ATTY. TEODORO V. CABILAN & ALEJANDRO A. PARALISAN, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. JUDGE JOSE R. RAMOLETE & PROVINCIAL/CITY JAIL WARDEN OF CEBU CITY, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction seeking the annulment of the April 2, 1976 Judgment of Hon. Jose R. Ramolete in Criminal Case No. CU-1388
declaring herein petitioners guilty of direct contempt of court sentencing them
to suffer the penalty of ten (10) days imprisonment.

Herein respondent judge is the presiding judge in Criminal Case
No. CU-1388, and herein petitioner Atty. Teodoro V. Cabilan is the private prosecutor.  Petitioner Alejandro A. Paralisan
is the husband of Norma Yap Paralisan, one of the
prosecution witnesses who was ordered arrested by respondent judge for failure
to attend the scheduled hearing of the said case.  Mrs. Paralisan
wrote a letter to respondent judge, explaining her failure and attached an
unverified medical certificate.

At the hearing of March
29, 1976, the prosecution presented an illegible xerox copy of a supposed
Deed of Sale of a truck executed by the complainant in favor of the
accused.  Consequently, petitioner Cabilan, as private prosecutor, moved for the production of
the original which is being kept in the same building.  Respondent judge granted the motion and
ordered a ten minute recess.  The prosecuting
fiscal, petitioners and Mrs. Paralisan went to the Notarial Division to search for the original of the
document.  Thereafter, upon instruction
of the fiscal, petitioner Paralisan returned to the
courtroom to watch their exhibits.  Shortly thereafter, respondent judge
allegedly approached him and a heated exchange of words transpired between
them, the details of which are contained in
an affidavit Annex”A” filed later on
March 30, by petitioner Cabilan attached to a motion
to disqualify respondent judge from further hearing the case.  The pertinent portions of the said affidavit,
read:

“4. The
Honorable Presiding Judge, upon seeing the affiant sitting on the bench walked
back and forth towards said affiant and then, with a pointed finger directed to
affiant said, ‘you, you where is your wife? 
I will have her arrested, I do not accept that kind of medical
certificate she submitted.  I will order
the Sheriff right now to detain your wife,’ in a voice so loud as if affiant
were his notorious enemy.  Drowned by
extreme humilation, shame and amazed by the violent
attitude of said judge, the affiant rushed up to the Judge and in a loud voice
also asked, ‘Judge, do you have personal grudge against my wife and my family
and why?  Why do you shout at me?  I am not a party to the case.  Your show of partiality is conduct unbecoming
of a Judge.  Are you interested
personally in this case?  I have not seen
a Judge acting like this.’ I further told him that his partiality is very
apparent.  ‘Since the start of the trial
in this case, you have been threatening witnesses for the prosecution.’ After
uttering those words, I left out of the court room and the Honorable Presiding
Judge followed me and threatened me with arrest and called the Sheriffs
available in the vicinity.

“5. Since
the start of the trial of this case almost a year ago, I noticed suspicious
behavior of the Honorable Presiding Judge like allowing counsel for the accused
and even the accused himself to enter his chambers without the presence of the
Fiscal and/or private prosecutor.

“6. Personally,
I have no intention of intervening or appearing as witness in this case
although I know the fact hereof.  I also
know the questionable acts of accused especially Romeo Ceniza.  But after reading in the papers that the
Honorable Presiding Judge is fond of issuing illegal orders like that Tanhu Case as enunciated by our Supreme Court, I got
interested in said Judge because my wife was also ordered arrested by her
failure to attend the hearing of this case as a mere witness.  I believed that the order of arrest is
another illegal order because I believe that my wife’s failure to attend a
trial as a witness is NOT direct contempt but an indirect one instead of
arrest, she should merely be cited for contempt.

“7. In
my observation, by the conduct of the Honorable Presiding Judge which he
demonstrated to me as above-stated, he is not only fond of issuing illegal
order but is tyrannical, oppressive, whimsical and capricious when he feels
like tilting the scales of justice in favor of a party in the case adverted to under trial.

