LEONORA TANTOY VDA. DE MACABENTA, FOR HERSELF AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILD, RAQUEL MACABENTA, CLAIMANTS-APPELLEES, VS. DAVAO STEVEDORE TERMINAL COMPANY, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

The success of the employer Davao
Stevedore Terminal Company in imparting plausibility to the novel question
raised as to whether or not the widow of a deceased employee whose marriage
occurred after the accident as well as the posthumous child could be considered
dependents within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Act may be gauged
by the fact that we gave due course to the petition for the review of a
decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission answering the question in the
affirmative and sustaining the right to compen­sation of the claimant Leonora Tantoy Vda. de Macabenta for herself and in behalf of her minor child,
Raquel Macabenta. 
After hearing the parties and in the light of the language of the law,
its manifest purpose, and the constitutional provisions on social justice and
protection to labor, we answer the question similarly.  We affirm the appealed decision of the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission.

In the decision rendered by the then Chairman of the Commission,
Nieves Baens del Rosario, dated September 27, 1966,
it is stated that there is no dispute “that at the time that the decedent
met the vehicular accident on September 13, 1961 which led to his death on
September 29, 1961, the claimant-widow was not yet married to the decedent
although they had already been living together as husband and wife for the past
three months.  However, on the day
following the accident, they were lawfully wedded in a marriage ceremony
solemnized at the San Pedro
Hospital in Davao City
where the deceased was hospitalized up to his death.  It is noteworthy that the marriage was
facilitated through the intercession of the general manager of the respondent
company.”^[1]
The decision likewise noted that the claimant widow gave birth on April 8, 1962 to the posthumous
daughter of the deceased who was given the name Raquel Tantoy
Macabenta.

As to how the deceased Conrado Macabenta met his accident, the decision, after stating
that the deceased was a laborer in the sawmill of the Davao
Stevedore Terminal Company at Manay, Panabo, Davao, about 48
kilometers from his residence in Davao City, went on
as follows: “Although some sort of quarters were provided by the
respondent to its employees at the sawmill, many of them apparently preferred
to commute, and the deceased in particular went home about three times a
week.  While the respondent, through its
lone witness and at the same time production manager, Sergio Dalisay, disclaimed the claimant’s declarations that the
company provided a service pick-up to transport its employees to and from work,
the synthesis of the very same testimonial evidence does not support this
denial, but on the contrary tends to bring out the fact that the respondent did
furnish transportation.”^[2]
As a result, it reversed the finding of the then acting referee of its regional
office in Davao City and awarded to the claimant
widow for herself and in behalf of her minor child the amount of P2,708.00 as
compensation and the sum of P270.80 as attorney’s fees.

Hence, this petition for review, which, as noted, was given due
course primarily due to the question raised being one of first impression.  As announced at the opening of this opinion,
we uphold the Workmen’s Compensation Commission.

1.  From the express language
of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, a widow living with the deceased or actually
dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter, if under 18 years
of age or incapable of supporting him or herself, and unmarried, whether or not
actually dependent upon the deceased, are considered dependents.^[3]
Claimant here is clearly the widow of the deceased Conrado
Macabenta.  It
is true that the marriage took place after the fatal accident but there was no
question that at the time of his death she was married to him.  She, therefore, comes entirely within the
letter of the law.  Nor can there be any
doubt that the child, Raquel Macabenta, also falls
within the words the Act employs.  As set
forth in the decision, while the marriage took place on Sept. 14, 1961, the widow and the deceased had
already been living together as husband and wife the preceding three
months.  The child born, of such
relationship, later legalized, is, as made clear in the decision, the
posthumous daughter of the deceased. 
What the employer Davao Stevedore Terminal Company
seems bent on ignoring is that our Civil Code, in no uncertain terms, considers
a conceived child born for all purposes that are favorable to her provided the
birth is attended with the conditions specified, namely, that she is alive at
the time she is completely delivered from the mother’s womb.^[4]
Here, fortunately, the child has survived the ordeal of the loss of the one
called upon to support her, her father, who, unfortunately however, met his
death before her birth.

Time and time again, we have stressed that where the law is
clear, our duty is equally plain.  We
must apply it to the facts as found.^[5]
What is more, we have taken pains to defeat any evasion of its literal language
by rejecting an interpretation, even if not totally devoid of plausibility, but
likely to attach to it a significance different from that intended by the
lawmakers.  A paraphrase of an aphorism
from Holmes is not inappropriate.  There
can always occur to an intelligence hostile to a piece of legislation a mis­interpretation
that may, without due reflection, be considered not too far-fetched.  The employer in this case, without impugning
its motives, must have succumbed to such a temptation, quite understandable but
certainly far from justifiable.  It is
quite obvious then why we find its stand devoid of merit.

