VICTORIO D. SANTOS, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. MACARIO MENDOZA ROSA, ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS AND APPELLEES.

Under Republic Act No. 557, approved on June 17, 1950, members
of the municipal police cannot be removed or discharged except for misconduct or
incompetency, dishonesty, disloyalty to the Philippine Government, serious
irregularities in the performance of their duties, and violation of law or duty,
and in such cases, charges shall be preferred by the municipal mayor and
investigated by the municipal council. (Section 1.) When charges are filed
against a member of the municipal police, the municipal mayor may suspend the
accused, but said suspension shall not be longer than sixty days; and if during
the period of sixty days, the case shall not have been decided finally, the
accused, if he is suspended, shall ipso facto reinstated in office without
prejudice to the continuation of the case until its final decision, unless the
delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence, or petition
of the accused, in which case the period of the delay shall not be counted in
computing the period of the suspension. (Section 3.)

On August 12, 1950, administrative charges were filed by Jose
N. Layug, municipal mayor of Guagua, Pampanga (hereinafter to be referred to as
respondent mayor), against the chief of police, Victorio D. Santos, (hereinafter
to be referred to as the petitioner), before the municipal council, as a result
of which the respondent mayor suspended the petitioner from his office on
August 16, 1950. The municipal council of Guagua referred the charges to the
committee on police and public safety, composed of three of its own members,
(hereinafter to be referred to as respondent committee) for investigation,
reception of evidence, and recommendation. The respondent committee, on
September 11, 1950, set the investigation of the case for September 16. At the
instance of the petitioner, the investigation was postponed to September 23.
Upon motion of the petitioner, the investigation was further postponed, first,
to September 30 and, secondly, to October 10, 1950. On the latter date the
petitioner assailed the right of the respondent committee to investigate him.
under Republic Act No. 557, on the ground, that the acts charged against him
were committed prior to the passage of said Act, and that the municipal council
could not delegate its power to investigate to the respondent committee. The
petitioner, therefore, moved that the case be dismissed. The denial of this
motion to dismiss led to the filing by the petitioner on October 26, 1950, in
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, of a petition for prohibition against
Macario Mendoza Rosa, Jose Cayanan and Emeterio Manlulu, as members of the
respondent committee, and Jose N. Layug, municipal mayor of Guagua.

On October 27, 1950, the petitioner requested the respondent
mayor to reinstate him, and this request was referred to the respondent
committee which denied the same. Whereupon, on November 9, 1950, the petitioner
instituted a petition for mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
against the respondent mayor, to compel the latter to reinstate the petitioner as
chief of police, with his corresponding salary during the period of suspension,
plus damages in the sum of P500. Upon motion of the petitioner in the
prohibition case, the court issued a writ of preliminary injunction on November
22, 1950, restraining the respondent committee from proceeding with the
investigation. In said case, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga rendered a
decision dated January 23, 1951, dismissing the petition for prohibition and
dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction. In the mandamus case, the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga (thru Judge Francisco Area) rendered a decision
dated January 23, 1951, ordering the respondent mayor to reinstate the
petitioner within a period of twenty-four hours, without prejudice to the
continuation of the investigation against him. However, upon motion for
reconsideration filed by the respondent mayor, the court (thru Judge Edilborto
Barot) issued an order dated February 12, 1951, vacating the decision of January
23, 1951, insofar as it orders the reinstatement of the petitioner. From the
decision in the prohibition case and from the last order in the mandamus case,
the petitioner has appealed.

I. With reference to the petition for prohibition, it is
contended for the petitioner that (1) he cannot be investigated under
Republic Act No. 557 because the acts imputed to him were committed before
the approval of said Act, and (2) assuming that Republic Act No. 557 is
applicable, the respondent committee has no jurisdiction to investigate him,
because it is the municipal council that is empowered to conduct the
necessary investigation.

The petitioner argues that the charges against him should be
investigated by the Provincial Inspector of the Philippine Constabulary who
shall forward the case, after the investigation, to the Commissioner of Civil
Service for decision, in accordance with Executive Order No. 175, series of
1938, in force at the time the acts in question were committed. Petitioner’s
contention is obviously untenable, since Republic Act No. 557, in providing
merely for a new procedure by which charges against a member of the municipal
police are to be investigated, may validly be given retroactive effect. It is
not contended that, by the new procedure, the petitioner is deprived of any
substantial right, or that his opportunity for defending himself is in any
manner impaired.

Neither is there merit in the contention that the municipal
council cannot delegate its power to investigate the charges against the
petitioner to the respondent committee. It is true that section 1 of Republic
Act No. 557 expressly provides that charges filed against a member of the
municipal police shall be investigated by the municipal council, but this does
not amount to a prohibition against the delegation by the municipal council of
said function to a committee composed of several of its members. In practice,
with a view to expediting the business of a municipal council, the latter
creates various committees for the purpose of handling or studying matters that
call for public hearings or reception of evidence which may not otherwise be
conveniently attended to by the municipal council as a body. At any rate, the
final decision in the case at bar lies with and is therefore the sole
responsibility of the municipal council.

II. In the petition for mandamus, it is contended for the
petitioner that from August 16, (commencement of petitioner’s suspension) to
November 22, 1950 (when the writ of preliminary injunction was issued), 98 days
had elapsed and that, therefore, in accordance with section 3 of Republic Act
No. 557, which provides that the suspension shall not be for more than 60 days,
his reinstatement was in order.

It appears, however, that the three postponements asked by the
petitioner, namely, from September 16 to September 23, from September 23 to
September 30, and September 30 to October 10, 24 days were embraced. Deducting
these from 98 days, 74 days are left. This figure wag taken as the basis of the
decision of Judge Area of January 23, 1950, ordering the reinstatement of the
petitioner. In our opinion, however, Judge Barot properly deducted the period
comprised between October 10 and November 22, 1950, because said period resulted
from the fact that when the case was to be heard on October 10, the petitioner,
instead of submitting to the investigation, questioned the jurisdiction of the
respondent committee to investigate the charges against him and on October 26,
1950, instituted his petition for prohibition against the respondent committee;
and although the latter reset the investigation for November 24, 1950, the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga, upon motion of the petitioner, issued a writ of
preliminary injunction on November 22, 1950. The delay from October 10 to
November 22 is clearly chargeable against the petitioner. As already noted,
under section 3 of Republic Act No. 557, reinstatement shall ipso facto follow
after a period of sixty days when the case shall not have been decided finally,
unless the delay is due to the fault, negligence, or petition of the accused, in
which case the period of the delay shall not be counted in computing the period
of suspension.

Wherefore, the appealed decisions are hereby affirmed, and it
is so ordered with costs against the petitioner-appellant.

Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, and
Labrador, JJ., concur.