“8. I
feel that taxpayers of this province wherein the Honorable Presiding Judge is
sitting should at least be respected in their rights.  We tax payers expect fairness in the
dispensation of justice.” (Rollo, p. 13)

Respondent judge, finding the allegations in the said affidavit
contemptuous, prepared the herein questioned judgment, but on April 2, 1976, the same was
promulgated only to petitioner Paralisan because
petitioner Cabilan was then in Ozamis City.  Petitioner Paralisan
was escorted to the City Jail and had already served the sentence.

On April 7, 1976,
petitioners filed the instant petition in this Court, and on the same date, the
Second Division of this Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order,
and to order the immediate release of the petitioners (Ibid., p. 36-A).

The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent judge
erred in declaring herein petitioners guilty of direct contempt of court and
sentencing them to suffer the penalty of ten (10) days imprisonment.

The answer is in the negative.

It is the contention of the petitioners that respondent judge
gravely abused his discretion in ordering the incarceration of the petitioners
without preferred charges, considering that respondent judge implied in his
order that the charges of the petitioners were unsubstantiated (Par. 2,
Judgment, Annex “E”); that it may be that the contempt contemplated by respondent judge was an
indirect contempt; that it was next to impossible to substantiate the charges
in the motion for disqualification because petitioner Paralisan
was immediately placed under arrest and sentenced to jail without charges; and
that the acts of respondent judge were highly arbitrary and derogatory to his
oath to hear before he condemns and to render justice to anyone regardless of
his station in life.

Petitioners’ contention is untenable.

At the outset, it should be stated that this Court has repeatedly
declared that the power to punish
for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of
order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and
mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice (Halili vs. Court
of Industrial Relations, 136 SCRA 112, 135 [1985], citing the cases of Slade
Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil. 271; In re Kelly, 35 Phil. 944; Commissioner of Immigration
vs. Cloribel,
20 SCRA 1241; and Montalban vs. Canonoy,
38 SCRA 1).  Under the Rules of Court,
contempt is classified into direct and indirect contempt.  Direct contempt is committed in the presence
of or so near a court or judge and can be punished summarily without
hearing.  Indirect contempt is not
committed in the presence of the court and can be punished only after hearing
(People v. Navarro, 121 SCRA 707, 710 [1983]). 
In the case of Ang vs. Castro (136 SCRA 453,
458 [1985]), this Court ruled that if the pleading containing derogatory,
offensive or malicious statements is submitted in the same court or judge in
which the proceedings are pending, it is direct contempt because it is equivalent
to a misbehaviour committed in the presence of or so
near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice.  This ruling was reiterated in the case of
Ante vs. Pascua (162 SCRA 780 [1988]), where it was
held that contemptuous statements made in the pleadings filed with the court
constitute direct contempt.

In the instant case, the basis of the judgment for contempt of
court is petitioner Paralisan’s affidavit which was
attached and made as an integral part of the motion for disqualification filed
by petitioner Cabilan which therefore falls squarely
under the above ruling.

As to the claim of petitioner Cabilan
that the affidavit was modified
by petitioner Paralisan and that he discovered the
insertion of the derogatory remarks only upon his return to Cebu
City from Ozamis City, suffice it to say that aside
from the arguments presented by respondent judge to the contrary, petitioner Cabilan, as counsel of record, has control of the
proceedings.  Whatever steps his client
takes should be within his knowledge and responsibility (Surigao
Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1, 23
[1970]).

Nevertheless, considering that petitioner Cabilan
has been practicing for nineteen (19) years and this is the first time that he
is charged with contempt of court, and considering that the power to punish
contempt should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle with the corrective rather than the retaliatory idea of punishment
(Baja vs. Macandog, 158 SCRA 391 [1988]), imposition
of a fine of P500.00 without imprisonment would be enough (Caniza
vs. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 [1984]).

On the other hand, petitioner Paralisan
having already served his sentence, this case is moot and academic insofar as he is concerned.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED, but the questioned judgment of April 2, 1976 is MODIFIED by changing the sentence of ten
(10) days imprisonment to a fine
of P200.00 without imprisonment.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman),
Padilla, Sarmiento,
and Regalado, JJ., concur.