THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ALFREDO RAPADA Y CARLO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

There is not much in this prosecution for rape of the accused Alfredo
Rapada that differs from numerous cases, with diametrically conflicting
versions as to the circum­stances under which the act of sexual intercourse
took place.  Twice it did happen between
him and complainant.  The defense
interposed was that there was consent on her part.  Her testimony was to the effect that she had
to submit to his desires because of the employment of force and
intimidation.  One distinguishing feature
is that complainant appears to be mentally deficient, and not solely due to her
having finished only the second grade in school.  On the basis of the conflicting testimony as
offered, the trial court rendered a decision finding him guilty of rape on each
of the above occasions and sentencing him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua
for each offense.  Hence this
appeal.  In the brief submitted for him,
the sole error assigned is the alleged failure of the trial court to appraise
correctly the evidence of record resulting in the adverse decision.  Such an approach in the light of decided
cases has not led to the desired goal of reversal.  So it must be in this instance.  Moreover, a careful study of the testimony
offered by both sides fails to substantiate the allegation that the lower court
should have acquitted appellant.  The
judgment must be affirmed.

In the brief for the accused-appellant, there was no statement of
facts.  It was not unexpected therefore
for the Solicitor General, on behalf of ‘the People of the Philippines, to rely
on the facts as found by the trial court. 
In the appealed decision, there was a detailed narration of the evidence for the prosecution and
the accused.  As far as the testimony of
complainant is concerned, this is the summary by the trial court appearing in
the appealed decision; “The complainant Nora Reyeg, 24 years of age and
single testified that her highest educational attainment is second grade in the
elementary school; that she had been sick with polio since childhood; that
sometime in February, 1968 she was living alone in the house owned by her sister
Delia Villareal at Bicutan, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, Rizal; that at 3:00 o’clock
in the afternoon of February 19, 1968, while she was alone in the house, the
accused passed by and came up the house; that the accused closed the door,
pushed her down, removed her panties and inserted his penis inside her vagina;
that he was able to have carnal intercourse with her on that occasion because
of the threat of the accused that if she will not agree, he will kill her; that
when the accused uttered these
words, he was holding with his hand a knife (kutsilyo) 12 inches long,
more or less, and 3 inches wide while he was on top of her performing the
sexual act. She also testified that she cannot resist, shout for help and even
wiggle during the sexual act because her mouth was covered .by the left hand of
the accused; that the accused left her alone on that night around.  8:00 o’clock telling her not to report the matter to anybody or
she will be killed; that on February 20, 1968 about 6:00. P.M. while she was
alone, the accused passed by and he did the sexual act again, pushing her down
and inserted his penis and on that occasion she cannot resist because she was
boxed twice in the stomach while she was still standing and she felt dizzy, the
accused leaving her in that condition; that when her sister Delia Villareal
visited her on the following Sunday, she disclosed the said incident which led
her sister to bring her along to their house that day.  It also appears from the testimony of this
witness that her sister Delia was living in Manila in a house rented by them;
that she has been all alone on that house in Fort Bonifacio, Rizal for more or
less a month as a caretaker; that her Aunt Titay used to join her in sleeping
during nighttime; that her Tita Titay has a house nearby also in Fort
Bonifacio; that on the night of February 19, 1968, she was not able to tell her
experience to her aunt because she feared the threat on her life by the
accused; that on the night of February 29, 1968, her Tia Titay did not sleep
with her in the house because her aunt went to Manila; and that Delia Villareal
upon knowing these facts, reported the matter to the Taguig Police Department,
Taguig, Rizal.”^[1]

