A.M. No. RTJ-93-944. July 20, 1994
RIZALIA CAPUNO AND THELMA VILLANUEVA, COMPLAINANTS, VS. JUDGE AUSBERTO B. JARAMILLO, JR., RESPONDENT.
PER CURIAM:
In these two (2) administrative complaints, respondent Judge
Ausberto B. Jaramillo, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 30, San Pablo
City, is charged with various corrupt practices detrimental to the
administration of justice.
Per resolutions of the Court, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-93-944 was
referred to Mme. Justice Corona Ibay-Somera of the Court of Appeals,[1]
and Adm. Matter No. RTJ-93-959 to Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez,[2]
for investigation, report and recommendation. In the meantime, we directed respondent judge to go on leave.[3] On 27 October 1993, we ordered the
consolidation of the complaints.[4]
Thereafter, in compliance with our directives, Justice Corona
Ibay-Somera and Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez submitted their
reports. We shall deal with
respondent’s administrative liability on the basis of the investigators’
findings and recommendations.[5]
I. Adm.
Matter No. RTJ-93-944
The complaint in this case was initiated by a “Sinumpaang
Salaysay” dated 28 August 1992 of complainants Rizalia Capuno and Thelma
Villanueva, mother and daughter, respectively, thus –
(1) Na si Pedro Calara Jr. ay nagdemanda ng ‘writ
of possession’ laban kay Rizalia Capuno sa sala ni Judge Ausberto Jaramillo ng
RTC-San Pablo City.
(2) Na pagkatapos ng makapagbigay ng ‘writ of
possession’ si Judge Jaramillo laban kay Rizalia Capuno sa nasabing kaso, ay
nagpunta si Sheriff Leonardo Ho sa bahay ni Rizalia Capuno at sinabi kay Rizalia
na gusto siyang makausap ni Judge Jaramillo.
(3) Na nagpunta si Rizalia, na kasama ng kanyang
anak na si Thelma, at ni Gregorio Capistrano, sa sala ni Judge Jaramillo, mga
alas 10:00 ng umaga at pinapasok sila sa kuwarto ni Judge Jaramillo.
(4) Sinabi sa kanila ni Judge Jaramillo na kung
gustong hindi mapaalis sa bahay si Rizalia, ay magbigay ng halagang P200,000
cash na kung maa-ari ay puro dadaanin, at saka isang tsekeng P150,000 na
postdated 30 days.
(5) Na sinabi ni Thelma na wala silang maibibigay
na ganoong halaga, at ang sabi ni Judge Jaramillo kay Thelma na subukan na
maghanap ng nasabing halaga at bumalik sa loob ng dalawang araw.
(6) Nang mga alas 11:00 ng umaga, bumalik si
Thelma at si Gregorio Capistrano sa kuwarto ni Judge Jaramillo pagkatapos ng
dalawang araw, at sinabi ni Thelma kay Judge Jaramillo na wala silang
maibibigay na halagang takda ni Judge. Sabi ni Judge na kung hindi kaya ni Thelma ang P200,000 cash ay kahit na
P150,000 na cash na lang, puera doon sa tsekeng P150,000 na postdated 60 days,
pero dapat ang mga ito ay maibigay ni Thelma sa kanya ng alas 2:00 ng hapon noong araw na iyon din.
(7) Na sinabi ni Thelma kay Judge Jaramillo na
wala silang maibibigay na ganoong halaga. Ang sabi ni Judge Jaramillo na kung ganoon ay wala na siyang magagawa.
(8) Na ang demanda ni Rizalia Capuno laban kay
Pedro Calara, Jr. na pa walang bisa ang pagkabenta at pagka-ilit ng kanyang
lupa ay bumagsak din sa sala ni Judge Jaramillo, kaya siya ay nakikiusap kay
Judge Jaramillo na ilipat ang nasabing kaso sa ibang hukuman.[6]
Required to comment, respondent judge denies the charges against
him. He maintains that this complaint
was filed out of pure harassment.[7]
On 19 November 1993, after due investigation of the case, Justice
Ibay-Somera submitted her report the pertinent portions of which follow –
During the testimony of complainant Thelma Villanueva, she only
identified the Sinumpaang Salaysay she executed with her mother Rizalia Capuno,
and affirmed the truth of the contents thereof.
x x x x
On cross-examination, complainant Thelma Villanueva admitted that
her mother, complainant Rizalia Capuno borrowed the amount of P15,000.00
sometime in 1987 from one Pedro Calara, Jr., for which the questioned property
consisting of 85 sq. m. and originally covered by Tax Declaration No. 34-1260,
was mortgaged as a security thereof (pp. 9 & 12, tsn, July 28, 1993). It was also shown that despite partial
payments on said loan (Exhs. B, B-1 to B-6), the mortgaged property was
extrajudicially foreclosed on August 21, 1990 and a certificate of sale was
issued by the respondent judge on the same date of August 21, 1990, and
registered with the office of the Register of Deeds on October 12, 1990 (Tsn p.
