FRANCISCO PERIQUET, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JUDGE ANDRES REYES, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, FLAVIANA MULI VDA. DE SUAREZ, DECEASED, REPRESENTED BY ROSARIO VDA. DE SAN PEDRO, …

Petition for certiorari and injunction with preliminary
injunction.

The following are the relevant facts:

On February 29, 1964, in Civil Case No. 7300,^[1]
the following Compromise Agreement was entered into and submitted to the trial
court for approval:

“COME NOW the undersigned parties, assisted by their
respective counsel, and respectfully move for approval of their Compromise
Agreement, and states:

1st.- That the parcels of land involved in this action, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 22657 to 22678, inclusive, of the Reg­ister of Deeds of Rizal,
were purchased and ac­quired by Maria Suarez (now.deceased), Flaviana Muli Vda.
de Suarez, B. Rene Gomez, Marcelo Suarez (now deceased), and Marcial Suarez,
all of whom were incorporators of the Suarez Estate, Inc., as their capital contributions
to said corporation, as evidenced by their ‘Incorporators° Preliminary
Agreement (Annex ‘A’ to the complaint), the Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Liabilities (Annex ‘B’ to the complaint);

2nd.- That upon the incorporation of the said Suarez Estate, Inc.,
on November 21, 1951, the aforesaid parcels of land represented the capital
contributions of the five above-named in­corporators, notwithstanding the fact
that the lots were registered in the name of Maria Suarez;

3rd.- That in the confusion that ensued following the death of
Maria Suarez in 1954 and, later, of Marcelo Suarez in 1955, the Suarez Estate
Inc. failed to organize formally as required by law and to carry out its
corporate purposes;

4th.- That in view of the aforesaid demise of their two principal
co-incorporators the heirs of said deceased as well as the remaining
incorporators have agreed, as by these presents they do hereby agree, not to
proceed with the formal organization of the Suarez Estate, Inc., and, instead,
to return to each of the incorporators their respective contributions
consisting of shares in the parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 22657 to 22678,
inclusive, of the Register of Deeds of Rizal; with the exception of the
following parcels which, during the lifetime of the deceased Maria Suarez and
Marcelo Suarez, were already sold to the persons enumerated hereunder, to wit:

(a) Lot 1, Block
369, under TCT No. 22657 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, in favor of Marcelo
Suarez;

(b) Lot 8, Block
369, under TCT No. 22664 of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal, in favor of Juan Francisco and Aquilino Cruz;

(c) Lot 9, Block
369; under TCT No. 22665 of the
Register of-Deeds of Rizal, in favor of the spouses B. Rene Gomez and Trinidad
Suarez-Gomez;

(d) Lot 2, Block
370, under TCT No. 22667 of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal, in favor of Buenaventura Bernabe;

(e) Lot 4, Block
370, under TCT No. 22668 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, in favor of Juan
Cuadrado;

(f)  Lot 6, Block 370, under TCT No. 22671 of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal, in favor of Ciriaco Montano; and

(g) Lot 5, Block
370, covered by TCT No. 22670 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, in favor of
the spouses B. Rene Gomez and Trinidad Suarez-Gomez, to whom a new transfer
certificate of title for said lot should be issued; but said spouses-vendee
shall, in addition to the sum of Fourteen Thousand Pesos (P14,000.00) already
paid by them as purchase price of this lot, pay to their co-incorpora­tors as
well as the heirs of the de­ceased co-incorporators the following amounts:

(a) to FLAVIANA MULI VDA. DESUAREZ, the sum of i3,333.33;

(b) to FRANCISCO PERIQUET, as surviving spouse of Maria Suarez, the
sum of P3,666.67; and

(c) to MARIA SUAREZ and the HEIRS OF MARCELO SUAREZ,the sum of
P2,000.00;

5th.- That the remaining lots involved in this action namely, those
described in and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 22658, 22659,
22660, 22661, 22662, 22666, 22668, 22672, 2.2673, 22674, 22675, 22676, and
22677 and 22678, all of the RegisterofDeedsofRizal, are hereby returned to, and
henceforth shall in the meantime he owned in common by, the following
incorporators and the heirs of the deceased incorporators, the same, or the
proceeds thereof if sold, to be partitioned among themselves in the following
proportions:

(a) To FLAVIANA MULI
VDA. DE SUAREZ, as in­corporator-contributor,thirty-three and one-third per
cent (33-1/3%);.

