DOMINGO ARAO, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE ILUMINADA ARAO, PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS, VS. ANTONIO R. LUSPO, MAYOR OF MAMBAJAO, CAMIGUIN SUBPROVINCE, MISAMIS ORIENTAL, MUNICIPAL COUNCIL …

Resolutions Nos. 62 and/or
63 of the municipal coun­cil of Mambajao, Camiguin subprovince, Misamis Oriental,
dated August 2, 1960, abolished the position of municipal clerk in the Mayor’s office in said
municipality, effec­tive August 3, 1960, premising the same on reasons of eco­nomy.  Domingo Arao, the
occupant of said position since January 4, 1952, moved for reconsideration with said coun­cil.  Said motion was however considered dropped
when Arao failed to appear at a subsequent date fixed
for him to be heard.  Aside from this, Arao complained to the Civil Service Commissioner, alleging
that the municipal council removed him from office in violation of his right
under the Constitution to security of tenure as a civil service eligible
holding a permanent appointment.

Without awaiting the ruling of the Commissioner of Civil Service,
Arao filed on June 21, 1961 a petition for mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Misamis Orien­tal, against the municipal mayor, council and
treasurer of Mambajao, to compel them to reinstate
him in his posi­tion and to pay his salary from the time he was separated from
the service.  Pending the same, on July 3, 1961,
the Commissioner of Civil Service, deciding Arao’s
complaint, ruled that the municipal council had the power to abolish the
position in question for bona fide reasons of economy, subject to
Department head approval.  The Secretary
of Finance, to whom the matter was then endorsed upon the theory that such
abolitions for reasons of economy are made subject to his approval under Republic Acts 1062 and 1063, recognized said abolition as fully within the
power of municipal council, in light of Republic Act 2260 pro­viding for local
autonomy.

On September 8, 1964,
the Court of First Instance de­cided the petition for mandamus, dismissing it
upon the finding that the position at issue was duly abolished in good faith
for reasons of economy.  Petitioner
appealed directly to Us to raise questions purely of law.

Appellant contends that Resolution No. 62 abolishing his position
was not duly passed in accordance with Sec­tion 2224 of the Revised
Administrative Code:

“Sec. 2224….The affirmative vote of a ma­jority of all the
members of the municipal council
shall be necessary to the passage of
any ordinance or any proposition creating indebted­ness; but other measures,
except as otherwise specially provided, shall prevail upon the ma­jority vote of the members present
at any meet­ing duly called and held.”

Appellant points out that Resolution No. 62 was voted upon as follows: 
Three in favor; two against; and three abstaining.  And thus, he argues, the required
majority of those present, five out of eight, was not obtained.  The point
however becomes academic in view of
Resolution No. 63, passed the same day, providing for the municipal budget, wherein two positions, one of
which is that of messenger-clerk herein involved, are stated as
“abolished” instead of being appropriated for with salaries.  Said Resolution No. 63 was passed unanimously
by all members of the council, except one who was absent.  Suppression of items in the municipal budget
resolution or ordinance amounts to abolition of the positions thus eliminated (Alipio v. Rodriguez, L-17336, December 26, 1963).  As the Court of First Instance aptly
observed:

“Subsequent to the consideration of Re­solution No. 62, on the
same date, August 2, 1960,
Resolution No. 63, approving the Budget wherein the position of petitioner was
abolished, together with the position of field clerk, was unanimously approved
by the members of the council, except one who was absent.  And it is important to note that the approval
of said resolution was upon motion of Councilor Ignacio Peñaloza
who previously voted against Resolution No. 62, and seconded by Councilor Melecio L. Sagrado who abstained
from voting on Said Resolution No. 62(Exh. 3, p.
111).  Thus, thru Resolution No. 63, the will of the Municipal Council was
expressed, clearly and unequivocally, in approving the Budget and in abolishing
the two positions.”

Appellant would claim that the reason why his posi­tion was
abolished is not really to promote economy but to remove and unseat him without
cause.  Appellant stress­es that the same
budget Resolution No. 63 provided
for salary increases in other items, totalling
P4,872.00.  And that there was still a
reserve of P3,144.98 so that his salary of P1,145.00 a year
could have easily been provi­ded thereunder.

The finding of the trial court is that petitioner’s office was
abolished because its functions were super­fluous, light and simple and could
readily be absorbed by other existing offices; that in fact it was so under­taken
by the municipal secretary; that no one was appoin­ted in his place, nor was a new
position created; that although the budget granted salary increases to
different officials, the same was pursuant to Republic Act 2368 standardizing the salaries of
municipal officials.  As to the reserve
of P3,144.98 the same appears
reasonably ne­cessary, as the record shows that it was intended to meet
statutory obligations of Mambajao in connection with
the creation of parts of its former territory as the new municipality of Mahinog, and for volcano eruption contingency.

Said findings are in the nature of facts regarding which the
trial court’s determination ought to be left un­disturbed herein.

Appellant’s clerical position, was within the power of the
municipal council to create, and was also within its power to abolish, provided
the exercise of said power is not used as a subterfuge to cover removal from
office without cause of a civil service employee.* Abolition
of the position in good faith is not a removal,
so the Cons­titutional provision, Sec. 4, Art. XII, providing that re­moval of
employees in the civil service be only for cause, does not apply.  Such is the situation herein.  Petitioner not only failed to prove that
personal or political rea­sons were behind the abolition of his position; the
fact that reasons of economy alone were what prompted the abo­lition, has been fully substantiated.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from, dismissing the
petition for mandamus, is hereby affirmed. 
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Reyes, JBL, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., and Dizon, J., on official leave.

* Ulep v.
Carbonell, L-17807,
January 31, 1962; Castillo
v. Pajo, L-11262, April 28, 1958; Manalang v.
Quitoriano, 94
Phil. 903.