FE B. ORENSE, REPRESENTED BY RENE H. IMPERIAL, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. SPS. PEDRO & PAZ SURTIDA, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

Orense versus Surtida

The Case

This is the case of Orense versus Surtida. Fe Orense, represented by Rene Imperial, sued the spouses Pedro and Paz Surtida for recovery of possession of a parcel of real property that was the subject matter of a contract to sell. The action is a simple one for possession, but the case matters for a larger reason: it is a lesson on the price of haste. The trial court cut the defendants off and decided the case on the plaintiff's evidence alone, and the Supreme Court used the appeal to remind every trial judge that the rules of procedure exist to serve justice, not to defeat it.

Procedural History

Fe Orense filed a complaint for recovery of possession before the Regional Trial Court of the Fifth Judicial Region in Legazpi City, Branch 1. The spouses Surtida filed their answer. The case was then set for pre-trial conference, first on 2 July 2012, and reset several times because the parties reported that they were trying to settle. On the last scheduled pre-trial conference, 19 September 2012, the defendants and their counsel did not appear. The trial court thereupon allowed the plaintiff to present her evidence ex parte, and on 29 October 2012 it rendered judgment ordering the defendants to vacate and turn over possession of the property and to pay 170,000 pesos in attorney's fees, with interest. The defendants moved for reconsideration; the trial court denied the motion in an order dated 19 November 2012. The defendants then brought the matter to the Supreme Court on appeal, assigning as errors that the judgment was contrary to fact and law and that the trial court gravely erred in rendering judgment exclusively on the plaintiff's evidence without first going through the mandatory mediation conference.

Facts

The facts are not in dispute. Fe Orense, represented by Rene Imperial, filed a complaint for recovery of possession against the spouses Pedro and Paz Surtida over real property covered by a contract to sell. The spouses answered, and the case was set for pre-trial conference on 2 July 2012.

That setting was moved to 17 July 2012, then to 28 August 2012, and then to 19 September 2012, each time because the parties manifested that they were in the process of settling their dispute. The defendants appeared at all of these scheduled pre-trial conferences except the last one.

On 19 September 2012, the defendants and their counsel were absent. The trial court treated this as an abandonment of the defense, allowed the plaintiff to present her evidence ex parte, and rendered judgment against the spouses. When the spouses received the order allowing the ex parte presentation of evidence, they immediately moved for reconsideration and explained why they had been absent. The trial court denied the motion, and the spouses appealed.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in rendering judgment exclusively on the plaintiff's evidence after the defendants failed to appear at a single scheduled pre-trial conference.
• Whether or not the defendants' non-appearance at the last pre-trial conference amounted to willful disregard of the court's orders that justified barring them from presenting their evidence.

Applicable Provisions

The decision invokes Section 6 of Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, on the construction of the rules, which the appellants raised and which the Court's reasoning embodies. It provides:

These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.

This provision bears directly on the case because the Court refused to let a strict, technical application of the pre-trial rules defeat the defendants' substantive right to be heard.

The appellants also invoked Article 2030 of the Civil Code, on the effect of a compromise, which the Court acknowledged in framing the errors raised. It provides:

Every compromise has the effect of res judicata between the parties, and it is binding upon them and their successors in interest.

This provision bears on the case because the repeated resettings were precisely in pursuit of a possible compromise, which is one of the primary purposes of a pre-trial conference.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled for the defendants. It held that the factual setting merited a reversal of the judgment based on ex parte evidence. The Court stressed that a party-litigant must be given the amplest opportunity to have the case justly determined, free from the constraints of technicalities, and that technicalities should take a backseat against substantive rights. The better and more prudent course is to hear both sides and decide on the merits rather than dispose of the case by technicality. The Court reminded trial courts to exert efforts to resolve matters on the merits, lest in hastening the proceedings they further delay the resolution of the cases.

On the second issue, the Court held that the defendants' non-appearance was not willful. They had been present at all the scheduled pre-trial conferences except the last, and that single instance of non-appearance was beyond their control and that of their counsel. Nothing on record showed a lack of interest to defend or an intent to delay. The Court laid down the governing standard:

Jurisprudence dictates that unless the conduct of the party is so negligent, irresponsible, contumacious, or dilatory as for non-appearance to provide substantial grounds for dismissal, the courts should consider lesser sanctions which would still achieve the desired end.

The Court also emphasized that a pre-trial conference is primarily for exploring the possibility of a compromise, or, failing that, for the parties to make admissions and stipulations that will facilitate a more efficient trial. It noted that the defendants were ready and eager to defend, having appeared at the previous settings and having immediately moved for reconsideration upon receipt of the order. It found no showing that remanding the case for trial would cause undue prejudice to the plaintiff. It concluded that judgments based on an ex parte presentation of evidence are generally frowned upon, and that unless reopening is clearly intended for delay, courts should be liberal in setting aside orders barring defendants from presenting evidence.

Doctrine

First, the rules of procedure are to be liberally construed under Section 6 of Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, so as to secure a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action, and not to allow hasty judgments at the price of great injustice.

Second, a party's right to present evidence may not be cut off for a single, excusable non-appearance at a pre-trial conference. Only conduct that is negligent, irresponsible, contumacious, or dilatory, such that the non-appearance furnishes substantial grounds for dismissal, will justify barring the defendant from presenting evidence; otherwise, lesser sanctions should be considered.

Third, judgments rendered on an ex parte presentation of evidence are generally frowned upon, and courts should be liberal in setting aside orders that bar a defendant from presenting evidence, unless reopening is clearly intended for delay.

Disposition

The appeal was granted; the trial court's decision and order were reversed and set aside, and the case was remanded to the trial court, which was directed to proceed with the pre-trial conference and trial on the merits with celerity.

Remember This

Memorize this line: unless the non-appearance is so negligent, irresponsible, contumacious, or dilatory as to furnish substantial grounds for dismissal, the court should impose lesser sanctions and must not bar the defendant from presenting evidence. Examiners use this case in remedial law and civil procedure, on pre-trial, default, and the liberal construction of the Rules of Court.