16, July 28, 1993; Exh. 6), and that the buyer of said property was Pedro
Calara, Jr., in the amount of P47,021.00 (Exh. 2-A, p. 17, tsn, July 28,
1993). Subsequently, an affidavit of
consolidation of ownership and deed of sale were made and executed by Pedro
Calara, Jr., and were registered with the Register of Deeds on December 9,
1991, which caused the cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 541260 and a new one
was issued, Tax Declaration No. 34-2753, in the name of Pedro Calara, Jr. (Exh.
6). A petition for the issuance of a
writ of possession filed by said Pedro Calara, Jr., on February 24, 1992 was
assigned to the Branch of respondent Judge (p. 25, tsn, July 28, 1993), who
issued the corresponding Decision on May 15, 1992 granting the said petition
(Exh. 11), and ordering the issuance of the corresponding writ of possession
and was implemented by Sheriff Aranguren (Exh. “15”). Said complainant met the respondent Judge
for the first time sometime in March 1992, ‘to know how much more’ the
complainants were to pay Pedro Calara, Jr. (TSN, July 29, 1993, pp. 2 &
15), upon advice of the Sheriff Ho (tsn, p. 9, July 29, 1993). Complainants, together with one Gregorio
Capistrano, went to see the respondent Judge sometime in May or June 1992 for
the second time, who, in one of those meetings, asked whether said complainants
‘could pay P350,000.00’, P200,000.00 of which should be in cash, all in
P100-bills, to be displayed on his table “so that Pedro Calara’s eyes will
bulge and I will take care of everything’, and P150,000.00 in postdated check
(pp. 16-17, tsn, July 29, 1993). Complainant
Thelma Villanueva informed the Judge that she could not afford the amount, thus
the Judge reduced the proposal to P150,000.00 in postdated check, which amount
should be brought to him at 2:00 p.m., and that they (complainants) ‘should not
talk to anybody’ (p. 20, tsn, July 29, 1993). Because the complainant failed to comply with the demand, complainant
Rizalia Capuno was evicted from the questioned premises and her house was
demolished. The testimony of the other
witness for the complainants, Gregorio Capistrano, was just corroborative of
the testimony of Thelma Villanueva, that he met the respondent Judge on those
two (2) occasions when Thelma Villanueva went to see the respondent.
x x x x
Respondent Judge Ausberto B. Jaramillo, Jr., testified that he has
been the Presiding Judge of Branch 30, Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City,
since January 30, 1987; that he came to know Thelma Villanueva when she
testified in Sp. Proc. Case No. 852 in a prayer for issuance of a writ of
possession over a parcel of land filed by one Pedro Calara, Jr.; that he issued
the writ prayed for. Respondent Judge
further testified that he, in his effort to settle the parties’ differences, as
per request of Deputy Sheriff Leonardo Ho, tried to mediate in order to help
them settle for the purchase price (tsn, p. 5, Aug. 30, 1993). He likewise testified that it was
complainant Thelma Villanueva who voluntarily offered to pay Pedro Calara the
amount of P200,000.00 cash and to pay the balance in P150,000.00 in postdated
checks (tsn, p. 6, Aug. 30, 1993). Another case was filed by the complainant against Pedro Calara, Jr.,
before the Branch of respondent Judge, where the complainant moved for
respondent’s inhibition, which motion he granted. Respondent Judge vehemently denied that he demanded money from
the complainants.
x x x x
From the testimonies and documentary evidence adduced by both
parties, and considering their (sic) demeanor of the parties during the hearings,
this Court concludes that there was indeed a color of truth in the
complaint. The complainants are simple
and ordinary people, who prefer to live a simple life than engage themselves in
complicated and perplexed lives. And
should they become part of complexed court battles, it is not of their own
choosing but because of circumstances. It may not be amiss to stress that ‘the courts exist to promote justice;
and thus to aid in securing the contentment and happiness of the people. Their administration should be speedy and
careful. Every judge should at all
times be alert in his rulings and in the conduct of the business of his court
so far as he can, to make it useful to litigants and to the community. He should avoid unconsciously falling into
the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts instead of the
courts for the litigants.’ (Adm. Order No. 162, Canons of Judicial
Ethics). The complainants failed to get
the justice they are requesting from the respondent Judge for their failure to
deliver the amount asked of them.