(b) To the surviving
spouse of incorporator-contributor Maria Suarez, FRANCISCO PERIQUET, thirty-six
and two thirds per cent (36-2/3%); and

(c) To incorporators-contributors
MARCIAL SUAREZ, B. RENE GOMEZ, and the HEIRS OF INCORPORATOR-CONTRIBUTOR
MARCELO SUAREZ, thirty per cent (30%);

6th. – That it is hereby agreed by all the parties in Civil Case No.
7300 of this court, Branch VI, for the purpose of ‘this compromise agreement
that the remaining Mandaluyong Subdi­vision lots, which are still in the name
of the deceased MARIA SUAREZ, do not form part of her estate, for they actually
belong to and are owned by the incorporators of the Suarez Estate, Inc., as
their capital contribution to the corporation which consists of the following:

GROUP I – Block 369, consisting of
five (5) lots, to wit:

(Note: Lot No. 2, of Block No. 369, will
he fur­ther investigated by the parties and if sold, its value shall be
partitioned in the same proportions as established in par. 5 hereof.)

GROUP II – Block No. 404 consisting of
three (3) lots, to wit:

GROUP III – Block
No.370 consisting of five (5) lots, to wit:

7th.- That it has been agreed by the parties
herein that the three (3) groups of incorporators and heirs of the deceased
incorporators shall draw by lots from the three (3) groups of lots listed in
paragraph 6th of this compromise agreement and from the result of the drawing,
inasmuch as the value of the groups of lots vary, hence, the share of FLAVIANA MULI VDA. DE SUAREZ of
33-1/3% and that of FRANCISCO PERIQUET, of thirty-six and two-thirds (36-2/3%)
shall be maintained and completed either in cash or in kind.  But, if the whole property or if all the lots
in the three (3) groups are sold at the same time, the sharing of the selling
price shall be maintained in the same pro­portions as stated in paragraph 5th
of this agree­ment;

8th.  That any other property
or sums of money that may hereafter be found to belong or pertain to the
defunct.  Suarez Estate, Inc. or to its
incorporators-contributors, as such, shall also be owned by, and divided among,
the parties named in paragraph 5th of this agreement in the same proportions.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered
approving the foregoing com­promise agreement, ordering compliance therewith,
and directing the Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 22670 and to issue in its stead a new transfer certifi­cate of title
in the name of the spouses B. Rene Gomez and Trinidad Suarez-Gomez,, and cancel
also the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title of the lots in the three
(3) groups of lots and issue the corresponding title to whoever the same may
belong as a result of this compromise.

Manila, for Pasig, Rizal, this 29th day of February, 1964.

(SGD.) FRANCISCO PERIQUET

Defendant

Assisted by:

CELSO B. JAMORA

Counsel for F.
Periquet

1410 Taft Avenue,
Manila

By:

(SGD.) CELSO B.
JAMORA

(SGD.) FLAVIANA VDA. DE SUAREZ

Defendant

Assisted by:

(SGD.) MARCIANO C.
SICAT

Salonga, Ordonez, Sicat & Ass.

300 Shurdut Bldg. Intramuros Manila

Counsel for F. M. Vda. de Suarez

(SGD.) B. RENE GOMEZ                   (SGD.) MARCIAL SUAREZ

Plaintiff                                                 Plaintiff

(SGD.) EUFROSINA I. SUAREZ        (SGD.) TEOFISTA ISAGON

Plaintiff                             in her own behalf as plaintiff and as
legal guardian of Danilo Marcelo Jr., Evelyn & Regino, all surnamed Suarez,
plaintiffs

(SGD.) EVELYN I. SUAREZ

Plaintiff

(SGD.) ELPIDIO I. SUAREZ

Plaintiff

Assisted by:

(SGD.) AGUSTIN O. BENITEZ

Suite 712; Don
Santiago Building

Taft Avenue,
Manila

Counsel for the
Plaintiffs”^[2]

The foregoing agreement
was approved by the trial court on March 9, 1964, when it rendered a -decision stating, in part, as follows:

“The foregoing compromise agreement is sign­ed by all the
parties and their respective coun­sel.

