FELICIANO A. CASTRO, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, EUGENIA SORIANO DE GOMEZ, SOCORRO A. CASTRO, AND THE HEIRS OF THE LATE ANTONIO VENTENILLA, JUSTO V. SISON, SUSANA V. S…

Before us for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 25234-R, dismissing the appeal from and in effect affirming the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
in Registration Case No. 305, G.L.R.O. Record No. 1176.

The original application for registration and con­firmation of
title was filed by Alejandra Austria on June 5, 1948, covering 10 parcels of
land situated in the barrios of Punglo Grande and Caviernesan, as well as in the poblacion,
of Mangatarem, Pangasinan.  Socorro A. Castro^[1]
submitted an opposition, alleging that the lands applied for had been donated
to her by the applicant in 1939.  On
March 2, 1950 the Court rendered judgment finding that Alejandra
Austria had been in possession of the lands in concept of owner since 1894, and
consequently, by virtue of the donation, ordered the registration thereof in
the name of the donee, Socorro A. Castro, subject
only to the usufruct reserved by the donor in herself for the rest of her
lifetime.

Alejandra Austria was the widow of the deceased Antonio
Ventenilla.  On
March 31, 1950 a number of
persons, claiming to be his heirs^[2]
(nephews and nieces) appeared and filed a petition to set aside the decision
and the order of general default previously entered, and to have their
opposition to the application admitted. 
Their petition was granted and the case was set for trial anew.  Meanwhile, Alejandra
Austria died and Socorro A. Castro was substituted in her place.

The averment of the oppositors was that
the lands applied for were owned by Antonio Ventenilla;
that when he died he left a will
bequeathing them in usufruct to his wife Alejandra;
and that upon her death they passed to the said oppositors
as his heirs.

The trial court, in its decision rendered on April 4, 1959,
rejected both the claims of Socorro A. Castro and of the oppositors
without deciding the question of title for purposes of registration.  From that decision only Socorro A. Castro
appealed to the Court of Appeals.  The appellees did not even file a brief.  On July
19, 1962 the appellate court rendered its decision dismissing the appeal, and the case was thereafter
elevated to us on petition for review.

The ten parcels of land applied for may be classified into two groups. 
Parcels Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 10, by agreement of the parties at the trial,
“passed into the possession of Alejandra Austria
after the death of Antonio Ventenilla^[3]
by virtue of the will left by the deceased Antonio Ventenilla
and probated in Special Proceeding No. 237.” With respect to the six other
parcels (Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9) the parties reached no agreement.  The oppositors
contended that they belonged to the said deceased, while the petitioner insists
that Alejandra Austria acquired them by purchase.

The issue in regard to parcels Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 10 is whether Alejandra
Austria was a mere life usufructuary thereof, the
naked ownership being in the oppositors, as
collateral heirs of Antonio Ventenilla, or was the
owner in fee simple, as re­siduary legatee under his will.  The Court of Appeals did not make any
categorical finding one way or the other on this issue, and disposed of it with
this equivocal observation:  “But,
to say that a parcel of land passed into the possession of a person does not
necessarily mean that said parcel of land formed part of the residuary legacy
of said person, for it may mean that said parson had usufructuary
right over said parcel of land.”

The question, it appears, has already been passed upon by this
Court in a previous case.  A brief
reference to antecedent facts is necessary, as they are set forth in its deci­sion
in G. R. No. L-10018, Austria
v. Heirs of Antonio Ventenilla, September 19, 1956.  It is there stated that the will of this
deceased was admitted to probate in 1909, in Special Proceeding No. 237 of the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.  The widow, Alejandra
Austria, was appointed administratrix of the estate.  In 1910 the collateral heirs, now oppositors, filed a petition for the annulment of the will,
which petition was denied by the Court below. 
In the order of denial, dated October
5, 1910, it was declared: 
“que la heredera
Alejandra Austria tiene derecho al remanente de todos los bienes
dejados por el finado, despues so deducir de ellos la pension que corresponde a cado uno de sus
coherederos…” That order was affirmed by this
Court on appeal an January 11, 1912, G. R. No. 6620, 21 Phil. 180.