Hence, the complainants’ allegation that the respondent Judge
demanded from them money when they were trying to seek his assistance in
amicably settling their case and which demand, when not met by them resulted to
their eviction from the premises, is meritorious and credible. It is well-settled rule that ‘acts of the
respondent judge of demanding x x x money from a party-litigant before his
court constitute serious misconduct in office’ (Office of the Court Administrator
vs. Gaticales, 208 SCRA 508). Likewise,
under the Canons of Judicial Ethics, ‘a judge’s official conduct should be free
from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon
the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday
life, should be beyond reproach.’
Finding
respondent judge guilty of the charge, the Investigating Justice
recommended his suspension for one (1) month without pay with admonition and
reprimand.[8]
The Investigating Justice is correct in finding respondent judge
guilty of the charge. As judge,
respondent knows fully well that he should avoid such actions as would subject
him to suspicion of interest in a case in his court. Yet, he threw all caution to the winds, so to speak, and left
nothing but telltale evidence of his guilt.
The active mediation of respondent judge in Sp. Proc. No. 852
allegedly to settle the differences between complainants and Pedro Calara, Jr.,
was highly questionable. Firstly, the
mediation was initiated not by the parties themselves nor their lawyers but by
respondent’s sheriffs, Leonardo Ho and Regalado Aranguren, whose words were
heavily relied upon by respondent.[9] Secondly, the meetings were unrecorded and
unattended by counsel of the parties.[10]
Respondent’s excuse that “in the (p)rovince, we mediate the differences of
the parties, especially at that particular time the parties have (sic) no
counsel,” is faulty and unacceptable practice. Unless a judge is conducting a pre-trial under Rules 20 and 118,
his role in the administration of justice is to decide contentious cases with
finality. In the absence of their
lawyers, a judge ought not to meddle in issues confronting the parties even on
the pretext of settling their cases. For to do so would compromise the integrity of his office which he is
mandated to uphold.[11] Once more, judges are strongly reminded that
the office of a judge is a public office and, as such, it is a public trust.[12] A judicial office demands that the incumbent
should conduct himself in such a manner as to merit the respect, reverence and
confidence of the people.[13]
Respondent’s defense that the parties have no lawyers fails to
convince us. We gather from his
testimonies that he intended to see the parties, alone, thus –
Justice Somera:
Q During
the first meeting you said the parties were not represented by counsel then
there was a request for a first meeting with you by the parties.
A They
have no more lawyers at that time, Your Honor.
Q But
they were represented by a lawyer during the hearing?
A During
the hearing.
Q Why
did you not require Calara to bring with him his counsel?
A Because
I do not have time to talk to Calara, Your Honor.
Q When
Villanueva and Capuno appeared before you during the hearing of the petition
for issuance of the writ of possession, were they also represented by counsel?
A Yes,
Your Honor.
Q During
this first meeting, why did you not require the lawyers to appear before you
for the arrangement?
A The
lawyer of the Capunos withdrew as counsel, Your Honor.
Q Why
did you not advise them to get another counsel?
A According to my Sheriff, I told my sheriff ‘I want their counsels to
be present’ my lawyer (sheriff) told me
‘ayaw na ho wala na raw silang abogado dahil wala na daw silang pambayad.'”
Q Who
was always in contact with Capuno and Villanueva?
A My
Sheriff, Your Honor.[14]
Yet, respondent in his earlier testimony revealed that
complainant had a lawyer –
Justice Somera:
Q After
they (complainants) left, did you have any occasion to meet them either Calara
or Rizalia Capuno and her daughter, Thelma Villanueva, altogether?
A There
was a hearing of a motion to dismiss that is the time I realized a new case was
filed by the complainants mother and daughter. In that hearing, the Calaras were absent, Rizalia Capuno was absent but
Thelma Villanueva was present.
Q Before whom?
A Before
me, Your Honor. I talk(ed) to Thelma
asking her was it not that you are the same person who failed to meet the other
party? She answered in the affirmative,
I ask(ed) her what is your pleasure now? Shall we wait for the Calaras because she has a motion to dismiss and to
talk it over with the spouses and she reply (sic) that she will just consult
her lawyer and ask for time to file opposition.[15]
Significantly, the rendezvous between respondent and complainants
took place in his chambers without the attendance of his staff. Considering that there was still the
question as to whether complainants could come up with the repurchase price of
the lot, the meetings conducted inside the chambers of respondent were uncalled
for. We have cautioned judges to avoid
in-chambers sessions without the other party and his counsel present, and to
observe prudence at all times in their conduct to the end that they not only
act impartially and with propriety but are also perceived to be impartial and
proper.[16]
Further, respondent judge insists on his good intention to help
the parties agree on the repurchase price of the lot. But, we find that his meetings were always with complainants and
not once did Pedro Calara, Jr., participate therein. Such situation gives us the impression that Pedro Calara, Jr.,
did not have any notion at all of these conferences. This suspicion is bolstered by (a) respondent’s testimony[17]
that “x x x I likewise told them (complainants) that according to my sheriff
they have been promising cash to Calara and further told them that if they have
cash they have to bring it during an arranged meeting to Calara and show
the money to Calara so that they will know they are negotiating in good
faith.” His statement clearly signified that he had not as yet set up an
appointment with Calara, Jr., and, (b) the contradictory stand among respondent
judge and his witnesses regarding the presence of Pedro Calara, Jr., in the
alleged conferences of the parties.