Insofar as appellant was concerned, the appealed decision had
this summary: “The accused Alfredo Rapada declared that he first met the
complainant Nora Reyeg while conducting a census of families living within his
district for their association, the Kapatirang Langgam,
Incorporated, in the house of Delia Villareal at Bo. Bicutan, Fort Bonifacio,
Rizal, in the first week of February 1968; that he came to know that Nora Reyeg
was living alone in that house separate from her sister Delia Villareal because
Marcos Villareal, Delia’s husband, treated her unfairly; that because of this
circumstance, he used to visit the complainant; that there were occasions when
the complainant asked him some favors like helping her fix the fence, fetching
water; that on February 16, 1968, at 8:30 in the evening, he went to
complainant’s house and delivered the lamp which Nora Reyeg borrowed from him;
that on said occasion the complainant requested him to sleep in the latter’s
house and keep her company because she was alone then; that he agreed to her
request and he slept in her house; that .at about 12:00 o’clock midnight while
he was sleeping, Nora came near him, leaned on him and embraced him, after
which they forgot everything and finally had sexual intercourse; that again
on.  February 20, 1968, at about 11:00
o’clock in the evening, he passed by Nora’s house which was then still lighted;
that he knocked at the door and the complainant let him in; and that ‘on that
evening, they again had sexual intercourse. 
The accused admits that from the first time they met up to.  February 26, 1969, he and the complainant had
cohabited only twice.  He also declared
that when he was brought to the Municipal Hall of Taguig, Rizal, by the
arresting officer, he was merely asked his name, address, his civil status and
his parents’ name after which he was made to sign an affidavit by the
policeman, which he would not have signed had it not been for the maltreatment
he received from the police; that this very incident was disclosed by him to
his mother when the latter visited him but he told his mother not to tell it to
anybody; that he was about to relate his horrible experience at the hands of
the policeman when he appeared before Mayor Monico Tanyag of Taguig, Rizal, to
swear to his affidavit but he feared further maltreatment upon seeing a
policeman; that at the preliminary investigation before Judge Sto. Domingo, his
lawyer Atty. Camilo Sabio advised him not to disclose the maltreatment he
suffered in the hands of the policeman in order to avoid further injury and to
relate this matter only during the hearing of the case before this Court.  On cross-examination, the accused Alfredo
Rapada declared that he was a bloc officer of their association Kapatirang
Langgam, Inc., comprising 24 families, the house of Mrs. Delia Villareal
being one of them.  He also testified
that because the complainant was all the time alone in the house, and with the
jokes of his friend Felipe Brazil and his aunt Aling Beatriz, and sensing that
Nora Reyeg is somewhat in love with him, the more he visited her in her house
and helped her; and that his house is only about 15 meters away from the house
of the complainant.”^[2]

Then came this portion from the appealed decision: “After
evaluating all the evidence submitted by the parties, the Court finds that the
version of the prosecution is credible and should be accorded belief.”^[3]
The trial court explained why: “It will be remembered that the complainant
Nora Reyeg from the way she speaks and the manner she acts appears to be a
mentally retarded girl.  She is not only
simple, but practically feeble-minded. 
‘During the course of her testimony, she most of the time smiled
although once in a while she burst into tears. 
With such mentality she can be an easy prey to anybody who would like to
take advantage of her.  This must be the
reason which induced the accused in committing the crime imputed to him in
those cases.  Another reason that
prompted the accused is the fact that during the incidents in question, that
is, February 19 and 20, 1968, the complainant was alone in the house, reason
for which, the accused was emboldened to commit, as he did commit, the crime of
rape on the complainant.  The story of
the accused that when he went to the house of the complainant at about 8:30 in
the evening of February 16, 1968 to deliver the lamp which the complainant was
borrowing from him, the complainant requested him to sleep in her house because
she was then alone, for which he agreed, and that at about 12:00 o’clock
midnight while he was sleeping, the complainant came near him, leaned on him
and embraced him after which they forgot everything and finally had sexual
intercourse, which act of sexual intercourse was repeated at about 11:00
o’clock in the evening of February 20, 1968 also at the instance of the
complainant, is not believable.  In the
first place, if it were really true that it was the complainant who seduced the
accused to have sexual inter with her, she’ would not have filed the complaint
in these cases.  In the second place,
what reason has the accused in going to, the house .of the complainant at 11:00
o’clock in the evening of February 20., 1968 when .he can go there any time of
the day considering that his house, as admitted by him, is only about 15 meters
away from the house of the complainant? 
Besides, the act complained of happened’ at about three o’clock in the
afternoon of February 19, 1968, not in the evening of February 16, 1968.”^[4]

