G.R. Nos. L-21528-29. March 28, 1969
ROSAURO REYES, PETITIONER, VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This case is before us on appeal by certiorari from the decision of
the Court of Appeals affirming that of the municipal court of Cavite City, convicting Rosauro Reyesof the crimes of grave threats and grave oral defamation,
and sentencing him, in the first case (Criminal Case No. 2594), to four (4)
months and ten (10) days of arresto mayor
and to pay a fine of P300, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;
and in the second case (Criminal Case No. 2595), to an indeterminate penalty of
from four (4) months of arresto mayor
to one (1) year and and eight (8) months of prision correctional, and to pay Agustin Hallare the sum of P800 as moral damages, with costs in
both cases.
The petitioner herein, Rosauro Reyes,
was a former civilian employee of the Navy Exchange, Sangley
Point, Cavite
City, whose services were terminated
on May 6, 1961. In the afternoon of June 6, 1961, be led a
group of about 20 to 30 persons in a demonstration staged in front of the main
gate of the United States Naval Station at Sangley
Point. They carried placards bearing
statements such as, “Agustin, mamatay ka;”
“To, alla boss con Nolan;” “Frank do
not be a common funk;” “Agustin, mamamatay
ka rin;” “Agustin, Nolan for you;”
“Agustin, alla bos con
Nolan;” “Agustin, dillega el dia di guide rin
bo chiquiting;” and
others. The base commander, Capt.
McAllister, called up Col. Patricia Monzon, who as
Philippine Military Liason Officer at Sangley Point was in charge of preserving harmonious
relations between the personnel of the naval station and the civilian
population of Cavite
City. Capt. McAllister requested Col. Monzon to join him at the main gate of the base to meet the
demonstrators. Col. Monzon
went to the place and talked to Rosauro Reyes and one
Luis Buenaventura. Upon learning that
the demonstration was not directed against the naval station but against
Agustin Hallare and a certain Frank Nolan for their
having allegedly caused the dismissal of Rosauro
Reyes from the Navy Exchange, Col. Monzon suggested
to them to demonstrate in front of Hallare’s
residence, but they told him that they would like the people in the station to
know how they felt about Hallare and Nolan. They assured him, however, that they did not
intend to use violence, as “they just wanted to blow off steam.”
At that time Agustin Hallare was in his
office inside the naval station. When he
learned about the demonstration he became apprehensive about his safety, so he
sought Col. Monzon’s protection. The colonel thereupon escorted Hallare, his brother, and another person in going out of
the station, using his (Konzon’s) car for the
purpose. Once outside, Col. Monzon purposely slowed down to accommodate the request of
Reyes. He told Hallare
to take a good look at the demonstrators and at the placards they were
carrying. When the demonstrators saw Hallare they shouted, “Mabuhay
si Agustin.” Then they boarded their jeeps and
followed the car. One jeep overtook and
passed the car while the other two trailed behind. After Hallare and
his companions had alighted in front of his residence at 967
Burgos St., Cavite City,
Col. Monzon sped away.
The three jeeps carrying the demonstrator’s parked in front of Hallare’s residence after being gone by it twice. Rosauro Reyes got
off his jeep and posted himself at the gate, and with his right hand inside his
pocket and his left holding the gate-door, he shouted repeatedly. “Agustin, putang
ina mo.
Agustin, mawawala ka. Agustin lumabas ka,
papatayin kita.”
Thereafter, he boarded his jeep and the motorcade left the premises. Meanwhile, Hallare,
frightened by the demeanor of Reyes and the other demonstrators, stayed inside
the house.
On the basis of the foregoing events Rosauro
Reyes was charged on July 24 and 25, 1961 with grave threats and grave oral
defamation, respectively (Criminal Cases Nos. 2594 and 2595, Municipal Court of
Cavite City), as follows:
“The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Cavite accuses Rosauro Reyes of
the crime of Grave Threats, as defined by Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code
and penalized by paragraph 2 of the same Article, committed as follows:
“That on or about June 6, 1961 in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, orally threaten to kill one
Agustin Hallare.
Contrary to law.
Cavite City,
July 24, 1961.
DEOGRACIAS S. SOLIS
City Fiscal
BY: (SGD.) BUEN N. GUTIERREZ
Special
Counsel”
“The undersigned complainant, after being duly sworn to an
oath in accordance with law, accuses Rosauro Reyes of
the crime of Grave Oral Defamation, as defined and penalized by Article 358 of
the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
“That on or about June 6, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, without any justifiable
motive but with the intention to cause dishonor, discredit and contempt to the
undersigned complainant, in the presence of and within hearing of several
persons, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously utter to
the undersigned complainant the following insulting and serious defamatory
remarks, to wit: “AGUSTIN, PUTANG
INA MO”, which if translated into English are as follows: “Agustin, Your mother is a whore.”
Contrary to law.
Cavite City,
July 25, 1961.
(SGD.) AGUSTIN HALL EE
Complainant
“Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of July,
1961, in the City of Cavite, Philippines.
(SGD.) BUEN N. GUTIERREZ
Special
Counsel”
Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to both charges and
the cases were set for joint trial. On
the day of the hearing the prosecution moved to amend the information in
Criminal Case No. 2594 for grave threats by deleting therefrom
the word “orally”. The defense
counsel objected to the motion on the ground that the accused had already been
arraigned on the original information and that the amendment “would affect
materially the interest of the accused.” Nevertheless, the amendment was
allowed and the joint trial proceeded.
From the judgment of conviction the accused appealed to the Court
of Appeals, which returned a verdict of affirmance. A motion for reconsideration having been
denied, the accused brought this appeal by certiorari.
Petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in affirming the proceedings in the lower
court allowing the substantial amendment of the information for grave threats
after petitioner had been arraigned on the original information; (2) in proceeding
with the trial of the case of grave threats without first requiring petitioner
to enter his plea on the amended information; (3) in convicting petitioner of
both offenses when he could legally be convicted of only one offense, thereby
putting him in jeopardy of being penalized twice for the same offense; (4) in
convicting petitioner of grave threats when the evidence adduced and considered
by the court tend to establish the offense of light threats only; and (5) in
convicting petitioner of grave oral defamation when the evidence tend to
establish that of simple slander only.
On the first error assigned, the rule is that after the accused
has pleaded the information may be amended as to all matters of form by leave
and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice
to the rights of the defendant (Section 13, Rule 110, New Rules of Court). Amendments tat touch upon matters of
substance cannot be permitted after the plea is entered.
After a careful consideration of the original information, we
find that all the elements of the crime of grave threats as defined in Article
282[1]
of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by its paragraph 2 were alleged therein
namely: (1) that the offender threatened
another person with the infliction upon his person of a wrong; (2) that such
wrong amounted to a crime; and (3) that the threat was not subject to a
condition. Hence petitioner could, have
been convicted thereunder it is to be noted that
under the aforementioned provision the particular manner in which the threat is
made not a qualifying ingredient of the offense, such that the deletion of the
word “orally” did not affect the nature and essence of the crime as
charged originally. Neither did it
change the basic theory of the prosecution that the accused threatened to kill Rosauro Reyes so as to require the petitioner to undergo
any material change or modification in his defense. Contrary to his claim, made with the
concurrence of the Solicitor General, petitioner was not exposed after the
amendment to the danger of conviction under paragraph 1 of Article 282, which
provides for a different penalty, since there was no allegation in the amended
information that the threat was made subject to a condition. In our view the deletion of the word
“orally” was effected in order to make the information conformable to
the evidence to be presented during the trial.
It was merely a formal amendment which in no way prejudiced petitioner’s
rights.
Petitioner next contends that even assuming that the amendment
was properly allowed, the trial court committed a reversible error in
proceeding with the trial on the merits without first requiring him to enter
his plea to the amended information.
Considering, however, that the amendment was not substantial, no second
plea was necessary at all.
The third and fourth issues are related and will be discussed
together. Petitioner avers that the
appellate court erred in affirming the decision of the trial court convicting
him of grave threats and of grave oral defamation when be could legally be convicted
of only one offense, and in convicting him of grave threats at all when the
evidence adduced and considered by the court indicates the commission of light
threats only.
The demonstration led by petitioner against Agustin Hallare in front of the main gate of the naval station; the
fact that placards with threatening statements were carried by the
demonstrators; their persistence in trailing Hallare
in a motorcade up to his residence; and the demonstration conducted in front
thereof, culminating in repeated threats flung by petitioner in a loud voice,
give rise to only one conclusion: that
the threats were made “with the deliberate purpose of creating in the mind
of the person threatened the belief that the threat would be carried into
effect.”[2]
Indeed, Hallare became so apprehensive of his safety
that he sought the protection of Col. Monzon, who had
to escort him home, wherein he stayed while the demonstration was going
on. It cannot be denied that the threats
were made deliberately and not merely in a temporary fit of anger, motivated
as they were by the dismissal of petitioner one month before the incident. We, therefore, hold that the appellate court
was correct in upholding petitioner’s conviction for the offense of grave
threats.
The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the
words, “Agustin, putang ina
mo”. This is a common enough
expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but
rather to express anger or displeasure.
It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that
is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother.
In the instant case, it should be viewed as part of the threats voiced
by appellant against Agustin Hallare, evidently to
make the same more emphatic. In the case
of Yebra, G. R. No. L-14348, Sept. 30, 1960, this Court said:
“The letter containing the allegedly libelous remarks is more
threatening than libelous and the intent to threaten is the principal aim and
object to the letter. The libelous
remarks contained in the letter, if so they be considered, are merely
preparatory remarks culminating in the final threat. In other words, the libelous remarks express
the heat of passion which engulfs the writer of the letter, which heat of
passion in the latter part of the letter culminates into a threat. This is more important and serious offense
committed by the accused. Under the
circumstances the Court believes, after the study of the whole letter, that
the offense committed therein is clearly and principally that of threats and
that the statements therein derogatory to the person named do not constitute
an independent crime of libel, for which the writer maybe prosecuted separately
from the threats and which should be considered as part of the more important
offense of threats.
The foregoing ruling applies with equal force to the facts of the
present case.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed
and petitioner is acquitted, with costs de oficio,
insofar as Criminal Case No. 2595 of the Court a quo (for oral
defamation) is concerned; and affirmed with respect to Criminal Case No. 2594,
for grave threats, with costs against petitioner.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Fernando, Teehankee, and
Barredo, JJ., concur.
Ruiz Castro and Capistrano,
JJ., no take part.
[1]
ART. 282. Crave Threats. – Any person who shall threaten another with
the infliction upon the person, honor or property of the latter or of his
family of any wrong amounting to a crime, shall suffer:
1. The penalty next lower in degree
than that prescribed by law for the crime he threatened to commit, if the
offender shall have made the threat demanding money or imposing any other
condition, even though not unlawful, and said offender shall have attained his
purpose. If the offender shall not have attained his purpose, the penalty lower
by two degrees shall be imposed.
If the threat be made in writing or
through a middleman, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period.
2. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500
pesos, if the threat shall not have been made subject to a condition.
[2] U.S.
vs. Sevilla, 1 Phil. 143; U.S.
vs. Paguirigan 14 Phil 450.