In his “Sinumpaang Salaysay” dated 16 February 1993,
Sheriff Regalado M. Aranguren confirmed the presence of Calara, Jr., in all the
conferences.[18] He stated that “(n)a sa lahat
ng beses ng conferencia ay palaging dumarating si Pedro Calara, Jr., at laging
naghihintay kay Thelma Capuno.” For his part, Sheriff Leonardo L. Ho,
in his “Sinumpaang Salaysay” dated 15 February 1993,[19]
declared that “(a)t nang malaman ng mga naghabla ang kahilingan
ng mga Capunos tungkol sa pagbaba ng presyo ng bilihan, ako ay pinakiusapan ng
mga naghahabla na sabihin sa mga Capunos na sila ay magkita sa hukuman para sa
isang conferencia upang mapagusapan ang tungkol sa presyo ng bilihang
mabibiling muli; (n)a, hindi nakatupad ang mga Capunos sa una nilang tipanan
kung kaya ang conferencia ay nakansela,” thus implying that Calara,
Jr., was present during the first meeting. However, respondent judge rebutted these statements when he testified
that nobody appeared in both meetings except complainants who came two days
after the appointed date of the second meeting.[20]
Admittedly, the amount of P350,000.00 was the subject of
conversation between respondent judge and the complainant Thelma
Villanueva. Respondent judge denies
that he demanded such sum but that complainant volunteered the information that
she had a checking account and that she was ready to pay P200,000.00 in cash
and the balance of P150,000.00 in postdated checks.[21]
He asserts that he could not have demanded money from complainants as they did
not strike him as moneyed.[22]
We note with interest that respondent then had a contrary opinion
about the economic condition of complainants. He unwittingly disclosed in his comment that “[f]or whatever it is
worth, according to reliable sources, Thelma Villanueva was given by her sister
abroad to pay the repurchase price of the Calaras; that Thelma Villanueva used
the money instead in constructing her own house x x x x”[23]
The reliable sources referred to were none other than his sheriff and the
latter’s wife. According to Sheriff
Aranguren, “[h]abang ang kaso ay nabibinbin pa sa hukuman hanggang sa
ito ay natapos na, si Thelma Capuno (Villanueva) ay palagi pa ring pumupunta sa
aking upisina upang siya ay bigyan pa ng kaunting panahon dahilan sa iniintay
pa lanq niya ang peranq padala ng
kanyang kapatid na nasa America. Sinabi
pa rin niya na may hinihintay pa ring pera siya galing sa kanyang asawa na sabi
niya ay hindi nagtatrabaho sa San Pablo.“[24] Concepcion L. Aranguren, utility worker
assigned to respondent’s court, supported her husband’s statement by saying
that “x x x Siya (Thelma Villanueva) ay umiiyak habang nakikipagusap na
kung maari daw ay bigyan siya
ng palugit dahil may dadatinq daw siyang pera galing sa kanyang kapatid sa
Amerika.”[25] With such information, it is not farfetched for respondent judge
to demand money from complainant. Evidently, he was led by his sources to believe that complainant had the
money to buy back the property from the Calaras.
Verily, the act of respondent in meeting with complainants
without the presence of counsel and warning them not to tell anyone, and
demanding money under the guise of forging peace between her and Pedro Calara,
Jr., constitutes grave misconduct. Additionally, his failure to uphold the integrity of the judiciary has
undoubtedly diminished the faith of our people in the administration of
justice. Given these serious
indiscretions, a more severe penalty than one (1) month suspension without pay
should be imposed. A judge who
established a common fund purportedly for his low income employees and who
himself together with his employees solicited contributions from litigants and
visitors for such fund was dismissed from the service.[26] We can do no less in this case.
II. Adm.
Matter No. RTJ-93-959
This administrative complaint seeks to subject respondent judge
to disciplinary action or to dismissal from office for violation of: (1) Sec. 3, pars. (b), (c) and (j) of R.A.
No. 3019, (2) Sec. 7, pars. (a) and (d) of R.A. No. 6713, and, (3) Arts. 206 and
210 of The Revised Penal Code.