“Pursuant to par.7 of the compromise agreement, the parties on
March 7, 1964 drew lots be­fore the Deputy Clerk of Court of this Court to
determine which portions of the property in question should go to the parties
mentioned in par. 5 of the agreement.  As
a result of the drawing of lots, reported by the Clerk of the Court and af­firmed
by the parties and their counsel, Group I of the parcels of land in question
consisting of five lots —. Lots Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Block -369 —
enumerated in par. 6 of the compromise ag­reement were adjudicated to the
parties Marcial Suarez, B. Rene Gomez, and the heirs of incorpo­rator-contributor
Marcelo Suarez as their share in the properties in question as
incorporators-contributors of the Suarez Estate, Inc.; Group II of the parcels
of land consisting of three lots – Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of Kock No. 404 –
enumerated in par. 6 of the compromise agreement were adjudicated to the party
Flaviana Muli Vda. de Suarez as her share in the properties in question as
incorporator-contributor of the Suarez Estate, Inc.; while Group-III of the parcels of land in question
consisting of five lots
— Lots -Nos. 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 of
Block No. 370 — enumerated in Para 6 of the compromise agreement were adjudica­ted as the shore of the deceased, incorporator?contributor Maria Suarez as
such incorporator-contributor represented in the compromise agree­ment by her
surviving spouse Francisco Periquet.

“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby renders judgment
approving the Compromise Agree­ment submitted by the parties, as well as the
result of the drawing of lots made by the parties before the Clerk of
Court.  The Register of Deeds of Rizal is
directed to cancel Transfer Certifi­cate of Title No. 22670 of his Registry and
to issue in its stead a new transfer certificate of title in the name of the
spouses B. Rene Gomez and Trinidad Suarez-Gomez of Pasig, Rizal; to cancel the
Transfer Certificates of Title in the name of the deceased Maria Suarez
covering Lots 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Block No. 369 of the subdivi­sion plan
Psd-9027, Mandaluyong, Rizal and issue new transfer certificates of title
thereto in the names of Marcial Suarez, B. Rene Gomez, and the Heirs of Marcelo
Suarez, namely Teofista Isagon, Eufrosina Suarez, Elpidio Suarez, Danilo
Suarez, Evelyn Suarez, Marcelo Suarez, Jr. and Reggineo Suarez, all of Pasig,
Rizal; to cancel the Transfer Certificates of Title in the name of the deceased
Maria Suarez, covering Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of Block No. 404, subdivision plan
Psd-9027 of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and issue new transfer certi­ficates of title
thereto in the name of Flaviana Muli Vda. de Suarez of Pasig, Rizal; and to can­cel
the Transfer Certificates of Title in the name of the deceased Maria Suarez
covering Lots Nos. 1, 3, 7, 8 and 9 of Block No. 370 of subdivision plan
Psd-9027 of Mandaluyong, Rizal and issue new transfer certificates of title
thereto in the name of Francisco Periquet, widower, of Quezon City, as
surviving spouse of the deceased Maria Suarez.” (Italics supplied.)^[3]

On April 11, 1964; herein
petitioner Francisco Periquet filed a motion to set aside the Compromise Agreement and
the decision thereon, and prayed for a new trial, alleging that he signed the agreement on the mistaken belief that the portion
equivalent to 36-2/3% of the properties of the Suarez Estate, Inc. was being alloted to him in his personal capa­city,
not as representative of his wife.  This
motion was denied on May 29, 1964.  Petitioner’s appeal from said Order was disallowed by respondent Court, and a motion for reconsideration of the Order of disallowance was
denied.  Petitioner came to the Supreme Court by way of a petition for mandamus and certiorari,^[4] to
compel respondent Judge to approve, certify ands elevate the record on appeal in its Civil Case No. 7300 to this Court, or for
declaration of nullity of the Compromise Agreement of the parties which was
approved by the respondent Court.  Said
petition was dismissed by this Court on December 29, 1967, in the following
manner:

“Generally, a judgment on a compromise ag­reement is not only
without appeal, but is also immediately executory, the reason being that when
the parties agree to settle their differences, to end a pending litigation, and request the court ‘to render judgment
based on their said agreement, there is an implied waiver of their right to ap­peal
from the decision.  The exception to the
rule is provided in case a party to the compromise agreement moves to set it
aside on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress; in which event, an appeal
would exist from the order denying the motion.

“The issue here presented, therefore, is whether or not the
case at bar comes within the exception to the general rule, that the denial of
petitioner’s appeal by the lower court amounted to grave abuse of discretion.

