G.R. No. L-4614. October 24, 1952
JUAN DELIVA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JOSE T. SURTIDA, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAMARINES SUR, AND LEODEGARIO RONQUILLO, RESPONDENTS.
PADILLA, J.:
execution of a judgment rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the
respondent in civil case No. 99-R of the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur entitled Juan Deliva vs. Leodegario Ronquillo et al.
The facts alleged in the petition are as follows: On 19 July
1944 the respondent court rendered judgment ordering Leodegario Ronquillo, one
of the respondents, to deliver to the petitioner one-half of three parcels of
land described under Group A of the complaint, the subject of partition
proceedings, and to pay him the sum of P1,425 by way of damages. The record of
the case was destroyed during the battle for liberation, so the petitioner began
reconstitution proceedings and the respondent court declared it reconstituted on
13 February 1947. The respondent Leodegario Ronquillo moved for reconsideration
of the order declaring it reconstituted. The parties presented their respective
evidence in support of their contentions as to whether judgment had been
rendered therein and a copy of the judgment had been served upon the respondent
Leodegario Ronquillo. The respondent court denied the motion for
reconsideration. Front the orders declaring the record reconstituted and denying
the motion for reconsideration Leodegario Ronquillo appealed to the Court of
Appeals. One of the issues joined and one of the questions raised, argued and
submitted by the parties to the Court of Appeals was whether in 1944 after
judgment had been rendered in the case, Leodegario Ronquillo or his attorney was
served with a copy thereof. On 8 April 1949 the Court of Appeals rendered
judgment declaring that Leodegario Ronquillo’s attorney had been served with a
copy of the judgment. On 2 February and 1 December 1950 motions for execution of
the judgment and for the appointment of commissioners to partition the three
parcels of land were presented but the respondent court, upon objection of the
respondent, denied the motions in its orders of 20 February and 20 December
1950, respectively, and refused to issue a writ of execution on the ground that
the judgment was not yet final. It is claimed that such refusal constitutes an
unlawful neglect to perform an act specifically enjoined by law and that there
is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to
have said orders denying the execution prayed for annulled and set aside. These
facts are uncontroverted.
In their answer Leodegario Ronquillo and the respondent court
allege that whether a copy of the judgment had been received by him or his
attorney was raised incidentally in the motion for reconsideration to support
the main claim that Leodegario Ronquillo or his counsel had not been notified of
the date of trial of civil case No. 7110 of the respondent court and that the
parcels ox land litigated therein could not be located and identified for lack
of description of the same.
In the two orders of 20 February and 20 December 1950 denying
the motions for execution, the respondent court states that the respondent had
not been notified of the judgment. In the memorandum for the respondents they
invoke the rule laid down in the cases of San Jose vs. De Venecia[1] (45 Off.
Gaz., 2073, 2074) and Velasquez vs. Ysip,[2] (45 Off. Gaz., 2079, 2080), wherein
this Court among other things said:
“Here, the last and only proceeding reconstituted is the
rendition of the judgment. The next step would have been notice thereof upon the
parties, but notice upon petitioner has not been reconstituted. Such notice
therefore should be served anew, and from the date of the new service the period
of appeal should be computed.”
The rule invoked by the respondents as laid down in the two
cases cited is correct and sound. However, in the case of San Jose vs. De
Venecia, et al., supra, we said: “the last and only proceeding reconstituted is
the rendition of the judgment” (p. 2074); and in the case of Velasquez vs. Ysip
et al., supra, we said; “No notice of the decisions upon the petitioner prior to
the destruction appeared to have been reconstituted.” (p. 2080.) The next step
in those cases was to serve notice upon the parties or their attorneys of such
reconstituted judgment. As it was not done the judgment could not become final.
Here, however, the situation is different. Not only the judgment was
reconstituted but also the fact that notice thereof had been served upon the
attorney of the adverse party, the respondent Leodegario Ronquillo, was found by
the respondent court and the Court of Appeals on appeal. Does reconstitution
mean a physical or verbatim reproduction of the pleadings, evidence, decision or
judgment rendered and subsequent judicial acts or orders and motions of the
parties prompting them? Section 4, Act No. 3110, gives the answer by providing
that “In case it is impossible to find a copy of a motion, decree, order,
document, or other proceeding of vital importance for the reconstitution of the
record, the same may be replaced by an agreement on the facts entered into
between the counsels or the interested parties, which shall be reduced to
writing and attached to the proper record.” If it is not a physical or verbatim
reproduction of the documents which made up the record to be reconstituted and
there is a finding of fact by the trial court affirmed by a reviewing court on
appeal that a notice of the judgment rendered in the case had been served upon
the attorney for the defeated party and the judgments of both courts where such
finding appears are attached to the reconstituted record, would not that be a sufficient compliance with the law?
The fact that the finding of both courts as to the service of
judgment upon the attorney for the respondent was not on the main issue, for it
is contended that it was just raised to strengthen the main claim and issue that
no notice of the date of trial had been served upon the respondent or his
counsel, such finding of fact does not lose its value and effectiveness, taking
into consideration that lack of notice of judgment might influence and lead the
trial court to believe and conclude that there was also no notice of hearing as
claimed by the respondent. Be it the main or just an incidental issue, the fact
remains that the question of service of judgment was raised, the issue joined,
evidence in support of both claims presented, and the respondent court and the
Court of Appeals passed upon it finding that a notice of judgment had been
served upon the attorney for the respondent. And, as already stated, both
judgments are part of the reconstituted record. To copy or type the dispositive
part of the decision in order to have copies thereof served upon the parties or
their attorneys and to make the date of receipt of such notice of judgment the
beginning of the period within which appeal may be taken would have the effect
of reversing the final finding already made by two courts that a notice of the
judgment rendered in the case had already been served upon the attorney for the
respondent.
The claim that the parcels of land cannot be identified for
lack of description, granting it to be true, is no legal reason for refusing to
issue the writ of execution upon a final and executory judgment, Let the sheriff
make the return thereon. If he cannot carry out the execution of that part of
the judgment for the reason pointed out, further proceedings may be had looking
toward the execution of the judgment. But the judgment not only holds that the
petitioner is entitled to one-half of the three parcels of land which his brother
Anastacio had sold to the respondent but also awards him damages in the sum of
P1,425. The execution of this part of the judgment does not need the description
of the three parcels of land involved in the case.
Petition for a writ of mandamus is granted, with costs against
the respondent Leodegario Ronquillo.
Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor, Bautista
Angelo, and Labrador, JJ., concur.
[1] 79 Phil., 636.
[2] 79 Phil., 645.