Complainant Celia E. Pampolina, President of PSM Development
Corporation and the duly designated and appointed Executrix of the Last Will
and Testament of Pastor S. Marino, alleges that on 6 April 1992, a decision was
rendered by respondent judge dismissing Sp. Proc. No. 849(92), “IN THE
MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF PASTOR S. MARINO,” for lack of merit; that during the pendency of
the case, respondent ordered Jesus Azores, nephew of Pastor S. Marino, to
surrender, among other properties, a Mitsubishi
Galant Super Saloon car to the court; that after the car had been surrendered
to the court, respondent requested complainant and the Board of the PSM
Corporation to issue a resolution to have the luxury car at his disposal during
weekends and to use it as he pleased; that the corporation appropriated the sum
of P10,000.00 to pay for the reconditioning, adjustment and tune-up of the
engine of the car; that respondent had the custody of the car from April 1992
to 5 May 1993; that he also demanded and received food, money, valuable
properties (jewelries) from complainant and her grandfather, the late Pastor S.
Marino; that further, respondent judge requested favors from complainant in
securing an exemption from the Gun Ban during the election period; that, in
this regard, respondent called up complainant using the name “E.
Pilapil” and further extorted money; that, upon the death of Pastor S.
Marino, complainant filed a “Petition for the Probate of the Will of the Late Pastor S. Marino,”
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 859 (92); that the petition was raffled to the
respondent’s sala; that one of the basic issues raised in the petition was the
mental capacity and the sound disposition of the testator; that this issue was
already passed upon by respondent judge
in Sp. Proc. No. 849 (92); that during the pendency of the probate proceeding,
respondent judge called the parties to a conference at Roño’s Place, a public restaurant in San Pablo City; that
the meeting started at eight o’clock in the evening and lasted until
midnight; that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss possible settlement of
the probate case; that shares and other properties were discussed except the
car; that respondent intentionally omitted to include the car in the list of
properties which he himself prepared so he could still make use of the car;
that despite the fact that complainant was named executrix in the will,
respondent appointed Rosevelinda Calingasan and Antonio Azcarate as joint
special administrators; that such order was issued without notice and hearing;
that her motion for reconsideration on this ground was denied; that, shortly
after, respondent judge ordered complainant to produce stock certificates in
the name of the late Pastor S. Marino, the books of the corporation, and other
papers; that she moved for reconsideration of this order but the same was
denied; that the joint special administrators filed a motion to cite
complainant in contempt for her refusal to obey the order of respondent; that
in view of the insistence of the respondent to continue hearing the probate
proceedings, complainant moved for the inhibition of respondent judge; that
respondent threatened to cite complainant in contempt because of her statement
that respondent had custody, possession and enjoyment of the luxury car of the
corporation; that he set the hearing for the contempt proceeding on 29 January
1993 at eight-thirty in the morning; and, that as a result, complainant filed
with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari.
In his answer, respondent submits that complainant has no valid
cause of action against him. He
explains that the car was in the possession of the court, although on few
occasions, he drove it merely to inflate the tires or to recharge the
battery. The car also needed minor
repairs and the expenses were paid for by the corporation which appropriated
P10,000.00 for the purpose. However, he
insists, there was no instance that he demanded money, food or valuables from complainant.
With regard to the telephone call using the name “E.
Pilapil,” respondent claims that he wanted to be discreet with his calls.[27]
He only wanted to get the names of the two (2) persons whom complainant
mentioned earlier who could help him secure exemption from the Gun Ban. He never called up complainant to extort
money. He got the exemption on his own efforts. Besides, complainant also used “E.
Pilapil” when she called him up at his residence.
Lastly, respondent contends that his orders in the probate
proceedings were just and properly issued without bias. He admits that he set the pre-trial
conference of the probate proceedings at Roño’s Place because it was the site
selected by the parties.
On 8 July 1993, after due investigation, Deputy Court
Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez submitted his report –
The complaint is an aftermath of the adverse Orders dated November
27, 1992, December 22, 1992 and January 25, 1993 issued by respondent Judge
against Celia Pampolina relative to SP 859(92) In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Pastor S. Marino,
appointing Antonio Azcarate and Rosevelinda Calingasan as Joint Special
Administrators instead of the named executrix in the will which (sic) is the
complainant herein.
Most of the issues raised by complainant in this administrative
complaint are the very errors assigned by complainant in her petition filed
before the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. 30073 entitled ‘PSM
Corporation and Celia Pampolina vs. Hon. Judge Ausberto Jaramillo (in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, San Pablo City). (Rollo, pp. 35-57) Thus, the undersigned cannot properly rule on
complainant’s assertions that respondent herein knowingly rendered an unjust
interlocutory order because of the case being sub judice on
appeal.
x x x x
However, in A.M. No. RTJ-92-859 (Natividad Calauan Uy, et al. vs.
Judge Florentino M. Alumbre, Assisting Judge, RTC, Las Piñas, Metro Manila),
respondent Judge Alumbre was imposed a FINE of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00)
for appointing a special administrator without a hearing.
