubsanable, no pudiendo ser objeto de confirmacion ni
prescripcion, excluyendo sin embargo los contratos que reunen los
requisitos expresados en el articulo 1261.” (2 Castan, 644).
“Evidente
es—dice Valverdo—que nuestro codigo admite tal distincion de nulidad
absoluta e inexistencia y nulidad relativa o anulabilidad; mas para el
legislador español, la nulidad solo interesa a los contratantes, pues
aun cuando existen contratos que afectan al orden publico y social y en
los cuales la nulidad deberia pedirse de oficio, para el codigo tal
accion tiene que ser ejercitada a instancia de parte.” (3 Valverde,
299).
Declarar que el vendedor no puede
recobrar, a cambio de lo que habia pagado, devolviendolo previamente,
es frustrar el espiritu que informa la Constitucion; es consentir que
los extranjeros continuen acaparando bienes inmuebles en daño y
perjuicio del pueblo, en vez de juzgar de acuerdo con el Codigo Civil,
inspirandose en el elevado proposito de la Asemblea Constituyente de
“conservar y acrecentar el patrimonio de la nacion” y evitar que, por
un error judicial, los Filipinos—al cabo de una generacion—sean simples
peones en su propia tierra. Desatender la demanda del vendedor y dejar
que el comprador continue gozando de la propiedad comprada a pesar de
la prohibicion, no es cumplir con la Constitucion: es violar su
espiritu y minar su principio fundamental de propia conservacion.
El comprador no puede acogerse a las disposiciones del articulo 1306
del Codigo Civil español que es inaplicable, segun el Tribunal Supreme
de España, a contratos inexistentes. Con mayor razon dicho articulo no
puede oponerse con exito como defensa en una demanda en que se pide la
declaracion de nulidad de la venta de un inmueble por ser contraria a
la Constitucion y la devolucion de las cosas que las partes habian
recibido.
En mi opinion, la decision debe ser revocada, la venta debe ser
declarada nula y las cosas recibidas por las partes sean restituidas.
(Articulo 1303, Codigo Civil.)
DISSENTING
REYES, J.:
I dissent. The majority opinion holds the sale in question void but denies relief on the ground that the parties were in pari delicto.
The doctrine invoked by the majority has no application where, as in
the present case, the contract sought to be annulled is against public
policy, the same being forbidden by the Constitution. (Vol. 3,
Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence, 5th ed., sec. 941.) The present case is
to be distinguished from that of Trinidad Gonzaga de Cabautan et al. vs. Uy Hoo et al., 88 Phil. 103, where the sale took place when the Constitution was no in force.
In my opinion, the sale here in question should be annulled.