The next incident took place thirty-eight years later when, on
April 22, 1950 herein oppositors filed a motion in the same testate
proceeding claiming, among other things, that Alejandra
Austria was merely the life usufructuary of the
estate of the deceased, the naked ownership belonging to the movants; that she was no longer able to administer the
properties; and that she had been disposing of them in violation of her trust;
and praying that said Alejandra Austria be removed as administratrix and another
appointed in her place.  The trial Court
denied the motion and ruled that the estate case had long since been
closed.  On appeal to this Court the
order was affirmed (G. R. No. 10018, supra.) The decision, penned by Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, ruled as follows
on the issue that is pertinent to the case now before us:

“We find no merit in the appeal.  We agree
with the lower Court that the proceedings for the settlement of the testate
estate of the deceased Antonio Ventenilla had long
been terminated and closed, and that the issues now raised by appellants had
been settled and decided by the court’s order of October 5, 1910, approving the
final accounts of the administratrix Ale­jandra Austria declaring said administra­trix
the residuary legatee of all the movable and immovable properties of the estate
after the payment of the shares of the other heirs (sister and nephews and
nieces of the deceased) in the pro­portion of P17.52 per stripes, condi­tioned
upon their putting up of the bond required by law (sec. 754, Act 190).”

x x x
“Appellants also insist that appellee Alejandra Austria is not the residuary legatee of the
estate of Antonio Ventenilla but only its life usufructuary.  This
stand has long been proven false and untenable when the Supreme Court found
unmeritorious the appeal of appellants’ predecessors from that portion of the Lower
Court’s order of October 5, 1910 denying their petition to annul the will
of Antonio Ventenilla and declaring appellee entitled to all the remaining properties of the
estate.  That appellee
Alejandra Austria was the residuary legatee of the
estate of the deceased is, therefore,
res adjudicata and can no
longer be relitigated by appellants after
thirty-eight years.  And as appellee had been in the possession and enjoyment of said
pro­perties all these years in the concept of owner, being the residuary
legatee thereof, there is no
reason nor justification for the reopening of these proceedings, the appoint­ment
of a new administrator, and the recon­stitution of the last will and testament
of the deceased Antonio Ventenilla.”

The foregoing, considered together with the agreement of the
parties at the trial of this case that the four parcels (Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 10)
passed into the possession of Alejandra Austria by
virtue of the will of the deceased Antonio Ventenilla,
as well as with the testimonial evidence concerning Alejandra’s
continuous possession as owner thereafter,
is sufficient proof of title for purposes of registration.

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals side-stepped the
issue of ownership concerning the six other parcels (Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and
9).  The documentary evidence for the
appellant is that these six parcels were acquired by Alejandra
Austria through purchase:  Nos. 6 and 7
on January 20, 1912 (Exh. M); Nos. 5 and 8 on February 21, 1911 (Exh. N); No.
4 by virtue of the deed of sale Exh. P; and No. 9 by
virtue of the deeds of sale Exh. O, dated January 18, 1920; Exh.
O-1, dated May 3, 1924; Exh. O-2 dated March
6, 1917; Exh. O-3, dated Feb. 3, 1917; Exh.
O-4, dated July 13, 1913; Exh. O-5, dated April
16, 1911; and Exh. O-6, dated Nov. 16, 1928.  The testimonial evidence confirms the long
possession of those parcels by Ale­jandra Austria,
and after her death by Socorro A. Castro. 
The receipts showing the corresponding tax payments have been sub­mitted
and form part of the record.

The contention of the oppositors below
is that these parcels also belonged to the deceased Antonio Ventenilla.  Even assuming this to be so, they would have
passed to his widow, Alejandra Austria, as the
residuary heir under his will; and as stated by this Court in Case G.R. L. No.
10018, supra, “she had been in possession and enjoyment of said properties
all these years in concept of owner, being the residuary legatee thereof.”
In any event, whether as purchaser or as residuary
legatee, such possession in concept of owner constitute sufficient registrable title.

The next issue relates to the donation of all the ten parcels,
executed by Alejandra Austria in favor of Socorro A.
Castro.  The Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court’s ruling that said donation was mortis causa and
consequently void because it did not follow the formalities required of a will, pursuant to Article 620 of
the old Civil Code,^[4]
the law in force when the donation was made on September 22, 1939.

Whether a donation
is inter vivos or mortis causa depends upon the nature of the disposition
made. “Did the donor intend to transfer the ownership of the property
donated upon the execution of the donation? 
If this is so, as reflected from the provisions contained in the
donation, then it is inter vivos;
otherwise, it is merely mortis causa,
or made to take effect after death.”^[5]
Sometimes the nature of the donation becomes controversial when the donee’s enjoyment of the property donated is postponed
until after the donor’s death.  Manresa comments on this situation
as follows:^[6]

‘When the time fixed for the commencement of the enjoyment of the
property donated be at the death of the donor, or when the suspensive
condition is related to his death, confusion might arise.  To avoid it we must distinguish between the
actual donation and the execution thereof. 
That the donation is to have effect during the lifetime of the donor or
at his death does not mean the delivery of the property must be made during his
life or after his death.  From the moment
that the donor disposes freely of his property and such disposal is accepted by
the donee, the donation exists, perfectly and
irrevocably (articles 618 and 623). 
Until the day arrives or until the condition is fulfilled, the donation, al­though valid when made, cannot be
realized.  Thus, he who makes the
donation effective upon a certain
date, even though to take place at his death, disposes of that which he donated
and he cannot afterwards revoke the donation nor dispose of the said pro­perty
in favor of another.’