“To fall within the exception to the general rule, the moving
party must allege vitiated eon-sent to the agreement, by reason of fraud,
mistake or duress.  But not every act
that may be consi­dered fraudulent, erroneous or under duress, can be the basis
for annuling a contract. A mistake, specifically, shall invalidate consent only
if it refers to the substance of the thing which is the object of the contract,
or the condition which has principally moved one or both parties to enter into
the contract (Art. 13.31, new Civil Code). 
In short, the error must be the causal, not merely incidental, factor
that induced the complaining party to enter into the agreement.

“In the present case, the mistake, alluded to by petitioner as
having vitiated the voluntariness of his participation in the compromise
agreement’ consisted in the mistaken that he would receive the alloted portion
in his per­sonal capacity; that the properties would belong to him solely.  This would contradict the explicit
terminology of the 5th paragraph of the agree­ment, partitioning the remaining
unsold lots among the ‘incorporators and heirs of the deceased in­corporators’,
and which was drafted by no less than appellant’s personal counsel.  Considering that from the context of the
agreement, it is apparent that it was entered into to determine the properties
of the Suarez Estate, Inc. and to fix and deliver the respective shares of the
incorpo­rators-contributors, and that it was the wife, Maria Suarez, not the
husband Francisco Periquet, who made contribution to the corporation, it can­not
really he claimed that the lower court made an alteration of the compromise
agreement when it adjudged the 5 lots enumerated in paragraph 6 ‘as the share
of the co-incorporator-contributor Maria Suarez as such
incorporator-contributor, repres­ented in the compromise agreement by her
surviving spouse Francisco Periquet.’ That Periquet origi­nally considered this
order as in accord with the agreement of the parties is evidenced by the fact
that after the judgment was rendered, he filed two motions seeking for its
enforcement or execu­tion.  Apparently
realizing much later the impli­cation of the phraseology of the agreement, as
carried out in the decision of the lower court, he belatedly contested the
validity and due exe– cution of said compromise agreement.

“But assuming that the effect of the word­ing of paragraph 5
of the agreement was not anti­cipated by petitioner when he and his counsel
prepared the instrumentandprevailed on the other parties to sign it, this is
not the kind of mis­take that would justify nullification thereof.
Miscalculation or misappreciation of its legal import, where the party as in
this case is assis­ted by counsel, will not provide basis for setting aside of
a compromise agreement on the ground of mistake or error.  A compromise, entered into and carried out in
good faith, will not be discarded even if there was a mistake of law or fact;
and in this case the parties have gone to the extent of drawing lots as
provided in the seventh (7) paragraph of the compromise agreement (Decision,
Court of First Instance, p. 4).  The
application of the rule to the present case becomes all the more imperative
when it is borne in mind that Periquet’s proposal would result in depriving his
wife’s surviving mother, Fiaviana Muli Vda. de Suarez of her hereditary share
in this 36-2/3% and vesting all of it upon the husband, contrary to our laws of
succession. (Civil Code, Art. 997)

“Appellant Periquet adverts to the circums­tance that in his
proposals previous to the final compromise agreement, he had insisted in being
personally assigned a share in the properties equal to that granted to his
mother-in-law, Fla­viana Mull.  We find
little relevancy in these proposals.  The
essence of compromises being mu­tual concessions by the parties to avoid or end
litigation, it is to be expected that neither will be able to maintain his
initial demands wholly un­altered.  Changes
are naturally made in the course of bargaining, and the final agreement rarely
coincides with the original terms proposed by either side.  Since, as previously remarked, the purpose of
the compromise agreement in question, was in its 4th paragraph, ‘to return to each of the
incorporators their respective contributions’ to the capital of Suarez Estate,
Inc., (as ex­pressed in its paragraph 4) and appellant Periquet was concededly
not such an incorporator, while his wife and mother-in-law were, it is difficult
to perceive on what basis Periquet could in law or justice demand any portion
of the distributed properties except as his wife’s representative, nor how he
could assert error in his not becoming a distributee in his personal capacity.

“Periquet’s argument that the Philippine Trust, as
administrator of his late wife’s estate did not sign the compromise, is one
that is not available to him for evading the effect of his Own consent thereto.  If at all, only the Administrator may raise
the objection and its prolonged silence is ‘evidentiary of acquiescence to the
compromise.

“Appellant’s contention being plainly unte­nable, there would
be no point in declaring that the Court below abused its discretion in refusing
to give due course to the appeal.  Even
if appel­lant were technically entitled to a mandamus, the net result
would merely be further delay in adjudicating that his case is devoid of merit.

“In view of the conclusion thus reached, there is no need to
pass upon the question of the timeliness or untimeliness of the appeal filed by
petitioner.

“WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismiss­ed, with costs
against the petitioner.”^[5]

The judgment having
become final, on April 16, 1968, respondent Flaviana Muli Vda. de Suarez filed
a motion for the execution of the same. On May 8, 1968, respondent Court issued
an Order granting the motion, thus:

“Acting upon the Motion for Execution, filed by defendant
Flaviana Muli Vda. de Suarez and her guardian Jovito R. Salonga, and finding
said mo­tion to be well-taken, the same is hereby GRANTED; as prayed for, let a
writ of execution issue or­dering the Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel the
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 22666, 22668, 22672, 22674 and 22673 of his
Registry, covering Lots 1, 3, 7, 8 and 9 of Block No. 370, of subdivision plan
Psd-9027ofMandaluyong, Rizal in the name of the deceased Maria Suarez and to
issue new ones in the names of Flaviana Muli Vda. de Suarez and Francisco
Periquet as co-owners thereof in equal pro-indiviso shares.”

“SO ORDERED.”^[6]

Alleging that the owner’s
duplicates of the transfer certificates of title mentioned in the Order are in
the possession of defendant (herein petitioner) Periquet, respondent Flaviana
Muli Vda. de Suarez filed a “Motion to Declare Owner’s Dupli­cate of
Certificates of Title Null and Void”. 
This was granted on May 10, 1968, and the Register of Deeds was ordered
“to cancel the title and issue new ones in the names of Flaviana Mull Vda.
de Suarez and Francisco Periquet as co-owners thereof.”

On May 20, 1968,
petitioner filed a “Motion to Quash Execution and the Orders of Trial
Court dated May 8 and 10, 1968 Dividing Lots 1, 3, 7, 8 and 9 of Block No. 370,
Equally Pro-Indiviso”, on the ground that respondent Court has no
jurisdiction to order the partition of said lots, as the Probate Court of
Rizal, where the proceedings for the set­tlement of the estate of the deceased
Maria Suarez was pending,^[7] has exclusive venue and jurisdiction over
the same.  On September 23, 1968,
respondent Court denied petitioner’s “Motion to Quash Execution,
etc.”, relying heavily upon the decision of this Court in G. R. No.
L-23886.

On June 3, 1969,
Francisco Periquet filed the present petition for certiorari, contending
that respondent Judge has no jurisdiction to effect a partition of the share of
the deceased Maria Suarez Periquet from the Juarez Estate in Civil Case No.
7300, as it is the Probate Court in Special Proceed­ings No. 2169, where the
estate of Maria Suarez Periquet is pending, which has such jurisdiction, apart
from the fact that the challenged Orders of respondent Judge, dated May 8, 1968, May 10, 1968, and September 23, 1968, were null because they
amend­ed or modified the final decision in Civil Case No. 7300, which is beyond
the authority of said respon­dent.

In the meantime,
respondent Flaviana Muli Vda. de Suarez died and was substituted in the instant
proceedings by her heirs — Rosario Suarez Vda. de San Pedro, Trinidad Suarez
Gomez, Marcial Suarez, Clarita Suarez Luna, Eufrocina Suarez Andres. Elpidio
Suarez, Danilo Suarez, Evelyn Suarez de Leon, Marcelo Suarez and Reggino
Suarez.

On May 13, 1974,
Francisco Periquet and the above-named heirs of Flaviana Mull Vda. de Suarez
submitted a Joint Motion for Judgment Upon Supple­mentary Agreement, setting forth
the said agreement, as follows:

“1.  That the parties agree to allot and ad­judicate
in favor of Francisco Periquet in full and complete settlement of the totality
of his rights and interest in the properties of his de­ceased spouse, Maria
Suarez, the following lots mentioned in the Compromise Agreement of February
29, 1964, paragraph 6 thereof, under Group III, Block No. 370, consisting of
four (4) lots, as follows:

Lot No. 3 . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . .   1,012.00
sq. meters

Lot No. 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.    1,060.00 sq. meters

Lot No. 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.    1,426.00 sq. meters

Lot No. 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.    1,584.00 sq. meters

“2.  That the parties also agree to allot and
adjudicate in favor of Flaviana Mull Vda. de Sua­rez, Lot No. 1, consisting of
1,833.00 sq. meters and valued at p82,575.00, covered in paragraph 6 of the
Compromise Agreement of February 29, 1964, Group III, Block No. 370, in
addition to her own share in the aforesaid Compromise Agreement of February 29,
1964, paragraph 6 thereof, Group II, Block No. 404, consisting of three (3)
lots, to wit:

