JUAN DELIVA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JOSE T. SURTIDA, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAMARINES SUR, AND LEODEGARIO RONQUILLO, RESPONDENTS.

Deliva versus Surtida

The Case

This is a petition for mandamus brought by Juan Deliva against Judge Jose T. Surtida of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur and against Leodegario Ronquillo. Deliva asks the Supreme Court to compel the respondent court to direct the execution of a judgment rendered in his favor in a civil case for partition and damages. The case matters because it fixes the rule on what a reconstituted record must contain before a judgment may be considered final and executory, and it teaches that a finding of fact on the service of notice of judgment, made by the trial court and affirmed on appeal, is itself part of the reconstituted record.

Procedural History

The Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur rendered judgment in favor of Juan Deliva and against Leodegario Ronquillo. The record of the case was destroyed during the battle for liberation, so Deliva began reconstitution proceedings. The trial court declared the record reconstituted, and Ronquillo moved for reconsideration. The trial court denied the motion. Ronquillo appealed both orders to the Court of Appeals, which rendered judgment declaring that Ronquillo's attorney had been served with a copy of the judgment. Deliva then moved for execution of the judgment and for the appointment of commissioners to partition the lands, but the trial court denied both motions on the ground that the judgment was not yet final. Deliva came to the Supreme Court on a petition for mandamus, alleging unlawful neglect to perform an act specifically enjoined by law and the absence of any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy.

Facts

On 19 July 1944 the trial court rendered judgment ordering Leodegario Ronquillo to deliver to Juan Deliva one-half of three parcels of land described under Group A of the complaint, the subject of partition proceedings, and to pay him 1,425 pesos by way of damages. The record of the case was destroyed during the battle for liberation, so Deliva began reconstitution proceedings. The trial court declared the record reconstituted on 13 February 1947.

Ronquillo moved for reconsideration of the order declaring the record reconstituted. The parties presented evidence on whether judgment had been rendered and whether a copy of the judgment had been served upon Ronquillo. The trial court denied the motion, and Ronquillo appealed to the Court of Appeals. One of the questions raised and submitted to the Court of Appeals was whether, in 1944 after judgment had been rendered, Ronquillo or his attorney was served with a copy of the judgment. On 8 April 1949 the Court of Appeals rendered judgment declaring that Ronquillo's attorney had been served with a copy of the judgment.

On 2 February and 1 December 1950 Deliva moved for execution of the judgment and for the appointment of commissioners to partition the three parcels of land. The trial court, upon Ronquillo's objection, denied both motions on 20 February and 20 December 1950, respectively, and refused to issue a writ of execution on the ground that the judgment was not yet final. These facts are uncontroverted.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent court unlawfully neglected to perform an act specifically enjoined by law when it refused to issue a writ of execution on the ground that the judgment was not yet final.
• Whether or not the reconstitution of the record, which included the finding of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that notice of judgment had been served upon the attorney for the respondent, was sufficient compliance with the law.
• Whether or not the alleged lack of description of the parcels of land is a legal reason for refusing to issue the writ of execution.

Applicable Provisions

Section 4 of Act Number 3110 provides:

In case it is impossible to find a copy of a motion, decree, order, document, or other proceeding of vital importance for the reconstitution of the record, the same may be replaced by an agreement on the facts entered into between the counsels or the interested parties, which shall be reduced to writing and attached to the proper record.

This provision bears on the case because it shows that reconstitution does not require a physical or verbatim reproduction of every document, and that the record may be completed by other means, including the findings of the courts.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the refusal to issue the writ of execution was improper. The judgment had already become final because notice of the judgment had been served upon the attorney for the respondent, as found by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

On the second issue, the Court distinguished the cases invoked by the respondents, San Jose versus De Venecia and Velasquez versus Ysip, where the only proceeding reconstituted was the rendition of the judgment and no notice of the decision had been reconstituted. Here, not only was the judgment reconstituted, but also the fact that notice thereof had been served upon the attorney of the adverse party was found by the respondent court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals on appeal. The Court asked whether reconstitution means a physical or verbatim reproduction of the pleadings, evidence, decision or judgment and subsequent judicial acts, and answered that Section 4 of Act Number 3110 does not require it. The Court held that where there is a finding of fact by the trial court affirmed by a reviewing court on appeal that notice of the judgment had been served upon the attorney for the defeated party, and the judgments of both courts where such finding appears are attached to the reconstituted record, that is a sufficient compliance with the law.

The Court also held that the finding does not lose its value and effectiveness even if it was not on the main issue, for the question of service of judgment was raised, the issue joined, evidence presented, and both courts passed upon it. To require a new service of the dispositive part would have the effect of reversing the final finding already made by two courts.

On the third issue, the Court held that the claim that the parcels of land cannot be identified for lack of description, even granting it to be true, is no legal reason for refusing to issue the writ of execution upon a final and executory judgment. The sheriff should make the return thereon, and if he cannot carry out that part of the judgment, further proceedings may be had. The Court also noted that the judgment awarded damages in the sum of 1,425 pesos, and the execution of this part does not need the description of the three parcels of land.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate must retain these rules. First, reconstitution of a record does not require a physical or verbatim reproduction of the pleadings, evidence, decision or judgment and subsequent judicial acts; Section 4 of Act Number 3110 allows the record to be completed by other means. Second, where the trial court and the Court of Appeals have both found that notice of judgment was served upon the attorney for the defeated party, and those judgments are attached to the reconstituted record, the judgment becomes final and executory, and execution may issue. Third, a finding of fact on an incidental issue, once joined and passed upon by both courts, retains its value and effectiveness. Fourth, the lack of description of the property is not a legal reason for refusing to issue a writ of execution upon a final and executory judgment; the sheriff should make the return, and the part of the judgment awarding damages may be executed independently.

Disposition

The petition for a writ of mandamus was granted, with costs against the respondent Leodegario Ronquillo.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that reconstitution is not a verbatim reproduction, and a finding of service of notice of judgment affirmed on appeal forms part of the reconstituted record and makes the judgment final. Examiners like to use this case on the finality of judgments after reconstitution and on the duty of the court to issue a writ of execution upon a final and executory judgment.