FE B. ORENSE, REPRESENTED BY RENE H. IMPERIAL, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. SPS. PEDRO & PAZ SURTIDA, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

The foregoing legal aphorism finds application in the case at bench.

Repugned in this Appeal is the Decision^[2] dated 29 October 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Fifth Judicial Region, Legazpi City, Branch 1, in Civil Case No. 11068, for Recovery of Possession, the decretal portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court hereby renders judgment:

1. Directing the defendants or any person or persons acting
under them to vacate and turn over the physical possession to the
plaintiff or her representative the real property described as follows
subject matter of the Contract to Sell; and,

2. Condemning the defendants to be jointly and severally liable
to pay and/or reimburse to the plaintiff the total sum of P170,000.00 in
attorney’s fees, the same to earn interest, pursuant to Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
at the rate of 6% per annum from February 18, 2012 and 12% per annum on
the amounts due from the finality of this judgment until its
satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.”^[3]

The salient facts are not in dispute. The legal strife between the parties has its provenance in a Complaint for Recovery of Possession^[4]
lodged by plaintiff-appellee Fe Orense (appellee), represented by Rene
Imperial, against defendants-appellants the spouses Pedro and Paz
Surtida (appellants). After appellants filed their Answer, the case was initially scheduled for a pre-trial conference on 2 July 2012.^[5] This was rescheduled to 17 July 2012,^[6] 28 August 2012,^[7] and 19 September 2012^[8]
as the parties manifested that they were in the process of settling
their dispute. On the last scheduled date for pre-trial conference,
appellants and their counsel were not present, prompting the court a quo to allow appellee to present her evidence ex parte.^[9] Ploughing through the evidence proffered by appellee, the court a quo rendered the challenged Decision.

Appellants moved for reconsideration but the court a quo unfavorably acted on their Motion.^[10]

Through the present recourse, appellants raise the following errors—

I

THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT DATED OCTOBER
29, 2012 AND ITS ORDER DATED NOVEMBER 19, 2012 IS (SIC) CONTRARY TO
FACTS AND TO LAW.

II

THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING THE
JUDGMENT EXCLUSIVELY BASED ON PLAINTIFF’S EVIDENCE WITHOUT FIRST GOING
THRU THE MANDATORY MEDIATION CONFERENCE. ALSO IN VIOLATION OF ART. 2030
OF THE CIVIL CODE AND IN VIOLATION OF SEC. 6 OF RULE 1 OF THE REVISED
RULES OF COURT.

The Appeal is meritorious.

The factual milieu obtaining here merits a reversal of the court a quo’s judgment based on an ex parte evidence.

Case law teaches Us that the Court should afford party-litigants the
amplest opportunity to enable them to have their cases justly
determined, free from constraints of technicalities. Technicalities
should take a backseat against substantive rights and should give way to
the realities of the situation. The better and more prudent course of
action in a judicial proceeding is to hear both sides and decide the
case on the merits instead of disposing the case by technicalities. What
should guide judicial action is the principle that a party-litigant is
to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his
complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty or
property on technicalities. The ends of justice and fairness would best
be served if the issues involved in the case are threshed out in a
full-blown trial. Trial courts are reminded to exert efforts to resolve
the matters before them on the merits and to adjudge them accordingly to
the satisfaction of the parties, lest in hastening the proceedings,
they further delay the resolution of the cases.^[11]

It is beyond cavil that appellants were present in all the
scheduled pre-trial conferences, except for the last one set on 19
September 2012. This single instance of non-appearance, which was beyond
their and that of their counsel’s control, neither amounts to willful
disregard of the orders of the court nor warrants the disallowance of
appellants’ right to present their evidence. Nothing on record would
demonstrate that appellants had manifested lack of interest to defend
their right or delay the proceedings. Appellants having shown no
culpable negligence in not attending the scheduled pre-trial, the court a quo
should not have so anxiously wielded its power to deny their right to
pre-trial and present evidence to controvert appellee’s claim.
Jurisprudence dictates that unless the conduct of the party is so
negligent, irresponsible, contumacious, or dilatory as for
non-appearance to provide substantial grounds for dismissal, the courts
should consider lesser sanctions which would still achieve the desired
end.^[12] It should be stressed
that pre-trial conference is primarily for the purposes of exploring
the possibility of a compromise, or on the failure thereof, for the
parties to make certain admissions and stipulations in order to
facilitate a more efficient proceeding at the trial proper.^[13]

Au contraire, it is discernible that appellants were
ready and zestful to defend their case. In actual fact, they were
present on the previous scheduled pre-trial conference. Further, upon
receipt of the Order allowing appellee to present evidence ex parte, appellants immediately filed their Motion for Reconsideration and adequately explained their non-appearance. Under such factual ambience, the court a quo should have granted appellants’ Motion
and allowed them to adduce their evidence. Besides, it was not shown
that a remand of the case for trial for purposes of allowing appellants
to present their evidence would cause undue prejudice to appellee.
Perforce, it is judicious for the court a quo to accord both
appellee and appellants a chance to litigate their causes fairly and
openly, without resort to technicality. Unless the reopening of the case
is clearly intended for delay, courts should be liberal in setting
aside orders barring defendants from presenting evidence. Judgments based on an ex parte presentation of evidence are generally frowned upon.^[14]
Needless to state, the ends of justice and fairness would best be
served if the issues involved in the case at bench are threshed out in a
full-blown trial and both parties are given the opportunity to litigate
their dispute and submit the merits of their respective positions.

WHEREFORE, the Appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision and Order
dated 29 October 2012 and 19 November 2012, respectively, of the
Regional Trial Court, Fifth Judicial Region, Legazpi City, Branch 1, in
Civil Case No. 11068, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The court a quo is DIRECTED to proceed with the pre-trial conference and trial on the merits, with celerity.

SO ORDERED.

Ybañez and Manahan, JJ., concur.

^[2] Original Records, pp. 69-74

^[3] Original Records, pp. 73-74.

^[4] Id., pp. 1-5.

^[5] Id., pp. 26 & 33.

^[6] Id., pp. 40-41.

^[7] Id., p. 42.

^[8] Id., pp. 46-47.

^[9] Id., p. 47.

^[10] Id., pp. 86-87.

^[11] See Chan Kent v. Micarez, 645 SCRA 176, 185-186 (9 March 2011).

^[12] See Real Bank, Inc. v. Samsung Mabuhay Corpration, 633 SCRA 124, 137 (13 October 2010).

^[13] See Alcaraz v. Court of Appeals, 497 SCRA 75, 81-82 (28 July 2006).

^[14] See Jonathan Landoil International Co., Inc. v. Mangudadatu, 436 SCRA 559, 571 (16 August 2004). (Emphasis Ours)