Lot No. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.    1,703.00 sq. meters

Lot No. 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.    1,653.00 sq. meters

Lot No. 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.    1,593.00 sq. meters

“That the undersigned heirsof Flaviana Muli. Vda. de Suarez
hereby confirmed the transfer to Jovito R. Salonga, Sedfrey A. Ordoftez, Pedro
L. Yap, and Marciano C. Sicat of the aforesaid lot No. 3 with an area of
1,593.00 square meters men­tioned in the aforesaid Compromise Agreement of ‘
February 29, 1964, par. 6 thereof, Group II, Block No. 404, as payment for
their professional servi­ces rendered in favor of Flaviana Muli Vda. de
Suarez.”^[8]

It
was, therefore, prayed:

“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, with the appro­val of the
Supplementary Compromise Agreement herein embodied, it is respectfully prayed
that this case be decided according to the aforesaid Agreement without costs,
and the same he remanded to the lower Court for the implementation of the Compromise
Agreement of February 29, 1964, with the corresponding Supplementary Compromise
Agreement of the parties herein embodied, and that the moment the decision
becomes final, that the ‘lis pendens’ annotated on all the Transfer
Certificates of Title involved in this case be cancelled.”^[9]

It is apparent from the
records of this case,, as well as those of G. R. No. L-23886, that the conflict
was between Francisco Periquet and his mother-in-law, Flaviana Muli Vda. de
Suarez, now represented by her heirs, both being heirs of the deceased Maria
Suarez.  The disagreement arose out of
the proper division between them of the proper­ties left by the deceased,
particularly the five lots enumerated in the first Compromise Agreement.  There is no dispute as to the shares of the
other parties who were incorporators’-contributors in the defunct Suarez
Estate, Inc..

The parties involved,
namely Francisco Periquet and the heirs of Flaviana Muli Vda. de Suarez, have
opted to settle their differences by virtue of the supplemental agreement above
set forth.  We find no reason for
disallowing said agreement, and hereby approve the same, it appearing that the
same has been signed by all the parties concerned and their respective counsel.  The distributive shares of the other parties,
however, are to be governed by the first Compromise Agreement submitted and
approved in Civil Case No. 7300.

WHEREFORE, the Supplementary Compromise Agree­ment is
hereby approved and the parties are hereby enjoined to comply with the terms
thereof.  Respon­dent Court is directed
to execute the agreements of the parties in the manner afore-mentioned.  The writ of preliminary injunction, dated
August 7, 1969, is hereby
dissolved, and the notice of lis pendens
annotated on all the transfer certificates of title involved in this case are
ordered to be cancelled.  The petition
against the remaining respondents, B. Rene
Gomez, Marcial Suarez, Eufrocina Suarez and the Heirs of Marcelo Suarez,
is hereby dismissed.  With­out special
pronouncement as to costs.

Barredo, (Acting Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and Santos, JJ.,
concur.

Fernando, J., (Chairman), on
official leave.

^[1] Entitled “Suarez Estate, Inc., et al. vs.
Phil. Trust Co., Inc., et al.”, filed before respondent Court.

^[2] Rollo, pp. 257-260.

^[3] Annex “L”, Petition, Rollo,
pp. 53-55.

^[4] G.R. No. L-23886, entitled “Francisco
Periquet, Petitioner, VA. Hon.
Judge Andres Reyes, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Suarez Estate, Inc., B.
Rene Gomez, Marcial Sua­rez, Eufrocina Suarez, Flaviana Muli Vda. de Suarez
and Heirs of Marcelo Suarez (Minors Elpidio, Danilo, Evelyn, Marcelo, Jr. &
Regino, all surnamed Suarez), represented by TEOFISTA ISAGON,
Respondents.”

^[5] Rollo
of G. R. No. L-23886, pp. 419-422, 21
SCRA 1503, 1510­, 1513.

^[6] Annex “C”, Petition, Rollo,
p, 24.

^[7] Special Proceedings No. 2169, entitled
“Intestate Estate of Maria Suarez Periquet, Deceased. Flaviana Mull Vda.
De Suarez, Petitioner, Suarez Estate, Inc. et al.; Claimants-Intervenors.
(Annex “K”, Petition, Rollo, p. 49.)

^[8] Rollo, pp. 254-255.

^[9] Ibid., p. 255.