🎧 Case Brief Lecture

DOMINGO ARAO, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE ILUMINADA ARAO, PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS, VS. ANTONIO R. LUSPO, MAYOR OF MAMBAJAO, CAMIGUIN SUBPROVINCE, MISAMIS ORIENTAL, MUNICIPAL COUNCIL …

G.R. No. L-23982. July 21, 1967 July 21, 1967

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Arao versus Luspo

The Case

This is the case of Arao versus Luspo, decided by the Supreme Court in July 1967. Domingo Arao, joined by his wife Iluminada Arao, sued the Mayor of Mambajao, Camiguin subprovince, Misamis Oriental, together with the municipal council and the municipal treasurer. Arao brought a petition for mandamus to compel the municipality to reinstate him as municipal clerk and to pay his salary from the time he was separated from the service. He claimed that his position had been abolished, not for genuine reasons of economy, but as a subterfuge to remove him without cause despite his security of tenure as a civil service eligible holding a permanent appointment. The case matters because it draws the line between a lawful abolition of office and an unlawful removal, and it teaches that good faith is the dividing line.

Procedural History

Before filing suit, Arao complained to the Commissioner of Civil Service, alleging that the municipal council had removed him in violation of his constitutional right to security of tenure. Without awaiting the Commissioner's ruling, he filed a petition for mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental against the municipal mayor, council, and treasurer. Meanwhile, the Commissioner of Civil Service ruled that the municipal council had the power to abolish the position for bona fide reasons of economy, subject to department head approval. The Secretary of Finance, to whom the matter was endorsed, likewise recognized the abolition as fully within the power of the municipal council in light of the law providing for local autonomy. The Court of First Instance dismissed the petition, finding that the position was duly abolished in good faith for reasons of economy. Arao appealed directly to the Supreme Court, raising questions purely of law.

Facts

Domingo Arao had occupied the position of municipal clerk in the Mayor's office of Mambajao since January 1952. On August 2, 1960, the municipal council adopted Resolutions Numbered 62 and 63. Resolution Number 62 abolished the position of municipal clerk effective August 3, 1960, premising the abolition on reasons of economy. Resolution Number 63, passed the same day, provided for the municipal budget, and in it two positions, one of which was the messenger-clerk position involved, were stated as abolished instead of being appropriated for with salaries. Resolution Number 63 was passed unanimously by all members of the council except one who was absent.

Arao moved for reconsideration with the council, but the motion was considered dropped when he failed to appear on the date fixed for him to be heard. He then complained to the Civil Service Commissioner. Resolution Number 62 had been voted upon with three in favor, two against, and three abstaining.

Arao contended that the abolition was not truly for economy but to unseat him without cause. He stressed that the same budget resolution provided for salary increases in other items totalling 4,872 pesos, and that a reserve of 3,144.98 pesos remained, so that his salary of 1,145 pesos a year could easily have been provided. The trial court found, however, that his office was abolished because its functions were superfluous, light, and simple and could readily be absorbed by other existing offices, as in fact they were undertaken by the municipal secretary; that no one was appointed in his place, nor was a new position created; that the salary increases were pursuant to the law standardizing the salaries of municipal officials; and that the reserve was reasonably necessary to meet statutory obligations in connection with the creation of parts of the former territory as the new municipality of Mahinog, and for volcano eruption contingency.

Issues

  • Whether or not Resolution Number 62 abolishing the position was duly passed in accordance with the required voting rule of the Revised Administrative Code.
  • Whether or not the abolition of the position was valid, considering that the budget resolution eliminated the position and was passed unanimously.
  • Whether or not the abolition was a subterfuge to remove a civil service employee without cause, in violation of his security of tenure.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2224 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Sec. 2224. The affirmative vote of a majority of all the members of the municipal council shall be necessary to the passage of any ordinance or any proposition creating indebtedness; but other measures, except as otherwise specially provided, shall prevail upon the majority vote of the members present at any meeting duly called and held.

This provision bears on the case because Arao invoked it to attack the voting on Resolution Number 62, a point the Court found had become academic.

Section 4 of Article Twelve of the Constitution, as discussed in the decision, provides that removal of employees in the civil service be only for cause. This provision bears on the case because the Court held it does not apply where a position is abolished in good faith, since abolition is not removal.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the point had become academic in view of Resolution Number 63, passed the same day, which provided for the municipal budget and stated the position as abolished instead of appropriating a salary for it. Resolution Number 63 was passed unanimously by all members of the council except one who was absent. The Court ruled that suppression of items in the municipal budget resolution or ordinance amounts to abolition of the positions thus eliminated. As the trial court aptly observed, the approval of the budget resolution came upon motion of a councilor who had previously voted against Resolution Number 62, and was seconded by a councilor who had abstained from voting on it, so that through Resolution Number 63 the will of the municipal council was expressed clearly and unequivocally in approving the budget and abolishing the two positions.

On the second issue, the Court sustained the validity of the abolition. The trial court's findings, being findings of fact, ought to be left undisturbed. The Court held that Arao's clerical position was within the power of the municipal council to create, and was also within its power to abolish, provided the exercise of that power is not used as a subterfuge to cover removal from office without cause of a civil service employee.

On the third issue, the Court held that abolition of the position in good faith is not a removal, so the constitutional provision that removal of employees in the civil service be only for cause does not apply. Such was the situation in this case. Arao not only failed to prove that personal or political reasons were behind the abolition of his position; the fact that reasons of economy alone prompted the abolition was fully substantiated.

Doctrine

A position within the power of a municipal council to create is also within its power to abolish, provided the exercise of that power is not used as a subterfuge to cover removal from office without cause of a civil service employee. Abolition of the position in good faith is not a removal, so the constitutional guarantee that removal of employees in the civil service be only for cause does not apply. Suppression of items in the municipal budget resolution or ordinance amounts to abolition of the positions thus eliminated. The burden lies on the employee to prove that personal or political reasons, rather than genuine economy, prompted the abolition.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance dismissing the petition for mandamus, without costs. The municipality won.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that abolition of a position in good faith is not removal, so the constitutional guarantee of removal only for cause does not apply. Examiners like to use this case to test the distinction between a bona fide abolition of office for economy and a subterfuge to remove a civil service employee without cause.