The lower court decision was likewise based on the following
circumstance: “Another point which militates against the accused is the
findings of Dr. Jesus Crisostomo on the examination conducted by him oil the
person of the complainant Nora Reyeg (Exhibit A).  In his Living Case Report No. MI-68-108,
Exhibit A, Dr. Crisostomo made the following conclusions: (a) No extra-genital
physical injury found on the body of subject at the, time of examination, and
(b) genital findings compatible with sexual intercourse with a man on or about
February 19, 1968 (Exhibit A-1).  The
accused claims that because there was no extra-genital physical injury found on
the body of the complainant, he did not force the latter to submit to his
carnal desires.  But it should be
remembered that according to the complainant, when she was assaulted by the
accused, the latter was holding a knife (kutsilyo) with his right
hand.  Hence, because of fright, the
complainant was forced to submit to the desires of the accused to have sexual
inter­course with him.  This explains the
fact that no extra-genital physical injuries were found on the person of the
complainant.  As regards the second
finding to the effect that it is compatible with sexual intercourse with a man
on or about February 19, 1968, the same needs no further elucidation; it is
self-explanatory.”^[5]

Even a cursory reading of the above recital of the evidence and
the reasons given for the verdict of guilt suffices to demonstrate the
difficulty of seeking a reversal.  There
was a valiant effort on the part of counsel for appellant, Attorney F. F.
Bonifacio, Jr., to secure an acquittal. 
It was not enough.  The sole
assignment of, error on the alleged lack of evidence to prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt was premised on what he considered to be the lack of
credibility of the testimony of complainant. 
That did not make matters any too easy for him. It was a well-settled
doctrine that findings of fact of a trial court usually command acceptance from
this Tribunal. Moreover, the evidence given by complainant can stand the test
of strict scrutiny. As noted at the outset, we affirm.

1. Appellant is quite insistent that there was consent on the part
of complainant. A reading of the testimony of complainant would easily reveal
that on both occasions where appellant had sexual intercourse with her, she was
forced to yield only because of force and intimidation. Appellant did make much
of the alleged admission to the trial court in her declaration that she did
nothing and did not resist at all when the act of coition took place. His own
brief, however, pointed out that when asked how he was able to consummate the
act if she did not consent, this was her answer: “I consented sir, because
he said that if I would not agree he would kill me.”^[6] As a matter of fact, upon request of
his counsel to have the words in Tagalog be recorded, his brief did quote the
exact response of complainant thus: “Pumayag
na ako, sinabi na kung hindi
ako papayag papatayin ako.”^[7]
That was insofar as the sexual inter?course that happened on February 19,
1968. Now as to the repetition of such an act, again with force and
intimidation being employed, on the evening of February 20, 1968, if there was
an admission why she did not resist, she explained by categorically affirming:
“I was hurt.'”^[8]
When asked to explain in what manner she was hurt on that occasion, this is her
answer: “He hit me in the stomach”^[9]
She explained further that she was boxed. 
When asked how many times, she replied: “Two (2) times, sir.”^[10]
Continuing, she stated that, the fist blow landed on her while she “was
still standing.”^[11]
She was boxed twice before she was pushed down. 
It is in that sense that the allegation that there was no resistance on
her part should be viewed.  In her own
words: “I was hurt and I consented.”^[12]
There was a vigorous cross-examination conducted by counsel for appellant. She
remained firm and resolute in her testimony. 
Her version was in no way impaired. 
What was more, it was given more credence.  She had opportunity to inform the court that
appellant was not courting her, and therefore the idea of consent on her part
was rather unlikely. Thus: “He, is not courting me, sir.”^[13]
Anent the observation of the trial court by way of referring to her being
mentally retarded that she was smiling during her testimony, a circumstance
which was made much of to show that what happened to her was not taken
seriously, the fiscal, when the same question was repeated on cross-examination
as to how the sexual act was consummated, sought to make it of record that the
witness cried and shed tears.^[14]
Counsel for complainant countered: “The witness has been apparently crying
before she took the witness stand if Your Honor please.  We would want that to -be of record.”^[15]
When she was asked by counsel this time as to whether or not she informed Dr.
Crisostomo of the appellant having boxed her and of her having lost,
consciousness, her answer being in the affirmative, again the fiscal made the
manifestation that “at this juncture the witness is again shedding tears,
Your Honor.”^[16]
The court observed: “With more profusion this time.”^[17]
When counsel asked why she was crying, she replied: “Because of what he
did to me, sir.”^[18]
It is thus evident that the cross-examination far from weakening her testimony
reinforced it by her reiterating the ordeal to which she was subjected, first
on February 19, 1968 and thereafter on February 20; 1968.  The conclusion reached by the trial court
that rape was committed on both occasions is thus supported by the credible and
competent evidence of record.