2. Our conclusion likewise finds support in the fundamental
principle that once the policy of purpose of the law has been ascertained,
effect should be given to it by the judiciary.^[6]  Even if honest doubts could be entertained,
therefore, as to the meaning of the statutory provisions, still respect for
such a basic doctrine calls for a rejection of the plea of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company.  We have never deviated from our constant hold­ing
from Ty Sue v. Hord,^[7] a
1909 decision, that, assuming a choice is necessary between conflicting
theories, that which best conforms to the language of the statute and its
purpose should prevail.  Again, as far
back as United States
v. Toribio,^[8]
decided the next year, we made unmistakable our view that no construction is to
be adopted that would tend “to defeat the purpose and object of the
legislator.” We made use of an expression almost identical in Riera v. Palmaroli^[9]
with our warning against so narrowly interpreting a statute “as to defeat,
the manifest purpose of the legislator.” The employer in this case should
have been well advised to take into consideration the teachings of the above
cases before it sought to press upon us the desirability of imparting to the
applicable statutory language a meaning that would render fruitless the purpose
so clearly evident on the face of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

3.     
There is still another avenue of
approach that similarly calls for the affirmance of
the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission now on appeal.  This is apparent from an excerpt from a
recent case of Automotive Parts & Equipment Company, Incorporated v. Lingad:^[10]
“To state the construction sought to be fastened on the clear and explicit
language of the statute is to reject it. 
It comes into collision with the constitutional command pursuant to the
social justice principle that the government extend protection to labor.”
How could such an intent, then be imputed to the legislative body.  No such suspicion ought to be entertained
that it was contemplated by our lawmakers that any provision of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act could be so worded as to deny protection to the laboring
elements and their dependents and thus frustrate the constitutional objective
of social justice.  To quote from the Lingad case anew: “For it is undeniable that every
statute, munch more so one arising from a legislative implementation of a
constitutional mandate, must be so construed that no question as to its
conformity with what the fundamental law requires need arise.”

4.     
The basic question in this
petition for review thus disposed of, there is nothing to stand in the way of
the affirmance of the decision now on appeal.  The alleged error that the accident resulting
in the death of Conrado Macabenta
could not be considered as having arisen out of and in the course of employment
is not to be taken too seriously.  The
facts as set forth in the decision, which must be accepted by us in view of
their being based on substantial evidence argue against the contention of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company.  As we had occasion to state only last month
in B. F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc. v. Acebedo:^[11]
“Nor can the conclusion reached by respondent Commission be repudiated
unless ‘on a clear showing of failure to consider the evidence on record or
failure to consider fundamental and patent logical relationships in the
evidence, amounting to a clear travesty of justice or grave abuse of
discretion.  What was said by us in Basaysay v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, through the
present Chief justice, bears repeating: “The task of ascertaining the
credibility and weight of conflicting evidence, is, however, beyond the
province of oar authority in appeals by certiorari.’ Even if the possibility
that the Commission’s conclusions were erroneous could not be ruled out, still,
to borrow the language of Justice Dizon in Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, ‘such errors would
constitute mere errors of judgment but do not involve any grave abuse of
discretion on its part.”

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission of September 27, 1966
is affirmed.  With costs against
respondent Davao Stevedore Terminal Company.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Teehankee,
and Villamor,
JJ., concur.

Dizon
and Makalintal, JJ., took no part.

Barredo, J., did not take part.

^[1]
Petition, Decision, Annex A, p. 1.

^[2] Ibid,
p. 3.

^[3]
Section 9 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, Republic Act No. 3428 (1927) as
amended, reads as follows: “Dependents of the injured person. – The
following persons, and no others shall be considered as dependents and entitled
to compen­sation under the provisions of this Act; A son or daughter, if under
18 years of age or incapable of supporting him or herself, and unmarried,
whether actually dependent upon the deceased or not. The widow only if she was
living with the deceased or was actually dependent upon him, totally or
partly.”

^[4]
According to the Civil Code: “[Art.] 40. Birth determines personality; but
the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are
favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the
following article. [Art.] 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born
if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother’s womb.
However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it
is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete
delivery from the maternal womb.”

^[5]
Cf. People v. Mapa, L-22301, Aug. 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1164; Pacific
Oxygen & Acetylene Co. v.  Central Bank, L-21881, March 1, 1968, 22, SCRA
917; Dequito v. Lopez, L-27757, March 28,
1968, 22 SCRA 1352; Padilla v. City of Pasay,
L-24039, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1349; Garcia v. Vasquez, L-26808, March
28, 1969, 27 SCRA 505; La Perla Cigar & Cigarette
Factory v. Capapas, L-27948 & 28001-11,
July 31, 1969, 28. SCRA 1085; Mobil Oil Philippines v. Diocares, L-26371, Sept. 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 656; Luzon
Surety Co., Inc. v. Ds Garcia, L-25659, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 111.

^[6]
Cf. Sarcos v. Castillo, L-29755, Jan. 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 853.

^[7]
12 Phil. 485.

^[8]
15 Phil. 85.

^[9]
40 Phil. 105 (1919).

^[10]
L-26406, Oct. 31, 1969, 30
SCRA 248.

^[11]
L-29551, March 25, 1970, citing Batangas
Transportation Co. v. Rivera, L-14427, Aug. 29, 1960; Basaysay v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission,
L-16438, NoV. 29, 1961, 3 SCRA 530 and.
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission,
L-20614 and L-21517, May 25, 1964, 11 SCRA 60. Cf. Victorias
Milling Co., Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, L-25640, March 21, 1968, 22 SCRA 1215 and Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, L-25665, May
22, 1969, 28 SCRA 285.