Admittedly, however, there were mistakes or omissions in the acts
of respondent Judge in his handling of some incidents in the case. One mistake he made was conducting a
pre-trial conference of SP 859 (92) at the Roño’s place, a public place (Restaurant),
rather than inside his chambers and/or the Courtroom. While the Rules of Court does not specifically provide for the
venue of pre-trial conferences, propriety demands that it should be confined
within the four (4) walls of his sala to avoid impropriety and appearance of
impropriety in all his activities (Iglesia ni Kristo vs. Judge Geronilla, July
25, 1981 and Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Code of Judicial Conduct).
Strangely, likewise, is (sic) the actuations of respondent in the
matter of the custody of the Super Saloon Car. He has demeaned himself and compromised his position as a Judge when he
obligated upon himself the recharging of its batteries and the inflating of its
tires.
Thus, it is difficult to conceive how a Judge would willingly go
out of his way to recharge the batteries and inflate the tires of a vehicle in custodia legis by driving the car
himself to the battery shop unless there is that intent on his part to use the
car.
Against the testimonies of his witnesses, there is no doubt that
indeed he used the car if not on all occasions that he went home to Parañaque
where he resides coming from his Court in San Pablo but at least on some
occasions.
The appearance in the glove compartment of the car receipt of a
beauty parlor located within the vicinity of their house admittedly patronized
by the wife of the respondent is a glaring proof that the car must have been
used and operated by the respondent.
Regardless of whether the same was used in his official capacity,
his motive could still be misinterpreted; and, in the course of events, his
actuations would come in conflict with the impartial performance of his
official duties. In Adm. Matter No.
690-CFI entitled ‘Benito B. Nate vs. Hon. Enrique A. Agana, Sr., et. al.’ (91
SCRA 1) the Honorable Court there ruled that it is misconduct for a judge to
use a car that it levied in execution by virtue of an order issued by him and
was censured and admonished. In his
separate opinion, however, then Justice Claudio Teehankee recommended that the
commensurate penalty should be six (6) months suspension considering the great
responsibility and trust vested in respondent. Justice Herrera, on her part, recommended three months suspension. However, in the case of Nate, the judge
intended to acquire ownership of the car. This does not appear to be the case here.
Likewise, another aspect which is highly questionable is the use of
respondent Judge of an alias ‘E. Pilapil’. If indeed there were no shady deals/transactions between complainant and respondent, why
was there a necessity to use an alias in their telephone conversations and/or
why would there be a need for a Judge to talk over the phone to a party who had
a pending case before him.
The charges of bribery, violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, despite the vehemence of complainant’s language, have not been
proven satisfactorily, there is no clear showing and/or proof that indeed
respondent Judge demanded and/or received money, jewelries and food from the
complainant.
The claim of complainant that respondent Judge demanded and
received money and jewelries from her is not supported by independent
testimonies and documents. In an
apparent effort to mislead this Office into believing her theory, complainant
resorted to annexing various documents, which if taken separately will
definitely lead into a different conclusion. One concrete example is her diary in which she allegedly recorded all
her transactions such as appointments, telephone calls, withdrawals from the
bank, collections and every minute details that transpired in her life, yet
the demand for Two Million Pesos (P2,000.000.00) was never recorded nor was
the delivery of the advance two hundred fifty thousand pesos (P250,000.00)
likewise recorded. When confronted on
the matter, she merely gave the excuse that the demand was almost everyday,
hence, there was no need to record the same. Likewise, the alleged delivery of the jewelries was made on April 26,
1992 but the unofficial receipt x x x was issued only on July 20, 1992 or only
after three (3) months.
Administrative charge against a judge is highly penal in
nature. Such charge must therefore be
proved beyond reasonable doubt, otherwise, the charge will be dismissed (Adm.
Case No. 270-J, Enriquez vs. Araulla, in re: Horellano, 43 Phil. 212).[28]
On the basis of his foregoing findings, Deputy Court
Administrator Suarez recommends that: (1) the charge for knowingly rendering an unjust order/decision be DISMISSED
for having been prematurely filed; (2) the charge for bribery, violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices act be likewise DISMISSED for lack of factual
evidence; and, (3) respondent judge be found guilty for the use of the car
while in custodia legis and for the issuance of an order appointing
Special Administrators without notice to the parties, submitting the
appropriate penalty however to the discretion of the Court.
We do not fully subscribe to the foregoing recommendations. Respondent judge cannot be made
administratively liable for issuing the order appointing the special
administrators. On 13 July 1993, the
Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing complainant’s petition for certiorari
but at the same time granting her plea for the inhibition of respondent judge
from hearing the probate case. We agree
that while there was no notice of the hearing for the appointment of the
special administrators, petitioner (complainant) was nevertheless heard on her
motion for reconsideration of the appointment of the special administrators;
and, that what the law prohibits is not the absence of notice but absolute
absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard. However, the Court of Appeals ruled that considering that
respondent judge admitted using the car, he should have immediately inhibited
himself once his objectivity and impartiality were put in question by
petitioner (complainant) in line with Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.[29]
While respondent judge may not necessarily be held
administratively liable for issuing the orders complained of, he certainly is
accountable for violating Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and of
committing a corrupt practice under Sec. 7, par. (d), of R.A. No. 6713.
