EUGENIO R. RAMOS, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. EDUARDO Z. ROMUALDEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF FINANCE; MISAEL P. VERA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE AN…

The case
for petitioner in this appeal from a decision of the then Judge, now Justice of
the Court of Appeals, Jose N. Leuterio, dismissing
his suit for mandamus to compel respondent, the then Secretary of Finance
Eduardo Romualdez, to reinstate him in his position
as Special Investigator of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, was sought to be
presented in the strongest possible light by his counsel.  What he would have the judiciary do is to
declare void the termination of his services as a removal without cause
contrary to the security of tenure guarantee of the Constitution.  It was not disputed though that he lacked
civil service eligibility. Unfortunately for him, such admitted fact had
consequences in law of the most adverse character.  It would thus appear that formidable indeed
were the odds that respondent had to face in this proceeding.  Insurmountable may be a more appropriate
term, considering the authoritative decisions to which reference will hereafter
be made.  We have no choice but to affirm
the decision of the lower court.

The
background facts are therein set forth thus: “On April 15, 1963, the
petitioner was appointed Special Investigator R-36 of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue by the then Secretary of Finance, Hon. Rodrigo D. Perez, Jr. * * * The
Office of the President in a letter declared the position primarily
confidential in nature and placed in the exempt class.  Petitioner is not a civil service
eligible.  In a letter dated August 5,
1966, * * * the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue informed the
petitioner that his services were terminated as of that date in accordance with
Section 671 (1) of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 5, Article 11 of
Republic Act No. 2260.  The petitioner
wrote to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on December
3, 1966, * * * contending that the dismissal was illegal and unjustified and
requesting that he be reinstated to his original position within 15 days.  A similar letter, dated December 23, 1966, was addressed to the respondent Secretary of
Finance, * * *.  Both letters were
ignored * * *.  Hence this action.”^[1]

Why the
petition had to be dismissed was explained in the decision thus: “Since
the petitioner here is not a civil service eligible, he cannot be extended
neither a permanent nor a provi­sional appointment.  His appointment falls under paragraph 6, and
that is a temporary appointment which is for a limited period.  A temporary appointee can always be dismissed
without notice and without cause by the appointing power.  The fact that petitioner’s appointment is
described as probational and that it was approved as
such by the Commissioner of Civil Service cannot give him the status of
permanent or probational appointment because such
appointment and such approval is a violation of the provisions of the Civil
Service Act.  Petitioner’s appointment as
‘probational‘ and its approval by the Commissioner of
Civil Service were void from the very beginning as contrary to the Civil
Service Law.”

Precision
in legal terminology would seem to require that instead of considering his
separation from the service as one of dismissal, it should be characterized as
termination.  The holding of the lower
court that the appointment must perforce be temporary due to the absence of any
civil service eligibility on the part of petitioner is legally impeccable.  We have always ruled thus since the case of Orais v. Ribo,^[2] Decisions subsequently
rendered with a similar conclusion are many and varied.^[3] In the latest case in point,
Valdez v. Gutierrez,^[4] this Court, speaking through
Justice B. L. Reyes, restated the principle thus: “Appellant’s appoint­ment
as Police Head, even if valid, was temporary; being a non-eligible, Valdez
could not be permanently appointed to a position in the classified
service.  The appointing power,
respondent Mayor, could validly terminate Valdez‘ appointment, and did so
terminate it upon the appointment of Pedro P. Cruz, Jr., vice Vitaliano B. Valdez, a non-eligible whose services were
terminated.'” As declared at the outset of this decision, the decision of
the lower court, being in accordance with our authoritative pronouncements,
cannot be set aside.

This is
not to say that petitioner in this appeal did not exert the most valiant
efforts to escape from the binding force of the above decisions.  His counsel would lend plausibility to such a
plea by characterizing his appointment as provisional rather than temporary and
by stressing its confidential character. 
Neither ground is impressed with sufficiently persuasive character to
justify a reversal of this decision now on appeal.

1. Petitioner would seek to impart a certain degree of permanence
to his appointment by characterizing it as provisional rather than
temporary.  As set forth in his brief:
“[It] is not con­tested that except for this requisite he otherwise meets
the requirements for appointment to the said regular position in the
competitive service.  His stay therein
therefore should continue only up to his replacement by eligibles,
and in no case 30 days from the receipt by the appointing officer of the
certificates of eligibility.  Since the
grounds stated in the letter of termination are not valid grounds for dismissal
of a provisional appointee, he should be reinstated back to said
position.”^[5]
In support, he would cite Ferrer v. Hechanova,^[6]

As noted
in the brief of respondent Romualdez, however, what
the law considers a provisional appointment refers to an appointee with a civil
service eligibility but other than the appropriate one for the position to
which he was appointed.  That was so
declared in the aforesaid case of Ferrer v. Hechanova.  It would
appear, therefore, that while petitioner did seek to lend cogency and force to
such an assertion, he could not be deemed to have succeeded.  For, as need not be repeated, the absence of
any civil service eligibility on his part stood in the way.  It was an obstacle that could not be hurdled.