2. The adherence on the part of this Court to the principle that
the findings of fact by the trial court, based as they are on his having
observed the witnesses testify, should be entitled to acceptance in the absence
of any showing that a circumstance has been overlooked or its significance
misinterpreted certainly does not lessen the burden shouldered by appellant in
his effort to obtain a reversal.  Only last
July, in People v. Villamala,^[19]
the conviction of the two accused for the crime of rape was upheld on the
inability of the appellants to persuade this Tribunal that their case came
within the exception.^[20]
So it must be likewise in this appeal.

3. It is true that there is the constitutional presumption of
innocence.^[21]
There is the requirement, therefore, that the guilt of the accused be shown
beyond reasonable doubt.  In a recent
case, People v. Dramayo,^[22]
there is this relevant excerpt: “Only if the judge below and the appellate
tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed
precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the
sentence be one of conviction.  It is thus
required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into
account.  The proof against him must
survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to
sway judgment.’ The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be
laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he
perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime.  What is required then is moral
certainty.”^[23] That stage of moral certainty has
been reached in this case.  The
conscience of the trial judge was satisfied that the appellant could be held
liable for such offenses.  That is
likewise true as far as this Court is concerned.  The reliance then on the constitutional
presumption of innocence is futile.

4. In the brief for appellant, the lower court decision as assailed
on the ground that the extra-judicial admission of the accused as to his having
committed rape on both occasions was given credence by the -trial court.  Counsel for appellant is to be commended for
his insistence that the constitutional right against self-incrimination must
not be ignored or disregarded.  Only
recently, in People v. Buscato,^[24]
Justice Antonio, as ponente, stressed its importance in this wise:
“The constitutional inquiry is not whether the conduct of the police
officers in obtaining the confession was shocking, but whether the confession
was free and voluntary; that is, it must not be extracted by any sort of
threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, nor by the
exertion of improper influence.  It has
been recognized that ‘coercion can be mental as well as physical, and that the
blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional
inquisition.'”^[25]
Considering that the doubt as to whether or not the admission was made
voluntarily is not easily dispelled, it ought to have been rejected by the
trial court.  Even so, there is no
justification for .the reversal sought. 
For as held in People v. Bagasala,^[26]
if evidence other than such involuntary admission or confession may be found in
.the record sufficient to justify a finding of guilt, then conviction is
warranted.  In the light of what has been
set forth above, the imputation that any involuntary extra­judicial admission
was erroneously given weight by the trial court even if warranted cannot be the
basis for an acquittal.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of September 8,
1969, finding the accused Alfredo Rapada y Carlo guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape in the two criminal cases filed against him and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each case’, with the
accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay the costs, is affirmed with
the modification that he should be credited not only with one-half but with the
full period of the preventive imprisonment ‘served by him and that an indemnity
of P12, 000 for each offense be imposed on him. 
In the service of the penalty of two reclusion perpetuas, the provision
of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code should be followed.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and Santos, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Decision, Appendix to Brief for Appellant, 48-49.

^[2]
Ibid, 54-56.

^[3]
Ibid, 58.

^[4]
Ibid, 59-60.

^[5]
Ibid, 61.

^[6]
Brief for Appellant, 12, reproducing answer of complainant on the witness stand
appearing in t.s.n., Session of October 20, 1968, 6.

^[7]
Ibid, 12.

^[8]
T.s.n., Session of August 2 0, 1968, 9.

^[9]
Ibid.

^[10]
Ibid.

^[11]
Ibid, 10.

^[12]
Ibid.

^[13]
T.s.n., Session of September 17, 1968, 5.

^[14]
Ibid, 19.

^[15]
Ibid, 19-20.

^[16]
Ibid, 22.

^[17]
Ibid.

^[18]
Ibid.

^[19]
L-41312, July 29, 1977.

^[20]
People v. Tila-on, 112 Phil. 546 (1961); People v. Lumayag,
L-19142, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA. 502; People v. Gumahin, L-22357,
October 31, 1967, 21 SCRA 729; People v. Manos, L-27791, December 24,
1970, 36 SCRA 457; People v. Angcap, L-28748, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA
437; and People v. Cudalina, L-34969, April 29, 1975, 63 SCRA 499 were
cited.

^[21]
According to Article IV, Section 19 of the Constitution: “In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, ***.”

^[22]
L-21325, October 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 59.

^[23]
Ibid, 64.

^[24]
L-40639, November 23, 1976, 74 SCRA 30.

^[25]
Ibid, 49-50.

^[26]
L-26182, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 236.