The records sufficiently establish that during the guardianship
proceedings, respondent judge had no qualms in taking advantage of the
authority granted by complainant and the Board of Directors of PSM Development
Corporation for him to use the Mitsubishi Galant Super Saloon on weekends or as
he pleased.[30]
This fact alone would have already raised valid speculations about his
objectivity in acting on the guardianship proceedings. Yet, he did nothing to apprise complainant
and the Board about the impropriety of accepting the favor.[31]
Nor did he require them to forthwith withdraw the authority granted him.[32]
Undeniably, his free use of the car during and after the pendency of the
guardianship proceedings for over a year constituted a corrupt practice under
Sec 7, par. (d), of R.A. 6713,[33]
i.e., acceptance by a public officer of a favor from any person in the course
of his official duty.
Respondent judge did not only
exhibit a personal interest in the
vehicle but also accepted the offer to use it. In fact, by his own admission, he drove it several times. In the conference held at Roño’s Place,
respondent judge purposely omitted the car in the list of properties belonging
to the estate of Pastor S. Marino. We
are not persuaded by his argument that the car was not part of the decedent’s
estate. His later testimony revealed
that the parties then desired to include all properties even those which
supposedly belonged to the deceased but deeded to the corporation.[34]
The car was one such property, but respondent never volunteered its inclusion. He justified his omission by saying that the
car was not mentioned in the discussion. Understandably, no one dared to do so as they were fully aware that
respondent was in possession and enjoying the use of the car. Besides, he should have been the one to call
the attention of the parties
about the existence of the vehicle as belonging to the estate. Obviously, he did not want to part with the
vehicle.
Respondent judge even personally supervised the maintenance of
the car beyond what the duties of his office would call for. He had the scratches of the car repainted,
the tires inflated and the battery recharged six (6) times. All the expenses for the reconditioning,
adjustment and tune-up, repainting and battery recharging were charged against
the P10,000.00 appropriated by the Board of Directors of PSM Development
Corporation.[35]
The records do not however disclose who kept the P10,000.00. Neither was there any accounting of the
expenses nor any statement made on the amount left of the P10,000.00. Considering the extra pains taken by
respondent in the upkeep of the car, the possibility that the P10,000.00 was in
his possession is not remote. Respondent’s conduct in this regard cannot be any different from that of
a judge who was removed from office because of manifest interest in a vehicle in
custodia legis by spending for its repairs and thereafter using it for her
benefit and convenience.[36]
Another reprehensible conduct of respondent which distresses us
was his availment of the battery recharging service of Cortes Battery Shop free
of charge.[37]
In so doing, respondent compromised his exalted position as a judge. It bears repeating that integrity in a
judicial office is more than a virtue; it is a necessity. We dismissed a judge who not only had the seats
of his “Lite Ace” van repaired but also received new seat covers both
for free from a litigant.[38]
Likewise, we terminated the services of a judge upon finding that he accepted
the benefit of riding regularly in Sarkies Tour Buses free of charge.[39]
Hence, the role of the judiciary in bringing justice to
conflicting interests in society cannot be overemphasized. As the visible representation of law and
justice, judges are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that would
enhance the respect and confidence of our people in the judicial system. They are particularly mandated not only to
uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary but also to avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in their actions.[40]
For judges sit as the embodiment of the people’s sense of justice, their last
recourse where all other institutions have failed.[41]
Sadly, respondent judge carelessly disregarded these stringent judicial
norms. Worse, his acceptance of the
Galant Super Saloon for his personal use and convenience as well as his evident
personal interest in it have defiled the “public trust” character of
the judicial office. These serious
transgressions cannot be countenanced. By his actions, respondent has clearly demonstrated his difficulty and
inability to keep up with the conduct required of judges. Consequently, he should not be permitted to
stay a minute longer in office. We have
repeatedly held that there is no place in the judiciary for those who cannot
meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity.[42]
WHEREFORE, for his gross misconduct and violation of Canon
1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct in A.M. No. RTJ-93-944, and his violation of
Sec. 7, par. (d), of R.A. 6713, and Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct in A.M. No. RTJ-93-959, respondent JUDGE AUSBERTO JARAMILLO, JR.,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, San Pablo City, is DISMISSED from the service
with prejudice to reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits and privileges, if any. This
dismissal shall be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado,
Davide Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, and Kapunan JJ., concur.
