ROSAURO REYES, PETITIONER, VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP­PINES, RESPONDENT.

Reyes versus People

The Case

This is the case of Reyes versus People, decided in March 1969. Rosauro Reyes, a former civilian employee of the Navy Exchange at Sangley Point in Cavite City, was charged with, and convicted of, two crimes arising from a single afternoon of protest: grave threats and grave oral defamation. He comes before the Supreme Court on appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals. The case matters for two reasons a reviewee should hold on to. First, it teaches when an information may be amended after the accused has already pleaded, and why the deletion of the word "orally" from a charge of grave threats is a mere matter of form. Second, and more memorably, it teaches that a single utterance may be absorbed into a more serious offense, so that the accused is convicted of the threats alone and acquitted of the defamation.

Procedural History

Rosauro Reyes was charged before the municipal court of Cavite City in two separate criminal cases, one for grave threats and one for grave oral defamation. Upon arraignment he pleaded not guilty to both, and the cases were set for joint trial. On the day of the hearing the prosecution moved to amend the information for grave threats by deleting the word "orally". The defense objected, insisting that the accused had already been arraigned and that the amendment would materially affect his interest. The amendment was nevertheless allowed, and the joint trial proceeded.

The municipal court convicted him in both cases. He appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the conviction. After his motion for reconsideration was denied, he brought this appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court.

Facts

Rosauro Reyes had been a civilian employee of the Navy Exchange at Sangley Point, and his services were terminated in May 1961. In the afternoon of June 6, 1961, he led a group of about twenty to thirty persons in a demonstration in front of the main gate of the United States Naval Station at Sangley Point. They carried placards bearing statements such as "Agustin, mamatay ka" and "Agustin, mamamatay ka rin" — threats that Agustin would die.

The base commander called Colonel Monzon, the Philippine Military Liaison Officer at Sangley Point, who spoke with Reyes and his companion. They explained that the demonstration was not against the naval station but against Agustin Hallare and a certain Frank Nolan, whom they blamed for Reyes's dismissal. They assured the colonel that they intended no violence, as they "just wanted to blow off steam."

Hallare, then inside the station, learned of the demonstration and became apprehensive for his safety, so he sought the colonel's protection. Colonel Monzon escorted Hallare and his companions out in his car, and deliberately slowed down so that Hallare could see the demonstrators and their placards. The demonstrators followed in three jeeps, one overtaking the car and two trailing behind. When Hallare alighted at his residence on Burgos Street, the jeeps parked in front after passing by twice. Reyes got off, posted himself at the gate with his right hand inside his pocket and his left hand holding the gate-door, and shouted repeatedly: "Agustin, putang ina mo. Agustin, mawawala ka. Agustin lumabas ka, papatayin kita." Frightened by his demeanor, Hallare stayed inside the house while the motorcade left.

Issues

• Whether or not the lower court erred in allowing the substantial amendment of the information for grave threats after the petitioner had been arraigned on the original information.
• Whether or not the lower court erred in proceeding with the trial of the case for grave threats without first requiring the petitioner to enter his plea on the amended information.
• Whether or not the petitioner may be convicted of both offenses when he could legally be convicted of only one, thereby placing him in jeopardy of being penalized twice for the same offense.
• Whether or not the petitioner should be convicted of grave threats when the evidence tends to establish only light threats.
• Whether or not the petitioner should be convicted of grave oral defamation when the evidence tends to establish only simple slander.

Applicable Provisions

Section 13, Rule 110 of the New Rules of Court governs amendments to an information after plea, and provides:

Section 13. Amendment. The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant.

This is the rule against which the deletion of the word "orally" is measured: form may be amended after plea, substance may not.

Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes grave threats, and provides:

Article 282. Grave Threats. Any person who shall threaten another with the infliction upon the person, honor or property of the latter or of his family of any wrong amounting to a crime, shall suffer:

1. The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the crime he threatened to commit, if the offender shall have made the threat demanding money or imposing any other condition, even though not unlawful, and said offender shall have attained his purpose. If the offender shall not have attained his purpose, the penalty lower by two degrees shall be imposed.

If the threat be made in writing or through a middleman, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period.

2. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos, if the threat shall not have been made subject to a condition.

This is the provision under which the original information was framed, and its structure — a conditional threat in the first paragraph, an unconditional threat in the second — is what defeats the claim of prejudice from the amendment.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the amendment was merely formal. After a careful consideration of the original information, all the elements of grave threats under Article 282 were alleged: the offender threatened another with a wrong upon his person, the wrong amounted to a crime, and the threat was not subject to a condition. The particular manner in which the threat is made is not a qualifying ingredient of the offense, so the deletion of the word "orally" did not affect the nature and essence of the crime charged. Neither did it change the basic theory of the prosecution, nor expose the petitioner to conviction under the first paragraph of Article 282, since the amended information contained no allegation that the threat was conditional. The deletion was effected to make the information conform to the evidence, and it prejudiced no right of the petitioner.

On the second issue, the Court held that since the amendment was not substantial, no second plea was necessary at all.

On the third and fourth issues, taken together, the Court held that the conviction for grave threats must stand. The demonstration at the main gate, the placards with threatening statements, the persistence in trailing Hallare in a motorcade to his residence, and the repeated threats flung in a loud voice, gave rise to only one conclusion: that the threats were made with the deliberate purpose of creating in the mind of the person threatened the belief that they would be carried into effect. Hallare was so apprehensive that he sought the colonel's protection and stayed inside his house during the demonstration. The threats were deliberate and not merely in a temporary fit of anger, motivated as they were by the dismissal a month before. The crime was therefore grave threats, not light threats.

On the fifth issue, the Court held that the utterance "Agustin, putang ina mo" did not constitute an independent crime of oral defamation. It is a common expression in the dialect, often employed not really to slander but to express anger or displeasure, and seldom taken in its literal sense by the hearer. In this case it should be viewed as part of the threats voiced against Hallare, evidently to make them more emphatic. Quoting its earlier ruling in the Yebra case, the Court said:

The letter containing the allegedly libelous remarks is more threatening than libelous and the intent to threaten is the principal aim and object to the letter. The libelous remarks contained in the letter, if so they be considered, are merely preparatory remarks culminating in the final threat.

That ruling applied with equal force: the defamatory words were absorbed into the more important offense of threats, and could not be prosecuted separately.

Doctrine

First, after the accused has pleaded, an information may be amended as to all matters of form by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant; amendments touching upon matters of substance cannot be permitted after the plea is entered. The manner in which a threat is made is not a qualifying ingredient of grave threats under Article 282, so deleting the word "orally" is a formal amendment that requires no new plea.

Second, grave threats under the second paragraph of Article 282 require that the threat be deliberate, made with the purpose of creating in the mind of the person threatened the belief that it will be carried into effect, and not made in a mere temporary fit of anger.

Third, where defamatory words are uttered as part of, and to make more emphatic, a threat, they do not constitute an independent crime of oral defamation but are absorbed into the more serious offense of threats; the accused cannot be convicted of both.

Disposition

The decision appealed from was reversed and the petitioner was acquitted in the case for oral defamation, with costs de oficio, while his conviction for grave threats was affirmed, with costs against him.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that defamatory words uttered to make a threat more emphatic are absorbed into the crime of threats and cannot be punished separately. Examiners use this case to test the formal-versus-substantial amendment rule after plea, and the absorption of a lesser utterance into a more serious offense arising from one act.