ATTY. TEODORO V. CABILAN & ALEJANDRO A. PARALISAN, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. JUDGE JOSE R. RAMOLETE & PROVINCIAL/CITY JAIL WARDEN OF CEBU CITY, RESPONDENTS.

Cabilan versus Ramolete

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for preliminary injunction, brought by Attorney Teodoro Cabilan and Alejandro Paralisan against Judge Jose Ramolete and the provincial and city jail warden of Cebu City. The petitioners ask the Supreme Court to annul a judgment holding them guilty of direct contempt of court and sentencing them to imprisonment. The case matters because it fixes the line between direct and indirect contempt when the offensive words are not shouted in open court but written into a pleading filed with the very judge complained of, and because it teaches that the power to punish contempt is exercised on a preservative, not a vindictive, principle.

Procedural History

The contempt judgment was rendered by Judge Ramolete in the criminal case pending before him, and it was promulgated on April 2, 1976. On that day only Paralisan was present to receive it, because Cabilan was then in Ozamis City. Paralisan was escorted to the city jail and served his sentence. Five days later, on April 7, 1976, the petitioners came directly to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari and prohibition. On the same date the Second Division issued a temporary restraining order and ordered the immediate release of the petitioners. The Court thus acted as a court of first instance over an original special civil action, not as a reviewing court on appeal.

Facts

Attorney Cabilan was the private prosecutor in a criminal case pending before Judge Ramolete. Alejandro Paralisan was the husband of Norma Yap Paralisan, a prosecution witness who had been ordered arrested for failing to attend a scheduled hearing. She wrote the judge a letter explaining her absence and attached an unverified medical certificate.

At the hearing of March 29, 1976, the prosecution presented an illegible xerox copy of a supposed deed of sale of a truck executed by the complainant in favor of the accused. Cabilan moved for production of the original, which was kept in the same building. The judge granted the motion and ordered a ten minute recess. The prosecuting fiscal, the petitioners, and Mrs. Paralisan went to the Notarial Division to look for the original. On the fiscal's instruction, Paralisan returned to the courtroom to watch their exhibits. Shortly thereafter the judge allegedly approached him and a heated exchange of words took place.

The next day, Cabilan filed a motion to disqualify the judge, attaching his own affidavit narrating the exchange. In it he recounted that the judge pointed a finger at Paralisan and, in a loud voice, demanded where his wife was, said he would not accept the medical certificate she submitted, and threatened to order the sheriff to detain her that very moment. The affidavit went on to describe the judge's conduct as partial, and called his orders tyrannical, oppressive, whimsical, and capricious. Finding these allegations contemptuous, the judge prepared the questioned judgment and promulgated it on April 2, 1976.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge erred in declaring the petitioners guilty of direct contempt of court and sentencing them to ten days of imprisonment.
• Whether or not the contemptuous statements contained in an affidavit attached to a motion to disqualify, and filed with the same judge before whom the proceedings are pending, constitute direct contempt.
• Whether or not the private prosecutor may escape responsibility for derogatory matter inserted into a pleading he filed as counsel of record.

Applicable Provisions

The decision classifies contempt under the Rules of Court, which it states as follows:

Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge and can be punished summarily without hearing. Indirect contempt is not committed in the presence of the court and can be punished only after hearing.

This classification is the hinge of the case, because the petitioners argued that their conduct, if punishable at all, could only be indirect contempt, which requires a charge and a hearing.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court answered in the negative: the judge did not err. It began with the settled rule that the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently to the due administration of justice.

On the second issue, the Court held that the affidavit fell squarely within its prior rulings. In the case of Ang versus Castro it had ruled that if the pleading containing derogatory, offensive, or malicious statements is submitted to the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending, the contempt is direct, because it is equivalent to misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. That ruling was reiterated in Ante versus Pascua, where contemptuous statements made in pleadings filed with the court were held to constitute direct contempt. Here, Paralisan's affidavit was attached to and made an integral part of the motion for disqualification filed by Cabilan, and so it fell squarely under that rule.

On the third issue, the Court held that Cabilan could not disclaim responsibility on the claim that Paralisan had modified the affidavit and that he discovered the insertion of the derogatory remarks only upon his return from Ozamis City. As counsel of record, Cabilan had control of the proceedings, and whatever steps his client took should be within his knowledge and responsibility.

Even so, the Court tempered the penalty. It noted that Cabilan had been practicing for nineteen years and was then charged with contempt for the first time, and that the power to punish contempt should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, with the corrective rather than the retaliatory idea of punishment. A fine without imprisonment would suffice. As to Paralisan, who had already served his sentence, the case was moot and academic.

Doctrine

First, the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the due administration of justice.

Second, contempt is either direct or indirect. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge and may be punished summarily without hearing; indirect contempt is not committed in the presence of the court and may be punished only after hearing.

Third, and this is the memorable rule, derogatory, offensive, or malicious statements in a pleading filed with the same court or judge before whom the proceedings are pending constitute direct contempt, because they are equivalent to misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice.

Fourth, counsel of record has control of the proceedings, and whatever steps the client takes are within the counsel's knowledge and responsibility.

Fifth, the power to punish contempt is exercised on the preservative and not the vindictive principle, with the corrective rather than the retaliatory idea of punishment.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed, but the judgment of April 2, 1976 was modified by changing the sentence of ten days of imprisonment to a fine of 200 pesos without imprisonment.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a contemptuous pleading filed before the same judge is direct contempt, equivalent to misbehavior in the presence of the court. Examiners use this case to test the direct and indirect contempt classification and the preservative principle in fixing the penalty.