Mendoza, J., no part.
[1]
Resolution dated 16 June 1993, First Division, Rollo, A.M. No.
RTJ-93-944, p. 42.
[2]
Resolution dated 10 March 1993, First Division, Rollo, A.M. No.
RTJ-93-959, Vol. I.
[3]
Id.
[4]
Resolution dated 27 October 1993, First Division, Rollo, A.M. No.
RTJ-93-959, Vol. IV.
[5]
Resolution dated 20 June 1994, these administrative cases were referred by the
First Division to the Court En Banc.
[6]
Rollo, A.M. No. RTJ-93-944,
p. 3.
[7]
Id., pp. 21, 27-31.
[8]
Id.
[9]
TSN, 30 August 1993, p. 4.
[10]
TSN, 2 August 1993, pp. 4-5.
[11]
Canon 1, Code of Judicial Conduct.
[12]
Concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Padilla in De Julio v. Vega, A.M.
No. RTJ-89-406, 18 July 1991, 199 SCRA 315, 319.
[13] Veronica v. Son, A.M. No. MTJ-90-436,
17 October 1991, En Banc, Min. Res.
[14]
TSN, 30 August 1993, pp. 9-10.
[15]
Ibid., p. 7.
[16]
See Bibon v. David, A.M. No. MTJ-87-67,
24 March 1988, En Banc, Min. Res.
[17]
TSN, 30 August 1993, p. 7.
[18]
A.M. No. RTJ-93-944, Rollo, p. 13.
[19]
Ibid., p. 16.
[20]
TSN, 30 August 1993, pp. 5-6.
[21]
Ibid., p. 6.
[22]
A.M. No. RTJ-93-944, Rollo, p. 29.
[23]
Ibid., p. 30.
[24]
Ibid., p. 33.
[25]
Ibid., p. 35.
[26]
Garciano v. Sebastian, A.M. No. MTJ-88-160; Lopez v. Sebastian, A.M. No. MTJ-88-244; Vivar v. Sebastian, A.M. No. MTJ-89-322; Lopez v. Sebastian, A.M. No. MTJ-89-344; Gavia v. Sebastian, A.M. No. MTJ-90-416; Office of the Court Administrator v. Sebastian, A.M. No. MTJ-92-661; Administrative Complaint of MeTC Personnel,
Br. 78, Parañaque v. Sebastian,
A.M. No. MTJ-89-4-371, all promulgated on 30 March 1994.
[27]
TSN, 24 May 1993, p. 46.
[28]
A.M. No. RTJ-93-959, Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 985-1004.
[29]
Ibid., Vol. IV.
[30]
A.M. No. RTJ-93-959, Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 860-A and 860-B.
[31]
TSN, 24 May 1993, p. 6.
[32]
Ibid.
[33]
An Act Establishing A Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees to
Uphold the Time?Honored Principle of Public Office Being a Public
Trust, Granting Incentives and Rewards for Exemplary Service, Enumerating
Prohibited Acts and Transactions and Providing Penalties for Violation Thereof
and for Other Purposes.
[34]
TSN, 24 May 1993, p. 56.
[35]
RTJ-93-959, Rollo, p. 32.
[36]
Arcenio v. Pagorogon, A.M. MTJ-89-270, and Office of the Court
Administrator v. Pagorogon, A.M. No. MTJ-92-637, both promulgated 5 July
1993.
[37]
TSN, 24 May 1993, p. 41.
[38]
Ompoc v. Torres, A.M. No. MTJ-86-111, 27 September
1989, 178 SCRA 14.
[39]
Felongco v. Dictado, A.M. No. RTJ-86-50; Lapak v. Dictado, A.M.
No. RTJ-88-222; Ang v. Dictado, A.M. No. RTJ-88-224; Jerez v. Dictado,
A.M. No. RTJ-89-320; and, Ropeta v. Dictado, A.M. No. RTJ-89-389, all
promulgated 28 June 1993.
[40]
Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 2.01, Canon 2, Code of Judicial Conduct.
[41]
Office of the Court Administrator v. Bartolome, A.M. No. RTJ-90-446; Medina
v. Bartolome, A.M. No. RTJ-90-494; Office of the Court Administrator v.
Bartolome, A.M. No. RTC-90-504; Ramon Tulfo’s Column “On
Target,” A.M. No. RTC-90-1-021; and Letter Request dated 24
July 1990 of Provincial Governor Leonardo B. Roman, Bataan, seeking the
transfer of Judge Jose T. Bartolome to another station, A.M. No. RTC-90-8-1909,
all promulgated 7 November 1991, 203 SCRA 328.
[42]
Vistan v. Nicolas, A.M.
No. MTJ-87-79 and A.C. No. 3040, both promulgated 13 September 1991, 201 SCRA
524.