2. He would likewise impugn his separation from the service by
respondent Romualdez on the ground that the position
he held of Special Investigator in the Bureau of Internal Revenue is,
confidential.  He does not ignore our
holding in Piñero v. Hechanova^[7]
to the effect that since the enactment of the Civil Service Act,^[8]
what determines whether a position is primarily confidential does not depend on
an executive pronouncement to that effect but the nature of the position.  Why he would consider that his duties were of
that character was sought to be justified by him by enumerating them: “I.
Conducts confidential investigation of violations of Internal Revenue Laws by
specified taxpayers; 2. Examine books of accounts to find out discrepancies or
anomalous entries and submits confiden­tial report to the Commissioner or
Deputy Commissioner; 3. Per­forms surveillance work to detect collusion or
connivance between employees and taxpayers; 4. Conducts confidential
investigation and inquiries on the whereabouts of files and determine and
pinpoint official and employees responsible therefore; 5. Performs such other
confidential assignment or duties which may be assigned from time to
time.”^[9]

Again,
while not inherently unpersuasive, such mode of reasoning, however, ignores the
fact that precisely the confidential character therein stressed requires that
his relationship to the appointing power be impressed with that degree of
“close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment
or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust* * *.^[10] Here„ petitioner was
appointed by the then Secretary of Finance Rodrigo D. Perez.  The assumption then, under his own view, was
that it was that, department head who reposed the requisite degree of
confidence in him.  With the new
administration and necessarily so a new secretary of finance, it must likewise
be equally assumed that the new incumbent, respondent Romualdez,
was not to be denied the opportunity of choosing a man of his choice for the
confidential position in question.

Even if,
however, the confidential character of the position in question be accepted,
petitioner still had not thereby adduced sufficient justification for reversing
the lower court.  For he apparently would
consider his separation as one of removal which, of course, must be for cause
in accordance with the constitutional protection to all civil service personnel
whether in the classified or unclassified service, rather than termination,
which it actually was.  A recent
decision, Ingles v. Mutuc,^[11] the opinion being penned by
the present Chief Justice, argues against such a stand.  Thus: “This should not be misunderstood
as denying that the in­cumbent of a primarily confidential position holds
office at the pleasure only of the appointing power.  It should be noted, however, that when such
pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not ‘removed’ or
‘dismissed’ from office — his ‘term’ merely ‘expires’, in much the same way as
an officer, whose right thereto ceases upon expiration of the fixed term for
which he had been appointed or elected, is not and can not be
deemed ‘removed‘ or ‘dismissed’ therefrom,
upon the expiration of said term.  The
main difference between the former — the primarily confidential officer — and
the latter is that the latter’s term is fixed or definite, whereas that of the
former is not pre-fixed, but indefinite, at the time of his appointment or
election, and becomes fixed and determined when the appointing power expresses
its decision to put an end to the services of the incumbent.  When this event takes place, the latter is
not ‘removed‘ or ‘dismissed‘ from office — his term has merely
‘expired.”

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower
court of June 27,1967 is affirmed. 
Without pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Teehankee,
and Villamor,
JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., on leave.

^[1]
Decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
June 27, 1967.

^[2]
93 Phil. 985 (1953).

^[3] Paña v. Medina,
94 Phil. 103 (1953); Manigras v. De Guzman, 94
Phil. 245 (1954); Inocente v. Ribo, 94 Phil. 652 (1954); Amora v.
Bibera, 99 Phil. I (1956); Cayabyab
v. Cayabyab, 101, Phil. 681 (1957); Quiatchon v. Villanueva, 101 Phil. 989 (1957);
Univer­sity of the Philippines v. CIR, 107 Phil. 848 (1960); Montero v.
Castellanes, 108.Phil. 744 (1960); Taboada v. Municipality of Badian,
L-14604, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 412; Flores v. Cordova, L-15071, Sept. 26,
1961; 3 SCRA 105; Phil. Land-Air-Sea Labor Union v. Court, L-17950,
August 31, 1964, 11 SCRA. 723; Hojilla v. Mariño, L-20574, Feb.
28, 1965, 13 SCRA 293.

^[4] L-25819,
May 22, 1968, 23 SCRA 661.

^[5]
Brief for the Petitioner-Appellant, pp. 15-16.

^[6]
L-24418, Jan. 25, 1967, 19
SCRA 105.

^[7]
L-22562, Oct. 22, 1966, 18
SCRA 417.

^[8]
Republic Act No. 2216 (1959).

^[9]
Brief for the Petitioner-Appellant, p. 6.

^[10]
De los Santos
v. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289 (1950).

^[11]
L-20390, Nov. 29, 1968,
26 SCRA 171.