The donation at issue in the present case opens with the
following disposition:

‘QUE YO ALEJANDRA AUSTRIA, la primera parte, en consideracion a los meritorios servicios y buenas atenciones que me haya prestado desde
su niña y de los que todavia
me esta prestando y seguira prestandome hasta mi muerte la senorita
SOCORRO A. CASTRO, hija legitima
de mi primo de Segundo grado, Sergio Castro, hago constar por
la presente que expontaneamente y sin influencia
de nadie cedo y traspaso en concepto de DONACION
ONEROSA e intervivos a la mencionada
senorita SOCORRO A. CASTRO, en compensacion a sus ya expresados SERVICIOS, los bienes que
a continuacion se describen
a saber.'”

After enumerating the properties donated, the deed of donation
recites further:

‘Tambien hago constar que es
nuestro convenio con la citada Donataria que esta Donacion
se ha hecho con las condiciones siguientes, a saber:

‘(a)   Que duranto el tiempo en que todavia viviere,
La donataria Socorro A. Castro, no tendra ninguna intervencion ni derecho sobre los
productos de los terrenos cedidos en concepto de donacion a su favor;

‘(b)   A mi fallecimiento,
la donataria pagara todos los gastos
que se incurriesen por mi intierro de acuerdo con mi posicion social; y

‘(c)   Despues de mi falleci­miento, la nuda propiedad y el derecho de Usufructo de todos los citados bienes
arriba descritos, se consolidaran inmediatamente a
favor de la Donataria Socorro A. Castro con la obligacion de destinar anualmente cierta cantidad justa y suficiente de los productos de los terrenos aqui donados
sitos en el barrio Caviernesan
para el Sufragio de mi alma
y el de mi finado esposo
Dn. Antonio Ventenilla.'”

It is quite clear from the terms of the donation that the donor
intended to and did dispose of her properties irre­vocably in favor of the donee, subject only to the conditions therein expressed,
one of which was that the latter would have no right to the products during the
donor’s lifetime.  This merely indicates
a reservation in herself of the usufruct over said properties, which usufruct
would be consolidated with the naked ownership of the donee
upon the former’s death.  The use of the words “se consolidaran” implied transfer of the naked ownership,
with which the beneficial title would be consolidated upon arrival of the term
thus fixed.  In the case of Concepcion vs. Concepcion, August 25, 1952, 91 Phil. 823, this Court, con­struing
a deed captioned as a donation mortis causa
held:

‘It is not sufficient to make a donation one mortis causa, requiring execution of the instrument of gift
in the form and manner required for a will, that the instrument of donation
states that it is mortis causa, if it
can be gathered from the body of the instrument that the main consideration is
not death of the donor but rather services rendered to him by the donee, or his affection for the latter, and title is
transferred immediately to the donee, even though the
gift is con­ditioned to take effect after death of the donor insofar as
possession and enjoyment of the property is concerned.”

By virtue of the donation executed by the original owner and
applicant in favor of Socorro A. Castro the latter succeeded to the properties
applied for, and hence registration in the name of her Intestate Estate,
represented in this case by the petitioner as administrator, is in order.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the
lands described in the original application for regis­tration are ordered
registered as indicated above, pursuant to the provisions of the Land
Registration Act.  No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Fernando, Teehankee, and
Barredo, JJ., concur.

Castro, J., on leave, did not
take part.

Capistrano, J., did not take
part.

^[1]
Socorro A. Castro died during the pendency of this
case in the Court of Appeals, and is represented by herein petitioner,
administrator of her intestate estate, Special Proceeding No. 4847 of the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan.

^[2] Justo V. Sison, Susana V. Sison, Jose V. Sison, Socorro V. Sison de Vera, Elias Ventenilla,
Maria Ventenilla, Juan Ventenilla,
Nieva Ventenilla, Guadalupe
Ventenilla, Vicente Ventenilla,
Rosario Ventenilla, Manuel Soriano,
Jose Soriano, Jr., Cesar Soriano,
Oliva Soriano, Soledad Soriano, Benjamin S. Viloria and
Paz S. Viloria.

^[3]
Antonio Ventenilla died in 1909.

^[4]
Reproduced in Article 738 of the new Civil Code.

^[5]
Howard v. Padilla and Court of Appeals, G. R. No. L-7064 and 7098, April 22, 1955.

^[6]
Cited in Laureta v. Mata, 44 Phil. 668.